From Deployment to Debriefing: Introducing the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Model of Hostage and

Crisis Negotiation

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Abstract

Hostage and crisis negotiation is one tactical option available to incident commanders when responding to critical incidents. Whilst several models of negotiation exist, there is limited research addressing negotiation from a United Kingdom perspective. This paper presents findings from semi-structured interviews with 15 negotiators from nine police forces in England. Data were analysed using grounded theory and 6 primary, 11 secondary, 19 tertiary, and 23 quaternary categories were identified to depict the procedural, operational and communicational aspects of negotiation. Findings indicate that negotiation takes place sequentially in three stages, with the core aspects being conceptualised using the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. mnemonic: 1) **_D_**eployment; 2) **_I_**nformation and intelligence gathering; 3) **_A_**ssessment of risk and threat; 4) **_M_**ethods of communication; 5) **_O_**pen dialogue with subject; 6) **_N_**egotiator toolbox and repertoire, and 7) **_D_**ebriefing procedures. The model represents the first attempt at modelling negotiation from an Anglo-centric perspective and provides insight into the entire critical incident management process, as opposed to focusing solely on the aspect of communication between negotiator and subject that has historically dominated the literature. The model highlights the breadth and complexity of the negotiator role and enables several recommendations to be made in relation to training and operational support of negotiators.

Keywords: hostage negotiation, crisis negotiation, police negotiation, conflict resolution, crisis communication

Introduction

Hostage and crisis negotiation (HCN) is one of many tactical options available to incident commanders when responding to a hostage or crisis incident. HCN has been used by the police since the 1970s, with the United States of America (USA) pioneering the development of hostage and crisis negotiator (hereafter "negotiator") teams within police departments (Fuselier, 1981a). Since the implementation of the "negotiate first policy" (Bolz, 1979), HCN has evolved and become more advanced and widespread internationally, with most police departments having at least some officers trained as negotiators. HCN as a police tool is well-established, with both anecdotal and empirical evidence attesting to its efficacy (Flood, 2003; McMains & Mullins, 2001; Rogan, Hammer, & Van Zandt, 1997).

Numerous models have been developed to aid our understanding of the HCN process and subsequently used as training or operational support tools. These models vary in focus, scope and complexity and can broadly be categorised into 1) bargaining (business) negotiation models, 2) expressive models of HCN, and 3) communicative or discourse models of HCN (see Table 1).

[Insert Table 1 Here]

The first category includes the principled negotiation model (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991); the getting past no model of negotiation (Ury, 1991), and the crisis bargaining model of negotiation (Donohue, Kaufmann, Smith, & Ramesh, 1991). These models were developed within the general (i.e. business) negotiation arena but framed negotiation in a context of both parties' interests being fulfilled (i.e. the interest-based approach), as opposed to one party being the "winner" and the other, the "loser" (i.e. the position-based approach). These models did achieve some early success when applied to HCN contexts, particularly in the absence of more HCN-specific models of negotiation, however, they have been criticised for not considering

the mind-set of the subjects involved when negotiating in a hostage or crisis context (Grubb, 2010). These early models, for example, tended to have a normative (i.e. integrative) focus, whereby there is an expectation that the subject will be able to engage in problem solving in a pragmatic, calm, and rational manner (which is often not the case when someone is experiencing a state of conflict or crisis).

The second category includes Call's (2003, 2008) interpretation of crisis negotiation; McMains & Mullins' (2001) stages of a crisis model; the STEPS model (Kelln & McMurtry, 2007); the four-phase model of hostage negotiation (Madrigal, Bowman, & McClain, 2009); the Behavioral Change Stairway Model (BCSM) (Vecchi, Van Hasselt, & Romano, 2005); and the Behavioral Influence Stairway Model (BISM) (Van Hasselt, Romano, & Vecchi, 2008; Vecchi, 2009; Vecchi et al., 2005). These models were developed with a contextual backdrop of the behavioural and emotional parameters involved in hostage or crisis scenarios, and as such, tend to identify the need to address crisis (i.e. distributive) needs in addition to addressing normative (i.e. integrative) needs. The assertion is that crisis (i.e. typically relational) issues need to be addressed prior to attempting to deal with substantive needs or specific demands, suggesting that forming a relationship between the negotiator and subject is a precursor to being able to deal with more substantive issues and engage in rational problem-solving. The models also highlight the importance of de-escalating subject emotional arousal and moving subjects out of conflict or crisis emotional states in order to successfully resolve the incident. Broadly speaking, these models take a more therapeutic approach, with the emphasis being on crisis intervention, de-escalating emotion and building relationships between the two parties, whereas the models in the first category tend to take a more pragmatic and business-orientated approach that may not necessarily meet the emotionally-driven and multi-faceted situational context presented by hostage or crisis incidents.

The third category includes the S.A.F.E. model[i] (Hammer, 2007), and the cylindrical model of crisis communications (Taylor, 2002); both of which are grounded in communication theory and constructs. These models imply that linguistic cues can be used by negotiators and subjects to make sense of the interaction occurring between the two interlocutors. In the case of the S.A.F.E. model, linguistic cues can be used by negotiators to establish and identify the subject's emotional frame of reference and match their interaction accordingly; whereas the cylindrical model is a three-dimensional model that delineates communication behaviour on three levels (i.e. the interaction, motivation and behaviours of negotiators and subjects within the negotiation process) (Taylor, 2002). Both models focus on the communicative process that occurs between the negotiator and subject, with linguistics being used to identify how an interaction may change throughout the course of a negotiation and how negotiators can tailor their communicative approach and behaviour in a manner that is most likely to promote successful resolution.

The USA has undoubtedly paved the way for HCN as a police discipline, with the majority of the aforementioned models having been developed by American researchers or police negotiators. In cases where models have been developed outside of the USA (i.e. the cylindrical model was developed by British academic Paul Taylor), they have often still been developed using American case studies or data, suggesting that the majority of the models in existence are US-centric and may not be directly transferable to other countries. It is possible that the models discussed above relate specifically to the country, society, or culture in which they were developed and, as such, may not be directly applicable cross-culturally. Whilst the existing models provide insight into the HCN process and have served a valuable role in laying the foundations for HCN practice, there is clearly a US-centricity that needs to be acknowledged and there is scope for research to identify practice from a non-US policing context. Research focusing on English HCN, for example, would enable the development of

an Anglo-centric model which could firstly validate and inform negotiator practice but also provide a forum for future cross-cultural comparison.

It is also worth noting that currently, the driving force for many HCN training curriculums, is that of the BCSM (developed by the Crisis Negotiation Unit [CNU] of the Federal Bureau of Investigations [FBI]) and the later-adapted BISM (Van Hasselt et al., 2008; Vecchi, 2009; Vecchi et al., 2005) that was developed by FBI negotiators based on years of operational experience. The BISM has four core tenets which are framed in the form of a stairway that needs to be climbed in order to successfully resolve a crisis incident. The negotiator must first demonstrate empathy (1) for the subject in order to develop a rapport (2) which can then be used to exert influence (3) on the subject to achieve behavioural change (4). The model purports that the negotiator needs to develop a relationship with the subject in order to reach a stage whereby they can influence the subject's behaviour in a positive manner and active listening is used to underpin the relationship building process throughout the crisis incident (Vecchi et al., 2005). Whilst the model has generic applicability and is broad enough to be able to be applied to any crisis or conflict situation, the incidents regularly encountered by negotiators in the USA are not necessarily identical to or representative of the incidents encountered by English negotiators.

There is no research, to date, for example, that validates whether the BCSM and BISM apply to (and are effective in) hostage or crisis incidents occurring in England. It may be that English negotiators, for example, operate differently to negotiators in the USA and that models need to be culturally-specific in order to be effective. Of notable import, is the fact that the majority of the research on HCN has been conducted in the USA and has particular relevance to countries which adhere to the right to bear arms. As a result, research within countries which do not adhere to this right may reveal illuminating comparisons in terms of procedural elements and best practices that are adopted within different countries. In the USA, for example,

negotiators will often try to avoid face-to-face negotiations due to the high level of risk posed by subjects who are likely to have access to firearms (A. Young, personal communication, August 19, 2013), however, this risk is undoubtedly reduced within the UK, due to the tighter restrictions around firearm possession and licensing. This simple legislative difference could potentially, therefore, implicate the existence of differences within the practices utilised by negotiators in different countries. The D.I.A.M.O.N.D. model discussed in this paper, therefore, attempts to address this equivocation by presenting an Anglo-centric model of HCN that has been empirically informed by the experiences of English negotiators.

To the authors' best knowledge, there has been no published empirical research that has identified how negotiators in England operate, or what works in relation to the styles, strategies and techniques utilised. Consequently, it is unclear whether English negotiators operate under the same procedural models and utilise the same communication techniques as negotiators based in other countries. The findings are relevant to the operational practices of negotiators in England and have implications for current training and continuing professional development (CPD) protocols. The aim of this study was, therefore, to provide an insight into English HCN and empirically validate the procedural and communicative methods adopted by negotiators. The current study, therefore, presents an exploratory, descriptive, chronological model of HCN based on the accounts of negotiators from across England. The research questions addressed were: 1) how do negotiators in England operate when deployed to hostage and crisis incidents? 2) How do negotiators resolve hostage and crisis incidents and what are the best practices in relation to HCN in England?

Method

Design

This study utilised a qualitative research design whereby semi-structured interview data were analysed utilising constructivist grounded theory (as directed by Charmaz, 2006).

Participants

Interviewees comprised of a sub-sample of participants who took part in an earlier quantitative study (see Grubb, 2016; Grubb, Brown, and Hall, 2015; Grubb, Brown, and Hall, 2018). Purposive sampling (in the form of maximum variation sampling; Patton, 1990) was used to identify negotiators who were most relevant for the progress of data collection and development of theory (Morse, 2007) and demonstrated a wide range of perspectives (as advocated by Cohen & Crabtree, 2006). Fifteen negotiators were interviewed from nine English police forces with theoretical sampling continuing until saturation of data had been achieved. This included male (n =10) and female (n = 5) officers from both Criminal Investigation Department (CID) ($n = 8$) and uniformed ($n = 7$) roles with a range of experience as negotiators (2-16 years). Two interviewees had completed the regional negotiator training course; thirteen had completed both the national negotiator training course and the red centre (i.e. kidnap and extortion) training course and seven were trained as Hostage Negotiator Coordinators (hereafter "coordinators"). Each interviewee is depicted by an alphanumerical code which represents their interview letter, gender, force number and length of service in months as a negotiator (i.e. A:M:1:156 refers to Interview A; Male; Force 1; and 156 Months of Service as a Negotiator), in order to provide context for the interviewee excerpts.

Measures

Demographic questionnaire. Participants completed a demographic questionnaire which included questions relating to: age, gender, ethnicity, force, rank, current role, length of service as a police officer, negotiator training and qualification levels, length of negotiator service, and number of incidents dealt with as a negotiator.

Semi-structured interview schedule (SSIS). A SSIS was devised by the researchers to address the following areas: 1) recruitment and selection processes; 2) training and CPD; 3)

operational experiences; 4) decision-making processes; 5) strategies, styles and techniques used by negotiators; 6) skills required and utilised during HCN; and 7) support structures and coping strategies utilised following deployment. Exemplar questions included: "can you describe the most recent incident that you have been involved in?"; "what happened?"; "how did you respond?"; "what was the outcome?"; "what are the decision-making processes involved in negotiating crisis incidents?"; "are there any specific strategies, styles or techniques that you use when you are negotiating?"; "if so, what do you feel is the most effective strategy, style or technique?"[ii].

Procedure

Ethical approval was gained from the Coventry University ethics committee and permission was granted by each Force Lead Coordinator. All interviews were carried out at the negotiator's place of work. The interviewer introduced herself and the nature of the research prior to the interview commencing and was cognisant not to lead interviewees in any way throughout (as reinforced by the open-ended nature of the SSIS). The interviews lasted between 45-130 minutes ($M = 87.0$ minutes) and were orthographically transcribed. The transcripts were emailed to each interviewee for veracity verification and sanitisation with specific redactions being made within three of the transcripts to protect the identity of the interviewee.

Analysis

The interview coding was completed by the lead author[iii]. The data were coded manually in line with a grounded theory constructivist framework (Charmaz, 2006). Line-by-line open coding was completed on the entire set of transcripts in chronological order, using highlighters and handwritten comments within the margins to identify relevant concepts. Using the constant comparative method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), and comparing the data across the transcripts, the identified concepts were then further refined into broad level tentative

categories that gave meaning to the data. In parallel, memoing (Flick, 2009; Lempert, 2007) and clustering (Charmaz, 2006; Rico, 1983) techniques were used to identify similar concepts that could be grouped together to form categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This process eventually resulted in a list of 320 concepts[iv] and tentative categories that were then subjected to focused coding whereby more directed, selective and conceptual categories were generated (Glaser, 1978).

Focused coding enabled the 109 initial broad categories or concepts relating to this particular model to be further refined into 6 primary, 11 secondary, 19 tertiary and 23 quaternary categories. Refinement of the categories was achieved by identifying the most significant and frequently occurring concepts and selection of the categories that made the most analytic sense to synopsising the data (Charmaz, 2006). The focused coding process was deemed to be complete once the cross-comparative process performed across the interview transcripts demonstrated saturation of data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Axial coding was used to identify how the categories related to one another in a hierarchical sense and conceptual maps and diagrams were used to help integrate categories and to produce substantive theory (as suggested by Clarke, 2003; 2005).

Results

A model was developed to depict the procedural, operational and communicational aspects of English HCN (see Figure 1). Three of the primary categories, three of the secondary categories and four of the tertiary categories were combined to form core underpinning components or mechanisms within the model (as depicted by vertical and horizontal arrows in Figure 1).

[Insert Figure 1 Here]

During the model development, the authors were cognisant of the fact that the pressurised environmental conditions and parameters that are often encountered by negotiators are likely to make it difficult for the entire model to be recalled during a live deployment. To counteract this, and for the purposes of increasing clinical utility, the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. mnemonic was created to highlight key *procedural* aspects and streamline the overall theoretical model. These key aspects are presented in Figure 2, and are represented by diamond shapes in Figure 1:

- *D*eployment

- *I*nformation and intelligence gathering

- *A*ssessment of risk and threat

- *M*ethods of communication

- *O*pen dialogue with subject

- *N*egotiator toolbox and repertoire to resolve incident

- *D*ebriefing procedures

[Insert Figure 2 Here]

Whilst the indication is that the outlined stages are completed sequentially, there is a recognition that negotiators may have to complete certain tasks at different stages, depending on the context and characteristics of the subject and the incident being responded to.

Stage 1: Initial Negotiator Deployment Tasks

The first stage can be divided into four subcategories that relate to the tasks performed during the initial phase of deployment: 'Information and intelligence gathering', 'Risk and threat assessment and management', 'Scene control, sterilisation and management' and 'Negotiator cell setup'.

Information and intelligence gathering refers to the process of collecting information and constitutes a key role within policing, forming part of the National Decision Model (College of Policing, 2014). Interviewees described the process of collating general *information* about the subject and their mental health history and gathering *intelligence* about the subject's criminal history and engaged in either or both of these processes as necessary. An incident involving a subject who did not have a criminal history, and was not "known to police", for example, would require negotiators to gather information, as opposed to intelligence *per se*. Two tertiary categories emerged as core themes: 'Information and intelligence gathering as immediate' and 'Information and intelligence gathering as a vital component used to inform negotiation strategy'.

     Information and intelligence gathering as immediate. Interviewees described this process with a sense of immediacy and stated that this task began as soon as the initial deployment call had been received. This process involved a variety of different methods that included checking police records, previous negotiator deployment logs, gathering information from call handlers, first responders or witnesses, and speaking to the family and friends of the subject.

> Let's speak to their family, let's speak to their doctors… to find out about what we call intelligence – I'd say it was just information really… I… use those techniques to try and find out as much as possible about the person before engaging with them (B:M:2:195).

Information and intelligence gathering was even carried out by negotiators on the way to the incident: "…usually en route I try to get details about any background on them" (L:M:7:54); attesting to the perceived urgency of this particular task.

Information and intelligence gathering as a vital component used to inform negotiation strategy. All interviewees described this process as vital to establishing context for the incident. The information gathered was then used to directly inform the negotiation strategy utilised when either entering into dialogue with the subject, or during ongoing communication with the subject: "it's about delving into their background to find the buttons to press to actually get them to come down" (D:M:3:63). Examples included identifying: how the subject presented and the situational circumstances around the event; the existence of mental health problems or history of substance abuse; criminal history or outstanding arrest warrants; previous negotiator call out history; conciliatory and aggravating parties; and precipitating factors to the crisis situation. Negotiators also used this information to directly inform risk assessment processes:

> …yes, he could commit suicide… but I think you get a feeling reasonably early on from… his demeanour, his actions, and his comments as to whether or not this is someone who is… actually going to carry out that threat. You obviously look at their criminal past, and all their past, you'll obviously try to find out… from associates or friends or family, has he done this before? (A:M:1:156).

The findings demonstrated an axial link between the information and intelligence gathering and risk assessment categories, with this relationship being represented by a downward-facing vertical connecting arrow between the two categories in Figure 1.

Risk and threat assessment and management[v]. Information and intelligence gathering was described as directly leading into this deployment task and related to all parties involved. Assessment of threat and risk constitutes the second stage within the National Decision Model (College of Policing, 2014) and, as such, negotiators appeared to be implementing this model within the HCN process: "My initial thing is safety of myself, that's

the primary thing.   Safety of other officers… and then… safety of them [subject]…
"(L:M:7:54). Risk assessment was perceived as vital to ensuring safety and was conceptualised
in terms of a prioritised risk assessment of the negotiator, and a continuous dynamic risk
assessment of all parties involved in the incident.

Prioritised assessment of risk to negotiator. HCN often involves working 'at height'
or in precarious positions and whilst negotiators were trying to successfully resolve incidents
and prevent injury or loss of life, their safety was paramount and was always considered as the
primary risk assessment: "You assess it yourself so you don't put yourself at immediate risk"
(N:F:8:34). Some interviewees described the natural desire to get closer to a subject to facilitate
the communication and rapport building process, but they were cognisant that their safety was
always paramount:

> …you can really get drawn into that dialogue, and… put yourself in danger… you get
> that creeping, and you move closer and closer… if you've got someone who's going to
> jump, actually, you don't want them to take you off, as well (J:F:6:110).

*Continuous dynamic risk assessment of negotiator, subject, colleagues and wider
community.* One interviewee described risk as something that he had to "continually reassess"
(A:M:1:156) and another referred to being "constantly aware of your own and their [subject]
safety" (B:M:2:195).

> …the first thing is, is there a threat to life? If so, whose life; how can that be mitigated
> against? …are there any other tactics that the ground commander might want to
> consider to keep the public safe? To keep me safe? To keep his staff safe?
> (G:M:4:123).

Risk was therefore conceptualised as an entity that affected all parties involved, could change
at any point, and needed to be monitored throughout the entirety of the negotiation process.

Scene control, sterilisation and management. This task aligns sympathetically with Poland and McCrystle's (1999) "containment and stabilisation" phase of hostage-taking. Two tertiary subcategories emerged in relation to this category: 'Incident scene control and management' and 'The importance of creating and maintaining a sterile environment'. It is worth noting that these operational tasks were not always performed by negotiators *per se* (i.e. they may be performed by coordinators, incident commanders or police colleagues present at the scene) but were conceptualised as vital components in the wider critical incident management process.

Incident scene control, containment and management. Interviewees referred to having to initially control the scene upon their arrival or having to direct others (i.e. police colleagues) to do this. This activity ensures that the public are safe, that there is no third-party intervention and that subjects are contained within a certain area: "…the police need to close down the immediate area for us to be able to do our bit" (I:M:6:84). Several activities fell under the "scene control umbrella" as outlined in the following extract:

> …you're then having to set up a negotiating scenario… having to set up a sterile environment, and… you… may well be evacuating people… so you're going to look at a physical… sterile zone, in which there will be proper cordoning's; you can look at, in certain situations, getting the assistance of technical support units, and draining certain phones of batteries… (A:M:1:156).

The importance of creating and maintaining a sterile environment was conceptualised as a key component when setting up a negotiator cell and trying to engage with a subject:

> The actual… atmosphere that you're… negotiating in can be a problem. It needs to be kept sterile. I've had negotiations going on where… people… perhaps, who may not

know the individual, but… are fed up with the inconvenience being caused to them, shouting jump or whatever… (D:M:3:63).

The concept of 'sterility' refers to environmental conditions that enable negotiators to complete their role to greatest effect, by ensuring that the subject is only receiving input or dialogue from the negotiator and thereby preventing external influence from bystanders or third parties. One interviewee referred to a lack of sterility (caused by interference from bystanders) as "diluting your efforts" as it was incongruent with the premise of keeping the subject solely focused on the negotiator and what they are saying at all times (A:M:1:156).

Negotiator cell setup.   In line with the national negotiator deployment model (Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO] & National Policing Improvement Agency [NPIA], 2011), negotiators typically set up a negotiator cell once they have arrived at the scene. A full cell consists of a team leader (an experienced negotiator) and four negotiators (Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO] & National Policing Improvement Agency [NPIA], 2011); however, the majority of incidents do not require the implementation of a full cell. For the purposes of the current research, 'negotiator cell' could refer to a scenario which only involves three parties (i.e. the primary and secondary negotiators and a coordinator acting either remotely or at the scene). Two tertiary categories were identified within this category: 'The identification of roles within the negotiator cell' and 'Liaison with bronze[vi] and silver command[vii]'.

Identification of roles within the negotiator cell. Negotiators are typically deployed in pairs, with the intention of adopting the roles of primary (number 1) and secondary (number 2) negotiator. The primary negotiator is the one who engages directly with the subject, whereas the secondary negotiator tends to adopt a supporting or advisory role. Interviewees described having to identify who was going to perform which role during the initial deployment phase:

"…if there's two of us for instance, we decide who is going to lead… who's going to be number two…" (K:M:2:111). This decision was dictated by several factors, including the nature and context of the scenario and a "feeling" for who was best placed to engage with the subject and develop a rapport. In addition, interviewees who were trained as coordinators[viii], described having to identify whether they were going to take on a negotiator role or a coordinator role at this stage in the process.

Liaison with bronze and silver command. The importance of forming an early link between the negotiator cell and the command structure to receive instructions in relation to how the incident was going to be approached and managed was also highlighted:

> …the first thing you usually do is… find out who's in charge… have a word with them, find out what it is they want… what they need and… usually give them some advice about what we're going to do (K:M:2:111).

The decision-making process was described as being removed from the negotiators themselves and firmly placed within the remit of the command structure: "…what does the commander, whether it be silver or whether it be the senior PC on the ground, what do they want from the negotiator?" (J:F:6:110). These excerpts resonate appositely with the "negotiators negotiate and commanders command" concept that is well-known within the HCN arena.

Stage 2: The Negotiation Process and Incident Resolution

The second stage of the model relates to the actual negotiation process whereby the negotiator attempts to resolve the situation by engaging with the subject, employing a variety of strategies and positively facilitating subject behaviour change. Three secondary categories were identified within this stage of the model: 'Engaging with the subject', 'The negotiator toolbox and repertoire' and 'Incident resolution'.

Engaging with the subject was described as the next step once the initial deployment tasks had been completed. Two tertiary categories emerged within this category which included: 'Selection of method of communication media as necessary' and 'Open communication or dialogue with the subject'.

Selection of method of communication media as necessary. Negotiators utilised several methods of communication media including face-to-face dialogue (which was often perceived as the most advantageous and efficacious method), voice-to-voice (i.e. telephone) conversation, text message (SMS), email/internet/social networking websites (SNS) and the use of a megaphone or loudhailer. Decisions were based on the situation in terms of utilising the most appropriate method, an element of personal preference and being directed by the commander in terms of the specific approach required: "…a lot of the time, it's going to be my choice, but depending on the job, it might be an instruction about, this is the way we want it done" (J:F:6:110). Please refer to Table 2 for details of the differing methods of communication utilised.

[Insert Table 2 Here]

Open communication or dialogue with the subject. To identify the reasons behind the situation, negotiators needed to establish communication with the subject and encourage bi-directional dialogue. Interviewees described a typical "default" approach that involved introducing themselves and explaining to the subject that they were "there to help" once the appropriate method of communication had been established. Two key concepts were acknowledged within this category: it is important for negotiators to 'Initiate communication with the subject as soon as possible' and 'Any benevolent communication is better than none'.

Initiate communication with the subject as soon as possible. Interviewees described trying to contact the subject as quickly as possible to limit the risks associated with the critical

period or initial hours of the crisis event; a principle that is corroborated by Miller (2015), who describes the first 15-45 minutes of a hostage crisis as being an especially dangerous period due to confusion and panic being at its peak. Similarly, the "Golden Hour" has been referred to within medical science and crisis management literature, highlighting the importance of acting quickly in order to minimise the potential harm to parties involved (Israel Crisis Management Group, 2016). The situations that negotiators are deployed to can be extremely volatile and as such, they must operate on tight timeframes and initiate communication with the subject quickly in order to minimise risk. This involved contacting the subject via telephone whilst on the way to a scene "…if you're going to a job you need to communicate on the way" (C:F:2:96) or putting a call in "from the kitchen table" (I:M:6:84); with interviewees emphasising the importance of establishing a rapport with the subject quickly, even if this was before they had physically arrived at the scene: "…it was a job that was at the opposite end of the country, but needed to be done by… phone… otherwise you've got an hour of somebody in crisis who just isn't going to get the contact…" (I:M:6:84).

> *Any benevolent communication is better than none.* Interviewees felt that simply engaging in dialogue with the subject early in the process was important, regardless of what was said or who was doing the communicating *per se*: "Just by being there and talking is better than not being there at all... So get in there, start talking, see what you're dealing with" (B:M:2:195). Some described a resistance from non-negotiator trained officers or staff to engage in dialogue prior to the arrival of the negotiators: "…We'll turn up at an incident and nobody's even tried to engage with the person… Because they think, well we're coming and that's their job" (K:M:2:111); however, there was a consensus that it is important to engage in some form of dialogue with the subject as soon as possible, and that any communication (albeit from first responder police officers or call handlers) was better than no communication, as long as this interaction was well-meaning: "I was given a quick briefing by the uniformed officer

who was there, who did his best, he'd obviously done a good job, because he hadn't jumped" (L:M:7:54).

The negotiator toolbox and repertoire. This part of the model relates to the specific skills, tools and strategies used by negotiators to resolve incidents, with these skills being conceptualised as 'the negotiator toolbox', or a repertoire of skills which can be selected during the negotiation process. Two secondary categories were identified within this stage of the model: 'Employment of quasi-therapeutic communication techniques' and 'Use of specific negotiation strategies and techniques'.

Employment of quasi-therapeutic communication techniques. Interviewees described employing several basic therapeutic communication techniques when communicating with subjects. All interviewees emphasised the importance of active listening and adhering to some of the core principles within person-centred counselling. These communication techniques are well-established within the literature and demonstrate a parallel with the principles utilised within psychotherapeutic or counselling settings to form the therapeutic alliance between the therapist (i.e. negotiator) and client (i.e. subject).

Use of active listening principles and techniques was perceived by all interviewees to be a core skill utilised within HCN: "…it's part of your trust building, because it's showing that you're listening to them and you're understanding what's going on with them" (J:F:6:110). This form of listening was described by some as "*effective*" or "*enhanced*" listening but this construct is typically referred to within the literature as "active listening" and refers to a range of multi-purpose communication tools which can be applied to HCN (Call, 2003; Lanceley, 1999; McMains, 2002; McMains & Mullins, 1996; Noesner, 1999; Noesner & Webster, 1997; Slatkin, 1996, 2005). Active listening also implicitly encourages the subject to continue talking and disclose further information, which may benefit negotiators by helping to identify

appropriate conversational focus: ""It's all about active listening... It's trying to understand what's brought them to that position where they're on top of a roof, top of a bridge, whatever, and they're going to jump…" (L:M:7:54). Exemplar techniques include the use of emotional labelling, paraphrasing, reflecting or mirroring, minimal encouragers, silences and pauses, "I" messages, and open-ended questions (Miller, 2005); with interviewees making specific reference to the use of open-ended questions (G:M:4:123); labelling of emotions (J:F:6:110); paraphrasing (M:F:8:24); mirroring (H:F:5:50); and "I" messages[ix] (B:M:2:195).

Use of person-centred therapy principles were demonstrated, with reference to three of the core conditions described by Rogers (1957) as necessary for therapeutic growth and personality change: 'congruence' (the therapist is congruent or integrated in the relationship with the client (Rogers, 1957)); 'unconditional positive regard' (the therapist "experiences a warm acceptance of every aspect of the client's experience" (Rogers, 1959, p. 209)); and 'empathy' (the therapist experiences an empathic understanding of the client's internal frame of reference (Rogers, 1957)). In the context of the current research, the terms 'therapist' and 'client' can be replaced by 'negotiator' and 'subject', respectively, to represent a conceptual version of the client-therapist relationship.

Examples of congruence or authenticity were evidenced by negotiators being prepared to say sorry: "I clearly got that wrong, I'm sorry" (I:M:6:84), an element that is also reflected within Oostinga, Giebels, and Taylor's (2017) work whereby apologising for an error was perceived as an important form of feedback for negotiators; and in personal self-disclosure: "…I'll… disclose something just to try and help things along…" (B:M:2:195). Unconditional positive regard was demonstrated by having a non-judgemental attitude: "…don't judge" (O:F:9:36); and expressing warmth for subjects: "…with rapport, you tend to think of… some sort of warmth…" (J:F:6:110). Interviewees also referred to the importance of being empathic,

thereby reflecting the third principle above: "…being empathetic is a big thing… telling them that you understand…" (L:M:7:54).

Use of specific negotiation strategies and techniques. Interviewees described using a variety of strategies and techniques; with the most commonly utilised techniques being conceptualised as twelve specific strategies (depicted in Table 3). All of the strategies were corroborated by at least five interviewees and are listed in order of the most to least frequently corroborated.

[Insert Table 3 Here]

Incident resolution was the third secondary category within Stage 2 of the model. To successfully resolve the incident, negotiators have to positively influence the way a subject is behaving (i.e. facilitate behavioural change). Interviewees described this part of the process as involving two elements: 'Use of enhanced persuasion techniques' and 'Positive facilitation of subject behavioural change'.

Use of enhanced persuasion techniques. Interviewees referred to using 'enhanced persuasion' to resolve incidents, whereby they 'persuaded', 'convinced' or 'influenced' subjects to change their behaviour in a positive manner: "…he was… tiring and more amenable to… discussion and I persuaded him to turn around, go back and give himself up to the officers, which he did" (D:M:3:63). The use of persuasion or social influence within HCN is well-established, with negotiators being trained to utilise techniques such as Cialdini's (2001) weapons of influence (i.e. reciprocity, scarcity, authority, commitment and consistency, liking, and social proof). Some of the strategies described above tap into these principles, allowing the negotiator to persuade the subject to positively change their behaviour (i.e. the use of *positive police actions* aligns with the "reciprocity" principle and the use of *honesty* aligns with the "commitment and consistency" principle). Similarities can also be drawn between some of

the aforementioned strategies and the concept of "social influence tactics" developed by Giebels (2002), and further discussed by Giebels and Noelanders (2004) and Giebels and Taylor (2010).

Positive facilitation of subject behavioural change. Interviewees described utilising the aforementioned techniques (i.e. use of active listening and person-centred therapy principles) and the underpinning mechanism of rapport building and development of the quasi-therapeutic alliance (discussed below) to get to a point whereby they could exert influence over the subject and facilitate behavioural change in a positive manner: "…so you build up trust, and you can influence the behaviour…" (J:F:6:110). This involved getting the subject to modulate their behaviour in a manner which reduced risk of harm: "…build their confidence, influence their views and get them to do what you want them to do" (D:M:3:63); with this category bearing resemblance to the behavioural influence stage of the BISM (Vecchi et al., 2005).

Liaison with operational teams and subject to orchestrate and execute surrender ritual or exit plan. Once negotiators had positively influenced the subject's behaviour and they had agreed to surrender or exit the situation, interviewees emphasised that complete resolution required further steps. Interviewees described a collaborative system whereby they needed to discuss and mutually agree a surrender ritual[x] or exit plan[xi] with the subject and highlighted the importance of this step to ensure that any potential risk was managed right up to the point where the subject was either in police custody, or safely removed from the crisis situation. The concept of face-saving was also highlighted within this stage of the model, as discussed below.

Discuss and mutually agree surrender ritual or exit plan with subject. This collaborative process often involved logistical aspects, such as ensuring that subjects followed

the appropriate steps specified by the police to minimise potential risk to hostages, victims and police personnel: "…looking at putting in place appropriate plans to deal with certain situations… So, for example, in a siege, how we might deal with a hostage being released safely" (E:M:3:114); or simply planning how an individual-in-crisis was going to get from one position to another without causing injury to themselves: "…eventually he agreed to come down… we had to negotiate how he was going to get down… and… we used a fire service cherry picker, and went up and… and got him" (F:M:4:111). Interviewees described having to liaise with tactical operational teams (i.e. authorised firearms officers (AFOs)) and incident commanders in order to ensure that the surrender ritual or exit plan was executed safely and appropriately and were cognisant that the risk had never been completely neutralised until the exit plan or surrender ritual had been successfully executed.

Allow subject to save face. The concept of 'face-saving' or 'face-honouring' is well-established within the literature and is included as a core tenet within many models of HCN (Hammer, 2007; Madrigal et al., 2009; Mullins, 2002; Taylor, 2002). The term 'face' refers to the projected self-image of the subject and the S.A.F.E. model of negotiation, for example, suggests that negotiators need to validate the face needs of a subject in order to promote face-honouring and de-escalation of the situation (Hammer, 2007). Interviewees described a range of techniques that they utilised as a means of allowing subjects to save face or protect their reputation:

> Sometimes it'll just be a face-saving thing… he's ready to surrender but you don't want to lose face… if I agree to let him have a fag or if I agree that he isn't going to be taken to the ground or… things like that, then he'll come on board (K:M:2:111).

For most subjects, saving face allowed them to maintain some dignity and reduced the embarrassment that may have been caused by the situation, thereby, enhancing the likelihood

of the situation being successfully resolved: "…you're offering them the least embarrassing option out…" (J:F:6:110).

Stage 2 Underpinning Mechanism: Rapport Building and Development of the Quasi-Therapeutic Alliance.

Rapport building or the development of a relationship between the subject and negotiator was described as a vital underpinning component within the negotiation process. This concept shares similarities with the notion of the therapeutic alliance within the counselling and psychotherapeutic literature and the authors perceive the negotiator-subject relationship to exist on a similar, but condensed format to that of the therapist-client relationship. Negotiators have far less time to develop this alliance and must establish such a relationship under intensely pressurised conditions; however, the findings suggest that they utilise the same skills or underpinning mechanisms as counsellors and therapists when developing a therapeutic alliance. Interviewees described two core sub-mechanisms that they utilised to achieve this alliance: 'Express or demonstrate empathy' and 'Establish trust between negotiator and subject'. These components are conceptualised as running in parallel with the processes described in Stage 2 of the procedural model and are represented by downward-facing vertical arrows in Figure 1.

Express or demonstrate empathy. Most interviewees [$n = 10$] described expressing (or at least demonstrating) empathy for the subject, and this was perceived as a vital pre-cursor to developing rapport, with this process being conceptualised as necessary to help the negotiator build trust and be viewed by the subject as genuine and trustworthy: *"…it's part of your… trust building, because it's showing that you are listening to them, and you're understanding what's going on with them"* (J:F:6:110). One interviewee referred to the use of

empathy as means of building a "stairway of trust" (D:M:3:63), and another compared it to "opening an instant can of friendship" (G:M:4:123).

It is worth noting that two interviewees indicated that they found it difficult to empathise with certain subjects due to the context of the crisis situation. One referred to having to deal with "some quite unsympathetic characters" (F:M:4:111), which included individuals who had committed very emotive or serious crimes, and another referred to subjects who they felt were wasting police time (and did not have a genuine intention to harm themselves): "…what you want to do is grab them by the scruff of the neck and, and tell them not to be so stupid… You can't do that. That's not effective. You've got to bite your tongue and… play the game" (D:M:3:63). In these instances, interviewees described an ability to demonstrate (or feign) empathy as opposed to a genuine expression of empathy and this was portrayed as another part of their negotiator repertoire:

> I will be very nice to some people, who are not necessarily… deserving of it… and if that's just… a means to an end, then possibly it is… but I'm not going to get anywhere… not achieving any degree of sympathy, or empathy… with the individual (F:M:4:111).

Establish trust between the negotiator and subject. This component was described by most interviewees [*n* = 12] as a necessary pre-requisite for the development of a rapport and *ergo* the ability to influence the subject's behaviour:

> …negotiation is entirely based on emotions. It's about being able to… build up enough of a rapport to be able to… exert some influence, which in turn would change behaviour… and the only way that you can do that is by building a trusting relationship between the two parties (E:M:3:114).

The building of trust between the two parties was not only perceived as vital for the successful resolution of the current situation but was also considered to be important for potential future scenarios involving the same subject, because if trust had not been established (or had been broken in some way) then the subject would be unlikely to engage with the negotiator(s) again in the future or see them as a credible entity.

Stage 3: Post-Incident Protocol

The third and final stage of the model relates to the procedures carried out by negotiators and wider police personnel once the incident had been resolved and any threat posed to the subject and other parties had been neutralised. This category includes a single secondary category in the form of 'Operational debriefing procedures'.

Operational Debriefing Procedures. Two subcategories or key themes were identified within this category: 'Debriefing as an important component of negotiation' and 'Debriefing as a means of CPD, therapeutic process or welfare check'.

Debriefing as an important component of negotiation. The College of Policing (2013) states that the purpose of debriefing is to "identify good practice and areas for improvement", and the Briefing and Debriefing Policy makes specific recommendations in terms of how police personnel should be debriefed. All interviewees referred to having experienced some form of debriefing, ranging from "hot debriefs" (I:M:6:84) that occurred on scene once the incident had been resolved, to more extended operational debriefs which often occurred as a result of a negative outcome. Interviewees highlighted the importance of debriefing and described a lack of consistent or adequate debriefing, with some recalling incidents whereby 1) debriefing had not been carried out at all, 2) had not been carried out appropriately, and 3) had not involved all necessary parties (resulting in some important information not being shared): "…we *should* have a debrief of the incident. It's rare that we don't, although it's dependent on certain

partners. But sometimes that debrief doesn't quite pick out all the issues… so sometimes we're a bit rubbish at debriefing" (A:M:1:156).

  Debriefing as a means of CPD, therapeutic process or welfare check. Debriefing was also conceptualised as serving multiple purposes. Some interviewees referred to debriefing as a means of CPD, whereby negotiators were able to reflect upon their performances during the incident, to identify mistakes made, or lessons learned and to highlight areas of good practice. Whereas others referred to debriefing in a therapeutic light, whereby it provided a forum to discuss issues that may have been raised, or for coordinators to check that their team members are functioning appropriately and are safe to either go home or continue with their shift: "…the closedown process for me then, which is about extracting my team, bringing them back here, debriefing them… making sure that they're in a fit state to drive home, because their adrenalin… Will have sapped a lot of energy…" (G:M:4:123).

Underpinning Procedural Mechanisms

  In addition to the three stages outlined above, two categories were identified as core underpinning procedural mechanisms within the overall model. These categories included 'Formal record keeping' and 'Defensible decision-making and accountability' (represented by horizontal arrows in Figure 1).

  Underpinning mechanism 1: Formal record keeping [written/electronic/audio]. Interviewees consistently referred to the need for, and importance of formal record keeping: "…recording what we do, showing an audit trail and what we've done and why we've done it…" (K:M2:111) and this was a theme that emerged at all stages of the model. Several methods were described, including the use of written/electronic records or deployment logs, and position papers[xii]. It was also reported as common practice to record the negotiation dialogue using a Dictaphone: "We all have digital recorders… and our routine… pretty much,

is just to record everything" (F:M:4:111); with this process serving a number of purposes. Firstly, it provides an audit trail to verify what was said between the two parties throughout the negotiations; and secondly it enhances negotiator accountability and defensible decision-making by providing a concrete record of the negotiator's comments and actions. The recordings can be used as evidence within coroner's court or legal proceedings that may follow incidents (particularly when the outcome was negative) to justify the actions taken by negotiators. These findings are in line with the guidance provided by the National Decision Model which specifies that there is a requirement for decision-making around the resolution of an incident to be recorded (College of Policing, 2014) and echo the suggestions of McMains and Mullins (2014, p. 423) in the USA who state that "negotiations should be taped and copies should be made of the tapes". Equally, the recording of dialogue in this context provides an opportunity for reflexivity, whereby the recorded narratives can be used to guide negotiator CPD and identify areas for improvement and areas of best practice.

Underpinning mechanism 2: Defensible decision-making and accountability. Due to the nature of the role and the high-risk scenarios that they were typically involved with, interviewees felt that their actions were always open to scrutiny and that they needed to be accountable. They were cognisant that their actions could be subject to scrutiny at coroner's court or within Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) procedures: "…if… someone falls off that building, and they die, and I'm held liable for what I said…" (A:M:1:156). As a result of this, interviewees described their actions as being underpinned by an ethos of defensible decision-making.

> …you do worry about negative consequences and, oh my God, there might be an inquest later and, have I done everything that I should have done? Have I got records that I can take, and people can read, and they can understand? Will I be able to justify the decisions that I make? (C:F:2:96).

This concept mirrors part of the National Decision Model which specifies that "decision-makers are accountable for their decisions and must be prepared to provide a rationale for what they did and why" (College of Policing, 2014).

Discussion

The D.I.A.M.O.N.D. model provides a unique insight into the processes and protocols that English negotiators follow when deployed and identifies the breadth of tasks that need to be completed by negotiators *in theatre*. In providing this insight, the model serves three main purposes. Firstly, the development of the model fills the gap created by a lack of research to date on the HCN protocol or procedure adopted in England. Secondly, the model depicts the entire process that is utilised by negotiators (and their colleagues) when responding to incidents, thereby providing a more complete blueprint of the critical incident management process followed by English police forces. Lastly, the model differs from many of its predecessors by combining both procedural and communicative elements that can be utilised to guide negotiators (and other police personnel) when responding to critical incidents, as opposed to focusing solely on the dialogue or communication between the negotiator and subject. The latter approach has typically dominated the literature, with models historically identifying communication patterns or styles that should be adopted by negotiators in order to increase the likelihood of peaceful resolution (Donohue et al., 1991; Fisher et al., 1991; Hammer, 2007; Kelln & McMurtry, 2007; Madrigal, et al., 2009; Taylor, 2002; Vecchi et al., 2005).

Instead of focusing solely on the communication between the key parties involved, the current model adopts a multifaceted approach, whereby it firstly maps out the wider roles performed by negotiators and other police personnel in terms of critical incident management (which equally form part of the overall "jigsaw puzzle"); and secondly identifies the

communication styles and negotiation strategies that are necessary for and reflect "best practices" in resolving critical incidents. In doing this, the model reflects elements of the communicative components contained within the BCSM/BISM, thereby validating the importance of rapport and relationship building within the behavioural change process, but also highlights procedural aspects that have not been identified as core components within US-derived models, such as the role of record-keeping and importance of risk and threat assessment. The contribution of the model is such that it highlights the procedural and communicational tasks that need to be completed in tandem by negotiators and police teams, as opposed to looking at the communication between the negotiator and subject in isolation. The model, therefore, depicts the wider process of critical incident management, from the perspective of multiple police roles. As such, the model provides a much more nuanced analysis of the overall HCN procedure, firstly providing a procedural "blueprint" of negotiator deployment in England, and secondly providing insight into the communicative strategies and techniques that are considered to be effective in English HCN contexts.

Implications and Recommendations

The model represents the first Anglo-centric model of its kind and the authors believe that this unique model can benefit the discipline of HCN in a variety of ways. Firstly, it provides a blueprint of procedural critical incident management which can be used to inform training and CPD of new or existing negotiators, aided by the mnemonic D.I.A.M.O.N.D. acronym that helps to break the process down into manageable chronological tasks (as depicted in Figure 2). Secondly, the model can be used to train non-negotiator police colleagues on the negotiation process and to highlight the importance of key procedural elements (i.e. the importance of engaging in communication early for call handlers and first responders, and the importance of ensuring that the incident is contained adequately, and the environment is sterile for uniformed officers who might be involved in establishing and maintaining cordons at a

scene, for example). Thirdly, the identification of the negotiator toolbox and repertoire has clinical utility for negotiator training, by establishing the "best practices" when attempting to de-escalate hostage or crisis incidents. The communicative styles and specific strategies identified in Stage 2 of the model (and listed in Table 3), could, therefore, be used to inform training and CPD sessions where negotiators practice implementing the styles and strategies within role-play scenarios or "back-to-backs".

In addition to the aforementioned broader implications, the findings have more specific implications for operational process. Firstly, the importance of debriefing (both tactical and psychological), for negotiators and their wider police colleagues is emphasised and the findings suggest that debriefing (as guided by the College of Policing (2013) Briefing and Debriefing Policy) should be performed more consistently and thoroughly both as a means of CPD and for negotiator welfare purposes. Enhancing the importance placed on debriefing within the negotiator community could be achieved by educating negotiators, coordinators and incident commanders in relation to the protective nature of debriefing for trauma. Equally, the use of Trauma Risk Management (TRiM) (i.e. a welfare led process intended to assess the response of a member of staff exposed to a potentially traumatic incident" (Kent Police, 2014)), is a post-incident activity that could be promoted to aid negotiators' recovery in the wake of a traumatic incident.

Secondly, the model also highlights the importance of entering into early communication with the subject, regardless of whether this is instigated by a first responder (i.e. non-negotiator trained uniformed officer) or a call-handler. As such, the findings suggest that all police personnel that are likely to encounter individuals in crisis would benefit from training in basic crisis intervention with an emphasis on the use of person-centred principles and active listening skills. Thirdly, the findings demonstrate the importance of both formal record keeping and defensible decision-making, in light of the potential for scrutiny at

coroner's court or within IOPC proceedings. As such, negotiators need to ensure that they engage in decision-making that is both justifiable and formally recorded and training and CPD should reflect these principles, in line with the College of Policing (2014) operational guidance.

Limitations, Future Directions and Conclusion

In line with qualitative research methodological principles, techniques were employed throughout the study to enhance the credibility and trustworthiness of the findings (please see Grubb, 2016, for a full discussion). This included engaging with other researchers to reduce research bias (Slevin & Sines, 2000) by conducting frequent debriefing sessions between the researchers (Shenton, 2004) in relation to the validity of the coding of the data and the development of the categories and theoretical models. Methodological rigour was further ensured via the use of respondent validation (Long & Johnson, 2000) and member checks (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Shenton, 2004), whereby interviewees had the opportunity to firstly validate and comment on the interview transcript and secondly to confirm whether the final categories and models created adequately reflected the phenomenon being investigated. Nevertheless, the findings are, to some extent, limited by the fact that they represent the interpretations and perceived realities of a sub-group of negotiators. In light of this observation, the procedural aspects of the model could be further strengthened and validated using observation of live deployments, which would reduce any potential bias that may have been introduced by focusing on the lived experiences of participants and not the social process (Benoliel, 1996). Equally, the negotiator toolbox and strategies identified could be verified by cross-referencing with audio or audio-visual recordings (i.e. body-worn camera footage) of negotiator-subject dialogue recorded *in theatre*. Future research could also focus on cross-cultural comparisons to establish whether HCN policy, procedure, and practices differ internationally, in light of the different cultural components that are likely to influence communication and interpersonal interaction.

Lastly, although the model provides a thorough depiction of the negotiation procedure, it has been developed mainly on the basis of negotiators' experiences of *overt* crisis and hostage negotiation (with emphasis on the former as this constitutes the majority of negotiator deployments in England; Grubb, 2017). As it stands, the model fails to identify any procedural or communicative differences that may exist when negotiating in a *covert* as opposed to overt format. Future research that compares the procedures and strategies adopted within different types of negotiation deployment might be beneficial for training purposes. For example, the development of a covert hostage negotiation model that could be used to guide negotiation in kidnap and extortion (i.e. red centre) cases, might involve adaptation of the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. model in line with the specific parameters involved with covert negotiation. Additional research that adopts these suggestions, would, therefore improve the overall credibility of the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. model as a training and operational guidance tool.

In conclusion, the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. model has been used to narratively map out the procedure that is followed when resolving critical incidents in England. It contains three stages that are typically progressed through sequentially and identifies the core tasks that need to be completed by negotiators, enabling a picture of successful deployment to be formulated. The current study represents one of the first attempts to validate the actions taken and procedures followed by negotiators from initial deployment all the way through to debriefing and presents the first analysis of its kind in the UK. The model has a variety of clinical or practical applications and can be used to inform the training and CPD of negotiators, thereby helping to bridge the gap between research and practice and enhance the evidence-base for HCN as a police discipline.

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Table 1

Table Synopsising Existing Models of Negotiation

Model	Key principles	Country of origin
BARGAINING (i.e. BUSINESS) MODELS OF NEGOTIATION*		

Principled Negotiation (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Fisher et al., 1991, 2001)	• An interest-based approach to negotiation (i.e. the emphasis is on the party's interests as opposed to their positions).
	• Advocates four fundamental principles:
	  1) Separate the person from the problem;
	  2) Focus on mutual interests instead of individual positions;
	  3) Generate options for mutual gain;
	  4) Insist on using objective criteria to judge effectiveness of the agreement.
		USA

The "Getting Past No" Model of Negotiation (Ury, 1991)	• Focuses on getting past the subject's refusal to cooperate in order to employ joint problem-solving.
	• Suggests there are five barriers to overcome before the negotiator can employ problem-solving strategies: 1) the negotiator's reaction; 2) subject's emotion; 3) dissatisfaction; 4) position; and 5) power.
	• The model contains five specific stages:
	  1) Don't react – go to the balcony;
	  2) Stepping to their side;
	  3) Change the game;
	  4) Build a golden bridge;
	  5) Make it hard to say no.
		USA

The Crisis Bargaining Model (Donohue et al., 1991)	• Distinguishes between crisis (distributive) and normative (integrative) bargaining. Incorporates the notion of both relationship (expressive) and substantive (instrumental) issues being addressed differently throughout the negotiation process. • The negotiator's aim is to move subjects away from crisis bargaining (where the focus is on relational issues such as power role, trust and status) and towards normative bargaining (where the focus is on substantive or material issues) in order to resolve the situation. • Model focuses less on specific techniques and more on adapting the style of negotiation to the appropriate needs of the subject (i.e. by focusing on crisis or normative bargaining, respectively).	USA
EXPRESSIVE MODELS OF HCN		

Call's (2003, 2008) Interpretation of Crisis Negotiation	• Takes a staging approach to crisis negotiations from a forensic psychology perspective.
	• Outlines five procedural stages or strategic steps that need to be worked through in order to resolve incidents, whilst also emphasising certain communicative aspects that are pertinent to success (i.e. the use of active listening to develop a relationship between the negotiator and subject):
	  1) Intelligence gathering;
	  2) Introduction and relationship development;
	  3) Problem clarification and relationship development;
		USA

	4) Problem solving; 5) Resolution.	

McMains and Mullins's (2001) Stages of a Crisis Model	• Takes a staging approach to crisis negotiations from a law enforcement and corrections context.
	• Identifies four central, distinct stages that characterise crisis incidents:
	  1) Pre-crisis;
	  2) Crisis or defusing;
	  3) Accommodation or negotiation;
	  4) Resolution or surrender.
	• This is an expressive model, that is stage-focused, whereby resolution of the incident centres around the management and de-escalation of emotions.
	• Negotiation begins at the crisis stage, whereby the negotiator's role is to defuse the situation by reducing emotional excitement, arousal and distress, so that more appropriate, non-violent solutions can be considered and problem solving can be engaged in during the accommodation stage. The resolution stage involves both parties committing to a specific course of action in order for surrender to occur.
		USA

The Structured Tactical Engagement Process (STEPs) Model (Kelln & McMurtry, 2007)	• Provides a framework for understanding and influencing a barricaded subject's behavior to reach a peaceful resolution by utilising principles from the Transtheoretical Stages of Change Model (Prochaska & DiClemente, 1986). • Proposes that a crisis situation has to go through four stages in order to reach successful resolution: precontemplation (step 0), contemplation (step 1), preparation (step 2), and action (step 3); with the final stage resulting in behavioral change that leads to peaceful resolution of the crisis incident. • A variety of skills or techniques can be utilised to help guide subjects through the stages (i.e. development of rapport, affirmation of need for peaceful resolution, problem-solving, instilling motivation and confidence in subject, and remaining supportive and directive during action or surrender phase). • This model is theoretically informed as opposed to being based on empirical investigation or research.	Canada

The Four Phase Model of Hostage Negotiation (Madrigal et al., 2009)	• Focuses on the communication of the negotiator as opposed to the communication or psychological state of the subject.
	• Developed on the basis of previous research and observations from actual hostage negotiations, as opposed to being directly informed by empirical data.
	• Suggests there are four key phases that provide a framework for successful HCN:
	  1) Establishing initial dialogue – before active listening can be used to develop a rapport, the negotiator must first establish dialogue with the subject. This may involve superficial conversation or calming and de-escalatory statements;
	  2) Building rapport – negotiator uses active listening techniques, demonstrations of empathy and positive regard in order to build a personal relationship with the subject based on trust and free exchange of personal information;
	  3) Influencing – primary goal of the negotiator is to influence the subject to release hostages or victims and surrender peacefully;
	  4) Surrender - primary goal of the negotiator is to provide the subject with instructions on how to go about the surrender process so that s/he can remain safe.
		USA

The Behavioural Change Stairway Model (BCSM) (FBI CNU, n.d.; Van	• The negotiation process consists of five stages achieved sequentially and cumulatively:
	  1) Active listening skills;
	  2) Empathy;
		USA

Hasselt et al., 2008; Vecchi et al., 2005)	3) Rapport; 4) Influence; 5) Behavioural change. • Emphasis is on establishing relationship between negotiator and subject so that the negotiator can positively influence subject's behaviour to resolve situation peacefully.	
The Behavioural Influence Stairway Model (BISM) (Van Hasselt et al., 2008; Vecchi, 2009; Vecchi et al., 2005)	• The negotiation process consists of three stages achieved sequentially and cumulatively whist being supported by active listening skills: 1) Empathy; 2) Rapport; 3) Influence. • Active listening is conceptualised as a continuous underpinning process that occurs throughout the entirety of the negotiation in order to enhance the relationship development between negotiator and subject.	USA
DISCOURSE OR COMMUNICATIONAL MODELS OF HCN		
The S.A.F.E. Model (Hammer, 2007)	• Stipulates that three core interactive processes are essential for HCN: 1) identifying the subject's emotional frame of reference (e.g. anger, sadness, jealousy) via communication; 2) matching the response style of the subject, and 3) attending to the negotiator's need for a peaceful resolution. • Negotiators must identify the predominant frame that reflects the perspective of the subject's communication, with four potential frames used to guide communication between the two parties: 1) Substantive demands (i.e. bargaining and problem-solving); 2) Attunement (i.e. trust or distrust toward the negotiator); 3) Face (i.e. sensitivity to how s/he is perceived); 4) Emotion (i.e. emotional state). • Negotiators should match their communication style to the most relevant frame represented by the subject by addressing their specific wants or needs. Once needs have been met, the negotiator will have more ability to exert influence over the subject, allowing the situation to be peacefully resolved.	USA
The Cylindrical Model of Crisis Communications (Taylor, 2002)	• Proposes there are three general levels of interaction behavior during negotiations ranging from avoidance, to distributive, to integrative. Negotiators aim to move subjects through these levels progressively to move subjects away from non-active participation (avoidant) interaction through to a degree of cooperation which may be based on self-interest (distributive) through to eventual normative and cooperative communication (integrative) that will result in reconciliation of the parties' respective divergent interests. • Proposes the existence of three different motivational emphases within negotiation behavior, and classifies these as instrumental, relational, and identity themes. The first theme refers to behavior which is linked to the subject's instrumental needs which can be described as tangible commodities or wants. The second theme refers to behavior which is linked to the relationship or affiliation between the negotiator and the subject; and the third theme refers to the negotiating parties' concern for self-preservation or "face". • The last aspect of the model suggests that these interactions are further influenced by the intensity of the communication, with the increased use of intense behaviours having a detrimental effect on negotiation outcome.	Developed by UK researcher utilising data from police departments in USA

Note. *These models were developed from a general or business negotiation perspective as opposed to a hostage or crisis negotiation context.

Table 2

Table Depicting Methods of Communication Utilised by Negotiators to Engage with Subjects

Method of communication	Interview transcript excerpt	Salient findings
Face-to-face (F2F)	"I prefer to do it face-to-face… then the personality comes into it… whereas on the phone, you don't always get that (N:F:8:34).	• Preferred method of communication for most negotiators. • Allows negotiator to read the subject's body language. • Suitable environment to display empathy and develop rapport or relationship with the subject.
Telephone	Face-to-face is good, but obviously, if there's any threat or risk, close to the proximity… it is… a problem… so mobile phones are used often (F:M:4:111).	• Suitable alternative when F2F communication isn't possible (i.e. negotiators unable to get close enough to the subject; siege or barricade scenarios or unknown whereabouts of the subject). • Includes use of landline telephones, field phones, and cellular mobile phones (i.e. subject's own mobile or a "throw" phone provided by the police). • The conversation or dialogue should be contained as far as possible, via the use of a field or throw phone that can only accept calls from specified police telephone numbers; or blocking incoming and outgoing calls on the subject's mobile to ensure sterility of the environment and prevent dilution of the negotiator's efforts as a result of interference from third parties.
Megaphone	…I know a colleague had to… go… up the gas towers... Somebody was up there, at the top of one of those. And he went up. But I think he quickly realised… if he decides to come flying down here, I'm off… or, if he starts throwing stuff at me, or whatever… and he came down, and then communicated through a loudhailer (O:F:9:36).	• Less frequently utilised method of communication. • Typically resorted to as a result of difficulties getting access to the subject during siege or barricade scenarios, or due to the risk associated with negotiators establishing F2F contact with subjects. • Caution should be used due to difficulties associated with developing rapport using this method (Fuselier, 1981b) as the use of intonation and specific tone of voice is likely to be impeded. • Alternative methods should be used if the megaphone is acting as a barrier to rapport development.
Text message (SMS)	…negotiation fell dead at about ten o'clock. And I was texting him still and sometimes he would respond to that (C:F:2:96). …it seems that culturally, people are more likely to respond to texts than they will to your phone call for instance (B:M:2:195).	• Fairly recent development within HCN as a result of enhancements within technology and computer-mediated communication (CMC). • Particularly beneficial for communicating with MISPERs and engaging with certain subjects as a result of perceived cultural aspects. • The use of SMS within HCN is becoming more common, with negotiators from different countries citing the use of this method of communication in addition to the more traditional communication formats (Almond & Budden, 2012). • Research by Nichols (2014) explored the use of CMC technology within a simulated HCN scenario and suggests that SMS can be effective but that training is needed to ensure efficacious use of SMS communication and to enhance trust between parties.
Internet/Email/Social Networking Sites (SNSs)	…it's all about negotiating with protestors… It's all social networking stuff. And sometimes we utilise a negotiator for that (A:M:1:156). …all the communication's through the internet… and through email and so on… (K:M:2:111).	• The emphasis appeared to be on utilising the appropriate method of communication for the specific contextual scenario, with one interviewee referring to negotiating with protestors and another referring to an extortion case that involved communicating via email as this was the only method of contacting the subject.

Table 3

Table Depicting the Strategies Most Frequently Cited by Interviewees

Strategy	Interview transcript excerpt	Pointers to inform use of strategy
1. Establish why the subject is in the situation	You're trying to find what's made them where they are, and if you can find that, you can generally help them find a solution (D:M:3:63).	• Try to understand why the subject is in crisis or conflict. • Establish what the precipitating event was for the subject. • What has been going on for the subject in their life to get them to this point?
2. Honesty	Being truthful – always be truthful…. (M:F:8:24).	• Always be truthful and honest. • If asked a direct question, don't lie!
3. Identification of hooks and triggers	…trying to establish what the big issues were for him… and you're looking for the hook, then, all the time, aren't you? The thing that… he's actually interested in, the thing that's at the heart of his problem (F:M:4:111).	• Identify what is at the "heart of the problem" and focus on that aspect. • Identify the topics that are de-escalating or conciliatory (i.e. hooks) and focus on those. • Identify the topics that are escalating or aggravating (i.e. triggers) and veer away from those topics of conversation.
4. Matching of negotiator and subject	…if you get on better with that individual, then you end up being the number one (N:F:8:34).	• Think about matching of negotiator and subject in terms of 1) personality, 2) gender, 3) culture and language, and 4) background. • Try to match the negotiator and subject in a way that promotes the greatest level of rapport between the two parties (i.e. if a subject has had negative experiences with men in the past, she may engage better with a female negotiator; if a subject has a military history, it may be better to use a negotiator who has knowledge or experience of the military).
5. Adapt strategy in line with situation or subject	…a friend of mine who was negotiating with someone who was ex-services… his eventual resolution was reached… because… my colleague was a sergeant; he'd got stripes on and he actually ordered the guy to come down. And that worked… (D:M:3:63).	• No fixed rule about which strategy to employ. Try one and if it doesn't work, try something else! • Adapt your style of language in line with the subject (i.e. you are likely to use different language when speaking to a young person, when compared to an adult). • Adapt strategy in line with situational context or subject background (i.e. a more direct approach from an authority figure may be appropriate for a subject who is ex-military).
6. Use of concessions and positive police actions	…I've done this for you. You do this for me (H:F:5:50).	• *Quid pro quo* concept (I.e. I'll do something for you, if you do something for me). • Parallels with the Cialdini's (1984) "reciprocity" weapon of influence. • Sometimes provision of basic concessions (i.e. cigarettes, food, water etc.) can be used as a demonstration of "positive police action" (i.e. this is what we are doing for you, now you need to help us by doing x, y, z…)

|		
7. Perseverance or Persistence	…he didn't want to engage first of all but, being persistent… persevering with him, I eventually got it, so he was talking to me (D:M:3:63).	• Persevere with the subject and don't give up! • They may not want to talk initially but demonstrate that you are listening to them and that you want to help and eventually they will start to talk to you. • Ignore verbal abuse which may be directed at you and persevere with dialogue.
8. Use of time as a tactic or "Playing it long"	…you're… trying to buy time and let them diffuse the anger really, the emotion (K:M:2:111).	• Time is on the negotiator's side. • Play the long game (i.e. you have all the time in the world and aren't going anywhere!). • Use time as a tactic to allow for: 1) de-escalation of arousal and emotion levels, 2) detoxification from drugs and/or alcohol, and 3) subject to become fatigued or bored.
9. Disassociation from the police	…introduce yourself just by name… never say I'm a police officer… generally I turn up not in police uniform; I wouldn't turn up in uniform ever actually (M:F:8:24).	• Try to dissociate yourself from the police as far as possible as police association can act as a barrier to developing a rapport with some subjects. • Never lie about being a police officer but try to separate yourself by wearing civilian clothing and introducing yourself by your first name (as opposed to rank or role). • State "my name is X and I am with the police", as opposed to "I am a police officer".
10. Generate options available to subject and encourage problem-solving	I'm not going away, and there are two choices… (H:F:5:50).	• Make it clear to the subject that there is more than one option available to them. • Emotion clouds and distorts rational thinking and it is difficult for subjects to see that there is another (more positive) way out of their situation. • Point out the potential options available to the subject and try to encourage problem-solving. I.e. "What do you think would help you to feel better about this situation? "What could we do together to try to resolve things?"
11. Identify commonalities or common ground	…trying to find that little thing that's going to give you some kind of rapport… with somebody who you otherwise might have nothing… in common with at all (F:M:4:111).	• Try to find the "common thread or denominator" between negotiator and subject. • Identify things that you have in common with the subject. • Use commonalities to build rapport and develop relationship with subject.
12. Encourage dialogue and allow subject to vent	[encourage the subject to] …talk as much as possible and offload it all (O:F:9:36).	• Encourage the subject to offload and ventilate. • The more they engage in dialogue, the more likely you are to identify hooks to work with and understand why they are in the crisis or conflict state. • You want the subject to feel that they are being listened to, heard and understood so utilise active listening skills during this ventilation process.

THE D.I.A

Figure 1. Conceptual model depicting the categories within the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. model. *Note.* HCN = Hostage and Crisis Negotiator; S = Subject; RA = Risk Assessment; F2F = Face-To-Face; SMS = Text Message; SNS = Social Networking Sites; PPAs = Positive Police Actions.

Figure 2. Simplified Version of the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Model of Hostage and Crisis Negotiation.

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[i] S = Substantive demands; A = Attunement; F = Face; E = Emotion (Hammer, 2007).

[ii] The full interview schedule is available upon request by contacting the lead author.

[iii] The lead author is a Chartered Psychologist, Registered Forensic Psychologist and Senior Academic with extensive experience of conducting and supervising research projects.

[iv] These 320 concepts were eventually categorised into five micro-models: 1) the nature of hostage and crisis negotiator deployment model; 2) the self-perceived successful hostage and crisis negotiator model; 3) the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. model of hostage and crisis negotiation; 4) the hostage and crisis negotiator journey model; and 5) the hostage and crisis negotiator experience model. The current paper addresses the findings relating to the third micro-model listed above. Please refer to Grubb (2016), Grubb, Brown, Hall, and Bowen (2019a), Grubb, Brown, Hall, and Bowen (2019b), and Grubb, Brown, Hall, and Bowen (2019c) for findings relating to the other micro-models.

[v] Whilst risk/threat assessment forms a vital component within the first stage of the model (i.e. initial negotiator deployment tasks), this process is also one which continues throughout the duration of the negotiation process and as such, this stage of the model is represented by a dashed outline/border in Figure 1.

[vi] The Firearms Strategic Commander (Bronze) is "responsible for developing the firearms strategy and ensuring that tactical plans are developed and implemented to support it" (Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO] & National Policing Improvement Agency [NPIA], 2009, p. 9). Public Order Strategic Commander (Bronze) is "responsible for developing the public order strategy and ensuring that tactical plans are developed and implemented to support it" (Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO] & National Policing Improvement Agency [NPIA], 2009, p. 9).

[vii] The Silver Commander "coordinates the individual strategies developed by the Firearms and Public Order Strategic Commanders (Bronze) to ensure that they reflect and contribute to Gold's overarching strategy" (Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO] & National Policing Improvement Agency [NPIA], 2009, p. 9).

[viii] Negotiator Coordinators are "experienced negotiators trained to provide specialist support for incident commanders by advising on the development and implementation of negotiation plans and tactics" (Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO] & National Policing Improvement Agency [NPIA], 2011, p. 17).

[ix] "I" Messages refer to statements that start with "I" or "we" as opposed to "you"; they are non-directive and are typically used to explain the way you are feeling without including any element of blame or judgment. An example of the "I" message typical format is: "I feel… when you… because"; this allows the subject to understand the negotiator's perception of the situation, whilst also allowing some personalisation of the negotiator (Miller, 2005), which ultimately helps to build rapport between the subject and negotiator.

[x] A surrender ritual is the process completed by a subject in order to exit a hostage taking situation (or a siege involving victim(s)) and give themselves up to police custody.

[xi] An exit plan is the process completed by a subject (i.e. individual-in-crisis) in order to successfully and safely exit a crisis situation.

[xii] Negotiation position papers are used by negotiation teams to help summarise and synopsise the hostage and/or crisis incident currently being dealt with. They typically include information relating to the status (an overall description of the incident), assessment (an analysis of the incident) and recommendations (guidance and strategy) in relation to the incident (Dalfonzo & Romano, 2003).