

“Real war ammunition:” Artists for Victory, the National War Poster Competition, and the Hostile Imagination on the United States World War II Home Front

Wendy Toon

Artists for Victory (AFV), the New York City-based, national artists' organization, was founded in 1942, when the U.S. government was actively seeking to connect with the community of artists in and around the city. Its creation was motivated primarily by patriotism and the conviction that there was an important role for art in the war effort on the home front. This was to be demonstrated through AFV's National War Poster Competition (NWPC) of 1942, which aimed to address the woeful standard of posters designed to underpin the morale of Americans at home. The posters submitted under the heading “The Nature of the Enemy,” the Competition's most popular theme, are the principal focus here. It will be argued that they captured the hostile imagination, the specific way of thinking that the state of enmity led to on the home front during World War II. This, in turn, assisted the ongoing process of enmification, or enemy-image creation, and thus might

be said to “represent the reactions of the American people, as voiced by their artists” (“War Posters Shown at Legion of Honor” B3).

Of particular concern here are the most widely disseminated of the posters which were submitted as entries in “The Nature of the Enemy” category (Theme C); it is these that will be subject to close reading. These include those reproduced and distributed by the government and displayed in public spaces, those that appeared in *Life* magazine, and those which were used as labels for packaging. This comprises some, but not all, of the posters entered for the AFV's competition. The entire collection (up to 350 posters) was exhibited across the nation and attracted considerable interest, but the general public was most likely to encounter these images in the forms indicated above as the government and AFV sought to weaponize art by using it to engage with a mass audience of patriotic Americans rather than a more select audience of gallery visitors. This article endeavors to tease

Wendy Toon is Senior Lecturer in American History at the University of Worcester, UK. She is currently writing *Images of the Enemy: American Constructions of the Germans and Japanese in World War Two* (Routledge). She has recently completed an article, “Everybody wants to be the pitcher”: The Army, Sports, Democracy and the Reeducation of German Youth during the Early American Occupation of Germany, 1945-46’ (under review).

The Journal of American Culture, 45:1

© 2022 The Authors. *The Journal of American Culture* published by Wiley Periodicals LLC.

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.

out the most likely responses of the public to the posters they would have encountered in this way. It seeks to view the posters from the perspective of Americans engaged on the home front in 1942/3, not looking through their eyes, of course, but over their shoulders, as it were, at one step removed. Though it is impossible to gauge responses with absolute certainty, close study of the particular circumstances in which these images were launched upon the nation seems likely to provide some significant indications. What follows will investigate the NWPC and the initiatives that it generated in some detail, setting it in the broader context of the priorities and preoccupations of those living and working on the home front. Any assessment of the efficacy of the posters as weapons requires an understanding of the tropes and stereotypes that prevailed as the process of shaping public perceptions of America's World War II enemies ran its course. Significantly, a new archetype of the enemy emerges from the analysis of these images: the enemy as destroyer of motherhood.¹

Previous studies of posters have either traced their history as an art form, located them within the broader context of propaganda, or have supplied wide-ranging surveys of their role in war, revolution, and politics across the twentieth century. There is some work on the contributions of individual artists and occasionally on specific audiences or campaigns. Various scholarly works on the posters of World War II include a segment highlighting portrayals of the enemy, but none of these seriously interrogate the role of AFV or the NWPC, even if they include a poster from Theme C for illustrative purposes. The only existing scholarship on AFV is by art historian, Ellen Landau, and her focus was artists' motivation and aesthetics in the *America in the War* exhibition, 1943.² Her work did not seek to highlight the relationship between AFV and the development of war posters, nor did it concentrate on the art produced as an expression of community perception of the enemy by those who lived through the war. Focusing on the NWPC, therefore, facilitates the exploration of evidence that has been rather neglected in previous research. This evidence, its provenance clearly

traceable, is of particular value in highlighting the overlooked role of AFV in wartime poster production and in enhancing our understanding of the hostile imagination more generally.

Artists for Victory: Origins and Purpose

After American entry into World War II the production of effective war posters was considered a vital contribution to the war effort but within the art community itself there were real concerns about the quality of the initial response. Writing for *New Republic* in March 1942, the month in which AFV and the NWPC were conceived, critic Manny Farber was scathing in his review of the posters that had been produced since the start of hostilities. While certain himself of art's, and especially posters', role in accelerating popular "desire to drive the totalitarians out of this world," he highlighted a lack of clarity regarding the nature of America's enemies as a particular problem, as well as confusion regarding the function of art in wartime. At the same time, he identified a refusal "to make use of the enormous psychological and emotional potentialities of pictorial expression as a way of bringing home to the average citizen the purpose and meaning of this war. We are fighting fascism, but you couldn't tell it from our poster art" (366). This critique was endorsed by *Time* a few months later, which went even further, arguing that the majority of posters produced in support of the war effort had been "ambiguous, arty, dutiful, frequently not worth the paste that held them up" ("War Posters" 54). In this context, the NWPC represented a significant initiative in terms of addressing the weaknesses identified by these critics, especially in relation to clarifying the image of the enemy for those who remained on the home front.³

Before the U.S. entered the war a degree of cooperation between the art community and the U.S. government was evident, especially in New York. The Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) coordinated a National Defense Poster Competition

for the U.S. Army Air Corps and the Treasury Department which ran from 29 April-28 June 1941, exhibiting the posters later that year (“Posters for Defense” 2). Museum President John Hay Whitney was to claim that, through participating in the competition “the American artist has brilliantly demonstrated his value as a potential worker in the interest of defense” (Renwick 24). In this way, MoMA was instrumental in making the case for establishing links between artists and the government in a “national emergency” even before the U.S. found itself actually engaged in the global conflict. Indeed, the National Defense Poster Competition of 1941 was an early attempt to showcase artists’ potential as war workers and the role of art in national defense. As Alfred H. Barr, MoMA’s Director, later expressed there was a growing conviction that “Art *can* help us win the war” (12). And by the end of 1942 the Museum had earned a reputation as “America’s leading institution in the business of forging a weapon out of art.”⁴ By then, art was very much on the offensive.

Ultimately, an extensive range of posters was printed and disseminated by a wide array of governmental, as well as private, agencies and this led to a greater focus on the poster as a way of communicating messages and much careful consideration of the role that the art community might play in wartime.⁵ In May 1942, critic Duncan Phillips expressed a sincere belief that art could “serve the cause of victory” and play “a very considerable part in total mobilization,” while noting at the same time that “Our war pictures should be better than they are” (20). *ARTnews*’ Alfred Frankfurter, confirmed that visual art had a “vast part” to play in winning the war, and that posters’ capacity for instruction, propaganda and appeal gave them “gigantic breadth and terrific agency.” He concluded: “The poster as a medium must be considered a weapon” (9; 44). This, however, was not necessarily apparent in the early years of the war. Posters and billboards were now not automatically considered to be the most effective means of communicating directly with the public, as they had been during World War I; other media, especially radio and film, were increasingly in the ascendancy. It

was of critical importance, therefore, that MoMA had been prepared to make the case for art in 1941 and 1942. It was now also in the interests of artists themselves to restate their claim for the efficacy of art as a weapon of war and posters as “real war ammunition” (*Poster Handbook* 6).

AFV began in response to a government request for an artists’ organization in the New York City region with which it could liaise. Its immediate predecessor, the Artists’ Council for Victory, was formed in January 1942 by the merger of rival organizations, the National Art Council for Defense (“Artists’ War Measure” 33) and the Artists’ Societies for National Defense, which had both launched in late 1941. The Council united the city’s artists in a “central organization” for cooperation with “governmental, industrial and civilian agencies.” Its purpose was to “make fully effective the talents and abilities of the artistic professions in the prosecution of the war and in the protection of the country.” President of the Council (and later AFV), Hobart Nichols, explained: “Now we are merged for patriotic service” (“Artists’ Council for Victory” 33). By early 1942 it had 10,000 members and *Art Digest* considered it the “definitive organization of artists for war work” (“Ten Thousand” 17; “Artists’ Council for Victory” 32). In March 1942, now called Artists for Victory, Inc., it was a national volunteer organization coordinating artistic war work for federal, state, and local government (“Artists for Victory” 28). Both the Council (“Artists’ Council for Victory” 32) and AFV prioritized artists’ potential for special wartime service resulting from their “qualities of imagination” and it is through that imagination that a key dimension of the American experience of World War II in 1942 is captured.⁶ Artistic expression led to pictorial representation documenting important features of the conflict which disclose societal views on those aspects and add to the war’s narrative.

AFV’s first formal meeting took place on 18 March 1942. Their constitution began:

We artists, our country at war, our welfare and security threatened, join the struggle of the nation against enemy aggressors. We offer our talents, our all, to help to win the war so that we shall remain a free nation, dedicated to a creative useful life, practicing the arts and sciences of peace.

Demonstrating the national reach of the new organization, the *Seattle Times*' art reviewer reported, "it represents the first effort to ally America's artists in one democratic art front working in a unified way to defeat the Axis and establish a free world." There were no other comparable, multi-discipline, non-partisan, national cultural movements which used visual art to expound war rhetoric in the same fashion as AFV. Initially, there were considerable tensions with the Federal Art Project until its disbandment in June 1943.⁷ Undeterred AFV pledged a minimum of five million hours to the war effort ("Hours Pledged" 27).

AFV was formed by artists who desired to assist the war effort by using their artistic abilities, especially in graphic arts, to make "the citizens of this United States conscious of the gravity of the present War and of the necessity of buying War bonds and stamps." It is perhaps not surprising that AFV was created in New York City. The tensions of the pro-/anti-intervention debate, which raged in the U.S. from the war's outbreak in Europe in 1939 until the bombing of Pearl Harbor, was especially heightened by the city's proximity to the Battle of the Atlantic.⁸ N.Y.C.'s large immigrant population pulled New Yorkers in different, and often opposing, directions. After U.S. entry into the conflict in December 1941, New York Harbor became the principal port of embarkation for the European Theater, and the city itself became increasingly martial because of fortification, training camps and the influx of military personnel and defense workers. The war seemed much more remote in other parts of the country, except the West Coast, where the threat of invasion after the attack on Pearl Harbor felt very real, certainly initially.

MoMA contacted AFV to express interest in their work and a desire for collaboration in April 1942. In the same month MoMA was approached about a poster competition by the Council for Democracy (CFD) and in early May 1942 by John Taylor Arms and Irwin D. Hoffman of AFV. The three bodies were collaborating by mid-May. The CFD was an interventionist organization set up in August 1940, over a year prior to American entry into the war. It hoped to counteract the isolationist and non-/anti-interventionist rhetoric of

organizations such as the America First Committee and included some of the most notable and influential liberal personalities of the 1940s: for example, C. D. Jackson, Raymond Gram Swing, Dorothy Thompson, and Ernest Angell. The CFD believed that "the preservation of democracy in the United States require[d] the defeat of totalitarianism abroad." Through its pro-democracy morale program, it placed anti-Hitler commentaries in eleven hundred national newspapers each week (Bird 109). The CFD had first envisioned a poster project in March 1942 which would "visualize our war aims, dramatize the issues at stake, and vitalize our thinking about democracy and freedom." Upon realizing that AFV had independently approached MoMA "with the same basic idea," they decided to "join forces in a cooperative project." Angell considered the NWPC to be a "patriotic undertaking" which would "serve to increase the participation of American artists in the war effort, thereby strengthening the American people with a new understanding and a renewed spirit for carrying forward this mighty conflict to victory." Ultimately the Council offered four prizes for the Competition.⁹

In August 1942, Nichols described the NWPC's purposes in a letter inviting submissions:

the first and the most important being to assist our country in its war effort by making available to the Government visual information material that will express the principles for which the United States is fighting and the results it hopes to achieve by that fight. . . . Secondly, it is our hope to raise the standard and effectiveness of poster design.

Thus, the NWPC had both pragmatic and aesthetic aspirations. In a letter to FDR, Nichols explained that the competition's "inspiration" was his recent State of the Union Address. Roosevelt's speech had emphasized that the U.S. must not be fooled into following a "Pacific-first" strategy, despite the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. It stressed the importance of the United Nations (alliance), the "Union" and the American people, providing a united effort against "common enemies." A major objective was the liberation of nations subjugated by the Axis, and priorities included work, production and financing the war, as FDR made it clear that the war would be "hard," "long" and require sacrifice. He emphasized that enemies must not be

underestimated as they are “powerful and cunning - and cruel and ruthless” and they revel in killing and destruction. He identified these enemies with “evil,” conquest, and the destruction of Christianity, but assured his home audience that victory and peace would be secured as Americans would pay the price of freedom (*Public Papers and Addresses* 32–42). The only Competition theme not explicitly raised in the address is “loose talk,” a warning about the dire consequences of revealing secrets to the enemy; but this was implied by Roosevelt’s emphasis on the domestic threat of the Axis. The resultant designs, Nichols wrote, express “in a visual manner the national state of mind on the State of the Union . . . [and are] evidence that [artists] are with you fighting with what weapons they hold in their professional hands.”¹⁰

The idea of a war poster exhibition based on a competition was considered important by AFV, as “without the opportunity offered by open competition, many a good talent might never be discovered or recognized.” The emergency of war necessitated that all American ability, wherever it may be found, must be exploited for ultimate victory. The “long negotiations” over the Competition were concluded by the end of July 1942. The themes for poster production were approved by the Office of War Information (OWI) and Treasury Department in August. MoMA’s Monroe Wheeler remarked, “I do not know of any competition which has ever been launched with such enthusiastic Government support.” Also that month, full color reproductions of the prizewinners was promised. Ultimately, the Competition was organized by eight themes and twenty slogans. These were: Theme A: Production; B: War Bonds; C: The Nature of the Enemy; D: Loose Talk; E: Slave World – Or Free World?; F: The People Are on the March; G: “Deliver us from Evil” and H: Sacrifice.¹¹

The National War Poster Competition

The NWPC invitation circular opened with the “vital job” for artists: production of “fighting

posters!” Hence, the Competition offered “a challenge and an opportunity for the artists of America to serve their country in this hour of peril.” And provided “a specific and concrete means of proving” art’s application in “winning the war,” as posters’ visual messages were “still the most potent medium for reaching the public.” The suggestions for “art treatment” for the Nature of the Enemy, “intended to arouse anger,” clarified that posters “should be of the menace and atrocity type, showing the vicious, treacherous, and brutish character of the enemy.”

Think in these terms: The horrors inflicted on the conquered peoples of Europe and Asia – the Crime of Lidice; the violation of the churches and the persecution of their followers; the beating to death and the cold slaughter of women and children . . . ; mass executions of civilians; shooting of hostages; deliberate starving of conquered peoples; Jap atrocities on women; . . . on prisoners of war, using them for bayonet practice. The enemy can be shown symbolically as the Beast-At-Large, destroying, pillaging etc.¹²

The emphasis on atrocity is significant, despite the legacy of World War I propaganda which generated skepticism about the use of such images. In the interwar period a propaganda analysis movement developed and its simplified emphasis, that had entered public consciousness, held that atrocity propaganda was a catalog of misrepresentation and fabrications. Nicoletta Gullace highlights Robert Graves’ autobiography, *Goodbye to All That* (1929), which questioned the veracity of the atrocity stories of World War I, as working particularly powerfully on the popular imagination. As well as Arthur Ponsonby’s *Falsehood in Wartime* (1928), which similarly claimed to expose “falsehoods” and “lies” (690). As a result, in 1942 official agencies were wary of rousing this atrocity skepticism. Thomas D. Mabry, Graphics Division, OWI, for example, wrote that many “are dead against anything of the sort.” However, AFV understood, “We need to get a clear picture in our minds of this menace to our lives and our liberty,” and the NWPC volunteer artists were not constrained by having to negotiate with the strictures of working directly for a government agency.¹³ The popular hostile imagination seemed entirely unhampered by caution regarding atrocity and with the further impetus of the circular’s

advice it is not surprising that it produced emotive images that prioritized the enemies' atrocious nature. "Horror" posters were predominant.

The Competition circular was sent to 28,000 artists ("Editor's Letters" 4), opening on 15 August, and closing on 22 October 1942, receiving 2224 entries from both professionals and amateurs. The *New York Times* reported: "Using paint brushes as weapons, 2,000 American artists have attacked the enemy in one of the country's largest war poster competitions" ("200 War Posters" 25). According to MoMA's Wheeler this made it "by far the most important poster competition ever held in this country!" Entrants "represent[ed] a cross section of the country" ("More about" 40) from forty-three of the then forty-eight States, plus Honolulu, Hawaii and Washington, D.C. No entries were received from Arkansas, Idaho, Nevada, South Carolina, and Utah, although seventeen were submitted without addresses. Most posters came from N.Y.C. (667) and New York State (218). 63 percent of entrants were male and 37 percent female. Submissions came from the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and Coast Guard, as well as civilians, including "Indians," nuns, "negroes," high school children and schoolteachers. The results represented "easel artists, commercial artists and citizens in many walks of life who wanted to pound the Axis with a poster." Most entries came from commercial artists, however. Though, as hoped, the Competition discovered additional artistic talent, and AFV's Hoffman proudly reported: "We uncovered about 200 persons utterly unknown who turned in work of really great merit."¹⁴

The Nature of the Enemy was the predominant theme with 415 entries, over a fifth of the total submissions. According to MoMA's Publicity Director, Sarah Newmeyer, this popularity "indicat[ed] that people are more interested in the nature of the enemy than in any other thing about the war." The posters were "starkly realistic and documentary testimonials of the cruelty of the Axis" which reflected a desire by Americans on the home front, insulated from battlefields and enemy occupation, to understand the enemy's nature. In particular, they helped explain enemy actions and behavior in

opposition to accepted moral positions, especially about the treatment of civilians. The emphasis on rape and violence in the images is significant, as James Aulich has shown that depictions of "graphic violence" are "scarce" in official anti-enemy posters (18). This is perhaps a reflection of the war's remoteness in 1942: its brutality was imagined based on increasingly alarming press reports of the Nazi and Japanese occupations. Such prominence is simultaneously revealing of genuine concerns about the threat of invasion, freedom's destruction, and the suffering this would mean for the American people. Interestingly in terms of who the enemy was, most dealt with the Nazis, despite the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor being the catalyst for U.S. entry into the conflict. That this revealed Nazi Germany as the U.S.' primary enemy was noted in a contemporaneous art critic's review (Price "Camera" 26). FDR's plea for a "Germany-first" strategy had been heard, but it was also perhaps an acknowledgment that this was Germany's second reversion to barbarism. None of the exhibited or reproduced posters addressed the Italian enemy, despite Italy still fighting as part of the Axis until September 1943. This is perhaps explained by the significant Italian American population in N.Y.C., as well as the ancestry of the city's popular Mayor, Fiorello La Guardia.¹⁵

The final meeting of the jury to decide on prizes took place between 24–26 October, and winners and those with honorable mention were announced in late November ("Poster Winners" 27). Theme C's winners Karl Koehler, "native American of German descent," and Victor Ancona, "naturalized American of Italian parentage," were themselves reminders of American racial diversity which complicated enmification. Both were of enemy descent when framed through the wartime filter. This potentially meant that they could comment on the enemy's nature with more accuracy and confidence, whilst through their voluntary effort to expose that nature, simultaneously prove their patriotic attachment to the American cause. If we look over the viewer in 1942's shoulder (as in all subsequent analyses), their winning design portrays a brutish, Nazi officer with stereotypical monocle,

downturned mouth and terrifying stare which betrays what he sees in reflection: a man hanged on gallows. He may wear a uniform purporting to be a worthy opponent but instead he is barbarous and represents what would become a typical Nazi type. Contemporary reviewers associated the “needle-like nose” to Reinhard Heydrich, “the infamous ‘Hangman.’” The facial resemblance is striking and probably not coincidental: the “Crime of Lidice” had occurred in the wake of Heydrich’s attempted assassination and consequent death in June 1942, so he had been evoked in the Competition’s recommendations. For British art critic, Eric Newton, this “‘hate’ poster” was “very powerful” because of the “concentrated venom of the terrifying close-up” (102). The Treasury Department, invoking FDR’s wartime emphasis on justice through punishment of war criminals, added to the subsequent label: “An Eye for An Eye – The Swine Will Swing!” This certainly advocated hatred (Figure 1). Despite



Figure 1. Koehler, Karl and Victor Ancona. *No. 46, Artists Victory Exhibit in miniature*. Ever Ready Label Corp., 1943, Records of the World War II History Commission, RG 68, accession 27544, box 1b, folder 100, State Records Collection, Library of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

winning the Competition, the poster would not be used officially for its intended domestic audience. With an altered title, *Ecco Il Nemico* (Here is the enemy) (Aulich 37), and style it was used after “Operation Husky,” July-August 1943, in Sicily by the Army’s Psychological Warfare Branch. The poster was intended to motivate the Italians to see their former allies as their new enemy. The Army therefore approved of this vision of the nature of the enemy and believed that the poster was “ammunition” to elicit the correct response.¹⁶

Honorable mentions were given to Adolph E. Brotman and Ben Nason. Brotman’s poster depicts a menacing, strangely gray, head and hands emerging from the darkness, identifiable as German because of his distinctive *stahlhelm* (steel helmet) (“Nazi Rips” 55). His humanity is removed as his eyes are eliminated by the helmet’s shadow. The square but bumpy jawline and puffy cheeks are reminiscent of Hermann Goering. As the clasped dagger slightly pierces the Stars and Stripes (representing the nation) this Nazi soldier is clearly the aggressor; his muscular, veined, tensed hands are belligerent. Nason’s enormous grinning Nazi (swastika emblazoned *stahlhelm*) skull betrays the reality of what the enemy is: death. Through the eye cavities and presumably resulting from an air raid (eight airplanes leave to the right) a scene of fire, death and destruction ensues. Accordingly, “Only A Numbskull Would Slacken!” (Figure 2)¹⁷

Of note, but not highlighted in the Competition statistics, were designs by Yasuo Kuniyoshi, an *Issei* designated as an “enemy alien” during the war. Although initially told he was ineligible to enter because of this, the jury’s ruling was altered and he submitted under both Theme C and “Deliver us from Evil,” an overlapping theme similarly revealing of the enemy’s nature. He was working as an OWI poster artist and Assistant Director Archibald MacLeish had specifically suggested that his work address the Japanese, implying his inherent knowledge of the enemy. Whilst this is problematic as Kuniyoshi was accepted as an *American* artist within the art community, he was a longstanding supporter of the Chinese as Japan’s



Figure 2. Nason, Ben. *No. 28, Artists Victory Exhibit in miniature*. Ever Ready Label Corp., 1943, Library of Virginia. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

first victims and had fundraised for United China Relief since the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, so this is a probable explanation for his choice of subject in the NWPC. Exceptionally he depicts the suffering of Chinese civilians; corpses lying in their own blood.¹⁸ The central figure, and therefore primary victim, is a supine, writhing, bleeding, and bayoneted woman. The faceless Japanese enemy (Japanese flag on bayonet rifle) is a destroyer of motherhood (drawing on an essentially Victorian stereotype of women's role). In a rendering of every mother's nightmare, her baby is abandoned (likely dead, also supine), arms behind its head, denoting helplessness. In the background another civilian (sex unclear, probably female), a child perhaps (as the mother looks back at the body over her shoulder), lies prone with hands bound behind their back, blood seeping from their head. The Japanese are merciless, they kill and destroy indiscriminately. If this is how they behave now, imagine what will happen if they are not stopped (Figure 3).

Through its exposure of brutality, this new archetype is a call for manly action in defense of maternity and for sympathy for the enemies'



Figure 3. Kuniyoshi, Yasuo. *Deliver us from Evil*. 1942, Fukutake Collection. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

victims. Utilizing a device already established in World War I propaganda, whilst explicitly depicting an enemy overseas, by implicit extension the enemy represents a menace to American women at home. Worse than this, the enemy is a threat not only to women now, but to the American future as they are the child-bearers, the mothers in prospect. This discovery is a significant addition to considerations of enemy image. In 1927 political scientist Harold Lasswell had argued: "Stress can always be laid upon the wounding of women, . . . and upon sexual enormities . . . These stories . . . satisfy certain powerful, hidden impulses. A young woman, ravished by the enemy, yields secret satisfaction to a host of vicarious ravishers on the other side of the border" (82). This titillating potential is crucially removed in the destroyer of motherhood. Women in this archetype are desexualized and rather than helpless, in need of rescue or desirous of retribution for their defilement, they are dead, irretrievably lost. Their children deprived of their only protector and nurturer (men are away at war). It is not only their loss that should be lamented, but the fate of children left behind, and those now never to be conceived. In

addition to the emotions aroused by mothers' deaths, fears are raised about the treatment of their orphans. The hope of this enemy image is that their sacrifice will somehow be made purposeful through ultimate victory over the forces that wrought their demise, the evils of the Axis enemy. It is significant that images in this archetype foreground explicit depictions of death. It is unusual for the wartime audience to be confronted with this reality of the primary effect of war. The norm was for death to be symbolically represented and initially official policy deliberately shielded the home front audience from such visual images.¹⁹ However, again, the popular hostile imagination appeared willing to face this directly.

The enemy as destroyer of motherhood is further evidenced in Mary Stewart's rendering of a spectral Nazi skeleton (again wearing a swastika adorned *stahlhelm*).²⁰ Dressed in a black cape and with a posture of waiting to pounce, its bony claw-like hands silently creep up on a mother and child from behind. The enemy (in red letters) is danger and fear itself. The label's message reads "Rid Them of the Specter of Fear!" The mother's hand caresses her daughter's arm in a reassuring and protective manner, obviously apprehensive. They both stare straight at viewers as a cry for help. The Nazis represent a direct threat to "home," traditionally represented by women and children, and they are bringers of death. Again, this child could be robbed of her sole protector, and her own future is in question. The Nazis' advance must be halted (Figure 4).

Duane Bryers' is the only poster that includes Hitler as the personification of the Nazi threat, and the third to represent the enemy as a destroyer of motherhood. Hitler is the face of the enemy and his physiognomy, with downturned mouth, is aggressive and emotionless. His actions are maniacal and ruthless. Appearing out of the wreckage of a village (including a Church) and staring at the viewer over a heap of human bodies, he is unmoved. In the rubble a corpse lies supine, head arched back into the blood bath with a noose around its neck. Another prone body's boots (bottom left) are just visible. The dead mother and anguished, screaming child again represent




Figure 4. Stewart, Mary. *No. 48, Artists Victory Exhibit in miniature*. Ever Ready Label Corp., 1943, Library of Virginia. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

"home;" this is underlined by the banner at the bottom, "God Bless Our Home." Home is where the heart is, but the mother is literally stabbed through the heart by what appears to be a coil handle fire poker. Hitler destroys creation, motherhood, the essence of family and home; he has a disregard for religion and God. Hitler appearing out of the flames is reminiscent of Hell. One could imagine that Hell would look something like this: a wounded, wailing child, desperately clinging to its dead mother's hand, left alone defenseless in a site of slaughter, literally sitting in a pool of her blood. This nightmarish vision is what will happen if Hitler is not stopped; and so, the Treasury Department exhorted, "Extinguish This Menace to Humanity!" It is notable that this archetype's "cold slaughter of women" was employed for both the German and Japanese enemies. Enemy image scholarship tends to highlight a difference in representations of the two peoples; though the use of Hitler and a swastika are shorthand for Nazi specifically, rather than German (Figure 5).

The OWI requested a ballot of visitors while at MoMA so that the public were "given an




Figure 5. Bryers, Duane. *This is the Enemy*. Popular prize winning poster, from the exhibition album ‘National War Poster Competition’ [MoMA Exh. #207, November 25, 1942 - January 3, 1943], c. 1942. Photographer: Soichi Sunami (copyright holder and rights status unknown). Exhibition Album, #207. Object Number: ARCH.2139.1. Photographic Archive. The Museum of Modern Art Archives, New York. Digital image © 2022, The Museum of Modern Art, New York/Scala, Florence. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

opportunity to exercise its own judgment in the poster exhibition.” The poster with the most votes in answer to “Which poster makes you want to do more to help win the war?” was awarded a \$50 war bond. Over 3000 votes were cast. Bryers’ received 341 votes, two-thirds more than any other, and as such was “overwhelmingly the winner.” It was also chosen in answer to “Which poster do you like best?” Therefore, it is reasonable to judge that the barbaric and repugnant nature of the enemy was not only accepted, but also worked as a forceful mobilizer of the home front audience. The poster was bought by the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and made available to other government agencies. AFV were delighted that it would be “put in service here and in Latin America.” Hoffman made it clear that the Competition’s purpose was “to have posters

reproduced, the exhibition is secondary.”²¹ It was through reproduction that art and artists could demonstrate their worth in national defense, whilst simultaneously emphasizing the gravity of the war, and the threat of the enemy in particular.

The NWPC’s Wider Audience

For the posters to truly “help win the war” they needed to be disseminated as widely as possible. The NWPC was extraordinarily successful in this regard. MoMA boasted: “The big story of the Competition . . . is the fact that TWELVE of the posters, including the nine prize winners, will immediately be reproduced in full color and distributed all over the country.” *Life* reported that “The OWI will select three . . . for national distribution to factories and public buildings” (“War Posters” 54). Reproduction continued at pace and by March 1943 it was recorded in Senate that “18 posters [had] been reproduced, 13 of which are being used by Government agencies such as Office of War Information, War Production Board, the Treasury Department, and the Office of Inter-American Affairs.” Treasury bought four posters including Brotman’s “This is the Enemy.” Another of those chosen was by Barbara Marks, receiving honorable mention in the “Deliver us from Evil” theme. It is noteworthy that the OWI changed the poster’s slogan to Theme C’s, “This is the Enemy,” prior to reproduction. Despite submission to the Competition being democratic and artists taking the “opportunity” in significant numbers, because of OWI’s direct involvement through suggestion and approval of slogans, plus purchase, the end product was in many ways out of the artists’ hands and agencies were able to pursue their own particular agendas. Marks’ Nazi enemy stabs through the center of the *Holy Bible*. The hand that grasps the *Hitler-Jugend-Fahrtenmesser* (identified by the distinctive quillon, symbolic of honor, loyalty, and courage in the Nazi credo) is veiny, strained, tightly clenched and hostile. Nazi intentions for the dagger’s symbolism are reversed through the dishonorable act of

destroying Christianity, the quintessence of civilized society. Although static, if the dagger were to continue to plunge it would make the shape of a cross. This cross has a double meaning in this instance: Christianity, but also death, a metonym of cemeteries. The Nazis are aggressive, murderous, and anti-Christian. Americans must “Destroy the Despoilers of Our Faiths!” (Figure 6)²²

The NWPC’s significance was also recognized within the art community. Poster expert, Charles Matlack Price, considered it of “outstanding importance in the Art-in-War effort” (“2224” 5). The exhibition of 200 posters was held at MoMA from 25 November 1942–3 January 1943 and the *New York Times*’ critic concluded it was the “best contemporary poster exhibition I have ever seen” (Jewell X9). As a result of its popularity and potential for further impact it quickly became a circulating exhibition. It was shown at the National Gallery of Art, Washington D.C., at the Carnegie Institute of Art, Pittsburgh, and then throughout the United States. Over 12,000 people attended the opening of the exhibition in Washington D.C. alone and, in total, 180,000 saw the

exhibition at the National Gallery. The collection was then split into three for the national tour. The first group visited the East and Midwest, the second, the South, and the third, the West. The first set was exhibited in Connecticut, New York, Illinois, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Ohio. By May 1943 it was claimed that the posters had been seen by “half a million people.” The second selection travelled to Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, Alabama, Texas, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Missouri. The third batch was seen in Wisconsin, California, Nebraska, Ohio, Kansas, Michigan, Oregon, and Washington. In the end the posters would be shown at forty institutions throughout the continental USA. Arms reported that the shows were “averaging 8,000 visitors per exhibition.” This demonstrated the posters’ national reach and wide audience despite the East Coast origins of AFV. The “travelling shows of posters” with Treasury Department sponsorship achieved “good attendance” according to AFV, which seems rather understated (and uncharacteristic), and finished in June 1944.²³

Included in the circulating exhibition was McClelland Barclay’s representation of the Japanese enemy. Rather than human form, he uses the Japanese flag and a stab-in-the-back with a samurai sword to symbolize Japanese military ferocity and treachery. Unusually this is a depiction of a military, rather than a civilian, death. In atrocity propaganda explicit depictions of death are usually of non-combatants or prisoners. The dead American sailor in white dress uniform lies prone, gripping the Stars and Stripes. The sailor is willing to die for the protection of all that the flag stands for (not only the nation, but American values) and has made the ultimate sacrifice. However, in this case death has been caused by the sneaky tactics of the Japanese. The label version emphatically related this to the attack on Pearl Harbor with the slogan: “Avenge Pearl Harbor – Buy War Bonds Today!” Also circulated was Douglas Grant’s Nazi gunboat, firing a machine gun on a lifeboat brimming with American sailors as their ship sinks in the background.²⁴ Clearly this is a war crime. For the villainous Nazis, however, it is an opportunity not to be missed. The label slogan,



Figure 6. Marks, Barbara. No. 20, *Artists Victory Exhibit in miniature*. Ever Ready Label Corp., 1943, Library of Virginia. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]



Figure 7. Barclay, McClelland. *No. 1, Artists Victory Exhibit in miniature*. Ever Ready Label Corp., 1943, Library of Virginia. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

“Loose Lips = Lost Lives!” makes the lesson clear. According to art critic Doris Brian, this submission revealed “the enemy not as an infantile’s [sic] bogey man but as his treacherous 1942 self, shooting survivors of a sunken ship” (12). For her, therefore, Grant had portrayed the enemy accurately and thus Nazi treachery, not just Japanese, was part of the hostile imagination (Figures 7 and 8).

To achieve an even wider audience for the Competition, in March 1943 AFV selected “50 of the most stimulating” entries and reproduced them as war poster labels to “carry their vital messages to every person throughout our country.” “500,000,000” were printed and they were to be “used on correspondence, on packages, on pay envelopes, and in many other ways” so that they would “reach almost every man, woman, and child.” AFV expected that ultimately “over a billion copies of these labels [would] be distributed throughout the country – through banks, retail stores, war-industry plants, schools, and many patriotic committees and organizations.” Ever Ready Label Corp. president, Sidney Hollaender, highlighting the designs’ intended effects on




Figure 8. Grant, Douglas. *No. 8, Artists Victory Exhibit in miniature*. Ever Ready Label Corp., 1943, Library of Virginia. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

wartime minds, thought their sale would “mak[e] people acquainted with the ruthlessness of the enemy” (“Daily Pick-Ups” 2) and “promote war consciousness.” Their purpose was clear: “YOU CAN FIGHT ON THE HOME FRONT WITH THESE!” Of interest is the choice of entries under Theme C which were consciously chosen because “as far as possible” they had not been reproduced before. Also noteworthy is the addition of Treasury Department authored slogans (mentioned previously) which clarified the posters’ messages and emphasized forceful retribution.²⁵ As in the NWPC itself the Nazis dominate the Theme C labels: eleven represent the German enemy, while only two the Japanese, a further reflection of Germany’s status as “enemy number one.”

The labels included Harley Melzian’s image in which the enemy is clearly identified as Japanese through the flag of the rising sun on his cap and yellow skin. He wields a dagger, here a primitive weapon, and his other hand, reaching forward, has the appearance of a claw. His teeth are bared and his features simian. He approaches from behind to attack a vulnerable member of society –

a woman. He towers over this openmouthed, horror-stricken, white, female as she looks back with frightened eyes. It seems that the normal rules of warfare do not apply. It is truly monstrous to assault women. This poster was not included in the MoMA exhibition which drew critical comment in *ARTnews* which considered Melzian's "active, stimulating concept" "better" than Koehler and Ancona's winning entry (Brian 11).²⁶ The Treasury Department certainly thought its message powerful and summed up: "Wipe This Slime and Crime from the Earth!" Again not exhibited at MoMA, D. H. Money Penny's enemy soldier, exceptionally not identified as Nazi or Japanese (the uniform is indistinct), is dehumanized through the lack of head, only his foot, legs and torso are visible. He stands astride a supine, openmouthed, white, woman, stripped to her waist (bra still intact), legs exposed. His bayoneted gun drips with the blood of other victims and his atrocious intent is implied. The additional slogan stated, "Just Another Atrocity Story, Eh?," which revealed Treasury Department acknowledgement of skepticism toward atrocity but had the purpose



Figure 9. Melzian, Harley. No. 31, *Artists Victory Exhibit in miniature*. Ever Ready Label Corp., 1943, Library of Virginia. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]



Figure 10. Money Penny, D. H. No. 39, *Artists Victory Exhibit in miniature*. Ever Ready Label Corp., 1943, Library of Virginia. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

of emphasizing the image's authenticity (Figures 9 and 10).

The power of atrocity on home front minds and emotions had again been highlighted by Lasswell: "A handy rule for arousing hate is, if at first they do not enrage, use an atrocity" (81). World War I Allied propaganda had established the German enemy as the barbaric, licentious, often simian, "Hun," as well as women and children as "home" through an especial focus on the "Rape of Belgium" (Figures 11 and 12). Although, none of the selected NWPC artists, except McClelland Barclay, participated through art in World War I, it is reasonable to assume that they had some sense of these preexisting visual metaphors of the enemy.²⁷ With their already established meanings these could be reinvigorated for the current conflict. Notably this time, however, popular belief of Axis atrocities was much more secure (with the noteworthy exception of the largescale murder of European Jews). The World War II hostile imagination was not only fed by emotions, such as hate, but by moral assessments of the behavior of the enemies that were inevitably influenced by war-time society and credible reportage on recent or




Figure 11. Young, Ellsworth. *Remember Belgium. Buy Bonds. Fourth Liberty Loan*. United States Printing & Lithograph Co., c. 1918, Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/resource/cph.3g04441/>. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]



Figure 12. Raleigh, Henry. *Hun or Home? Buy More Liberty Bonds*. Edwards and Deutsch Lithographic Co., 1918, Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/resource/cph.3g10331/>. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

contemporaneous events. Since the 1930s Americans had marveled at the Axis powers' openness regarding their aims and actions which exposed the nature of their regimes. Homicidal vengeance, such as Lidice, were not falsehoods or even secrets, but boldly disseminated announcements designed to dampen resistance to Nazi occupation and demonstrate the power of the *Reich*. In Asia, evidence of the brutality of Japanese occupation stretched back even further to the annexation of Korea in 1910, a point made in FDR's State of the Union address, but the recent "Rape of Nanking" 1937–8 acted particularly powerfully on American minds.

Stress on atrocities in the NWPC provided the perfect opportunity to use the Axis' own propaganda against them whilst simultaneously exposing the brutal realities of war to the distanced domestic audience. It was hoped that these images, used on a national scale, would be a potent source of mass mobilization. As the *New York World Telegram* reported: "These are no

gay pictures. They are powerful and grim ... Some are even shocking. But all are designed to bring to the boiling point America's will to win." In a *PM* satirical cartoon a male artist shows a poster on a desk in a room designated "Posters" entitled "The Nature of the Enemy"—a terrifying image of the open-mouthed enemy in ape-like stance—whilst explaining "Now what I was trying to do here ..." ²⁸ The three viewers (presumably imagined competition jurors), two male and one female, lie supine, doubtless having fainted (the desk chair is supine too), from the shock of having the enemy's nature exposed to them in this graphic way. The reaction of shock reveals contemporary thinking on the record and actions of the enemy which emphasized the atrocious nature of Nazi and Japanese conquest, as well as an acceptance of the authenticity of their brutal and iniquitous treatment of subjugated peoples.

A further recurring theme in the labels is Nazi impiety. Lionel S. Reiss, like Melzian, Marks and Brotman, uses a dagger (symbolic of

threatening aggression). Swastika-engraved and blood-drenched it smashes through a stained-glass church window (figurative of Christianity and, for a contemporary reviewer, the “destruction of Europe’s heritage of art” [Berryman E4]). Here again what the enemy means is the destruction of your way of life and everything that you believe in. To the Nazis nothing is sacred, and they hate religion. The intended response, encapsulated by the slogan is, “Praise the Lord and Pass the Ammunition!” Clarence West’s Nazi clawing hand reaches up, perhaps from Hell, but certainly out of a barren wasteland to destroy the noticeably white (purity, virtue, goodness) heavenward Christian cross. Its message, “Fight for Your Right to Free Worship!,” one of Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms.” The chosen images act as mirrors of enemy perception in World War II and, for NWPC sponsors the CFD at least, affirm that “the dynamic impression of poster-styling is a near-perfect medium for the promotion of lucid thinking.”²⁹ The primary publicized thought is that America’s enemies are horrifyingly wicked and a considerable threat (Figures 13 and 14).



Figure 13. Reiss, Lionel S. No. 30, *Artists Victory Exhibit in miniature*. Ever Ready Label Corp., 1943, Library of Virginia. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]



Figure 14. West, Clarence. No. 44, *Artists Victory Exhibit in miniature*. Ever Ready Label Corp., 1943, Library of Virginia. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Importantly, some NWPC posters were also published in *Life* magazine, a mainstream national reflection of the war for the home front. When war broke out in September 1939 *Life* claimed “a new and grave responsibility” of recording the conflict and “helping America see with its own eyes what it means for the world to be at war” (Larsen 2). Since its inception the magazine adopted a “technique of holding up mirrors to its readers” (Wainwright 26). The choice of the inclusions from Theme C reflect a contemptuous position toward the enemy which was a characteristic of *Life*’s wartime coverage; its stark assessments of the images appeared in captions. The feature included twenty-six posters; six in color were from Theme C, plus Marks’ entry (“War Posters” 54–57). Interestingly, some saw *Life*’s selection of posters as a critical comment on the prizewinning entries. They included only two of the nine (one of which was Koehler and Ancona’s). *Life*’s significant circulation of four million, with the added sizeable “lookers-through” or “pass-along” audience, dramatically increased the already considerable reach of the posters to those

who would not, or could not, attend an art exhibition, the traditional preserve of the middle and upper classes.³⁰ *Life's* photojournalism has been characterized by Philip Beidler as having a “thoroughgoing political and psychological identification in the public mind with the Allied war effort . . . at once representing and essentially constructing it for Americans . . . [it] assumed the position of preeminent popular information and morale resource for the duration” (66; 69). Therefore, *Life* encapsulated the “sturdy unanimity” of the home front but also cemented the posters and their pictorial perception of the enemy as equally unanimous (Wainwright 139).

Not included in the labels or MoMA exhibition but published in *Life* was the final publicly available enemy poster. G. V. Lewis' enemy is unmistakably Japanese: declared by the rising sun on his sleeve and field hat, his slanty-eyes, glasses, and Fu Manchu moustache (“Jap Murder” 55). In crouching, ape-like stance this soldier sneaks away from the battle to defile this presumably unconscious (she is not resisting), conspicuously Caucasian, naked, female. This enemy is so craven and driven by animalistic desires that he is literally dragging her back to his “cave.” His countenance and posture are devious as he grins and brandishes his pistol. In the background, someone is bayoneted, and shadowy figures are shown hanged in the flaming wreckage. The image of hanging as a method for murder (probably of the civilian population) is a further statement on the primitive, depraved and atrocious nature of Japanese soldiers.

The NWPC's reach even extended to Congress. In February 1943 Joseph Baldwin (N.Y.) deemed that the Competition was “Of immediate and direct service to the Nation” and highlighted the significant sweep of its posters with “well over 100,000,000 repetitions” appearing in a host of publications. In Senate, Robert Wagner (N.Y.) stated that he was “greatly impressed by the splendid voluntary contribution of the artists of America in dedicating their talents in our united effort for victory.” He continued: “the results obtained are placing Artists for Victory in a position of growing responsibility in relation to the

war.” Further congressional support for the Competition was received via over sixty letters of appreciation. The attention that AFV attracted in Congress was not universally positive, however. In the House of Representatives in mid-1943 Fred Busbey (Ill.) referred to AFV as a “communist controlled organization;” he highlighted Henry Billings' “past record for communist leanings,” and identified Hugo Gellert, “one of the reddest of the Reds,” as “a prime mover on the Communist art front;” and he used Rockwell Kent's long-standing “Communist” record to demonstrate “his total unfitness to act as juror in any competition devoted to patriotic purposes.” The “little Red Scare” of 1939–40 was in the immediate past, and although the Soviet Union was now an ally of the United States, anti-Communism did not disappear from the American scene. Communism remained an “Un-American” cause. AFV had long felt that there was a “deep rooted prejudice in the Congress against art and artists” and had hoped that their wartime contribution would erode this.³¹ Busbey's speech would have been doubly disappointing, therefore. Nonetheless, AFV's NWPC was a visual capture of U.S. images of the war and her enemies and ensured the survival of posters as a potent “weapon” in the conflict.

Conclusion

In the NWPC, and during World War II generally, posters were simple message vehicles that could address the war's fundamental questions: “why we fight?,” “who are we fighting with?” and “who are we fighting against?” As a result, it was increasingly understood that “Graphic presentation is in fact a war weapon.” Through easy, wide dissemination posters had the ability to attract, inform, inspire, persuade, garner support, urge action, and boost morale. The maintaining and moulding of morale was especially significant to the American experience of war because of geographical distance from the battlefields and escape from aerial attack. Nichols understood this,

stating that posters' "value as a morale builder is beyond doubt." Production of posters was informational work through which the American "spirit" would be motivated by the "understanding" the posters graphically rendered. The Associated Press agreed, writing: "One of the home front's most potent war weapons is the poster."³² The NWPC's particular significance in this regard was highlighted by Price, who described it as "the most effective effort yet made to turn American artists' skills into ammunition for winning the war" ("Camera" 24).

The power of war posters to wartime advocates, like AFV and the OWI, was that they had a uniquely democratic appeal. Primarily, they could be produced by anyone, seen by everyone, and understood by all. They had the advantage of being accessible, cheap, and ever-present. They could be placed anywhere with ease and their ubiquity offered huge potential for public consumption regardless of literacy. As Doris Brian made clear, for a poster to be functional in war it had to "be completely intelligible to the lower third of the population" (12). Thus, the issues needed to be simplified for the home front audience and, in the advertising tradition, interpretation limited. This included reference to stock figures and symbols drawing on pre-existing assumptions and widely-held beliefs. AFV explained effective poster technique to NWPC entrants: this required "one salient idea," a "simple and direct," "sincere and respect-commanding" message, "strong emotional impact" and expression of "the starkness of the issues."³³ Assessing the contents of the NWPC shows that this mandate was carefully followed. Early art-in-war efforts, like the NWPC, quickly created a visual discourse that was instantly recognizable and effective, using their own metonymy: flags stand for nations/unity, bomb stands for war, death's head/skeleton stands for death, women and children stand for home, white dove/olive branch stands for peace. In terms of enemy image, posters drew upon antecedent anti-German/-Japanese imagery to frame an accepted wartime iconography (from a twenty-first century viewpoint, the visual language of caricatured racism) of jackboots,

stahlhelme, monocles, daggers, samurai swords, claws, horn-rimmed glasses, buckteeth, slanty-eyes, simian features, and yellow skin. These results of the hostile imagination, a shorthand for both producer and receiver, shed light on perceptions of the enemy among the U.S. population.

Competition entries, if understood as graphic representations of the "national state of mind," reveal a great deal about the process of enmification but also disclose significant and interesting responses to the question "who are we fighting against?" Wartime enmity as exposed by the NWPC was firmly focused on German and Japanese behavior. This centered on their treatment of, and threat to, civilian populations and their antithetical stance to American values—"life," "liberty," "home," Christianity, honor, civilization. These issues were most crucial to understanding the enemies' "nature" as opposed to commenting on ideology (Nazism/Ultrnationalism). The posters reveal that nature as atrocious, violent, and savage, and it was both accepted and acceptable to think, speak and graphically vilify both enemies along these lines. Specifically, the Germans were murderous, barbarous, villainous, destructive, treacherous, and ruthlessly aggressive. Simultaneously, the Japanese were barbarous, treacherous, depraved, animalistic, and predatory. Crude racial stereotyping (yellowing of the skin, slanty-eyes, myopia, and buckteeth) is present in the images of the Japanese in a way that is absent in representations of the Germans. Racial difference between Americans (in this context WASPs) and "Orientals" in the visual realm were especially obvious, and the stereotypes were already well-established for American audiences since the graphic renderings of the "Yellow Peril" in the late-nineteenth century.³⁴ Racial difference was not central to these images, however. Instead, the answer to another key wartime question was paramount: "Are They Like U[.]s[.]"? or "Not Like U[.]s[.]"? In the results of the Competition neither the Germans, nor the Japanese were. This answer was cemented further by Theme C's required slogan, "This is the Enemy." Using "This" dehumanized the enemy, and for artists and viewers instantly created distance between

“Us” and “Them.” In its review of the MoMA exhibition *New Masses* reported that its “strength” was its “vigorous statement-in-practice of artists’ profound hatred of the fascist enemy” (“A Win-The-War” 16). The submissions therefore also reveal an entrenched normalization of acceptable levels of public hatred of other peoples, and the creation and legitimization of a certain language and imagery of the enemy within public discourse. Simultaneously the NWPC discloses auto-stereotypes of American identity by way of implicit contrast which is often overlooked in enemy image analysis.

Significantly, posters representing, and therefore exposing, the enemy’s nature, were viewed by employers as having additional value as workplace motivators. For example, in 1943 seventy-five posters representing the “best ‘horrors’” were requested by a Worcester, Mass., factory to “stir their complacent workers.” According to an AFV report, “with ghoulish glee we chose everything gory from hangings and rapeings [sic] to Hari-Kari for Hirohito and from which most people have shuddered away. The reaction to this was so grat[i]fying that another factory in this vicinity immediately borrowed the whole seventy-five to stimulate the efforts of their workmen.”³⁵ This instance reinforces the link between posters and morale. It is noteworthy that neither of the factories requested posters focused on the Production theme as likely to be stimulating for their workers, but instead chose those emphasizing the “horror” of the enemy. It seems that the NWPC exhibition ballot was correct in predicting the power of posters in the Nature of the Enemy category. As the OWI hoped, it appeared that the posters had helped to “develop a state of mind” and “persuade[d] the civilian to adopt his country’s war ideals as his own” (*How to Make* 5). This legitimization of hostile thinking and arousal of anger is especially important in understanding the national state of mind in World War II.

Overall, the NWPC was one of the most significant contributions made by American artists during the war. This was acknowledged contemporaneously as the Competition received high profile attention and endorsement from not only

the international art community, national press, a variety of government agencies, many in Congress, but also drew brief attention from the Commander-in-Chief himself. FDR wrote that the NWPC “is proof of what can be done by groups whose ordinary occupations might seem far removed from war. . . . not as a chore that they were asked to do but as a voluntary, spontaneous contribution.” Art, and art volunteerism especially, therefore was given noteworthy recognition because of the Competition. The posters’ influence was also lasting, as in 1944 at the Treasury Department’s request, AFV provided reproductions from the NWPC’s Production theme to the Fourth War Loan Drive.³⁶

Although the NWPC concentrated on poster production, AFV was keen not to confine its efforts to posters exclusively and sought to demonstrate a much larger role for art and artists in the war. Of course, AFV had been formed by artists who wished to combat German and Japanese philistinism, and desired to assist in the war effort by using their wide range of artistic abilities. AFV’s first public display of the hostile imagination was their construction of fourteen floats for Mayor La Guardia’s “New York at War” Parade, 13 June 1942, which “gave a graphic picture of the tyranny and treachery of the enemy.” Enemy images included the enemy as death (a giant Nazi skeleton), as barbarian (Hitler leading terrified and bedraggled occupation victims), as criminal (Hitler as chief gangster) and as aggressor (stab-in-the-back by Hitler’s stooges, the Japanese). A float warning, “Tokio [sic], We Are Coming,” depicted “yellow rats” being chased into the sea by American air power (“City Roars” 1; 3). These earlier efforts hinted at the tenor and concepts of the enemy theme in the NWPC. During the conflict AFV also operated as a clearing house for artists seeking war work, such as lecturing, camouflage, map and chart making; produced/provided further posters; sponsored, participated in, and organized other competitions and exhibitions, for example, *America in the War* which showcased “a picture of America in 1943, of a country and a people in their second year of war.” Under “The Enemy” theme Nazi atrocities

were still dominant with twelve in the category emphasising the persecution of their victims, depicting Lidice, aggression, ruin, execution, and slavery. Two entries portrayed the monstrosity of the Axis and two Japanese villainy. This demonstrates the persistence of atrocity in the U.S. hostile imagination that stretched beyond the confines of the NWPC and the early stage of the war. Other “patriotic service” included buoying American wounded in military hospitals.³⁷

The NWPC is an important and revealing event that historians of World War II and art historians have previously neglected. It illustrates the role of war posters as supposed “ammunition” in the conflict and sheds light on the U.S. population’s hostile imagination and visions of the enemy. The NWPC and AFV’s wider renderings of the enemy certainly revealed artistic passion for participation in enmification. AFV thought that the response to the NWPC was an “expression of the feelings and opinions of a perceptible percentage of the American people” and provided evidence to support such a conclusion. This volunteer effort demonstrates a determination by assumedly patriotic citizens, but also by the American government, to resolve what was considered to be a critical gap in the production of war posters. It also gives an insight into the creation, development, and acceptance, of images of the enemy. The posters the NWPC produced were cultural products that were designed to shape social acts and attitudes (the effects of which cannot be measured), and as such they have a significant value to the historian in a perhaps unexpected way in that they are testimonials of home front wartime psychology. The posters are surviving historical witnesses of American perceptions in 1942. Twenty-five years after he first advocated “making a weapon of printer’s ink and artist’s colors” (Price and Brown 16), Price reflected that “posters seem to express wartime psychology more directly than any other form of art” (“Camera” 38). The Competition is significant therefore as an expression of public perceptions of the enemy, stimulated by the President, in 1942. These were still relevant at least through 1943–1944. Despite aspirations for a peace-time role as a cultural stimulus that

continued until late 1945, AFV dissolved on 1 February 1946 as its “original purposes” were “accomplished in full with the end of the war.”³⁸ According to a contemporary commentator it “close[d] its books on a job well done” (Boswell 3).

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to Naoki Hashimura, Associate Curator at Okayama Prefectural Museum of Art and Shun Ito, Department of Yasuo Kuniyoshi Studies: Art Education and Rural Revitalization, Graduate School of Education, Okayama University for access to Kuniyoshi’s sketches and to the Fukutake Collection for granting reproduction rights.

Notes

1 Reflecting on the Cold War environment, philosopher Sam Keen sought to understand the “hostile imagination” and the “psychology of enmity” through analysis of images from various countries throughout the twentieth century. In so doing he identified thirteen “archetypes of the enemy.”

2 On posters as an art form, see for example, Price, *Poster Design*; Rickards, *Rise and Fall* and Barnicoat, *Concise History*. For posters as a medium of propaganda, see Aulich, *War Posters* and Welch, *Propaganda*. For posters in World War II, see Judd, *Posters*; Rhodes, *Propaganda*; Zeman, *Selling the War*; Nelson, *The Posters That Won the War*; Darman, *Posters* and Welch, *World War II Propaganda*. For posters in a wider sense, see Paret et al., *Persuasive Images*. For work on individual war poster artists, see for example, Decker, “Fighting for a Free World.” On posters for a specific audience, see Bird and Rubenstein, *Design for Victory*. Landau, *Artists for Victory*; ““A Certain Rightness”” and “Artists for Victory, Inc.”

3 In Apr. 1942, the Office of Fact and Figures had agreed that any AFV members could submit posters to the National Advisory Council on Government Posters which was trying to find a formula for effective poster design. Betty Chamberlain to Clif, 25 Apr. 1942. Early Museum History: Administrative Records, I.3.c. The Museum of Modern Art Archives, New York. Hereafter EMH. MoMA Archives, NY.

4 Swan, Bradford F. “War Posters.” *Providence Journal*, Rhode Island, 13 Dec. 1942. Department of Public Information Records, I [15; 207]. The Museum of Modern Art Archives, New York. Hereafter PI, I [15; 207]. MoMA Archives, NY.

5 Famous private poster series include Douglas Aircraft Co.’s “Tokio Kid,” General Motors Corp.’s “Keep ‘em Firing!” and RCA Manufacturing Co.’s “Beat the Promise” campaigns.

6 See Durney, “Asides” for the National Art Council for Defense’s statement of purpose; Minutes of the Meeting of the

Artists' Council for Victory, 19 Jan. 1942, 2, 3 (microfilm: frames 859–1428, reel 115), Artists for Victory, Inc. records, 1942–1946, Archives of American Art, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. Hereafter AFV Records, (115). AFV represented "Painting, Mural Painting, Sculpture, Architecture, Landscape Architecture and the Graphic and kindred arts." Certificate of Incorporation of AFV, 5 Mar. 1942, 1–2, *ibid.*

7 Organization Meeting of the Incorporators, 18 Mar. 1942, AFV Records, (115). The name "Artists for Victory" had been adopted on 2 Mar. 1942. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board of the AFV, 2 Mar. 1942, 1, *ibid.*; Preamble, Constitution, AFV, Incorporated, n.d., 1, *ibid.*; Callahan, Kenneth. *Seattle Times*, 13 Sept. 1942. PI, I [15; 207]. MoMA Archives, NY; for example, Minutes Executive Board, 8 Apr. 1942, 1–4, AFV Records, (115).

8 Deposition of Arthur Crisp, Treasurer, Feb. 1943, 2. AFV Records, (115). On the intervention debate, see Cole, and Doenecke.

9 Minutes Executive Board, 15 Apr. 1942, 1. AFV Records, (115); John Taylor Arms, Director, and Irwin D. Hoffman then Chairman, Committee on Production, later Chairman, Poster Committee and Co-Director of the NWPC. Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of Directors of AFV, 6 May 1942, 1, *ibid.*; Minutes Board of Directors, 18 May 1942, 1, *ibid.*; List, Council for Democracy, Board of Directors, 3 Oct. 1940, 1–2. HUGFP 17.24: Council for Democracy (CFD), 1940–1942, box 4, CFD, 1940–1945, folder, CFD, 1940–1941, Papers of Carl J. Friedrich, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, Mass.; CFD, Draft of statement for Executive Committee, 6 Mar. 1941, *ibid.*, courtesy of the Harvard University Archives; Theodore S. Ruggles, Co-Director, NWPC and Director of Visual Education, CFD to Margit Varga, Art Director, *Life*, memo, "Statement from Council for Democracy re National War Poster competition," 24 Nov. 1942, 1. The Museum of Modern Art Exhibition Records, 207.3. The Museum of Modern Art Archives, New York. Hereafter MoMA Exhs., 207.3. MoMA Archives, NY; Ernest Angell to Hobart Nichols, 22 Jul. 1942, 2. The Museum of Modern Art Exhibition Records, 207.2. The Museum of Modern Art Archives, New York. Hereafter MoMA Exhs., 207.2. MoMA Archives, NY.

10 Hobart Nichols, 24 Aug. 1942. MoMA Exhs., 207.2. MoMA Archives, NY; Nichols to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 5 Nov. 1942. MoMA Exhs., 207.3. MoMA Archives, NY.

11 Betty Chamberlain, Assistant to the Director to Charles Coiner, Consultant on Design, Office for Emergency Management (OEM)/OWI, 19 May 1942. MoMA Exhs., 207.2. MoMA Archives, NY; Monroe Wheeler, Director of Exhibitions and Publications, MoMA, consultant Publications and Art Section of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, to Clark, Goodyear, Rockefeller, Abbott, Barr, Courter, Hawkins, Newmeyer, Soby and Ulrich, memo, re: National War Poster Competition, 24 Jul. 1942. EMH, I.29, *ibid.*; Wheeler to Nichols, 22 Jul. 1942. MoMA Exhs., 207.2, *ibid.* For no recorded reason, the slogans were initially "turned down" and new ones prepared. Minutes of a Board Meeting of AFV, 5 Aug. 1942, 3. AFV Records, (115); Press release, "War Bond Prizes in Nationwide Competition Sponsored by Artists for Victory, Council for Democracy, and Museum of Modern Art," 12 Aug. 1942, 2. MoMA Exhs., 207.3. MoMA Archives, NY. A: Treasury Department approved slogan, suggested by Francis E. Brennan, Chief of Graphics Division, OWI. Sponsored by AFV. B: Sponsored by AFV. C: Approved by the OWI. Sponsored by AFV. R. Hoe & Co., a NY-based manufacturer of printing presses, provided four war bonds of \$300 (Production, War Bonds, Nature of the Enemy and Loose Talk), \$1000 for competition development and agreed to produce 5000 copies of each of their poster designs for sale by AFV. Minutes Board of Directors, 15 Jul. 1942 and Minutes of a Meeting of AFV, 17 Dec. 1942, 2. AFV Records, (115). D: Suggested by OWI. Sponsored by AFV. E: Suggested and sponsored by CFD. Approved by the OWI. Also sponsored by Broadway producer, Dwight Wiman. F: Suggested and sponsored

by CFD. Approved by the OWI. Also sponsored by Ellsworth Bunker, member of the Board of Directors, CFD. G: Suggested and sponsored by CFD. Approved by the OWI. This theme "should evoke pity and compassion for the suffering victims of Nazi slavery, brutality and persecution." NWPC Circular, 10 Aug. 1942, 10. MoMA Exhs., 207.3. MoMA Archives, NY. Interestingly artists' interpretation of slavery emphasized sexual enslavement and enemy licentiousness. For example, "Women by J. Willard to Symbolize Beauty Defiled." *Life*, 21 Dec. 1942, p. 55 and "Protective Custody" Under the Barbarian!, Willard, Jack A. No. 42, *Artists Victory Exhibit in miniature*. Ever Ready Label Corp., 1943. H: Suggested by OWI and sponsored by CFD. Thomas J. Watson, President of IBM, offered \$1000 for his slogan, "Sacrifice - The Privilege of Free Men." Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of AFV, 19 Aug. 1942, 1. AFV Records, (115). Also sponsored by art collector, Sam A. Lewisohn.

12 The Circular resulted from collaboration by Scott Williams, Vice-President/Chairman, Poster Committee, AFV, Irwin Hoffman and Theodore S. Ruggles with input from the OWI and others. Ruggles to Varga, memo, "Statement from Council for Democracy . . .," 24 Nov. 1942, 1, MoMA Exhs., 207.3. MoMA Archives, NY. The only restrictions were that entrants must be an Associate Member of AFV or "of any voluntary group of artists organized for war work" or be registered as an "artist-volunteer" by a Civilian Defense Council. Circular, 10 Aug. 1942, 1, 2, 3, 7, 10, 8, *ibid.*

13 Letter to Yasuo Kuniyoshi, 19 Sept. 1942, Yasuo Kuniyoshi Papers, Box 4, Folder 34, Archives of American Art, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. Hereafter Kuniyoshi Papers; Circular, 10 Aug. 1942, 1. MoMA Exhs., 207.3. MoMA Archives, NY.

14 Originally 15 Oct. Press Release, "National War Poster Competition Extended One Week—Entries Received at Rate of 100 Daily," 24 Sept. 1942; "National War Poster Competition" and Press release, "Great Number of Entries—2,224—in National War Poster Competition Causes Postponement of Exhibition at Museum of Modern Art," 6 Nov. 1942. The Museum of Modern Art Exhibition Records, 207.4. The Museum of Modern Art Archives, New York. Hereafter MoMA Exhs., 207.4. MoMA Archives, NY. The Board considered that they had "the largest collection of war posters in the country." Minutes Board Meeting, 21 Oct. 1942, 1–2, AFV Records, (115); Wheeler to Stuart Davis, 19 Oct. 1942. MoMA Exhs., 207.2. MoMA Archives, NY; Irwin Hoffman, "Breakdown of all the 2,224 entries to the Competition," 31 Oct. 1942 and "National War Poster Statistics," n.d. MoMA Exhs., 207.3. MoMA Archives, NY. Over 30% were from servicemen. Russ[ell Pleasant] Hodges/Hoffman, Transcript, For WOL Broadcast – "War Posters," 16 Jan. 1943, 1. AFV Records, (115); Press release for *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, n.d. MoMA Exhs., 207.3. MoMA Archives, NY; Quoted in "Posters for Victory' Exhibit Started on Nation-Wide Tour." *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 Jan. 1943. PI, I [15; 207], *ibid.*

15 Hoffman, "Breakdown," MoMA Exhs., 207.3. MoMA Archives, NY; Sarah Newmeyer, Publicity Director, to Floyd Taylor, Feature Editor, *New York World Telegram*, 17 Nov. 1942, 1–2, *ibid.*; Transcript, For WOL Broadcast, 16 Jan. 1943, 1. AFV Records, (115); Italians made up the largest foreign-born white population in N.Y.C.: 19.7%. This figure does not include details of naturalized citizens of Italian ancestry. *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, vol. 2, pt. 5, Population*. Government Printing Office, 1943, 159.

16 The jury made up of: John Taylor Arms; Walter Baerman, Section of Volunteer Talents, Office of Civilian Defense; Francis E. Brennan; Charles T. Coiner; Stuart Davis; James T.[hrall] Soby, Director, Armed Services Program, MoMA; Rex Stout, Chairman, War Writers Board and Board Member, CFD and Monroe Wheeler. Press release, "President Roosevelt Congratulates 2,200 Artists of the Country on Response to National War Poster Competition," 21 Nov. 1942, 1. The Museum of Modern Art Exhibition Records, 207.1. The Museum of Modern Art Archives, New York. Hereafter

MoMA Exhs., 207.1. MoMA Archives, NY. They also won the prize in Theme F: The People are on the March. See also "Artists Koehler and Ancona Drew Monaced Nazi." *Life*, 21 Dec. 1942, p. 55. For example, Swan, "War Posters." PI, I [15; 207]. MoMA Archives, NY. "Message to Italians in Sicily." *Washington Evening Star*, 8 Aug. 1943. PI, I [15; 207]. MoMA Archives, NY.

17 Both included in the MoMA exhibition.

18 "Issei, considered to be resident aliens, were the first generation of Japanese in the United States. They were born in Japan but immigrated to the United States, where discriminatory laws, such as those embodying the national origins quota system, prevented their becoming naturalized citizens." (Toon 201-2). Dorothy Payne, Assistant Secretary, AFV to Kuniyoshi, 9 Sept. 1942 and response to reply, n.d., Box 1, Folder 20, Kuniyoshi Papers; MacLeish to Kuniyoshi, 24 Jun. 1942, 1, Box 4, Folder 34, *ibid.* For example, the *Washington Post's* report on the NWPC noted: "Of particular interest is the inclusion of two designs by Kuniyoshi, who has an established place in American art." Watson, Jane. "Poster Show War Theme Panorama." *Washington Post*, 24 Jan. 1943, L4. PI, I [15; 207]. MoMA Archives, NY. To my knowledge only one other exhibited, but not widely disseminated poster, potentially depicted Chinese death. It was reported as follows in the contemporary press: Monty Lewis "depicts a brutal and powerfully armed Japanese soldier bayoneting his victims." *San Diego Union*, 13 Dec. 1942. PI, I [15; 207]. MoMA Archives, NY. The only information about Kuniyoshi's Theme C submission also appeared in a press report. His "interpretation of 'This is the Enemy' is an admirable crayon drawing of a medieval Japanese warrior in armor, standing over his victim" (Beryman E4). It seems reasonable to assume that this was a Chinese victim also and potentially female. A warrior appears in sketches completed in September 1942 for the OWI. The ancient origin of current Japanese militarism is the implication. See *Yasuo Kuniyoshi from the Fukutake Collection, Okayama Prefectural Museum of Art, 2011*, Exhibition Catalog, in Japanese, Nos. 21024, 21025, 21026. Both posters were included in the MoMA exhibition.

19 For enemy image studies, see for example, Rieber, *Psychology*; Dower, *War Without Mercy*; MacDougall, "Red, Brown, and Yellow Perils;" Hase and Lehmkühl, *Enemy Images*; Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*. See Roeder, *Censored War* for more details.

20 Included in MoMA exhibition.

21 "President Roosevelt Congratulates . . .," 21 Nov. 1942, 1-2. MoMA Exhs., 207.1. MoMA Archives, NY; Wheeler to Hoffman, 25 Jan. 1943, 1. MoMA Exhs., 207.2, *ibid.*; Hoffman to Wheeler, 1 Feb. 1943, *ibid.* It is important to note, however, that the original form of the poster was considered "not altogether suitable for use in Latin America, so the Office of Inter-American Affairs negotiated . . . the execution of a similar poster, taking certain other factors into consideration." Wheeler to Hoffman, 25 Jan. 1943, 1, *ibid.* The issue was that "Chile has declared war on Japan . . . making the rising sun an important factor in this poster as the swastika." Wheeler to Arthur Dressel, R. Hoe & Co., 9 Feb. 1943, *ibid.*; Hoffman to Wheeler, 12 Dec. 1942, *ibid.* It was further reproduced as: "D. Bryers Drew Hitler's Face Over War Victims." *Life*, 21 Dec. 1942, p. 55 and Bryers, Duane. No. 23, *Artists Victory Exhibit in miniature*. Ever Ready Label Corp., 1943. Both in color as in the original submission.

22 Newmeyer to Floyd Taylor, 17 Nov. 1942, 1. MoMA Exhs., 207.3. MoMA Archives, NY. These were: Frederick Siebel, "Someone talked!," OWI Poster No. 18, 1942; Anton Otto Fischer, "A careless word . . . A needless sinking," OWI Poster No. 24, 1942 and Fischer, "A careless word . . . A needless loss," OWI Poster No. 36, 1943. Irwin Hoffman, Report: Posters for the First Annual Meeting, 27 Jan. 1943, 1. AFV Records, (115); Robert F. Wagner (Sen., N.Y.), "Artists for Victory," *Congressional Record*, 78 Cong., 1 sess., 9 Mar. 1943, p. 1711. The other Treasury posters were Dudley G. Summers, "Some One Talked," Henry La Gagnina [sic Cagnina], "Fight It Out on This Line" and Harriet Nadian [sic Nadeau], "A photograph of a Child with Swastika 'back of her.'" ("Deliver us from

evil': Buy War Bonds," War Savings Staff Poster 808, U.S. Treasury, 1943). Beyond those outlined above, two further posters were: Barbara Marks, "This is the Enemy," OWI Poster No. 76, 1943, "Axis Dagger Through Torn Bible is by B. Marks." *Life*, 21 Dec. 1942, p. 55 and "Work To Keep Free," War Production Board, No. A-29, 1943 (possibly Otto Keisker or at least based on his idea. "Work Poster for the Home Front is by O. Keisker." *Life*, 21 Dec. 1942, p. 56.) *ARTnews* reported that the OWI "also purchased the idea from a poster by Milton Brageman [sic Milton L. Bergman (Production)]" "Poster Exhibit."

23 It was noted that "on account of lack of space at the Modern Museum there are many first-rate designs that cannot be shown there." Minutes Board Meeting, 28 Oct. 1942, 1. AFV Records, (115). National Gallery, 17 Jan.-17 Feb. 1943, 300 posters. They hoped to exhibit 350 posters, but this had to be reduced as it "could only hold three hundred." Hoffman Report, 6-11 Jan. 1943, 1, 3, AFV Records, (115). The "extra posters [were] chosen on the basis of effectiveness and popular appeal." "Poster Exhibit." Carnegie Institute, 3 Mar.-4 Apr. 1943, 262 posters. "War Posters." *Carnegie Magazine*, vol. 16, no. 10, 1943, 296; Olmsted, Anna W. "Artists for Victory War Posters." *Syracuse Post-Standard*, 8 Nov. 1943. PI, I [15; 207]. MoMA Archives, NY. "On Sunday, January 24, 16,117 persons came to see the exhibition . . . This was one of the largest crowds the Gallery has ever drawn." "More Poster News." Meeting of the Corporation, 21 Apr. 1943, 1, AFV Records, (115); Arms to Ralph Walker, 15 Jul. 1943, 1-3 (microfilm: frames 1-640, reel 116), Artists for Victory, Inc. records, 1942-1946, Archives of American Art, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. Hereafter AFV Records, (116). First collection, 112 posters, 1943: Wesleyan University, 28 Apr.-12 May; Yale University Art Gallery, 13 May-7 Jul.; Albright Art Gallery, 15 Jul.-26 Aug.; Syracuse Museum of Fine Arts; Marshall Field Company, 6 Oct.-1 Nov.; Currier Gallery; Boston Public Library; Cleveland Museum of Art, 1 Sept.-1 Oct.; Columbus Gallery of Fine Arts and Dayton Art Institute. The exhibition would return to the East in 1944 e.g. Morgan Memorial building, Conn., 19 Mar. 1944. "War Posters Being Shown at Wesleyan." *Middletown Press*, 8 May 1943. PI, I [15; 207]. MoMA Archives, NY. Second collection, 112 posters, 1943: Baltimore Museum of Art, 15 May-15 Jun.; Oglebay Institute, 2-22 Jul.; Valentine Museum, 29 Jul.-26 Aug.; Alabama Polytechnic Institute, Aug; Birmingham Public Library, 1-30 Sept.; Dallas Museum of Fine Arts, 10-31 Oct.; Fort Worth Art Association, 3-30 Nov.; Brooks Memorial Art Gallery, 5-31 Dec. 1944: Isaac Delgado Museum of Art, 7-30 Jan. and City Art Museum of St. Louis, 5 Feb.-Mar. List, War Posters Exhibition, Group B, Dallas Museum of Fine Arts, 10-31 Oct. 1943. War Posters Exhibition, Group B, Dallas Museum of Fine Arts, https://files.dma.org/multimedia/document/145398173527573_original.pdf. Accessed 8 February 2022. Third collection, 112 posters, 1943: Milwaukee Art Institute, 1 May-9 Jun.; California Palace of the Legion of Honor, 15 Jun.-15 Jul.; Joslyn Memorial Art Museum, 1-26 Aug.; Cincinnati Museum of Art, 1 Sept-1 Oct.; Taft Museum, 15-30 Sept.; Thayer Museum, Mulvane Art Museum and Wichita Art Association; Grand Rapids Art Gallery, Jan. 1944; Portland Art Museum and Seattle Art Museum. "Fords Graduate Designs Poster." *Perth Amboy Evening News*, 7 Jun. 1943. PI, I [15; 207]. MoMA Archives, NY; "Poster Shows"; Minutes Executive Board, 23 Jun. 1943, 2. AFV Records, (115); Minutes Executive Board, 16 Jun. 1943, 2, *ibid.* Senator Wagner highlighted the Treasury sponsorship. Wagner, *Congressional Record*, 9 Mar. 1943, p. 1712.

24 Barclay, not included at MoMA but exhibited at the National Gallery of Art. Grant, included in the MoMA and National Gallery exhibitions.

25 Minutes Executive Board, 3 Mar. 1943, 1 and 10 Mar. 1943, 1. AFV Records. (115); Joseph Clark Baldwin (Rep., N.Y.), "Artists for Victory," *Congressional Record*, 78 Cong., 1 sess., 16 Feb. 1943, p. A611. AFV claimed "over five million," however. Certificate of Appreciation, War Poster Label Campaign, 29 Mar. 1943. AFV Records, (115); Wagner, *Congressional Record*, 9 Mar. 1943, p. 1712;

Minutes Board Meeting, 23 Dec. 1942, 1. AFV Records, (115); “Artists Victory Exhibit in miniature;” Recommendation of Julian Levi, Chairman, Committee on Publicity, AFV. Minutes Board Meeting, 30 Dec. 1942, 1 and 23 Dec. 1942, 1, *ibid.*

26 See also “H. Melzian Drew Jap Atrocity as Grim Warning.” *Life*, 21 Dec. 1942, p. 55. The figure “looks more like [a] 1918 Prussian than a 1942 Nazi” (Brian 11).

27 See also Treidler, Adolph. *Help Stop This*. 1917. Library of Congress. <https://www.loc.gov/item/2002722578/>. And St. John, J. Allen. *The Hun – His Mark*. 1918. Library of Congress. <https://www.loc.gov/item/2002722433/>. Accessed February 2022. Barclay worked on naval camouflage and won a poster competition in 1917. Barclay, McClelland. *Fill the Breach*. Wood, Henry A. Wise. *Work of the Conference Committee on National Preparedness, 1918*. The Committee, c. 1918, 22.

28 “Posters Promote the ‘Will to Win.’” *New York World Telegram*, 23 Nov. 1942. PI, I [15; 207]. MoMA Archives, NY. “‘Now what I was trying to do here . . .,’” *PM*, 8 Nov. 1942, *ibid.*

29 Reiss included in the MoMA exhibition. Also “Nazi Religious Persecution Depicted by L. Reiss,” *Life*, 21 Dec. 1942, p. 55. West, not included in the MoMA exhibition but included at the National Gallery. The “Four Freedoms” first articulated in Roosevelt’s 1941 State of the Union Address, and repeated in the same in 1942, were: freedom of speech and of religion and freedom from want and fear. CFD, memo, re: “Poster Project,” 29 Apr. 1942, 2, MoMA Exhs., 207.2. MoMA Archives, NY.

30 *Star Press*, 27 Dec. 1942. PI, I [15; 207]. MoMA Archives, NY. The Net Paid Average Circulation of *Life* in 1942 was 3,879,589. *Magazine Circulation and Rate Trends, 1940–1959*. Association of National Advertisers Inc., 1960, 12. By the spring of 1940 *Life*’s weekly audience was 19,900,000 with a formal circulation of 2,800,000 copies (Wainwright 29; 114).

31 Baldwin, *Congressional Record*, 16 Feb. 1943, p. A611; Wagner, *Congressional Record*, 9 Mar. 1943, pp. 1711–12; Henry Billings, Chairman, Committee on Government and Public Relations and Gellert, Vice President of AFV. Special Meeting of the Executive Board, 21 Jul. 1943, 1. AFV Records, (115); Fred E. Busbey (Rep., Ill.), “Red Art Propaganda,” *Congressional Record*, 78 Cong., 1 sess., 30 Jun. 1943, pp. 6892–94 and Hoffman Report, 27 Jan. 1943, 2. AFV Records, (115).

32 Wagner, *Congressional Record*, 9 Mar. 1943, p. 1711; “President Roosevelt Congratulates . . .,” 21 Nov. 1942, 2. MoMA Exhs., 207.1. MoMA Archives, NY; for example, AP Features, “Posters to Help Win the War.” *Key West Citizen*, 1 Jan. 1943, p. 1.

33 Circular, 10 Aug. 1942, 2. MoMA Exhs., 207.3. MoMA Archives, NY.

34 See for example, Lee, *Orientalism*.

35 The Index Committee Reports - Posters, Jul. to Nov. 1943, 1. AFV Records, (115).

36 Roosevelt to Nichols, 16 Nov. 1942. MoMA Exhs., 207.3. MoMA Archives, NY. FDR was presented proofs of four prizewinning posters in January 1943. Hoffman Report, 6–11 Jan. 1943, 2 and Report on trip to Washington, 13–16 Jan. 1943, 3, 2. AFV Records, (115). Minutes Executive Board, 26 Jan. 1944, 3. AFV Records, (116).

37 Minutes, 20 Apr. 1942, 2. AFV Records, (115); Report of the Index Committee for the First Annual Meeting, 27 Jan. 1943, 1–2, *ibid.*; Minutes Executive Board, 30 Jun. 1943, 3, *ibid.*; The Index Committee Reports - Posters, Jul. to Nov. 1943, 1, *ibid.* and Bianca Todd, Index Report for Dec. 1943, 2. AFV Records, (116); Joseph LeBoit, AFV Promotions and Programs, quoted in Landau, *Artists for Victory*, 3 and America in the War competition circular, 1943, AFV Records, (115); Edward Steese, Committee on Volunteer Services, AFV, to Arthur Crisp, memo, Activities of the Committee for the year 1944, 23 Jan. 1945, AFV Records, (116); Committee on Volunteer Services Summary of Work Accomplished to Oct. 1

1945, n.d., *ibid.* and Hamburger, “Boys in Maroon.” Other exhibitions: a national aviator sculpture exhibition, Women’s International Exposition of Arts and Industries, Contemporary American Art exhibitions in 1942; The Arts in Therapy, Interpreting the Christmas Message for Our Own Times in 1943; Portrait of America, the American-British Goodwill Exhibition, 1944 and 1945. Competitions, for example, La Tausca Pearls and Inter-Racial and Inter-Faith Committee in 1945. Minutes Executive Board, 12 Sept. 1945, 3, AFV Records, (116); Minutes Executive Board, 31 Jan. 1945, 2, *ibid.*

38 Minutes Board Meeting, 28 Oct. 1942, 1–2. AFV Records, (115); Important - To the members of the Board, (c. 19 Dec. 1945). AFV Records, (116). For postwar planning, see Post-War Planning Committee reports, *ibid.* and “A for V Plans Now.”

Works Cited

- “A for V Plans Now.” *Art Digest*, vol. 19, no. 6, 1944, p. 19.
- “Artists’ Council for Victory.” *Art Digest*, vol. 16, no. 9, 1942, pp. 32–3.
- “Artists for Victory.” *Art Digest*, vol. 16, no. 19, 1942, p. 28.
- “Artists’ War Measure for the Attention of All Art Societies and All Who Work in the Visual Arts.” *Art Digest*, vol. 16, no. 6, 1941, p. 33.
- “A Win-The-War Poster Exhibit.” *New Masses*, vol. 45, no. 10, 1942, pp. 16–7.
- Aulich, James. *War Posters: Weapons of Mass Communication*. Thames and Hudson, 2007.
- Barnicoat, John. *A Concise History of Posters*. Thames and Hudson, 1972.
- Barr, Alfred H. “What We Are Fighting For.” *PM*, New York, 10 Jun. 1942, p. 12.
- Beidler, Philip D. *The Good War’s Greatest Hits: World War II and American Remembering*. The University of Georgia Press, 1998.
- Berryman, Florence S. “Large Exhibition of War Posters at National Gallery.” *The Sunday Star*, Washington D.C., 7 Feb. 1943, p. E4.
- Bird, Kai. *The Chairman: John J. McCloy*. Simon & Schuster, 1992.
- Bird Jr., William L., and Harry R. Rubenstein. *Design for Victory: World War II Posters on the American Home Front*. Princeton Architectural Press, 1998.
- Boswell, Peyton. “Artists for Victory Disband.” *Art Digest*, vol. 20, no. 8, 1946, p. 3.
- Brian, Doris. “Are These Posters for Victory?” *ARTnews*, vol. 41, no. 14, 1942, pp. 11–3.
- “City Roars Vow to Win at War Parade.” *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, New York, 14 Jun. 1942, pp. 1, 3.
- Cole, Wayne S. *Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–45*. University of Nebraska Press, 1983.
- “Daily Pick-Ups.” *Chillicothe Constitution Tribune*, Missouri, 26 Jul. 1943, p. 2.
- Darman, Peter. *Posters of World War II*. Brown Reference Group, 2008.
- Decker, Christof. “Fighting for a Free World: Ben Shahn and the Art of the War Poster.” *American Art*, vol. 33, no. 2, 2019, pp. 84–105.
- Doenecke, Justus D. *Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939–1941*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

- Dower, John W. *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*. Pantheon Books, 1986.
- Durney, Helen. "Asides." *Design*, vol. 43, no. 6, 1942, pp. 25–6.
- "Editor's Letters." *ARTnews*, vol. 41, no. 16, 1943, p. 4.
- Farber, Manny. "War Posters." *New Republic*, 16 Mar. 1942, pp. 366–7.
- Frankfurter, Alfred M. "The Place of the Poster." *ARTnews*, vol. 41, no. 9, 1942, pp. 44–5.
- Gullace, Nicoletta F. "Allied Propaganda and World War I: Interwar Legacies, Media Studies, and the Politics of War Guilt." *History Compass*, vol. 9, no. 9, 2011, pp. 686–700.
- Hamburger, Philip. "The Boys in Maroon." *New Yorker*, 25 Sept. 1943.
- Hase, Ragnhild Fiebig-von, and Ursula Lehmkuhl, editors. *Enemy Images in American History*. Berghahn Books, 1997.
- "Hours Pledged." *ARTnews*, vol. 42, no. 6, 1943, p. 27.
- How to Make and Reproduce Posters*. Government Printing Office, 1943.
- "Jap Murder and Rape was Drawn by G. V. Lewis." *Life*, 21 Dec. 1942, p. 55.
- Jewell, Edward Alden. "War Posters." *New York Times*, 29 Nov. 1942, p. X9.
- Judd, Denis. *Posters of World War Two*. Wayland, 1972.
- Keen, Sam. *Faces of the Enemy – Reflections of the Hostile Imagination: The Psychology of Enmity*. Harper & Row, 1986.
- Koppes, Clayton R., and Gregory D. Black. *Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies*. The Free Press, 1987.
- Landau, Ellen G. *Artists for Victory: An Exhibition Catalog*. Library of Congress, 1983.
- . "A Certain Rightness: Artists For Victory's "America in the War" Exhibition of 1943." *Arts Magazine*, vol. 60, no. 6, 1986, pp. 43–54.
- . "Artists for Victory, Inc." *The Grove Encyclopedia of American Art*, vol. 1, Ed. Joan M. Marter. Oxford UP, 2011, pp. 150–1.
- Larsen, Roy E. "Letters to the Publisher." *Life*, 26 Jan. 1942, p. 2.
- Lasswell, Harold D. *Propaganda Technique in the World War*. Peter Smith, 1938 [1927].
- Lee, Robert G. *Orientalism: Asian Americans in Popular Culture*. Temple UP, 1999.
- MacDougall, Robert. "Red, Brown and Yellow Perils: Images of the American Enemy in the 1940s and 1950s." *Journal of Popular Culture*, vol. 32, no. 4, 1999, pp. 59–75.
- "More About the National War Poster Contest." *American Artist*, vol. 6, no. 10, 1942, p. 40.
- "More Poster News." *ARTnews*, vol. 42, no. 1, 1943, p. 26.
- "National War Poster Competition." *Design*, vol. 44, no. 2, 1942, p. 21.
- "Nazi Rips American Flag in A. Brotman's Poster." *Life*, 21 Dec. 1942, p. 55.
- Nelson, Derek. *The Posters That Won the War*. Motorbooks International, 1991.
- Newton, Eric. "New American War Posters." *Art & Industry*, vol. 35, no. 208, 1943, pp. 98–106.
- Paret, Peter, et al. *Persuasive Images: Posters of War and Revolution from the Hoover Archives*. Princeton UP, 1992.
- Phillips, Duncan. "The Arts in Wartime." *ARTnews*, vol. 41, no. 9, 1942, pp. 20, 45.
- Poster Handbook*. Government Printing Office, 1943.
- "Poster Exhibit." *ARTnews*, vol. 41, no. 17, 1943, p. 25.
- "Poster Shows." *ARTnews*, vol. 42, no. 6, 1943, p. 27.
- "Poster Winners to Be Picked." *New York Times*, 1 Nov. 1942, p. 27.
- "Posters for Defense." *The Bulletin of The Museum of Modern Art*, vol. 8, no. 6, 1941, pp. 3–8.
- Price, Charles Matlack. *Poster Design: A Critical Study of the Development of the Poster in Continental Europe, England and America*. George W. Bricka, 1922.
- Price, [Charles] Matlack, and Horace Brown. *How to Put in Patriotic Posters the Stuff that Makes People Stop-Look-Act!* National Committee of Patriotic Societies, 1918.
- . "2224 War Posters." *American Artist*, vol. 6, no. 10, 1942, pp. 4–11, 40.
- . "The Camera and the Poster." *American Artist*, vol. 7, no. 1, 1943, pp. 24–6, 38.
- Renwick, Stephen Lee. "Observations on a Poster Competition." *American Artist*, Oct. 1941, pp. 24, 38.
- Rhodes, Anthony. *Propaganda the Art of Persuasion: World War II*. Chelsea House Publishers, 1976.
- Rieber, Robert W., editor. *The Psychology of War and Peace: The Image of the Enemy*. Plenum Press, 1991.
- Rickards, Maurice. *The Rise and Fall of the Poster*. Thames and Hudson, 1971.
- Roeder Jr., George H. *The Censored War: American Visual Experience during World War Two*. Yale UP, 1993.
- "Ten Thousand Artists United for Victory." *Art Digest*, vol. 16, no. 9, 1942, p. 17.
- The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. XI. Ed. Samuel I. Rosenman. Harper & Brothers, 1950.
- Toon, Wendy. "Japanese Americans." *Historical Dictionary of the 1940s*. Ed. James G. Ryan and Leonard Schlup. M. E. Sharpe, 2006, pp. 201–2.
- Wainwright, Loudon. *The Great American Magazine: An Inside History of Life*. Alfred A. Knopf, 1986.
- "War Posters." *Time*, 31 Aug. 1942, p. 54.
- "War Posters." *Life*, 21 Dec. 1942, pp. 54–7.
- "War Posters Shown at Legion of Honor." *Oakland Tribune*, California, 27 Jun. 1943, p. B3.
- Welch, David. *Propaganda: Power and Persuasion*. The British Library, 2013.
- . *World War II Propaganda: Analyzing the Art of Persuasion during Wartime*. ABC-CLIO, 2017.
- Zeman, Zbynek. *Selling the War: Art and Propaganda in World War II*. Orbis Publishing, 1978.
- "200 War Posters Go on View Today." *New York Times*, 25 Nov. 1942, pp. 25–6.