

**Inspiring a Generation(?): Interconnecting
discourses between governing actors, policy,
and legacy around London 2012**

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Abstract

In this thesis, I critically examine governing actors, policy, and legacy discourses connected to the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games' legacy aim to 'inspire a generation.' In academic, political, and media scrutiny around the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim the debates are frequently reduced to considering why policy changes or legacy initiatives have not resulted in observable increases in sport and physical activity among young people. I move beyond these debates to discuss the governing aspect and to contribute a perspective on how the legacy aim affected policy across the bidding, planning, delivery, and (ongoing) legacy of London 2012. I focus on how the official London 2012 educational programme (Get Set) affected discourses around domestic policy in the sport and education sectors.

To achieve this, I employ a multimethod qualitative design (documentary evidence, political and policy dialogue, and semi-structured interviews) to, firstly, identify key policy and legacy documents related to the Get Set educational programme and the London 2012 'inspire a generation' legacy aim. Secondly, to explore discursive changes to legacy and policy from the perspective of a variety of governing actors that span across the state, commercial, and non-profit organisations. Given the importance placed on young people by the UK Government and the Olympic and Paralympic movements, the legacy aim intersects both domestic and international discourses, such as neoliberalism and ableism. The findings of the analysis are examined further through a theoretical lens influenced by the Foucauldian concept of governmentality.

The findings and discussion demonstrate how policy and legacy discourses have been interpreted and utilised differently by governing actors, moreover, how such differences can be analysed through governmental ambitions, political rationalities, and governing technologies. The findings and discussion highlight, firstly, the ownership and responsibility of the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim as there are distinct differences between the UK Government and the Olympic and Paralympic organisations formations of governing. Secondly, the intersection of legacy and policy around the visibility and legitimacy of the Paralympic movement and disabled young people. The thesis contributes to the ongoing debate around the London 2012 legacy. It suggests how the case of the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim has implications for academics, policymakers, and other agents understanding of governing systems around young people, sport, and education.

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You did in your twenties what you knew how to do, and when you knew better you did better. And you should not be judged for the person that you were, but for the person that you're trying to be and the woman that you are now

~ Dr Maya Angelou (author, poet, and civil activist)

[as quoted in 'The Powerful Lesson Maya Angelou Taught Oprah' aired in 2011]



Olympic cauldron being lowered at the London 2012 Olympic closing ceremony ([Flickr: DSC_5121, Nick Webb](#))



Greenway approach, looking towards Channelsea House ([Marcus Cyron/Sludge G](#))

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List of Abbreviations

BOA	British Olympic Association
BPA	British Paralympic Association
DCSF	Department for Children, Schools and Families
DCMS	Department for Culture, Media and Sport
DfE	Department for Education
DfES	Department for Education and Skills
DNH	Department of National Heritage
GLA	Greater London Authority
HM Treasury	Her Majesty's Treasury
HoC	House of Commons
HoL	House of Lords
IOC	International Olympic Committee
IPC	International Paralympic Committee
LOCOG	London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games
London 2012	London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games
ODA	Olympic Delivery Authority
OfDI	Office for Disability Issues
OFSTED	Office for Standards in Education
PE	Physical education
PESSCL	Physical education, school sport and club links strategy
PESSYP	Physical education, school sport and young people strategy
PSA	Public Service Agreement
UK	United Kingdom
YST	Youth Sport Trust

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Focus and rationale

The central rationale for my thesis is to bring together a combination of elements that intersect with the legacy aim and strapline connected to young people and the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games (herein, London 2012), commonly referred to as the Games' ability to 'inspire a generation.' The following section will briefly signpost the different elements that are important to my thesis focus and rationale. I will elaborate on the elements raised in this section in later chapters, the purpose of this subsection is to rationalise the focus and subsequent thesis question and aims.

The London 2012 Olympics were the thirtieth edition of the modern Olympic movement.¹ The Olympic movement reborn in the late nineteenth century by a French Baron, Pierre de Coubertin, has grown into a global sporting event. It attracts elite athletes, leading political interests, multi-national corporate sponsors, and a far-reaching international audience (Cashman, 2006; Chatziefstathiou and Henry, 2012; Roche, 2017; Gold and Gold, 2017a). The London 2012 Paralympics were the fourteenth edition of the Paralympic movement.² The Paralympic movement and its flagship multi-sport international event has developed more recently (Brittain and Beacom, 2018). It was founded by a German doctor, Dr Ludwig Guttman, who opened a spinal injury centre at Stoke Mandeville Hospital in the UK during World War II. Since its inception, the Paralympic movement has grown with a concurrent rise in international understandings of sports' role in rehabilitation and broader disability rights movements (Legg and Steadward, 2011).

The official gatekeepers to the Olympic and Paralympic movements and associated brands are two significant non-profit and autonomous international sporting federations, the International Olympic Committee³ (IOC) and the International Paralympic

¹ The third edition for London as it previously hosted in 1908 and 1948

² London had not previously hosted in the Paralympic format.

³ Founded in 1894. Alongside the National Olympic Committee system, in the case of London 2012 the British Olympic Association, founded in 1905.

Committee⁴ (IPC). The respective federations aim to promote their organisational morals and values that benefit society through the means of sport. For the IOC, this is encapsulated in the concept of Olympism and the “respect for universal fundamental principles” (IOC, 2019) enshrined in the Olympic Charter⁵ (IOC, 2004). For the IPC, the vision is to “make for an inclusive world through Para sport” enshrined in the Paralympic values (IPC, 2019). The moral underpinnings, autonomous and non-profit stances are essential elements to how international sports federations engage with society at a national and international level.

At a national level, direct engagement with societies by the IOC and IPC is through the host city selection and delivery process of their events. Traditionally engagement is in conjunction with local and national authorities, such as city politicians, corporate partners. The scale and cost of hosting the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games have grown in recent decades, with local and national authorities taking responsibility for the financial burden (Roche, 2017). The growth has given rise to a wealth of scholarship and debate around concepts connected to international sports governance and sport mega-events, for instance, the concept of legacy (Chappelet, 2008, 2014).

In the context of my thesis, London officially bid for the rights to host the 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games in the early 2000s. The bid received formal support from governing authorities at a national and local level, for example, the Greater London Authority, this support included economic, legal, and political commitments. In 2005 at the IOC Executive Board the election for the host city of the 2012 Games took place, London won (Evans and Edizel, 2017). By London winning the rights to host the Games, it triggered actions to deliver what is expected by the international, national and local authorities. For example, upon winning the rights to host in 2005 the UK Government committed considerable funding, this amounted to over nine billion pounds of public money across the life course⁶ of London 2012 (DCMS, 2010; Girginov and Olsen, 2014).

⁴ Founded in 1989. Alongside the National Paralympic Committee system, in the case of London 2012 the British Paralympic Association, founded in 1989.

⁵ The Olympic Charter first produced in 1908 has many iterations. During the life cycle of London 2012 there were editions released in 2003, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019. Where necessary I will differentiate, but for my thesis I will use the 2004 edition as this was the starting point for London 2012.

⁶ Life course refers to the chronological bid, plan, delivery, host, and legacy stages of London 2012

Given the large sums of public money and level of political commitment, a debate has grown at the national level to the effectiveness (or how to measure claims of effectiveness) of sport mega-events in achieving wider political and societal aims, such as an increase in sporting participation or urban regeneration (Gold and Gold, 2017a). This debate has grown significantly in the academic community in recent decades (such as Weed et al., 2012; Boardley, 2012) with a focus on rationalities and policy mechanisms. The focus often relates to political, economic, or sport participation rationalities or mechanisms that relate to hosting a sport mega-event, for example, funding for elite sport or soft power strategies (Girginov and Hills, 2008; Grix and Carmichael, 2012). Such rationalities and policy mechanisms engage with entities that contribute to varying levels of sport in the UK, including national governing bodies of sport, professional leagues, local sports clubs, or school sport. These span across public, private, and non-profit organisations that contribute to a complex UK sporting industry (Bloyce and Smith, 2010; Houlihan and Lindsey, 2012; Lovett and Bloyce, 2017).

In the context of London 2012, the public funding of the Games covered preparations for the actual event that took place in July and August 2012 but also invested in broader programmes that connected to aims beyond the event, such as the Cultural Olympiad and the Inspire Mark programme (LOCOG, 2013). The broader and official London 2012 programmes and activities take place before, during and after the Games and interlink with the IOC and IPC brands, values, and hosting expectations (Evans and Edizel, 2017). The broader aims and activities were framed around the “illusive” term of legacy (Girginov and Hills, 2008, p. 2102). London 2012 in the bid, planning and delivery periods used the term legacy to rationalise and account for the Olympic and Paralympic Games achieving wider political and societal aims.

A substantial amount of academic literature pre and post-London 2012 has debated many aspects of legacy (such as Girginov and Hills, 2008; Bloyce and Lovett, 2012; Girginov, 2012; Bell and Gallimore, 2015; Mackintosh et al., 2015; Kohe and Bowen-Jones, 2016; Lovett and Bloyce, 2017; Brown and Pappous, 2018a, 2018b). The amount of literature can be attributed to the scale and changes made to the London 2012 legacy aims across its life course (Bretherton et al., 2016). As well as an explicit drive for Olympic and Paralympic knowledge around London 2012 within academia. The drive for knowledge

can be illustrated by a Routledge report which describes how 40 Olympic and Paralympic focused special journal issues were produced, with 174 academic papers forming the Routledge Special Issues Collection on the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012 (Girginov and Collins, 2013). My thesis will incorporate the relevant broader themes from current London 2012 legacy literature, given the importance placed on young people by the UK Government and international sporting federations my main focus is around young people and legacy.

The inclusion of young people in the London 2012 project developed from the outset of the London bid when claims were made to put young people at the heart of the Games (Lee, 2006). During planning the formal legacy statement made by the Labour UK Government in 2007 was to use London 2012 to “inspire a new generation of young people to take part in local volunteering, cultural and physical activity” (DCMS, 2007, p. 4). The statement enveloped national and regional activities connected to London 2012, such as youth involvement in the Torch Relay and volunteering programmes (Keech, 2012; Girginov, 2016). The focus of my thesis is the formal legacy statement and bid requirement “to create a London 2012 Education Programme” (DCMS, 2007, p.4). My thesis will critically examine the intersection of these governing actors concerning national legacy and policy discourses connected to the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim and Get Set programme.

The London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG) designed and enacted the official educational programme (called Get Set) in conjunction with other public, private, and non-profit governing actors (LOCOG, 2012b). LOCOG and the UK Government, in an unusual strategy for a host, promoted London 2012 as ‘one Games’ where the Olympics and Paralympics became conflated in both planning and delivery of legacy (Gold and Gold, 2017b). Kerr (2015) outlined that the fields of Olympic and Paralympic Games are distinct, yet the ‘one bid, one city’ movement at the turn of the twenty-first century has pushed further integration and recognition of the Paralympic Games. LOCOG used the domestic school system (primary schools, secondary schools, special schools, and Further Education colleges) to deliver the Get Set programme this in line with previous Olympic and Paralympic hosts, and the IOC and IPC hosting requirements (Bunt et al., 2011; Hwang, 2018).

The implementation of education programmes across different Olympic and Paralympic hosts and London 2012 has been scrutinised by academics (for example Chatziefstathiou and Muller, 2014; Chen and Henry, 2016, 2019; Kohe and Chatziefstathiou, 2017). The focus of my thesis will be to bridge the evidence and debate around the London 2012 legacy into the literature connected to related UK Government policy. Concerning literature around young people, sport, and education policy in the context of the UK there is an established mass of studies on the topic (for example Houlihan and Green, 2006; Phillpots, 2013; Mackintosh and Liddle, 2015; Jung et al., 2016; Lindsey, 2020). The rationale for my thesis is built on interpreting how LOCOG's use of the school system to deliver the Get Set programme created an intersection between the legacy activities, the education sector, and policies connected to young people and sport. My focus and rationale invoke an inter-disciplinary approach as literature from different disciplines and debates – notably, sport mega-events and legacy; international sporting federations and education; and domestic authority's policy connected to young people, education, and sport. The inter-disciplinary aspects of legacy, policy, and London 2012 are all important aids to better understanding the London 2012 'inspire a generation' legacy aim and Get Set programme.

Concerning policy, a notable increase in the study of sport has developed around formal state involvement in sport at a national and local policy level. The increased academic attention can be illustrated by the creation of the academic journal *International Journal of Sport Policy (and Politics)* in 2009. In the opening editorial Houlihan, Bloyce and Smith (2009, p. 1) commented that the need for such a journal is based on the growing scholarship and "the steady increase in government and state involvement in sport." Hosting the established sport mega-event (Olympics) and the ever-growing multi-sport international event (Paralympics), London 2012, is concurrent with a complex involvement in sport policy by the UK Government at a national level. The focus of my thesis will be the national UK Government level of policy largely because of the changes to UK Government across the life course of London 2012 (see Table A.9.1 in Appendix 9 for a chronological overview of London 2012 and UK Governments). The changes produce complexity to how the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim was governed, this is in

part due to the length of the London 2012 life course, spanning across numerous Prime Ministerial tenures and political circumstances in the UK.

It is noted that the described complex governing dynamic in hosting a sport mega-event is not a new or unique phenomenon (Gold and Gold, 2017a). However, as I have justified above the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim in the context of London 2012 provides an intriguing rationale for further research. The compelling context revolves around the (1) the heightened use of the concept of a legacy by international sporting federations and the UK Government, (2) the explicit target of young people by the London 2012 bid and organising committee, and (3) the attempts across the UK Government tenures to harness policy around young people, education, and sport in relation to London 2012.

1.1.1 Thesis question and aims

The summarised focus of my thesis, therefore, is on the national context and debate around the interpretations of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim and policy connected to young people, education, and sport. I will examine how traditional governing mechanisms (policy) are affected (or not) by the inclusion of sport mega-event programmes (legacy). Given the focus and rationale, the overarching research question of my thesis is:

How has the legacy aim to ‘inspire a generation’ affected policy associated with young people and sport between the bid, planning, delivery, and (ongoing) legacy of London 2012?

To guide the process and structure of the thesis, I developed four overarching aims:

1. To genealogically consider the governing around education programmes connected to the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim.
2. To genealogically consider the concurrent governing around sport-related policies connected to young people in the education sector.
3. To critically analyse the intersections of governing between legacy and policy during the London 2012 bid, planning, delivery, and (ongoing) legacy.

4. To explore through the lens of governmentality the governing actors' perspectives on the intersection between the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim and policy associated with young people and sport.

The overarching research question and aims reflect the approach I developed throughout the doctoral process, this has evolved, I discuss this below and in more detail in Chapter Four and Nine.

1.2 Approach

What links the rationale and focus of my thesis with my research philosophy is capturing how concurrently legacy and policy was governed during the life course of London 2012, and how we can understand this from a variety of governing actors' perspectives (illustrated by Figure 1.1a and 1.1b, pp. 12-13). A note here on the use of the word 'governed' is needed because I will use both govern with a capital 'G' to refer to the UK Government and official UK Government bodies or connected organisations, such as Sport England. Also, I will use govern with a small 'g' to refer to the act of governing which can be understood in a variety of ways, such as the family, school, media and individualised. I view London 2012 as a complex project constructed by many forms of governing systems and actors. The governing actors that have influenced legacy and policy in the context of the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim connect to both the UK Government and wider notions of governing, such as the school system, corporate sponsors, IOC, IPC and LOCOG.

When hosting a sport mega-event, the inclusion of different entities, such as the organising committee, create additional layers of governing. In relation to London 2012 and previous Olympic and Paralympic Games, there have been studies around varying aspects and entities, for example organising committees (Leopkey and Parent, 2012; 2015; 2017), international sports federations (Evans and Edizel, 2017), regional legacy programmes (Chen and Henry, 2016; 2019), national UK Government policies (Girginov, 2012; Wagg, 2015), and multi-national corporate sponsors (Coburn and McCafferty, 2016). The pieces listed have theorised and illustrated the Olympic and Paralympic Games across macro-level (interactions at a systemic level involving large populations), meso-level (community or organisations that interconnect the macro and micro levels)

and micro-level (individuals in their social settings). The levels of research and focus of analysis impact on the approach taken by the researcher (Savin-Baden and Howell Major, 2013; Giulianotti, 2016). In particular, as regards the philosophical and theoretical position of the researcher, the studies cited above are epistemologically influenced by positivism, realism, and/or interpretivism (see Appendix 4 for an abridged overview of philosophical underpinnings).

The research process, role of theory, and types of data are subsequently influenced by the researchers' philosophical position and approach. My approach has been influenced by my pedagogical development through studying politics and then inter-disciplinary studies of law, politics, and ethics. I philosophically do not seek to create a grand narrative or singular truth and view the world as co-constructed by individuals and discourses of power. My research philosophy, therefore, is in line with interpretivism and the development of accounts rather than testable hypothesis or revealing underlying mechanisms of reality (Smith and Sparkes, 2016; Bryman, 2016). The ontological and epistemological debate in interpretivism (or constructivism, or idealism) is about generating findings and developing discussion to what is the most likely inference from a set of observations by the researcher, i.e., there is no ultimate truth or falsifiable proposition (Given, 2008; Savin-Baden and Howell Major, 2013).

My research position connects to the the complexity and number of different entities involved in governing the 'inspire a generation' legacy at a macro-level, meso-level, and micro-level. Although not comprehensive, the list below shows that the governing actors connected to the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim are from:

- UK Government actors: Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), Department for Education (DfE), HM Treasury; executive non-departmental bodies of the DCMS and other departments (such as, UK Sport and Sport England).

- Education-based sport policy actors: national governing bodies (some UK based, and some England based), local authorities and schools in England⁷ (public and private, at the varying key stages of the national curriculum).
- Non-governmental international actors: international sporting federations (i.e. IOC and IPC), multi-national corporations who sponsor events (such as, Coca-Cola).
- Non-governmental domestic actors: national charities (such as Youth Sport Trust), national lobby groups (such as Sport and Recreation Alliance), London 2012 related actors (such as BOA, BPA, and LOCOG), and corporate sponsors of legacy and policy programmes (such as Sainsbury's or Aldi).
- Young people: across multiple demographics, such as socio-economic status, geographical areas, able/disabled bodied (at the different educational institutions across the key stages of the national curriculum).

My approach for the thesis since the beginning of the project, therefore, has been to form a design and theoretical framework that encompasses and reflects multiple perspectives from the different governing actors in different governing systems connected to policy and legacy (see Figure 1.1a p.12).

Beyond the variety and diversity of governing systems and actors another notable point is that they are not static across the life course of London 2012. For example, the Department for Education (2010-present) was the Department for Children, Schools and Families (2007-2010), Department for Education and Skills (2001-2007), and the Department for Education and Employment (1995-2001). More specifically, since the formal bid for London 2012 in the early 2000s up to 2016, there have been six different Secretaries of State for Education. Although I do not focus simply on individual Secretaries or UK Government departments, this illustrates that the policy and legacy associated with young people and sport during London 2012 have not been static, on the contrary, they have taken many directions and interpretations. Consequently, my approach reflects this dynamic.

⁷ England is deliberately used here in reference to policy due to the devolved and individual approaches taken by the home countries around education policy areas. Where necessary additional detail will be given to contexts in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales.

Methodologically I complement my philosophical approach with a multimethod qualitative research design (as presented in Appendix 1; and Figure 1.1a and 1.1b, pp. 12-13). By using documentary evidence, political and policy dialogue, and semi-structured interviews, my approach is to triangulate the data to gain a rich and in-depth understanding of the 'inspire a generation' legacy, Get Set programme, and policy connected to young people, education, and sport. The data represents governing from different perspectives across different periods of the London 2012 life course (presented in Appendix 7). My analytical framework and process are inspired by a Foucauldian understanding of genealogy and discourse (for example, Foucault, 1980, 1994b [presented in Appendix 3]; Dean, 2010). The process of analysing the meaning of my data is driven by my theoretical underpinnings (discussed below in brief) and the continued review and re-interpretation of my data sources (Piggin, 2014). The analytical framework (outlined in Chapter Four) is robust and allows me to process multiple sources of qualitative data and renderings of what is an extensive chronological period of legacy and policy activities (presented in Table 1.1b p.12; Appendix 1 and Appendix 9).

Theoretically, my research question and overarching aims (outlined above on p.6) are underpinned by the notions of power, relationships between entities, and systems of regulating. The use of the word 'how' in my research question implies a theoretical approach to understand the ways in which dynamics of power relations play out in a political understanding of policy and legacy. A starting point is, therefore, my understanding of power and this has influence the theoretical framing and analysis undertaken (Piggin, 2014). As I discussed above around philosophy, I do not search for absolute truth or testable statements. In relation to power I embrace a broad definition that includes state, commercial, and not-for-profit entities who use power to influence individuals through to national populations through a variety of means and messages.

The broader understanding of power I described above is in line with a poststructuralist standpoint and relates to my thesis because of the amount and diversity of actors who engaged with the 'inspire a generation' legacy and can be seen to be regulating young people directly and indirectly through legacy and policy mechanisms. As I collected data from sources that represented multiple perspectives my project sought to gain insight into how a variety of entities viewed the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim; policy and legacy,

therefore, can be problematised and understood in varying interpretations connected to knowledge of social actors and artefacts (Bryman, 2016).

By including a broader definition of power and also including multiple governing actors' perspectives, I gained a greater level of analysis of the 'how' in my research question and explore the relationship between legacy and policy intersected. For example, although the educational legacy programme, Get Set, was launched in 2008 through the domestic school system, the programme was directly governed by LOCOG. Consequently, the rationale for my thesis should not be approached to produce a model of governing. Instead, emphasis is placed on tracing interpretations that are context-specific and from a variety of governing actors' perspectives across the life course of London 2012.

Developing this further, my approach to power and governing through a multiplicity of authorities is associated with the concept of and the theoretical framework of governmentality which originates in writings by Foucault (Foucault, 1980, 1991b, 1994b) and social theorists inspired by Foucault (such as Rose and Miller, 1992; Lemke, 2001; Dean, 2010). In brief, governmentality is an analytical approach that views power and governing as shared by a variety of authorities in different sites and forms of knowledge to shape the conduct of a target population (Dean, 2010). Governmentality is a useful theoretical framework for my thesis through which I can capture and explore how domestic and international entities governed during the life course of London 2012 (outlined in Figure 1.1b p.13). I will expand on this more extensively in Chapter Two.

Rail (2002, p. 191, emphasis in original) describes how poststructuralism is “an intentionally provocative effort to transcend and blur the modernist binary oppositions of micro-analysis *versus* macro-analysis, structure *versus* agency, and science *versus* art in social analysis.” The poststructuralist and Foucault-inspired approach described here is useful for my thesis as through governmentality the discourses of ableism and neoliberalism become prominent and useful points of intersection and analysis. Ableism allows me to blur the modernist binaries of able-bodied versus disabled-body by considering the changes in language and formation of the Paralympic values in the Get Set programme, moreover the design of London 2012 as ‘one Games’ not distinctly Olympic or Paralympic (Kerr, 2015; Gold and Gold, 2017b). Neoliberalism allows me to

blur the modernist binaries of economic power between state, commercial, and not-for-profit entities, that are associated with dichotomies, such as, moral versus profit driven (Roche, 2018; Evans et al., 2018). Rather than viewing them in separate categories of power relations or systems (Rose and Miller, 1992; Lemke, 2001; Dean, 2010). In terms of my thesis this will allow me to consider the changes in language and formation of the Get Set programme in the design of London 2012 legacy and education policy around young people and sport.

Figure 1.1a Illustration of my overall thesis design




Figure 1.1b Illustration of my overall thesis chronology, aims, and sources

Life course stages of London 2012:	Overarching aims of my thesis:	Primary sources of data:
Bid and emergence, up to 2007	1. To genealogically consider the governing around education programmes connected to the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Documentary evidence (publicly accessible and official) e.g. London 2012 bid documentation, UK Government policies, IOC documentation; ● Political and policy dialogue (publicly accessible and official; private transcriptions from events) e.g. Oral and written evidence from the 2013 Education Committee inquiry into school sport following London 2012; ● Semi-structured interviews x 12 with a variety of governing actors relevant to the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim (conducted between August 2017 and April 2018, stored securely in conjunction with the UoW (2016) Data Management Plan procedure).
Planning and formation, 2007-2010	2. To genealogically consider the concurrent governing around sport-related policies connected to young people in the education sector.	
Revisions and delivery, 2010-2012	3. To critically analyse the intersections of governing between legacy and policy during the London 2012 bid, planning, delivery, and (ongoing) legacy.	
Inquiry and continuation, 2012 onwards	4. To explore through the lens of governmentality the governing actors' perspectives on the intersection between the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim and policy associated with young people and sport.	

1.3 Contribution to knowledge

Firstly, my contribution to knowledge links to ongoing governing activities around young people and sporting events within the UK Government and other international contexts, such as the Japanese Government and the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games. In the UK, in 2018 the Conservative Government announced a new “School Sports Action Plan” with the following rationale:

The action plan will be launched in spring 2019 and it will be informed by the first publication of data from the Active Lives Children Survey – the government’s new and world-leading approach to measuring how children and young people engage with sport and physical activity.

It will also link to the existing Sporting Future strategy, Childhood Obesity Plan and to plans to build a legacy from the Commonwealth Games, which will be taking place in Birmingham in 2022 (Department for Education, 2018).

The announcement and details show that beyond the context of hosting London 2012, the UK Government has continued to use sporting events to influence policy and young people under the guise of legacy. My thesis is timely as it can be used to challenge, support and critically think about the intersections and governing actors between legacy and policy connected to young people. Moreover, how to move the debate forward around the effectiveness of using sport mega-events to achieve political or societal aims in the context of young people, through considering empirical and theoretical discussion points from my thesis.

Throughout the production of my thesis (2015-2020), I have proactively sought to develop networks to discuss and develop my understanding of London 2012 and legacy, plus disseminate my findings (examples listed in Appendix 2). This has been incredibly productive as I have sourced more materials and data through meeting different actors connected to my thesis context. Moreover, many have offered informal and formal advice and opinion on the components of my thesis. Post my thesis submission, I will continue to engage a diverse audience with my research in the hope to challenge and inform future practice and discussion.

Secondly, my contribution to knowledge links to academia. In the wealth of literature, I have cited so far scholars have used a diverse range of research approaches and paradigms to study aspects of London 2012 legacy, and domestic policy connected to young people and sport. For example, a realist evaluation approach to legacy and policy where the formation, delivery and evaluations are the focus (for example, Chen and Henry, 2016, 2019; Girginov, 2016). Frameworks of policy analysis, such as advocacy coalition frameworks or a qualitative policy research design (Girginov, 2012; Thomas and Guett, 2014; Lindsey, 2020). Stakeholder management analysis techniques, such as the conceptualisation of fragmented accountability (for example, Leopkey and Parent, 2015, 2017). Figuration sociological approach to relationships involved in planning legacy (Bloyce and Lovett, 2012; Lovett and Bloyce, 2017). I advocate and contribute an approach where governing connected to legacy and policy should be viewed as a social phenomenon and in a constant state of revision. The contribution will be particularly relevant to further debates empirically and theoretically to how young people feature in the governing of legacy and policy.

The empirical and theoretically based findings and discussion will interlink the debates around policy connected to young people and sport, and the London 2012 ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim. In two recent pieces, authors have identified that concerning policy and legacy, this type of endeavour is needed. For example, Lindsey (2020, p. 27) showed that academic literature on physical education and school sport policy has focused on the Labour Governments (1997 to 2010) and beyond that, there is an “urgent need to reinvigorate theoretically-informed and empirically-based analysis of physical education and school sport policy.” My thesis contributes to this need as my latter discussion chapters relate to the Coalition and Conservative Governments between 2010 and 2016, and how physical education and school sport policy intersects with other formations of policy and legacy. About legacy Girginov (2016, p. 490) stated the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim is “nothing short of putting the main claim of Olympism to the test, but surprisingly the Inspire project has received virtually no scholarly scrutiny.” My thesis will address this need by bridging theoretically informed debate around policy connected to young people and sport with the London 2012 ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim, and

the Get Set educational programme. The claim of Olympism and, also, claims of the Paralympic movement will feature in my findings and discussion.

To date there have been a modest amount of studies specifically around London 2012, the Get Set educational programme, the target of young people, and national policy. In this sense, more can be done to explore the educational programme and legacy aim critically. Moreover, the current studies (for example, Keech, 2012; Tims, 2013; Griffiths and Armour, 2013; Kohe and Bowen-Jones, 2016; Kohe and Chatziefstathiou, 2017; Chen and Henry, 2016, 2019) are not formed around one dominant discipline or debate. Instead, they represent empirical and theoretical engagement from an inter-disciplinary nexus, including, sport pedagogy, management studies, policy studies, sociology and Olympic studies. Consequently, my thesis will synthesise debate around the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim to develop links across disciplinary and paradigmatic boundaries. I will reflect on this further in my thesis conclusions in Chapter Nine.

1.4 Thesis Overview

My thesis has nine chapters. In **Chapter One**, I have given a brief overview of the overall project through the focus and rationale of governing connected to the London 2012 ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim, Get Set educational programme and national policy associated with young people, education, and sport. I also briefly outlined the approach and the theoretical orientation I adopted in pursuing the research question and aims of my thesis. The theoretical basis for my thesis is presented in **Chapter Two**. The opening section of the chapter explores levels of theory and analysis in the backdrop of London 2012. I then develop a discussion around the concepts of power and governmentality. The final sections translate the notion of governmentality and consider how the proposed theoretical lens forms the basis for my thesis contextualisation and analysis.

In **Chapter Three**, I contextualise historical and academic debate connected to the development of London 2012, the concept of legacy, the London 2012 educational programme, and policies connected to young people and sport. The chapter focuses, firstly, on legacy and the role and scope of different governing actors, for example, the organising committee, political actors, and international sporting federations. The chapter focuses, secondly, on the development of policy and sport, especially those connected to

young people. The focus is on the historical development of policies connected to young people and sport during the Conservative Government under John Major and the beginning period of the Labour Government under Tony Blair. In doing so, links are drawn about the growing role of the UK Government in this policy area and the content of policy documents before the London 2012 bid.

In **Chapter Four**, I provide an overview and description of the research design used for my thesis (see figure 1.1a and 1.1b pp. 12-13; Appendix 1 for an overview). I will consider, in turn, the elements of my thesis design under the headings of methodological underpinnings, data collection, and data analysis. Throughout the chapter, I will highlight the decision making and utility of my design. Furthermore, I will account for how limitations and steps taken in my research process developed to achieve my overarching research question and aims.

In **Chapter Five** “...London’s vision to reach young people...” I present the concurrent London 2012 bid process in 2004 (governed through the bid committee), the formation of LOCOG in 2005 (governed through the IOC requirements and UK legal principles), the physical education, school sport and club links (PESSCL) strategy from 2002 (governed through the DfES and DCMS), and in 2007 the origins of the visions for London 2012 legacy promises (governed through the DCMS) and underpinned by the Public Service Agreement 22 (governed by HM Treasury). I will discuss how the emergence of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim was in the context of the Labour Government political rationality and governing technologies connected to modernization. Moreover, influenced by the corporatized governing technologies regulated through the IOC’s candidature procedure and host requirements. Another notable level of governing is the visibility of the Paralympic movement during the bidding process and the inclusion of the Paralympic values in the planning of the London 2012 educational programme.

In **Chapter Six** “legacy is one of the central reasons...” I present the simultaneous launch of the London 2012 legacy action plan in 2008 (governed through the DCMS), launch and development of *Playing to win* policy and physical education, school sport and young people (PESSYP) strategy in 2008 (governed through the DCMS), the launch of the Get Set programme in 2008 (governed through LOCOG). Then the enactment of the London

2012 Education Legacy Programme in 2009 (governed through the DCSF), and the launch of the sixth legacy promise and legacy for disabled people in 2010 (governed through the DCMS and OfDI). I will discuss the development of governing around the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim. During this period, there is a saturation of governing that connect to different authorities, such as multiple Labour Government departments language, and the continued corporatized governmental technologies of the Get Set programme. A notable development is rise and attention paid to the Paralympics and disability as legacy and policy integrate Paralympic and disability formations in the rationalities and governing technologies.

In **Chapter Seven** “...to talk about 2012 is missing the point...” I present the transition period between the outgoing Labour Government and incoming Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition Government. There are changes to UK Government political rationalities and governing technologies, including the announcement discontinuing the PESSYP strategy in 2010 (governed through HM Treasury and DfE), revision of the legacy plans in 2010 and 2011 (governed through the DCMS and OfDI), and the launch of the *Creating a sporting habit for life* youth sport strategy in 2012 (governed through the DCMS). I discuss the context of the changes surrounding the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim through the prominence of the financial crisis and the Coalition Government political rationality connected to austerity and restructuring governing technologies connected to public services. What is pertinent is that although the London 2012 ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim was repositioned by the Coalition Government, the LOCOG and Get Set governmental technologies were largely unaffected by the UK Government changes and revisions.

In **Chapter Eight** “I’m sorry school sport became tribal...” I present the concurrent evaluations and inquiries produced by Parliament (governed through the House of Lords and House of Commons), Olympic and Paralympic authorities (authored by LOCOG and IOC), and Coalition Government department authorities (authored by the DCMS, DfE). Then, the announcements made by the Coalition Government about continuing legacy and policy activities around young people and sport (governed through the Prime Minister’s Office and the DCMS). I discuss the interpretations of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim in the context of activities and evaluations post-London 2012 by

the Coalition then Conservative Governments, the IOC, LOCOG, and BOA and BPA. During this period there is a greater emergence and influence of other political rationalities and governmental technologies from private and non-profit actors, such as Sainsbury's, who capitalise on the opportunities presented by the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim and continuing the Get Set programme and brand.

In my final **Chapter Nine**, I bring together my concluding thoughts from the thesis, including analytical reflections, methodological reflections and limitations, then how my thesis contributes to knowledge. The genealogical reflections in Chapters Five through Eight interweave with critical points about the discursive dynamics around the governing of young people. My two main analytical points interconnect with ableist discourses and the inclusion/interpretation of disabled young people and the Paralympics in both legacy and policy. Then, the understanding that neoliberal political rationalities and governing technologies linked to the construction of young people, legacy, and policy, at the benefit of protecting brands and agendas. I will discuss these in turn and consider what can be done with the analysis; and where might this take us.

Chapter 2 Theoretical framework

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework for my thesis. The chapter is divided into subsections which engage with notions, examples and limitations of power and governmentality. The initial discussion is about levels of theory and power, with a focus on moving beyond the state as a central and dominating authority. In doing so, specific consideration will be given to the concepts of neoliberalism, ableism, and governmentality. The ideas are discussed through theories of political rationality and governing activities that go beyond a focus on state influences. The penultimate section of the chapter will focus on translating governmentality and viewing political rationalities and technologies of governing concerning societal and individual interconnections but, also, how this manifest in formations of governing in macro-level and meso-level systems. The chapter will conclude by considering how the proposed theoretical framework will be the basis for the contextualisation and analysis of policy and legacy connected to the rest of my thesis.

2.2 Levels of analysis

The debate and perspective on units of observation or levels of analysis are bound in a researcher's disciplinary and theoretical position, moreover, the concept or phenomena central in the research study (Savin-Baden and Howell Major, 2013; Houlihan, 2014; Giulianotti, 2016). In my introductory chapter, I identified the concepts of legacy and policy in terms of governing, where traditional governing mechanisms (policy) are affected (or not) by the inclusion of sport mega-event programmes (legacy). It is useful, therefore, to consider the macro-levels, meso-levels, and micro-levels of analysis. My interpretation in Chapter One was that macro-level analysis is based on interactions at a systemic level involving large populations; meso-level analysis is based on community or organisations that interconnect the macro and micro levels; micro-level analysis is based on individuals in their social settings. I will explore this further below with studies on sport, sport mega-events and London 2012.

Considering levels of analysis applies to the international sporting federation aspect of my thesis because the IOC and IPC are part of the global sporting system of international processes and actors where varying levels of analysis are used to understand the relationships between governing actors. The IOC has been a significant feature of research, moreover, the moral (Olympism) and corporate (profit-making) rationalities of sustaining a sport mega-event and using sport for broader societal objectives. Chatziefstathiou (2012a, 2012b) argued that since its birth in the late nineteenth century, the development of Olympism has not been static. Chatziefstathiou (2012b, p. 28) analysed further that the discourses around the IOC positioned it as an authority that promotes “an overt philosophy of behaviour...which both instantiate and legitimate power from the micro inter-personal context, through meso-level contexts (the world of sport, or the Olympic world), and at the macro (societal) levels.” Bretherton et al. (2016, p. 613) translated the IOC position into the context of London 2012 and contends that through Olympism the IOC and host city utilise values, principles and behaviours that hold “legitimacy from micro to macro levels of society.” Here, the influence of the IOC and the Olympics is not to influence the policy per se but to contribute to legitimising formations of governing for their ends of spreading Olympism and the IOC brand.

In the contemporary era, an adaptation is notable around youth and new additions to the Olympic movement to attract a young audience, such as the introduction of the Youth Olympic Games and increase in the use of social media (Chatziefstathiou, 2012b). For example, a growing range of scholarship views the recent Youth Olympic Games initiative as a mechanism to increase the reach of Olympism and the Olympic brand without considering ethical or political issues around the distribution of values of elite sport into the child population (Parry, 2012). Less attention has been paid to the role of the IPC and the Paralympic Games. They are frequently viewed as inferior in terms of scale and size compared to the Olympic Games, this should not be considered a surprise because of the long history of the Olympic Games and status of disability in society and sport (Legg et al., 2015). However, the IPC and Paralympic Games is a growing area of research about understanding the effects of legacy promises targeted at varying levels of organisational and individual practices, especially around understandings of disability (Brittain and Beacom, 2016; Brown and Pappous, 2018a).

Beyond the international level, there has been an emergence of policy studies and debate about representing state models, policy sectors and individual decision making at different levels of domestic policymaking (Bessusi, 2006). In policy studies, there is a focus on the micro-level and how the policy process influences human behaviour, such as citizens, leaders (Howlett et al., 2009). A significant feature of debate around London 2012 and legacy is the assumption that an event or connected policy can deliver outputs that influence individual behaviour. Boardley (2012) used psychological behavioural theories to dispel the assumption made by policymakers that citizens sport and physical activity levels and motivation can be linked to hosting a sport mega event. Moving beyond causal links between sport events and a citizen's behaviour, a focus of research at a micro-level is useful for understanding different perspectives on rationalities or assumptions of legacy. For example, Kohe (2017) considered the voice of young people in conjunction with the alleged universal appeal of London 2012 to offer a counter-narrative to the rhetoric of the official governing actors, such as LOCOG. The inter-personal setting and micro-level of data here productively challenge the rationality of policy as the young people were not universally invested or influenced by London 2012. It highlights the benefit of gathering data or considering theoretically the different voices and settings that legacy and policy intersect with at a micro-level, i.e. individuals in their social settings.

Houlihan, Bloyce and Smith (2009, pp. 3-4) and Houlihan (2014) raised important points about the aims of research at the macro-level where a researcher "seeks to provide an interpretation of the social world" through grand theory. Then, meso-level "where the aim is to better understand the process of sport policymaking and explain policy stability and change" (Houlihan, Bloyce and Smith 2009, pp. 3-4). The authors problematise a tendency of macro-level theory to oversimplify complex social processes while, meso-level work fails to maximise the broader contextual elements to enrich the analysis. In the context of comparative sport policy research, Dowling et al. (2018, p. 695) discuss further that there is a clear divide between scholars who inextricably link macro-level concerns (economic, political, population etc.) and those who "deliberately chose to ignore or overlook these broader contextual factors and focus instead on the meso-level." What is productive for me is to attempt not to overlook or oversimplify concerns or factors, then be mindful in contextualising the phenomena (in my case legacy and policy) in the

complexities of economic, political, and population concerns as it will maintain a level of depth in my analysis.

The distinction of levels of research is useful in my thesis as several pieces about around legacy and policy concerning London 2012 have tendencies to divide analysis between the macro-level or meso-level of process and interpretation. For example, Devine (2013, p. 258), claims “in 2005 the successful bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games in London had a powerful impact on UK sport policy.” The claim by Devine (2013) is based on documentary analysis and a human rights framework where the IOC’s Olympic Charter and London 2012 legacy is evaluated about emergent sport policy. The connection between meso-layers and macro-layers is on how discourses translate into what rights are being addressed within policy. The connection between legacy and policy is the ability to evaluate the UK Government’s rationality and if the “UK sport policy is ‘fit for purpose’ with a London 2012 Olympic legacy aspiration of the right to sport for all” (Devine, 2013, p. 274). A limitation of this piece is overlooking the instability of changing political contexts in the UK, such as the economic recession in 2008. The piece privileges policy documents up to 2010; moreover, it does not consider how other contexts influenced the power of London 2012 to impact changes to UK Government sport policy in the longer term.

From a non-Government or policy perspective, but in specific terms of the London 2012 educational programmes, Kohe and Chatziefstathiou (2017) considered the interplay of the programme at a local and national level. The authors take a socio-cultural perspective and advocate for “more rigorous dialogue that first assesses the commercial and political imperatives that drive the construction of Olympic education material and how Olympic education is operationalised to meet policy ends within physical education” (Kohe and Chatziefstathiou, 2017, p. 67). This is a departure from the Devine (2013) piece as the authors view the London 2012 education programmes as a mechanism for policy ends within school sport and physical education, rather than a programme to evaluate the role of policy. It focuses on the meso-level of the programme. Still, it intersects how the macro-level context of vested interests by the IOC and UK Government limits and influences the programme itself.

The different interpretations presented here conflate and understand policy from macro-level, meso-level, and micro-level depending on the theoretical or conceptual lens, such as human rights, event educational programmes, young people's voices, or international sport federation governance. What links the pieces is trying to critically analyse the rationality of the policy and legacy by different governing actors. A common thread throughout the pieces is the production of policy and how hosting a sport mega-event influence such. Keech in the context of London 2012 and young people claims:

The scrutiny of policy is necessarily analytical and descriptive in various measures, but in the case of sports policy for young people and the associated legacy of London 2012, the size and ambition requires careful examination (Keech, 2012, p. 84).

The argument from Keech continues to caution that the individual approaches further complicate the context of London 2012 to policy and legacy by the respective Labour (1997-2010) and Coalition (2010-2015) Governments. What is challenging, therefore, is the interpretation of rationalities of legacy and policy that promote notions or values that interconnect between macro-level, meso-level, and micro-levels of analysis across the life course of London 2012. This challenge is at the crux of my thesis and informed my research question:

How has the legacy aim to 'inspire a generation' affected policy associated with young people and sport between the bid, planning, delivery and (ongoing) legacy of London 2012?

The use of 'how' is important in my research question as I do not intend to prove in a positivist approach the causal reality between impacts of macro-level or meso-level legacy and policy into the micro-level. Instead in a poststructuralist approach, I interpret legacy and policy as emergent from constructions of "concepts, values, beliefs, ethics and norms of actors within a social field," i.e. across and contingent on the different levels of analysis (Fox, 2008, p. 661). Concerning theory, I navigate this by using broader concepts, such as, power and governing to interconnect knowledge and evidence around different levels of analysis. In advocating this position, I can highlight and interconnect aspects of policy and legacy in analytical and descriptive measures which is necessary

given the complexity of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim (Keech, 2012). As discussed now, my position is contingent on further detail to what I interpret power and governing to be.

2.3 Power and Foucault

The theme of power is synonymous with Foucault. The total mass of writings and lectures Foucault developed throughout his career do not progress linearly or build a grand narrative (Patton, 2017). Markula and Pringle (2006) argued that Foucault did not want to be subject to a professional definition or a coherent whole and grand theoretical framework. Lemke (2001) made the commonly noted point that there is a continual rewriting within Foucault’s own body of work and, therefore, it should be approached as ‘toolbox’ for scholars. This ‘toolbox’ is perpetuated by the plethora of ways you can read Foucault (originally communicated in French) as his thoughts are based in translated books, interviews, papers and published lectures. Moreover, different translated versions of texts and the publications are still emerging (see Appendix 3 for an abridged chronology of Foucault works consulted for my thesis). As alluded to in my Chapter One I also utilise secondary readings of Foucault to contextualise and adapt to the focus of my thesis. For example, the political power discussed below by Rose and Miller (1992) resonates with the formation of power in the context of the UK and the state. Given, my thesis is based on the UK political context and London 2012, such secondary readings are as valuable as the original writings of Foucault. Consequently, the discussions herein produce a Foucault inspired theoretical framework, rather than a pure translation of original Foucauldian writings.

In relation to the concept of power, a difference in understanding power in Foucault’s writings was a move away from grand theories, such as Marxist theories which use economic structures and class as the “nature, limits and legitimate exercise of power” towards the question of “*how* power is exercised” (Patton, 2017, p. 632, emphasis in original). The shift is an attempt to not reduce or materialise power as a consolidated or homogenous domination over others, rather as something that:

... is never localised here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a

net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application (Foucault, 1980, p. 98).

The quote is taken from a passage that is discussing power/knowledge from lectures in the 1970s when Foucault is outlining genealogical research as the concern to the effects of the centralising powers which are linked to unitary discourse, with power this stems from juridical and domination-repression (Foucault, 1980). As noted by Patton (2017), the circulatory notion of power quoted above differs from earlier works by Foucault where disciplinary power was criticised for not differentiating between benign and dominating exercises of power. Discussing this in lectures Foucault (1980, p. 99), contends that “the important thing is not to attempt some kind of deduction of power starting from its centre and aimed at the discovery of the extent to which it permeates into the base.” Instead, Foucault encourages thought where techniques and the procedures of power enter play at the most basic levels and the “subtle fashion in which more general powers or economic interests can engage with these technologies that are at once relatively autonomous of power and act as its infinitesimal elements” (Foucault, 1980, p. 99). Moreover, Foucault urges analysis of power to not be reduced to “what is the aim of someone who possesses power” instead analysis should focus on the effects of power in the myriad of bodies that are impacted by governing (Foucault, 1980, p. 97). The line of thought here as I understand it is to move beyond viewing power as absolutes or commodities that emit from a joined or centralised source. In moving beyond this power can be analysed discursively through individuals, technologies of governing, nets of interests and rationalities of organisations.

One prominent critique of the Foucauldian development of power in this way is that this articulation of power is free-floating and not anchored (Curtis, 1995; Green and Houlihan, 2006). Harding (2010) contends that power not being anchored can move analysis away from top-down and hierarchical lines of thinking to a more bottom-up focus. The strength understanding power in this way is that it consistently challenges the notion that power is a commodity and can be possessed or transferred in a dominating form. Instead, it exists

in forms of social interaction and exercises of power at different levels of social interaction. This understanding of power connects back to the discussion in the previous subsection, where levels of analysis can be neglected or overlooked if one level of interaction is privileged over another. The interpretation of Foucault's reconceptualization of power that is pertinent to the context of my thesis is into the political analysis of power as legacy and policy stem from political actors that regulate and engage with the circulation and techniques of power.

The notion of power in this line of thinking was developed by Rose and Miller (1992) and Miller and Rose (2008) in the context of political power and how states govern populations. The broad understanding of power interconnects with an understanding of political power, as it shifts from power being possessed by the state into a more nuanced analysis of political rationalities and governmental technologies of many authorities. In the following statement, Rose and Miller (1992, p. 174) demonstrate the institutional and individual characteristics of the concept:

Political power is exercised today through a profusion of shifting alliances between diverse authorities in projects to govern a multitude of facets of economic activity, social life and individual conduct. Power is not so much a matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as of 'making up' citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom.

The paper by Rose and Miller in the 1990s has been influential in introducing the idea of problematics of government. It anchors the broader Foucault (1980, p. 98) discussion about power as "employed and exercised through a net-like organisation" into shifting alliances between diverse authorities. The shift from Rose and Miller is understood as:

... the political vocabulary structured by oppositions between state and civil society, public and private, government and market, coercion and consent, sovereignty and autonomy and the like, does not adequately characterise the diverse ways in which rule is exercised in advanced liberal democracies (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 174).

The initial discussion by Foucault (1980) then the articulations by Rose and Miller (1992) advocate that analysis of political power should not be viewed as a domination by one

homogenous authority (often labelled the state) over society but of the governmentalization of advanced liberal democracies. The problematics of government is associated with governmental ambitions, political rationalities, and governmental technologies of national contexts that are described as advanced liberal democracies. It is, therefore, not a globalising model of power but particular to a national context, in the context of my thesis the UK. To better articulate the governing context of the UK it is pertinent to discuss the term neoliberalism.

2.4 Neoliberalism

The term neoliberalism is associated with a post-Enlightenment political ideology and modernist form of capitalist governing by Western Governments in advanced liberal democracies. The main ideas are associated with Governments who privilege capitalist market mechanisms and tendencies above Government and state-led provision (Peck, 2010). The characteristics associated with neoliberalism are competitiveness, autonomy, performance and responsibility, which are pertinent to individuals, public, and private institutions (Green and Houlihan 2006; Peck 2010; Ball, 2017). The origins of neoliberalism have been attributed to the decades immediately after the end of the Second World War and the challenge to the dominant post-war ideology around Keynesian economics, that in contrast to neoliberalism, promoted Government activities that “lead on public services, employment and relief of poverty” (Andrews and Silk, 2018, p. 517). The shift in thought and mechanisms towards ideas associated with neoliberalism have attracted a significant amount of social science attention, for example, from: education (Furlong, 2012; Patton, 2016; Ball, 2017), history (Rollings, 2013; Edwards, 2015), and geography (Harvey, 2007; Peck, 2010).

The connection between neoliberal discourses and state practices is discussed as emerging at the end of the 1970s when Margaret Thatcher was the British Conservative Prime Minister, and Ronald Reagan was the United States Republican President (Peck, 2010; Furlong, 2012). The political and economic imperative during this era was to maximise the conditions that were favourable to the values of a market economy, for example in the British political context policy and legislative changes allowed for the privatisation of public services and deregulation of financial markets (Rollings, 2013;

Edwards, 2015). What has been heavily debated are: who produces these tendencies and conditions, and how the tendencies and conditions are (re)produced. In the context of my thesis, this is entwined with the political rationalities and governmental technologies at macro-level and meso-level policy formations. As noted already the London 2012 life course traversed the Labour and Coalition UK Governments. Consequently, the term neoliberalism should not become a catch-all to assumed tendencies and conditions.

A frequently discussed issue of using neoliberalism as a political rationality in an academic debate is the scepticism surrounding the use or overuse of neoliberalism as a catch-all concept. For example, Hesmondhalgh et al. (2015, p. 99) warn against the “conceptual looseness” of neoliberalism as it has been over-used and now over-simplifies complex and varied uses of corporate-led capitalism. About sport and events, Roche (2017, p. 39) discussed that both right-wing perspectives on the nature of capitalism share “unwittingly” a similar weakness to social researchers who “view mega-events in ways which overemphasise their economic aspects and generally overly standardise their nature and impacts.” The notions of a ‘logic of capital’ or ‘hidden hand of the market’ are decontextualizing and often overemphasises economic dimensions over cultural, governmental, technological layers. Roche goes onto argue that with mega-events “contemporary capitalism needs to be understood as being capable of taking a variety of hybrid forms dependent on the political, cultural and technological contexts it infiltrates and within which it becomes embedded” (Roche 2017, p. 38). The caution by Roche (2017) and others around the use of neoliberalism extends my thinking that sport mega-events cannot be simply viewed as an economic influenced project that can be measured by its outputs, instead, the broader contexts must be considered.

Evans et al. (2018) discuss neoliberalism in terms of tendencies that influence Danish Government policy mechanisms when emphasising accountability, efficiency and arms-length regulation of active ageing service provision. The political rationality is driven by the “neoliberal consumer logic” and demand for self-determination from the national active ageing policy in Denmark (Evans et al. 2018, p.4). Here, neoliberalism is a rationality that influences levers of national policy, such as, funding, the scope of regulation, shaping of systems, or collection of information. Consequently, I do not want

to define or set parameters of what a neoliberal policy is as varying studies relate to different contexts, political circumstances and aspects of policy mechanisms.

In the context of the UK and policy, a significant amount of scholarship has discussed neoliberal tendencies concerning the education sector. Furlong (2012) and Pratt (2016) argue that the term neoliberal does not represent a single ideological position or set of tendencies. In the past two decades of UK Government, the authors interpreted differing neoliberal positions as the Labour Government tendency towards a centralised and “managed market.” In contrast, the Coalition Government tendency towards the autonomy of individuals and institutions “which are themselves increasingly competing in a market, the state remains strong in key areas” (Pratt, 2016, p. 892). Relating this to the understanding and caution from Roche (2017) the concept of neoliberalism is useful for understanding how different interpretations manifest through different Government contexts and cannot be standardised into one set of tendencies or rationality.

Beyond the domestic government and the UK, perspective neoliberalism is also valuable for thinking about the international governing actors, which are pertinent to my thesis as the IOC and IPC. Chatziefstathiou and Henry (2012) have written extensively about the changes in the discourse around Olympism and the IOC values. The authors frame their genealogical work as the development of Olympism as a “moral project” from the inception of the modern Olympiad project in the 1890s through to the present day (Chatziefstathiou and Henry, 2012, p. 247). Pertinent here is that the authors view this moral project as emerging “along with the maturing of neo-liberalism in a post-Enlightenment context” where neoliberalism “engenders a particular form of knowledge, with for example a predisposition to accept market mechanisms and a restricted remit of the state.” The focus of populations and technologies of neoliberal governing is associated with the concept of governmentality and further debate to how neoliberalism can be interpreted alongside the Foucauldian notion of power.

2.5 Ableism

The term ableism is associated with a contemporary political and social movement for disability rights and ending discrimination against disabled people. Able and disabled bodies are part of a binary system dominant in Western societies that regulate individuals

around notions of normalcy, disability, inclusion, mainstreaming, ability and biological/social models of welfare (Rhodes et al., 2008; Kitchin and Howe, 2014; Hammond and Jeanes, 2018). Ableism discourses in terms of governing are dominated by non-disabled perspectives and definitions of what is 'normal' and how disabled bodies should access and function varying systems. Historically, a human being was viewed through a medicalised lens of disability. However in the past century social models of disability have been conceived and promoted, and a viewpoint developed around the environment being disabling, not simply the human body form (Shakespeare, 2013). Creating binary or opposing systems of disability between a medical and social model is problematic, according to Rhodes et al. (2008) who suggest this too simplistic and ignores the complexities of the discourses around disability.

Authors, such as Rhodes et al. (2008), Thomas and Guett (2014) suggested that frameworks of disability from national and international governing levels have impacted on societal contexts. My entry point into the theory of ableism is to understand how the non-sport debate translates into sporting settings. More specifically, in a non-sporting context, the language and regulation around disability has perpetuated ableism discourses as many experts and dominant knowledges have produced concepts, such as impairment, classification, categorisation, social oppression and conditions. In a global context, the World Health Organisation and the United Nations have been prominent voices. For example, in 2001 the WHO had a framework for measuring health and disability at both individual and population levels referred to as the 'International Classification of Functioning' officially endorsed by all 191 WHO Member States (Shakespeare, 2013). These have then transcended into sporting settings, for example, through the IPC designed classification system that regulates athletes according to their formal medical disability (Wickman, 2011; Brittain, 2016a).

Another significant international moment around disability was the 2006 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 'Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.' The Convention has been praised by scholars, such as Shakespeare (2013) who argued the United Nations approach is a more complete understanding of disability and it accounts for the relationship between the individual, the environment, and the context of the individual. This expansive view of disability is shared by Rhodes et al.

(2008) who argued that the medical, social, environmental and contextual elements encourages complementary and different insights into a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. What is pertinent to my theoretical framework and thesis context is to what extent the more nuanced and expansive understandings of disability promoted during this period did translate into the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim and UK Government policy formation. On this point, but in relation to the broadcasting of the London 2012 Paralympic Games, Pullen et al. (2019, p. 471) stated:

The starting point is the dominant assumption of the incompatibility or disjuncture of the disabled body with the structural and material practices of an able-bodied elite sport complex structured by a discourse of ableism.

Actors, for example Channel Four, in this study were aware of the need to reframe, legitimise, and make the Paralympic Games coverage distinct from the Olympic Games counterpart. The authors cited the importance of marketing during the Paralympic Games television campaign and how Channel Four “utilised athlete backstories as *the* point of distinction” (Pullen et al., 2019, p. 471, emphasis in the original). The discourse of ableism serves here to inform and disrupt how governing actors (in the Pullen et al. study Channel Four) think about and form their understanding of macro-level and meso-level representation of disability during London 2012. Theoretically, therefore, as Rhodes et al. (2008), Brittain (2016a), and the Pullen et al. (2019) amongst other suggest, international and sporting events can influence actors’ seeing disability and more specifically the Paralympics as a more complex and multidimensional phenomenon.

Another area of focus around ableism and sport has been a significant amount of studies into the everyday lived experiences of disabled people in a sporting setting. The limited opportunities for disabled people (sport and non-sport) and lived experiences of people engaging in and from the disability community (sport and non-sport) have transcended into academic debate. Hammond and Jeanes (2018, p. 432, emphasis in original) offer a summary of this debate as connected to the growing academic area of Critical Disability Studies and “problematizing disability against the background of *ableism*.” A form of such problematisation is as to analyse how athletes, sporting federations, policy makers engage at macro-level, meso-level and micro-level able-bodied norms that are visible and

invisible in governing practices (Wickman, 2011; Hammond and Jeanes, 2018). Developing this further, Brittain et al. (2020) combine the theoretical premise of ableism with social practice and self-determination theories to propose a framework to aid explaining why disabled people are less likely to access and participate in sport and physical activity. The authors position ableism as the subject of extensive research to focus on the way disabled people are treated within the wider society. The understanding of ableism is based on the above expansive understanding of disability and used to problematise ‘normal’ and ableist practices that promote or harm experiences of sport and physical activity (Brittain et al., 2020).

I interpret and engage with tenants of ableism, such as a medicalised construction of identity or governing systems, to highlight and problematise ableist tendencies in the formation and understanding of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim in my theoretical and empirical analysis. This is prominent in my analytical framework where I consider the significance of including the Paralympic values in the Get Set programme (discussed more extensively in Chapters Three and Four below), then in the development of policy interconnected with disabled young people (discussed further in Chapter Three). Utilising the approaches by Wickman (2011), Hammond and Jeanes (2018), and Brittain et al. (2020), ableism can be used as a discourse and component of a theoretical and analytical framework. Whereas the three studies have problematised everyday lived experiences of disabled people, athletes, and coaches I take ableism to help understand my data around the language in policy and legacy documents and dialogue.

Similarly, to the point made above about neoliberalism, beyond the domestic government and the UK, perspective ableism is also valuable for thinking about the international governing actors, which are pertinent to my thesis as the IOC and IPC. A number of scholars have written extensively about the changes in visibility to the Paralympic movement, actors, and values (e.g., Legg and Steadward, 2011; Misener et al., 2013; Gold and Gold, 2017b; Kerr, 2018). However, authors do not agree on the factors for the rise in visibility of the Paralympic movement and state economic, social, cultural, political, and technological motivations for this. Pertinent here are the views that disability and/or ableism are useful to understanding the dynamic between the IOC and IPC projects, then how this translates and develops into the context of a host city and host state, in my thesis,

London 2012, the UK, and more specifically the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim and disabled young people. The focus of populations, discourses, and technologies of ableist governing can be linked with the broader concept of governmentality and further debate to how ableism and the Paralympics can be interpreted alongside the Foucauldian notion of power.

2.6 Governmentality

Governmentality developed in the latter stages of Foucault’s work and is explicitly discussed in teaching at the College de France (his 1977-78 course ‘security, territory and population’, and his 1978-79 series of lectures ‘the birth of biopolitics’ see Foucault, 1991a, 1991b, 1994a, 1994b). The questions that Foucault led within these lectures were in relation to the problematisation of government: “how to govern oneself, how to be governed, by whom the people will accept being governed, how to become the best possible governor” (Foucault 1991a, p. 87).

Lemke (2001, 2002) and Dean (2010, 2018) caution that scholars dispute components of lectures that Foucault gave around governmentality as the original Foucauldian writings are fragmented in lectures and sporadic translations rather than a coherent whole. Consequently, this section will outline the tenants and thought suggested by Foucault, but also, consider governmentality in terms of other social theorists and applications within a range of scholarship. The term governmentality emerged from Foucault’s interpretation of the changing role of the state and market in regulating populations, the connections between technologies of the self (micro-level) and technologies of government (macro-level and meso-level) (Lemke, 2001; Smith Maguire, 2002).

Major theoretical contributions and interpretations of governmentality have come from many contemporary social theorists who have sought to explain a variety of social issues around contemporary governmentalities, for example, sexuality, employment, human rights (Bröckling et al., 2012). Dean in *Governmentality* (2010, p. 13) states the applicability of governmentality to a range of disciplines and contexts is a strength as:

The study of governmentality indicates an empirical terrain of the rationalities, technologies, programme and identities of regimes of government. However, it cannot be reduced to that empirical terrain because studying governmentality is

also about the production of new concepts of that study, or in the course of using other scholars' study. The production of concepts multiplies possibilities of analysis; concepts come back combined with those of others, in different empirical domains.

Although I do not cover all domains, there is influence in my thinking by previous governmentality-based studies from areas connected to the sport, education, and health. Moreover, such studies are not confined to the context of the UK, but also, come from Canada, New Zealand, Australia and international sport governance contexts (for example Fullagar, 2002; Green and Houlihan, 2006; Piggin et al., 2009a, 2009b; Bretherton et al., 2016).⁸

The questions Foucault (1991a, 1994a) posed around how to govern were genealogically contextualised through two processes. Firstly, in the sixteenth century where according to Foucault the sovereign base shifted from a feudal state to a territorial state, and then secondly, the religious-based Reformation and Counter-Reformation movement influenced the notion of governing. The two separate processes are interconnected by a “state centralization on the one hand and of dispersion and religious dissidence on the other” (Foucault, 1991a, p. 88). The genealogy of the state is traced through to the twentieth century where Foucault (1991a, p. 100) contrasts the historical understanding of unilateral power by a sovereign ruler over a territory with the development of “the field of the art of government.” The central tenant of governmentality, therefore, is that power and governing is a ‘conduct of conducts’ and a management of possibilities (Foucault, 1991a, 1994a). The role of governing actors is not to control or operate as a single source of power but governmentalize the rationalities and technologies of governing.

As described by Raco and Imrie (2000, p. 2191) the governmental form of power is used “not to govern society per se, but to promote individual and institutional conduct that is consistent with government objectives.” An example cited as demonstrating such is physical education in England where Hargreaves (1986, p. 161) notes the strategic intervention of knowledge is part of the economic productivity and maintenance of social

⁸ I acknowledge here that I do not explicitly engage with post-colonial or non-Western contexts-based studies that have used governmentality (such as, Inda, 2005).

order as it is a mechanism “for the production of normal individuals.” Physical education policy and curriculum formed at the meso-layer connect the neoliberal rationality that a fit individual will be more economically productive, then the micro-level where this produces an understanding of a ‘normal’ child who participates and benefits from physical education. Extending such thought and links between physical education, broader power networks and political agendas Maguire Smith (2002, p. 300) states “such an analysis could well be extended to contemporary physical education, in which different perceived market needs lead to an emphasis on health-related fitness.” The contention here shows the benefit of using a discursive power relation as it allows a scholar to build on previous studies as further techniques and mechanism shift or change. Here, Maguire Smith (2002) builds on the work of Hargreaves (1986) to trace changes to the policy that are based on similar underpinning political rationalities.

Rose and Miller (1992, p. 175) referred to political rationalities as “the changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualised” and governmental technologies as “the complex of mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions.” This understanding of political rationalities is a link back to power, where it is more about identifying and understanding the mundane elements of social settings. The articulation from Rose and Miller (1992) here is more akin to the meso-layer of governing as it focuses on the technologies that give effect to the authorities that interlink the macro-discursive fields and governmental ambitions to the micro-workings of power. Harding (2010, pp. 39-40) described that the notions of power repositions the perspective of the researcher, moreover, it is then governmentality that “provides a method of thinking about the interaction and intersection of everyday experience and power relations, with macro-strategies of governance and regulation.” It is not as simple as identifying a governmental objective and how that affects the micro-workings of power in local settings. Instead, there are interconnections which can contradict, fragment or combine political rationalities and government technologies from multiple sources of power and governmental ambitions.

2.7 Translating governmentality

Several studies have used governmentality as their theoretical tool, in particular, in considering policy around sport, health, development and education. Fullagar (2002, p. 48), for example, demonstrates that governmentality “has been taken up by sociologists interested in how health promotion and policy discourses participate in the production of truth and norms about health and risky lifestyle practices.” The production of truth and norms is also present in studies around London 2012. Bretherton et al. (2016, pp. 612-613) use a governmentality framework to examine the London 2012 sport and physical activity participation legacy which in their words “represents an explicit attempt to influence individual behaviour that is coordinated by a range of different public (and private) organisations.” The focus here is between the UK Government and reaching individuals or populations to shape behaviours, especially, behaviours that cannot be directly coerced, such as, healthy lifestyles. Here the authors highlight how “risk discourses... function as moral technologies that help guide individual conduct” (Bretherton et al., 2016, p. 613). The authors track the risk and reward discourses through policy documents and political statements around London 2012, physical activity and sport participation. The analysis shows how the UK Government use health and risk to achieve “wider social and economic benefits” for the state (Bretherton et al., 2018, p. 617). The analysis around health and risk is persuasive to how governmental technologies influence micro-personal contexts, moreover, how the moral imperatives of the international sporting federation can function as moral technologies to influence individual conduct. An opportunity to further this research is to consider the impact at a meso-level and on the policymakers or governing actors trying to capitalise on the opportunities boosted by London 2012.

Strength of a governmentality framework is the ability to incorporate a mixture of private, non-profit, and public organisations involved in governing national and international systems and policy. The international non-profit organisation the IOC has significant power and influence over the rationality and technologies in hosting the sport mega-events connected to their movement and brand. In the domestic context, non-profit organisations, such as the English Football Association or BOA, have power and influence over the rationality and technologies in delivering and forming sporting

opportunities. Then, private and commercial entities, such as private leagues, media outlets or sponsors have power and influence over the rationality and technologies in coverage and promotion of the sport. The public organisations, including central, arms-length and local entities, are working in conjunction with the executive to harness sport in its different forms. Over the London 2012 life course the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim and Get Set programme engaged with organisations across private, non-profit, and public authorities to promote and influence rationalities and technologies. Governmentality, therefore, offers a framework to consider the distinctive discourses of governing and how those intersect with different levels and forms of governing actors.

My thoughts have been influenced by the translation of governmentality in the context of New Zealand. In particular, the body of work produced by Piggin et al. (2009a, p. 89) who proposed through a governmentality framework that there was a “taken-for-granted naturalness of sport in New Zealand society with the need by policymakers to prove that sport is worthy of significant government investment.” The consideration here was the construction and knowledge in the rationalities of policymakers around the ‘scientific’ evidence base and ‘positivist’ understandings of sport and recreation. The studies and examples from Piggin et al. (2009a, 2009b) show the distinction between a state-centred analysis of policy and a more comprehensive analysis based on discursive layers. Moreover, a shift from assuming the political rationalities and distinct discourses from governing actors are part of negative and risk policies to influence individuals. The strength of governmentality as a theoretical framework is that it can be translated into understanding governing not simply to dominate through risk but, also, to create assumptions, mundane practices and the formation of evidence that become unquestioned and accepted.

In translating governmentality political rationalities connected to sport policy in this way we can uncover continuity and contradictions within different contexts and governing settings. Beyond research in New Zealand, the translation of governmentality into political rationality and governmental technologies at a sports policy level has been conducted in the UK. For example, Green and Houlihan (2006) and Green (2007) in the context of the Labour UK Government highlight the connection between the advanced liberalism influencing governmental technologies (such as, funding targets) and the

everyday practices introduced to national sport organisations that are typical to the commercial business sphere (such as, viewing sporting participants as customers). In concluding thoughts Green and Houlihan, 2006, p. 66) note that sport as a policy sector under Labour in the 1990s had a “profound shift in the pattern of accountability away from traditional stakeholders... and toward government and its agencies and commercial sponsors.” Green (2007) furthers this by illustrating the theoretical utility of governmentality lies in moving beyond simple understandings of governing, towards how governing should be viewed as a combination of decentralisation and increasing central control. Writing about sport policy and young people, Green (2007, p.68) argued:

On the one hand, under advanced liberalism, governmental power is contingent upon freedom of choice and the autonomy of the individual, not simply by command and control from the centre. On the other hand, autonomy is made possible by governments that have utilised policy initiatives and reforms of institutional arrangements to endorse certain patterns of behaviour and lifestyle in the “making up” of citizens who are self-regulating and responsible but within a demarcated space of illusory freedom.

The ‘illusory freedom’ described here by Green (2007) applies to individuals and institutions at the meso-level and micro-level because political rationalities at a macro-level influence the formation and the practices of governing populations.

As discussed in the previous subsection, I interpret the analysis and explanation of political power as part of the governmentalization of the governing actors connected to the governing areas distinguished as a state, market and civil society (Miller and Rose, 1992; Foucault, 1991a, 1994a). The governing actors connected to state, market and civil society in the context of legacy and policy are public, private and non-profit organisations seeking in my case to ‘inspire a generation’ of young people. I will analyse the actors and context through political rationalities and governing technologies. From the literature I have discussed in this chapter I view political rationalities as discourses connected to the settings in which legacy and policy are formed, for example the economic climate, the influence of corporate governing actors or international sporting federations, consultation with public or non-profit governing actors, and the leading UK Government department

or agency rationalities. I view governing technologies as the translation of macro-level governmental ambitions and political rationalities in the meso-level and micro-level of governing, for example funding, shaping of the delivery systems, scope of exercising authority, and collection or dissemination of information. I summarise this into four elements of a governmentality framework (1) formation of governing, (2) distinctive discourses, (3) practices of governing, and (4) interactions between the levels of governing. These are not step-by-step or isolated elements but instead allow me to translate the theoretical aspect into my research design and analytical framework, I will expand on this in Chapter Four.

2.8 Concluding chapter thoughts

The theoretical framework of my thesis is underpinned by understanding power and governing. I presented a synthesis of political, policy and sport renderings of macro-levels, meso-levels, and micro-levels of study, and how the role of policy and legacy has been perceived and analysed. In the context of literature connected to London 2012 there are differing perspectives to who and how legacy was constructed and used. What is persuasive is understanding the influence of legacy and sporting authorities as a contribution to legitimizing formations of governing, such as notion of the state and citizens.

The broader theoretical term connected to governing is around power and political power. In this chapter, I presented a Foucault (1980, 1991a, 1991b, 1994a, 1994b) based understanding of power and the feature of viewing power as a circulation of technologies through net-like organisations. In the context of the UK and London 2012 the political power advocated by Rose and Miller (1992) of an advanced liberal democracy and the problematics of Government. The authors developed the Foucauldian understanding and proposed further framing to how contemporary political power can be analysed. Here, the political rationality and governmental technologies connect in creating a regulated freedom where citizens and programmes are not imposed upon but governed through diverse authorities.

The role of power and political power is associated with neoliberal political rationalities where the market and economic mechanisms are privileged in conjunction with a

governmentalization of the state's remit. The governmentalization is not definitively defined or static; rather, it is based on the context and dynamics of the what is being governed. The diverse authorities contributing to neoliberalism, such as corporate organisations, government entities, and international sporting federations are underpinned by varying moral visions. Still, all share the similar outlook of creating regulatory freedom to further their interests and governing populations.

The final subsections contributed to the governmentality element of my theoretical framework. The examples I included assisted in demonstrating how governmentality provides a way of thinking about how macro-level governmental discourses combine with governmental ambitions, political rationalities and government technologies to form regulated freedom in meso-level and micro-level settings. A trend in the examples and the theoretical underpinnings is to translate and contextualise: (1) formation of governing, (2) distinctive discourses, (3) practices of governing, and (4) interactions between the levels of governing. I will expand on these four steps further in Chapter Four. Before doing so, it is vital to contextualise further legacy and policy concerning London 2012 and the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim.

Chapter 3 Contexts of legacy and policy

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to go into further depth to the academic understandings of policy and legacy in the context of London 2012 bid and legacy, LOCOG, the Get Set programme and policies connected to young people and sport. Throughout this chapter I will examine background components (a) connected to the legacy rhetoric especially the bidding documentation and process; (b) connected to the formation of London 2012 legacy and the educational programme, Get Set, will be examined; (c) the education sector and policies connected to young people and sport during the Major (1990-1997) and Blair (1997-2007) Government periods before the London 2012 bid.

This chapter aims to understand historical elements to legacy and policy, and to comprehend better how to analyse my empirical data in the latter part of my thesis. In addition to the background components, I will also provide further detail on academic knowledge and debates connected to legacy, policy, and education. My strategy in reviewing academic literature was collecting and analysing separate pieces that related to policy, legacy and education, especially those that consider London 2012 and aspects of educational legacy. I then synthesised the literature with the contextual points that were present in the literature and relation to my thesis rationale and focus (described in Appendix 1 about my wider thesis design).

3.2 The London 2012 bid and international sporting federations

Academic discussion around the autonomy and non-political nature of international sporting federations and hosting sporting events is notable across disciplines, including, sociology, history and management studies. Seminal work by Allison and co-authors (1986, 1993) argue against a persistent assertion that sport is separate from society as a ‘myth of autonomy’ that sport and politics do mix. Pertinent to my thesis is the retreat against thinking that an international sports federation, or Sports Council, or sports policy are either gimmicks or above the political dimensions of social life (Allison, 1993). The social, political and economic circumstances of the sports industry have continued to change since Allison et al. made these arguments, however, it remains valuable to

consider the political role of international and domestic sports governing authorities. Especially, as international federations of sport are trying to maintain separation from politics, while concurrently having moral and social aims as underpinnings of their movements.

A point of exploration and focus of recent academic literature has been the hosting process and emergence of legacy to construct broader value for a city beyond the actual sporting spectacle. About London 2012, Horne (2013, p. 18) states it is a prime example of bid and event, which is the outcome of “competing intentions, interests, preoccupations and strategies.” Yet a growing critique of sport mega-event literature is that it is too focused on explaining the output and process of an event, rather than the competing elements surrounding the event. For example, Cohen and Watt (2017, p. 446) argue that a weakness of sports event analysis and that of the Olympic movement “is purely conjunctural; it lacks a sense of historical transition, which is largely due to its overwhelmingly functionalist model of causal explanation.” This argument can be attributed to the heavily procedural bidding process designed by the IOC that London as a bidding city experienced. The functionalist model of causal explanation is imagined through the academic trend of focusing on explaining the material chronology and circumstance of the sporting event, rather than considering the wider discourses or historical antecedents.

The international sports federation discourses around being non-political and autonomous of national state systems link to Cohen and Watt’s point as the IOC, IPC and process of London 2012 legacy cannot be simply viewed as non-political. Instead, it needs to be historically contextualised from different perspectives. For example, the decision for London to bid for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games was influenced during the mid to late 1990s by local voices (such as the Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone), national voices (such as the Chairman of the British Olympic Association, Sir Craig Reedie) and international voices (such as the President of the IOC, Jacques Rogge). The individuals listed here are directly and indirectly involved in politics and governing, plus illustrate the reasoning for supporting a bid from London will be vested in different political realms and means.

From a national Government perspective, although London was a principal city to bid for the Games, there were several domestic concerns and barriers to overcome during the 2000s before they were given the right to host by the IOC. For example, the ‘Picketts Lock Affair’ and ‘Millennium Dome’ scandals in the early period of the Blair Labour Government term demonstrate inconsistent preparation, commitment and delivery of large-scale events and projects in London (Poynter, 2009). In brief, the examples of the ‘Picketts Lock Affair’ in 2001, where the Government blocked funds for the redevelopment of the Wembley stadium which caused “the collapsed plan to host the 2005 World Athletics Championship” (Bose, 2001). Then, the post-millennium scrutiny and multiple inquiries by the National Audit Office into how ministers handled what was reported in the media as “a disastrous year of financial ineptitude and incompetence over the running of the Millennium Dome” (Hencke, 2000). The two examples illustrate that the early 2000s was not a positive public or Governmental climate for embracing large scale sport mega-events in London (Masterman, 2013).

To counter concerns and build a successful bid, the initial London bid committee (an independent organisation) created a narrative around two areas: regeneration and young people. This was developed through the IOC (2003a) formal bid process referred to as the ‘Candidature Procedure and Questionnaire’ and then several private meetings with UK Government politicians (Lee, 2006). The culmination of this process is a vote facilitated by the IOC. At the IOC Executive Committee vote in Singapore in 2005 in a closely fought bid contest (including oral presentations and voter lobbying) London prevailed. London was praised for a high level of political commitment, including, an appearance from the then UK Prime Minister Tony Blair (Girginov, 2008; Masterman, 2013). Although the IOC does not explicitly publish why a host is chosen, it was clear that London’s strategy around legacy and young people had significantly contributed to pipping its closest rival Paris to the post (Lee, 2006). The available empirical evidence to the bid process is centred around the Candidature Questionnaire (IOC, 2003a) and the IOC Evaluation Commission (IOC, 2005a). The assessment criteria are built around project management language in a functionalist system for a bidding city to prove it can host and meet all the requirements. Scholars, such as, Lenskyj (2012), Boykoff (2013) and Wagg (2015) problematise the ‘Olympic industry’ that has increased in recent

decades in a backdrop of commercialisation and increased economic and managerial rationalities behind hosting.

In an account of the London 2012 bid success Masterman quotes (2013, p. 39) - Michael Payne- a former IOC marketing manager reflected that London made “a bold decision, but London decided to focus on inspiration of young people from around the world to get them into sport, a focus that would hopefully be welcomed by many stakeholders because of their concerns over future audiences and markets.” The reflection here engages with the managerial and economic rationality that is observable across the IOC bidding process and London 2012. The use of the terms - stakeholders, audiences and markets – illustrates that the London bid recognised the concerns within the IOC and used an innovative focus of young people to showcase why London was a credible return on investment for the IOC and Olympic movement.

The rise of the managerial approach by the IOC has been observed and challenged by scholars, for example, MacAloon (2008, p. 2061) discussed the shift from the ‘Olympic brand’ to ‘Olympic legacy’ which has involved a “continued penetration of managerial rationality into Olympic affairs through... the magical properties of legacy discourse.” The piece illustrates how varying authorities have embraced the term legacy and a number are driven by corporate aims, for example, “the burgeoning population of international consultants seeking to sell their services to Olympic, Paralympic and other mega-event planning bodies has seized upon legacy discourse with a special eagerness and aplomb” (MacAloon, 2008, p. 2066). Interestingly, MacAloon concludes that his analysis may well be “abstract and uninteresting to colleagues preoccupied with the particular historical and political outcomes of specific Olympic events” yet the discursive analysis is key to problematizing the “managerial rationality” as “an unquestionable good in Olympic affairs” (MacAloon 2008, p. 2069). The discursive view of MacAloon here adds a further layer to the critique of sport mega-event literature, as the author sees dominant trends in literature based on outputs and outcomes of an event. Yet, he wants to focus on the broader discourse and rationalities that enable actors and governing mechanisms to go without substantive questioning. A position I agree with and will further consider the presence of a ‘managerial rationality’ during London 2012 and beyond the international federation and into the domestic governing layer.

3.3 The development of sport policy in the UK

The study of policy according to Weible (2018, p.1) emerged in the 1950s as academic branches of political and government integrated around a policy orientation, most notably public policy which are “deliberate decisions-actions and non-actions of a government or an equivalent authority toward specific objectives.” Although scholarly attention emerged in the 1950s, this is not representative of academic or policy-maker activities on sporting activities. Houlihan (2016) discussed an understandably less valued position on activities connected to sport by academics and policymakers who are preoccupied with policy issues that command greater public attention and regular political decision making, such as tax, health or education. What contributes to the growth in studies of sport is the use of it to achieve non-sport objectives within political and social contexts, such as, diplomatic leverage or health improvement. A consequence of this is how to understand the factors influencing domestic sport policy and its presence in non-sport policy to achieve other objectives.

Green (2006) traces a fragmented and ad hoc approach to sport in the UK Government during the latter half of the twentieth century, partly due to the movement of sport around Government departments, but also to the voluntarist approach to sports organisation. A voluntarist approach meaning that a non-professionalised movement drove the workforce and structures. Coghlan and Webb (1990) highlighted that it was not until 1965 that the UK Government showed interest formally in the sports sector by creating an Advisory Sports Council. The activities during this period were influenced by the public and high profile 1960 Wolfenden Report on ‘Sport and Community’ for national and regional policymakers, then for national and local sports organisations (Houlihan and Green, 2006; Jefferys 2012). Before that bodies, such as the Central Council of Physical Recreation had advocated positions between statutory, voluntary and private sporting authorities to discuss physical and sporting issues. The impact this period up until the 1990s has had academically is that studies on public policy did not commonly include sport as a formal space or subject until the recent decades.

In the 1990s, the Conservative Prime Minister, John Major, played a proactive role in changes to the position of sport as a public policy area (Phillpots, 2013), for example, the

creation of the Department of National Heritage in 1992 (Jefferys, 2012). Houlihan and Lindsey (2012, p. 2) traced Majors' contribution to his passion "about sport and, although a reluctant interventionist, he [Major] successfully placed sport back on the public policy agenda." A sport policy was formally established in *Sport Raising the Game* (DNH, 1995) and implemented through the establishment of:

The Department of National Heritage (1992, created to amalgamate a number of functions related to the arts, broadcasting, film, sport, architecture and historic sites, royal parks and tourism);

UK Sport (1996, created as the elite sport investor as an executive non-departmental public body by Royal Charter);

Sport England (1996, previously the English Sports Council and purposed as the community sport investor as an executive non-departmental public body by Royal Charter).


The funding for UK Sport and Sport England was channelled through grant-in-aid from the UK Government and funds raised through the National Lottery (a state-franchised lottery, established by the National Lottery Act 1993 to fund activities, such as those connected to the Department of National Heritage). The formation of policy and governing around sport here is vital because there is a clear differentiation between 'elite' and 'community' sports areas. Moreover, the ensemble of power is separated between the arms-length governing bodies of UK Sport and Sport England. Plus, discussed in the following subsection the development of a discrete policy area around youth sport which initially has been primarily governed by the Department for Education through the national curriculum and school sport.

In a theoretical discussion (Heikkila and Cairney, 2018, p. 303) identified elements of policymaking systems as "actors making choices; institutions; networks or subsystems; ideas and beliefs; policy context; and events." The authors continue with complications of applying the identified elements into one complete theory or connecting studies of policy. This links back to the discussion in Chapter Two around levels of analysis and areas of sport scholars have argued against viewing policy as elements and part of a process, not an objective. For example, Penney and Evans (1999, p.19, emphasis in

original) commented on physical education and school sport policy in the 1990s and problems with viewing it as a static object they restated that we should “reject a traditional, hierarchical view of policy in which policy is reified as an artefact, commodity or “thing” made by certain individuals” instead “policy should best be seen as a *process*.” In keeping with this broad understanding of policy connected to sport and education Phillpots (2013) argued that to examine a policy context it should be over a substantial period, stating that a decade or more offers a reliable account of policy change not policy as short-term decision making.

To demonstrate the complexity of policy formation and process in the context of sport, Houlihan (2016, p. 56) summarised selected factors influencing the character and pattern of development of domestic sport policy (as shown in figure 3.8, overleaf). The selected factors identified by Houlihan (2016, p. 56) are useful for contextualising sport policy as it forms a base of elements that intersect the varying international influences, national political, economic, and social structures, and individual organisations which influence policy.

Figure 3.3 Selected factors influencing domestic sport policy (reproduced from Houlihan, 2016, p.56)



In relation to London 2012 (and discussed in Chapter Two) Devine (2013, p. 258) wrote that “in 2005 the successful UK bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games in London had a powerful impact on sport policy.” The author critically explores the traditional binary oppositions of sport policy namely ‘sport for social good’ and ‘sport for sport’s sake’ through the lens of human rights and whether philosophically the legacy aspiration of the ‘right to sport for all’ is fit for purpose against emerging UK sport policy (Devine, 2013, p. 274). The assumption here is that policy is based predominantly from a UK

Government source and perspective in a top-down system that has a powerful remit to exercise authority and regulation. However, that is not true for all context and states, for example, Sam (2003, p. 192) noted that in the context of New Zealand, public sport and recreation policy is:

increasingly formulated by the various interests around it, including athletes, educators, sports administrators, civil service advisors, and ministers (none of whom could be said to ascribe to a single, determinable ideology). Rather, these agents likely adhere to particular dominant ideas about sport, within wider ideological undercurrents.

This understanding of sport and policy links to a contextual element of my thesis as it should not be assumed, as discussed above, that political interests fully supported the bidding and hosting of London 2012 or that those who did help it all shared the same understandings of sport and policy. In direct relation to London 2012 and youth policy Keech (2012, p. 83) argued that:

...acquired public policies, such as delivering legacy, are complex and multifaceted processes that involve interaction between a wide variety of state and non-state actors from supra-national level to particular individuals and interest groups.

The quote supports the position of Sam (2009) and expands the focus of policy and London 2012 that Devine (2013) focused on by including the additional dynamic of legacy. Girginov (2012) argued that from a London 2012 and legacy perspective the preparation to host the Games represented an issue concerning governance between state, market and society. In this framework, four modes of governance and a range of policy instruments were used: coercive, voluntarism, targeting, and framework regulation. Girginov (2012, p. 554) develops that the UK Government (Labour period) actively created a “new policy space” to govern legacy activities connected to London 2012. The legacy and policy-driven research by Girginov support that London 2012 affected the systems and processes within the UK Government, however it does not consider how this shifted into the Coalition and then Conservative Governments in 2010 and beyond. Moreover, there is a focus on the meso-level that the policy produced a space and forms

of governance, but not necessarily how it was informed by previous governing practices and translated into the macro-level or micro-level of governing. Consequently, before considering the relationship between legacy and policy during the life course of London 2012, it is pertinent to translate the discussion presented here into policies connected to young people and sport before London 2012.

3.4 Policies connected to young people and sport (pre-London 2012)

A trend in sport policy research has been to focus on school sport and physical education regarding curriculum, politicisation and connection to broader educational policy changes (Flintoff, 2013). Youth sport and a concern for young people's participation in physical activity, sport and play dates back many centuries within the UK. In more contemporary history the Central Council of Physical Recreation in 1960 commissioned a report by the Wolfenden Committee on 'Sport and Community' and it references a cultural tradition of "very many children (in some schools) play games regularly and the healthy tolerance of moderate standards of performance which is part of our games-playing tradition" (CCPR, 1960, p. 44). In a seminal article on the Government involvement in youth sport, Houlihan and Green (2006) offered a history of school sport and physical education and noted that the 1960s and 1970s was a period of disdain regarding the inclusion of sport in the curriculum or policy.

A significant milestone and academic discussion point were the inclusion of physical education in the national curriculum and its rise in political salience since. Before the 1988 Education Reform Act and the subsequent national curriculum for Physical Education in 1992 there was only marginal policy interest in PE and school sports (Houlihan and Green, 2006; Flintoff, 2013; Bloyce and Smith, 2010). A discourse that is observed frequently in the academic debate around youth sports documents in this period is competitive team sport. Penney and Evans (1999) and Bloyce and Smith (2010) argue that the UK Government had a great capacity to privilege certain values and priorities, such as, elite and competitive sport. This emphasis is followed up in the formation of policy in 1995 released under the Conservative Government around national sports policy.

The first formal sport policy from the Department of National Heritage (DNH), *Sport Raising the Game* (1995), marked a growing national policy and centralised structure of sport and education. Referring specifically to young people, the intent around youth sport was clear from the foreword of the policy document where John Major states:

In this initiative I put perhaps highest priority on plans to help all our schools improve their sport. Sport is open to all ages – but it is most open to those who learn to love it when they are young. Competitive sport teaches valuable lessons which last for life. Every game delivers both a winner and a loser. Sports men must learn to be both. Sport only thrives if both parties play by the rules, and accept the results with good grace. It is one of the best means of learning how to live alongside others and make a contribution as part of a team. It improves health and it opens the door to new friendships (DNH, 1995, p. 2).

The quote reaffirms the centrality of competitive team sports that has been documented by scholars previously. There is a connection between the benefits of sport and education to values, ethics and health. However, there is no explicit use of Olympism based language or reference to the Olympic values or Paralympic values in the document and statement cited here.

Two key points can be raised by this observation. Firstly, the language is representative of both the distinction between domestic sport policy documents and the focus of sport, as well as the interpretation and inclusion of international sporting federations. Some states, such as, Turkey have enshrined the Olympic Charter and Olympism into their state-based legislation and policies, plus regional global organisations and unions, such as the European Union have acknowledged obligations from the Olympic Charter (Naul, 2014; Postlethwaite and Grix, 2016). This is symptomatic of the debate raised in Chapter Two around Olympism and the governing of the IOC as there are inherent paradoxes and different academic interpretations around the role and significance of the IOC's moral project. My interpretation is that there is a spectrum of scholars who promote, problematise, and observe Olympic-based language and its influence on internal, host cities, educational settings, commercial activities (e.g., MacAloon, 2008; Culpan and Wigmore, 2010; Sugden and Tomlinson, 2012; Chatziefstathiou and Henry, 2012;

Lenskyj, 2012; Coburn and McCafferty, 2016). Debate about Olympism is significantly influenced by the paradoxes reproduced by the IOC and other international sporting federations, such as elite versus sport for all; values versus commercial; equity versus privilege; western versus global (Chatziefstathiou and Henry, 2012; Hsu and Kohe, 2015). I will expand on this at varying moments throughout the remainder of the chapter, in particular in section 3.8 and the debate around Olympic education programmes.

What is pertinent here and an area to develop nuance in the debate around the IOC and Olympism, is to critically explore further how the IOC and Olympism interacts and translates with domestic policy and political understandings of the Olympic Games and more broadly values in sport. As seen here, in the context of the 1990s, the Major 1995 policy document is not directly attributed or connected to Olympism or the Olympic Games, instead the moral connection is made to broader governmental beliefs and formations of thinking around youth and sport. For example, in *Sport Raising the Game* under the subheading of the national curriculum, there is a further heading of “ethics” and the statement:

the Government believes that such concepts as fair play, self-discipline, respect for other, learning to live by laws and understanding one’s obligations to others in a team are all matters which can be learnt from team games properly taught (DNH, 1995, p. 7).

The quote and emphasis of ‘team games’ in this period, can be connected to the academic debate around more recent UK Government approaches. For example, Jung et al. (2016) who focus on the Labour 2000s Government noted a dominant discourse within the national curriculum to be competitive sport and talent development. Still, there was a growth of other areas, such as, health, citizenship, lifelong participation and Olympic legacy. The authors discuss, alongside other studies (notably Houlihan, 2000), that school sport and physical education is a “crowded policy space” (Jung et al., 2016, p. 502). The crowded nature is a reference to the number of interests, groups and discourses present in the formation and enactment of the policy. This links to the findings from London 2012 as scholars noted the complexity of the school sport system and the interlinking between

legacy and policy objectives (Chen and Henry, 2016, 2019; Kohe and Chatziefstathiou, 2017).

The complexity that scholars refer to in the education system and delivery of school sport (Chen and Henry, 2016, 2019) is, also, notable in this initial policy document from the Major Government in the 1990s. As elements of education in the *Sport Raising the Game* (DNH, 1995) strategy are split into firstly, the category of ‘sport in schools’ where points are structured around: the national curriculum for physical education, putting sport at the heart of school life, accountability, raising standards and recognising achievement, and teacher training. Then, secondly, in a chapter on ‘further and higher education’ where points are structured around: audit of sporting provision and facilities, and university sports scholarships. There is a definitive notion that the Government expects varying governing actors to pursue and align activities to the national framework and expectations. The centralisation of youth sport through the policy document is symptomatic of this Government period where mechanisms and policies were used to “exert a stronger degree of central control of the education system” (Houlihan and Lindsey, 2012, p. 157).

The observation around exerting further central control can be illustrated by the 1988 Education Reform Act and the Education (Schools) Act 1992 which embedded a broader systemic overhaul of the whole school system quality and standards (Ball, 2017). It was enacted through the Department for Education and Science governing technologies, such as, the development and expansion of the Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) to audit and monitor school’s performance to national standards (Penney and Evans, 1999; Flintoff, 2013). Within this physical education experienced significant changes, as it became a foundation subject on the national curriculum. Meaning that pupils aged between 5 and 16 (in compulsory education) should receive provision around physical education as part of a national curriculum (ERA 1988, p. 3; DNH 1995, p. 7). The distinctive governing discourse in this period, therefore, is connected directly to mandatory legislation and framed around what physical education is to the UK Government and how a school should be measured for delivering it.

During this period, the centralisation of the school system in the Major led Conservative Government had a direct impact on the policy around the approach to youth sport. In *Sport Raising the Games*, the Department of National Heritage (1995, p. 40) stated that:

Promoting sport in schools and beyond does, of course, depend on a partnership between schools, further and higher education institutions, sporting bodies, local authorities, clubs, the private sector and Government. No single partner can act alone; each partner must pull its weight and maintain a clear view of the importance of sport within society and of the importance of achieving the broadest possible access to sporting opportunity.

The policy statement here implies a **multiplicity of governing actors functioning together to provide sporting opportunities**. However, the formal mechanism of the national curriculum or official regulating actor OFSTED did not account for the multi-partner approach or monitor how much each partner contributed. Instead, the measurable focus on the effectiveness of the policy was based on young people's levels of physical activity and the quality of provision around physical education (Bloyce and Smith, 2010; Flintoff, 2013). The Major Conservative Government and this period represent an increased UK Government attention on youth sport, centralisation of physical education and school sport, and outcomes evaluated on activity levels and quality of provision. Yet, although a multi-partner approach is advocated through vision and intangible benefits, there is not a set of formal mechanisms to achieve or maintain such.

The final system and distinctive discourse that is present in this period are around able bodies and the lack of explicit acknowledgement or discussion around disability and sport. In the language around sport and education, a young person is discussed homogenously. The dominant governing discourse is that of abled-bodied, mainstream education and elite athletes in the Olympics. For example, *Raising the Game* document recommends that the role of the regional offices of the Sports Council is to:

iii. help promote visits to schools by star sports men and women, for example those signed up to the Youth Charter or the British Olympic Association's Olympians or members of the Institute of Professional Sport (DNH, 1995, p.20).

Granted this period is early in the elite disability sport movement, as the BPA was formed in 1989 “to become one of the first National Paralympic Committees to the join the then-newly created International Paralympic Committee” (IPC, 2014). It is essential to view that the policy in the mid-1990s is established within an Olympic and able-bodied elite athlete framework.

In 1997, as Major lost the general elections to Tony Blair, sport continued to be a focus for the Labour Government. Firstly, the rise in profile of youth sport in domestic sport policy continued into the Labour Government led by Tony Blair from 1997 (Green, 2007a). Penney and Evans (1999) contend that school sport and physical education was given increasing political attention as it was a means to counter growing moral concerns, the authors frame this around restorative discourses about healthy active citizens which physical education was seen to be able to produce. In terms of content and approach, Devine (2013, p. 258) argued Labour departed from the traditional Conservative rhetoric “of ‘sport for sport’s sake’ and adopted an evidence-based instrumental view of ‘sport for social good.’”

The Labour Government that took power in 1997 shifted sport policy under the rhetoric of modernization where the system has driven a shift from voluntarist and local sport driven delivery to state-monitored and centralised structures to govern elite, grassroots and educational based sports provision (McDonald, 2005). Houlihan and Green (2009) outline how the reform of Sport England and UK Sport under the 1997 Labour government modernization movement was partly a balance of the redefinition of Labour Party socialism under the leadership of Prime Minister Tony Blair. However, this reform can also:

...be traced most strongly through Thatcherism and in the 1990s the promotion of managerialism, the concern of the Labour government being to retain the neo-liberal economic gains of Thatcherism and build upon the Conservatives’ managerialist legacy (Houlihan and Green, 2009, p. 680).

The point made here emphasises institutional and ideological influence on policy and Government, however, does not separate based on political party changes. Instead,

continuity follows through the Labour and Conservative party through a political rationality influenced by managerial tendencies and neoliberalism.

In terms of the Labour Government and sport policy, Houlihan and Lindsey (2012) traced the neoliberal tendencies and paradoxes further. The authors discuss the Labour sport policy in the 2000s as a:

...retention of neoliberalism's advocacy of market solutions and individualism, people who are financially dependent on the state become the focus of policies and rhetoric designed to foster and encourage self-reliance and engagement in economically useful activity (Houlihan and Lindsey, 2012, pp. 52-53).

The broader policies and modernization project have been assessed by non-sport academic work, such as Finlayson (2011) where the public sector and services were central to the ideological rationale that the state has responsibility for improving the social conditions of groups in society. Concerning the Labour Government and this period, young people were a particular focus of policy to produce active citizens of the future (Green, 2007a).

More broadly in the 2000s Houlihan and Green (2009, p. 685) proposed that within the socio-political climate of Labour sport was seen as moving from "a peripheral policy concern to one that is currently promoted a cross-cutting solution to policy problems in key sectors such as education, health, crime, and social inclusion." In the policy documents produced in 2000 titled *A Sporting Future for All* and in 2002 titled *Game Plan: A strategy for delivering Government's sport and physical activity objectives*, the documents offer extensive discussion based on statistics, international comparisons, funding, and national capacity. The extensive and thorough nature of these documents can be illustrated by the change in length of the actual documents as the *Sport Raising the Game* published in 1995 was 45 pages long, whereas, by 2002 *Game Plan* was 226 pages long.

The Labour sport policy document in 2002 was co-constructed by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and the Government "Strategy Unit" (DCMS and Strategy Unit, 2002, p. 2). The use of the Strategy Unit indicates a broader connection to Labour's modernization plan. The document used physical activity as an economically

quantifiable measure to show the cost to England and the National Health Service. For example, it states, “assuming higher levels of physical inactivity and a wider range of diseases, as described above, a total cost of £8.2bn (£1.7bn NHS, £5.4bn work absence and £1bn early mortality) can be calculated” (DCMS and Strategy Unit, 2002, p. 48). The policy formation here is akin to the description and analysis by scholars in New Zealand, such as Piggin et al. (2009a) where policymakers use a scientific evidence base to rationalise the investment and management of sport as an area of policy and governing technology.

The focus on sport in schools is part of a broader development in the English school system where the Labour Government established a specialist school initiative. The national initiative involved substantial Government funding to achieve whole-school improvement, resource and expertise sharing with partner schools and wider communities, and benefits to young people within and beyond their school boundaries (Penney and Evans, 1999; Philpotts, 2013). Schools during this time could apply for specialist status in sports, arts, modern languages or technology. For schools that developed sport, their ‘specialist sports college’ status set a precedent of schools being a central hub for developing discourses across youth sport. Philpotts (2013, p. 196) described these as “sport in education, sport in the community and the development of talent.” Several academics problematise this period as blurring the policy boundaries around sport and physical education as the diversity of objectives, beliefs and alliances between policy actors did not converge (McDonald, 2005; Flintoff, 2013). For example, national governing bodies, Youth Sport Trust, Sport England as actors were proactively engaging with different school sports colleges’ aims for elite, community and educational outcomes.

A registered charity the Youth Sport Trust (YST) was established in 1994 (in political terms at the end of the Major Government) with the central objective to develop and implement educational and sporting programmes for young people aged 4-19 in schools and their local communities (YST, 2007). Moreover, the role of its former Chief Executive, Sue Campbell, lobbied and galvanized through her governmental advisory role an understanding that youth sport could be a solution to many of the Government’s wider policy concerns, such as educational attainment or community cohesion (Houlihan and

Green, 2006; Bloyce and Smith, 2010; Philpotts, 2013). The success of lobbying in this period can be attributed to the belief of prominent Labour politicians that levels of physical inactivity amongst young people is associated with the obesity epidemic and perceptions of deteriorating provision of opportunities for young people in physical education and school sport (Philpotts, 2013; Lindsey and Bacon, 2016). This belief translated into sustained attention, strategy and funding around children and young people through further strategies, policies and funding.

The funding, attention and promotion were projected into a standalone youth sport strategy launched in 2002 and implemented in 2003 the Physical Education, School Sport and Club Links strategy (PESSCL) (DfES, 2003a, 2004). The PESSCL strategy launched a number of mechanisms, such as school sport coordinators to “establish a more efficient national infrastructure for PESS [physical education and school sport]” (Bloyce and Smith, 2010, p. 64). The emphasis in policy change during this period was the national policy that was directly influencing and measuring the local structures of physical education and school sport. Philpotts quotes from an interview with Sue Campbell (in her role as a non-political advisor) that YST lobbied and had “the ability to make things happen, to turn a statement by the government into a practical thing on the ground, it makes a difference and gains you a reputation” (Sue Campbell, 2006, as quoted by Philpotts, 2013, p. 201). The focus on non-governmental authorities is prominent as academics have continued to try to understand how school sport and physical education has developed during the implementation of the PESSCL strategy. At this point, the planning and strategies did not explicitly include hosting the Olympic and Paralympic Games or the concept of legacy. This section is more about the national curriculum and connection to broader educational policy changes during the Major and Blair UK Governments.

3.5 The development of LOCOG

Beyond the focus on international sporting federations, an important governing actor and aspect is the organising committee who occupy a role between the host city/nation systems and the international federation’s regulations. Once the London bid committee won the right to host the 2012 Games the preparation and hosting were channelled

through the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG). The Olympic Charter in bye-law to Rule 36 stipulates that an organising committee “shall have the status of a legal person in its country” (IOC, 2004, p. 65). Within the UK legal system, this amounted to LOCOG being registered as a private company limited by guarantee. It was accountable to “its stakeholders, the Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport, the Mayor of London and the British Olympic Association, under the terms of a Joint Venture Agreement” during its prescribed life course “7 October 2005 and was dissolved at the end of June 2013” (Girginov and Olsen, 2014, p. 72). Here, it is evident that the governing structure around London 2012 was based on notions of it being centralised, private and autonomous. The structure of London 2012 and LOCOG aligns to the position of the IOC and the IPC to retain separation from the host city’s or nation’s formal Government mechanisms.

It has been documented that the IOC holds a significant influence over a host nation and host city that wins the right to host a Games (for example, Wagg, 2015). As noted above, this influence is formally through the Olympic Charter and the ‘Candidature Procedure and Questionnaire’ where the IOC requests legal, financial and political support from each candidate city and appropriate Government body (IOC, 2003a, 2004). Beyond guaranteeing the status of the organising committee, the host city and nation-state are expected to protect and create several bespoke governing mechanisms. For example, legally, the UK Parliament enacted the London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act in 2006. The law guaranteed the Host City Contract which included multiple stipulations, such as, the protection of the Olympic Symbols, and guaranteed trading and advertising systems for Olympic sponsors (London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act, 2006). A contextual element to my thesis, therefore, is the role and dynamic between international sporting federations who gatekeeper the Olympic and Paralympic brands, plus the UK Government mechanisms that formally guarantee and govern the domestic preparation to fulfil and host a successful Olympic and Paralympic Games.

In relation to hosting a sport mega-event, a focus of academic literature has been on the formation and process of an organising committee. For example, Parent (2008) and Leopkey and Parent (2015) isolate sport mega-event stakeholders to those connected to the local organising committee: staff and volunteers, host Governments, the community,

sport organisations, delegations, media, sponsors and other stakeholders (e.g., consultants). The authors emphasise the role of governance for an organising committee to manage the multitude of stakeholders, however, do not explicitly consider this beyond the hosting period or into a domestic policy space other than guarantees during the event period. Such a gap in research approach has been identified by scholars, such as Agha et al.'s (2011) observation that the local organising committee is void of long-term accountability as it does not engage in stakeholder discussion beyond hosting an event. The issue of long-term accountability is also real in the LOCOG context as the life course of the committee ran until June 2013. Beyond that, it did not exist in the same form or capacity. Instead, activities and staff dispersed into a range of sectors, for example, an endowment fund from the sale of the Olympic Village by the National Lottery formed an independent trust 'Spirit of 2012' Trust to fund further community projects around legacy (National Lottery, 2013). The organising committee in theory, therefore, is a useful organisation to contextualise; however, the temporal and capacity limitation must be recognised.

In the context of legacy and London 2012, scholars have gone beyond the organising committee and tried to reconcile how traditional political actors adapted to the circumstances of hosting and creating broader impacts. For example, Girginov (2012, p. 552) uses the phrase 'policy as governance' as elements of "legacy institutions, modes of governance and policy instruments" were present during the life course of London 2012. Consequently, the policy becomes a component to a wider conceptualisation of collective action towards hosting the Olympic and Paralympic Games, rather than a concurrent or separate part. Unlike the organising committee, the policy governing actors can change or be impacted by other political circumstances. For example, over the development of London 2012 there were three Prime Ministers, an economic global recession and significant public debate about the war in Iraq and terrorism. Although, these political contexts do not directly relate to the activities of London 2012 they influence the political and policy environments. Consequently, the activities of the organising committee (LOCOG) or political entities cannot be viewed in a vacuum or overly simplified outputs or outcomes. Instead, the broader contexts and changes must be considered.

The diverse nature of the multiple political contexts during London 2012 has produced a plethora of academic studies. For example, Falcous and Silk (2010, p. 170) view the hosting of a sport mega-event as a “seductive, corporate-inspired veil of material and symbolic regeneration”. Here the host state’s agenda is to promote an aesthetically pleasing event “no matter how sanitised, sterile, and repetitious” (Falcous and Silk, 2010, p. 169). The empirical example they use is tension in the London 2012 bidding documents around the notion of inclusivity and diversity juxtaposed by a nationalist discourse of the London 2005 bombings. The juxtaposition allows for a critical reading of how a mega sporting event is problematically based on significant corporate investment, branding and advertising by the host city and investors, rather than reflective of an authentic community or circumstance (Falcous and Silk, 2010). In line with other scholars, such as Boykoff (2013) political discourse from sport mega-events are examined as forms of neoliberal tendencies through the physical spaces, imagined communities and underlying logics of hosting. The managerial rationality discussed above is a form of neoliberal thought where economic and business practices are privileged over social and cultural imperatives.

3.6 The development of legacy

A prominent theme throughout bidding and preparing to host London 2012 was the public and political discourse around the cost of the Games. The financial support for London 2012 totalled over nine billion pounds of funds from the public purse (DCMS, 2012a; Girginov and Olsen, 2014). A term used throughout the preparations by organisers and politicians to unite civil society, justify funding and develop clear visions for delivery is legacy (Coalter, 2013). Consequently, another contextual element is the legacy-based governing mechanisms developed to manage the domestic landscape during the bid, preparation and hosting of London 2012. Contextually, legacy is both a concept encouraged by the international sports federations and sport mega-event consultants as discussed above, it is, also, a concept harnessed by the London 2012 and UK Government. Similar to points raised above, there is a significant amount of scepticism to the utility and conceptualisation of legacy for particular means. Coalter (2013, p. 5), for example, argued the UK Government conceptualisation of legacy was “amorphous and self-serving... to legitimate £9.5 billion public expenditure on the Olympics.” The origins and development of legacy is an essential contextualisation for my thesis.

The concept of legacy was systematically used from the outset of the London 2012 bid (Weed and Dowse, 2009). In 2004 during the bidding process, the London bidding committee outlined four broad legacy aims:

- Delivering the experience of a lifetime for athletes
- Leaving a legacy for sport in the UK
- Benefiting the community through regeneration
- Supporting the IOC and the Olympic movement (LOCOG, 2004a, p. 17).

The initial London legacy aims were in line with the broader early 2000s thinking around legacy from other bidding cities and the IOC (see, IOC, 2013). Academics have viewed this as a watershed period for the IOC, including legacy in the bidding procedures. Tomlinson (2016, p. 3) describes that the IOC formally adopted legacy to its Olympic Charter to include a fourteenth mission “promoting a possible legacy from the Olympic Games to host city and host country.” Academics view the 1980s as a decade where the term informally began to be commonly used in bidding and evaluation documents (Chappelet, 2008). Leopkey and Parent (2012) argued that the term legacy is important from a management perspective about the issues of return on investment and the increasing cost of hosting a sport mega event. Such issues became prominent following negative and positive examples of investing in hosting, such as Montreal’s debt from hosting the 1976 Games to the unprecedented profit produced by the Los Angeles corporate sponsorship initiative during the 1984 Games (Gold and Gold, 2017a). The early informal and formal origins of the term legacy are bound, therefore, in the IOC discourses associated with the economic imperatives around ‘return on investment’ of hosting.

The conceptualisation of legacy has provoked a raft of debate and research (for example, Girginov and Hills, 2008; Gratton and Preuss, 2008; MacAloon, 2008). In the early 2000s around the time of the London bid preparation, the IOC noted that legacy is notoriously difficult to define, as there are multiple meanings and ways of viewing it, for example, urban and environment; sporting; economic and tourism; political; cultural, economic and communication; and Olympic education and documentation legacies (IOC, 2003b).

Misener et al. (2013, p. 330) commented on the challenge of researching and defining legacy “partly because legacy research is interdisciplinary, set in the local through global milieus where the size of the event, city, region or nation creates different cultural contexts.” However, such caution has not stopped academics and members of the IOC movement from continually trying to define what legacy is and develop generalising principles to measure it across different editions.

A trend in literature has been to focus on the objective and scientific ways of defining legacy and being able to measure such. For example, Gratton and Preuss (2008) and Preuss (2007; 2015) use variables, stakeholders and several diagrams to show how host cities of sport mega-events negotiate the formation of legacy. Preuss (2007, p. 211) argued that legacy could be seen through the prism of a cube, “legacy is all planned and unplanned, positive and negative, tangible and intangible structures created for and by a sports event that remains longer than the event itself.” The work of Preuss and the ‘legacy cube’ is useful to differentiate between different types of legacy, more recently Preuss (2015, p. 660) uses vectors of “*what, who, how and when* of legacy” noting that the varying stakeholders have different responsibilities and outcomes in different contexts. Yet, similarly to the discussion around LOCOG and the role of organising committees, this body of work around legacy focuses on the objective and output view, rather than problematising the rationalities and circumstances around it.

Moreover, although Preuss (2007, 2015) made a persuasive argument to view legacy in a typology the timeline for London 2012 suggests that there were changes to London legacy plans as non-sporting contexts changed, such as changes to Government in 2010 resulted in changes to legacy documents. The trend of viewing legacy development as a definable process reflects the focus noted by others on the Olympics and legacy as a product, rather than a process of meaning-making (Sugden and Tomlinson, 2012). This meaning-making perspective contributes to the point made by Misener et al. (2013) that legacy is set in a milieu of cultural contexts. As I develop my thesis, the political and cultural context around education and young people will enrich the meaning-making present in legacy and policy across London 2012. I will reference how the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy was defined, and the formation of the Get Set educational programme. However, as my

research question and aims implied it is more important to understand ‘how’ and within what contexts, rather than the output or outcomes.

3.7 Legacy and London 2012

In terms of London 2012 several academic and non-academic bodies have produced legacy evaluations and debate, as noted in Chapter One, this can be attributed to the scale of London 2012 and the drive for evidence and knowledge about it. A trend has been to focus on tangible and planned legacy outputs and outcomes. For example, the annual Anniversary Games hosted in the London Stadium, at the Queen Elizabeth Park are celebrated as a tangible example of legacy from London 2012. In the early 2000s, the Lower Lee Valley was described as a “polluted industrial” area. Still, through London 2012 the UK Government created the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) “tasked with preparing the site for the biggest show on earth...turned into a stunning new urban park in one of Europe’s largest regeneration projects” (Olympic Park Legacy Company Limited., 2012, p. 3). The ODA was a non-departmental public body of the DCMS and dissolved in 2014. It had a clear public remit, budget, accountability and outcome. Granted the transformation of the Lower Lee Valley and Queen Elizabeth Park have not been without controversy and debate around the negative legacy, around the commercial and exclusive nature of Lower Lee Valley regeneration (see the edited collection by Cohen and Watt, 2017). What is notable is the agreement that this tangible legacy exists as there are measurable processes and evidence in terms of the ODA, stadium, park and ongoing Anniversary Games.

Scholars have challenged the focus on tangible and objective construction of legacy in varying ways, for example, through economic rationalities and viewing legacy as regulatory capitalism in action. Proponents of this position Raco (2012) and Nichols and Ralston (2015) highlight the problematic contradiction of the role of organisations during London 2012 that was between traditional systems of private and public regulatory practices. For example, the ODA who although it is a:

...public company that might be expected to comply with Freedom of Information requests, the ODA will not reveal details of its contracts with private companies because public disclosure of these would provide a commercial advantage to the

company's contractual counterparties. That is, 'it is (deemed to be) in the public interest not to know how public money is being spent'! (Nichols and Ralston, 2015, p. 392, emphasis in original).

The critical analysis, here, supports the point made by Misener et al. (2013) that cultural contexts matter, but also extends that regulatory, economic and political contexts matter. The problematisation arises for Nichols and Ralston (2015) and Raco (2012) in the use of public money in such a manner. It suggests that the expected normal behaviour of a public body is usurped by the organising committee and international federation regulations that are framed around private company practices and norms. However, the authors do not extend their analysis beyond economic and legal regulations to consider the historical and cultural contexts that have allowed this unquestioned behaviour by the ODA and LOCOG during London 2012. Beyond regulatory capitalism, the evidence, also suggests hybrid governing between the London 2012 connected authorities and the domestic authorities. Such governing demonstrates a further connection to the neoliberal discourses as the public, and private partnerships merge to achieve event management and preserve corporate regulations.

A reaction to the growth in legacy and growth in the critical debate from the IOC and subsequent hosting cities has been to seek ways to create scientific knowledge, such as the evidence from the Queen Elizabeth Park and the ODA above. The University of East London Olympic Games Impact Studies was commissioned jointly by the UK Government funded Economic and Social Research Council and the IOC as part of the London 2012 bid agreement. The research produced a *Pre- Games Study* (2010), *Games-time Study* (2012) and *Post-Games Study* (2015) the reports cited here are over a thousand pages in total and include quantitative methodologies to "develop an objective and scientific analysis of the impact of each edition of the Games" (UEL, 2015, p. 4). The quantifying and positivist approach taken within this report uses large data sets and indicators to view positive trends. The scale and approach represent a systematic and observable way to see the Games' impact. However, it does not consider broader structures, systems, narratives or non-quantifiable elements. To an extent, the report acknowledges this as in concluding remarks the *Post-Games Study* (2015, p. 5) authors comment:

As with any long term project that is intended to be a catalyst for long term change and transformation, the analysis of three years into legacy that this report presents is only the beginning. That London 2012 has been a catalyst for positive change is not in doubt, but when and where the process ends and what will be the full magnitude of the effect is not yet known. The story of London 2012 will continue to unfold for a long time to come.

However, rather than acknowledging the limitation in terms of the effectiveness of being “a catalyst for positive change” the restriction is framed around the timings of the data and report. Gratton and Preuss (2008, p. 1933) note that “the problem is that it will take 15-20 years to measure the true legacy of an event such as the Olympic Games and the OGGI [Olympic Games Impact Study] project finishes two years after the event has been held.” I agree that legacy is a long-term concept and can be interpreted in many ways. What is problematic here is the overlooking of other limitations of measuring legacy and quantifying it. Although tangible legacy, such as the redevelopment of the Lower Lee Valley can be measured against vectors of construction, economic return and urban development. It does not account for the legacy aims that target societal and intangible outcomes which involve significant public and political investment and infrastructure beyond the Games, such as those enveloped in the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim and the London 2012 educational programme.

A societal legacy aim from London 2012 that is an area of significant scrutiny has been to increase grassroots participation. The conceptualisation and measurement of such legacy have been considerably associated with the ‘feel-good factor’ or explicitly in terms of sport mega-events is the ‘festival effect’ which is assumed can inspire engagement and participation beyond hosting (Weed et al., 2012). Within academia pre and post-London 2012, there has been scepticism that no definitive evidence bases to support the ‘feel-good factor’ or ‘festival effect’ (Weed et al., 2012; Boardley, 2012; Bretherton et al., 2016; Lovett and Bloyce, 2017). Several studies have focused on problematising the outcome of the inspire legacy aspirations from the perspective of psychology and health. For example, Boardley (2012) explores psychological theories and models, such as self-determination theory, demonstration effect and self-efficacy in the promotion of participation in physical activity to suggest there is not an automatic link between elite

and mass sport participation. The focus on behaviour change and outcome of legacy or policy is a valuable element to debate. It supports and challenges the aspects of policy implementation, such as the perceived scientific knowledge and tools to monitor participation numbers, especially at the micro-level.

The scepticism and lack of agreement around how to measure the outcome of legacy and particularly legacies aimed at increasing mass participation has drawn more studies to consider the political elements that influence bidding, hosting and constructing legacy programmes. This scepticism is pertinent to the context of London 2012 as the focal point of the bid around driving participation through the sporting spectacle was entangled with political influence. Girginov (2008, p. 903) evidenced that the UK Prime Minister in 2005 Labour's Tony Blair projected:

The British Government also wants to use this unique festival of sport as a catalyst to promote sports participation and physical activity in all communities throughout the celebration through the fundamental principles of the Olympic movement.

As discussed above, the use of the language 'celebration' is problematised by Falcous and Silk (2010) who critique the London 2012 bidding documents against the narrative from the 2005 London bombings. In further research around the pre-London 2012 political legacy discourse, Bretherton et al. (2016) suggest the UK Government used risk around health to rationalise the attempts to increase sport and physical activity among the population. For the authors, the "perceived special status of the event was more readily apparent in the intangible notion of 'inspiration'" linked to the assumptions of "Olympism, which has been described as a 'philosophy of behaviour'...accepted across the global context of world sport that may also be internalised at individual level" (Bretherton et al., 2016, p. 618). The pieces from Bretherton et al. (2016) and Falcous and Silk (2010) offer nuance to the legacy outcomes and systems as they consider what Horne (2013) described as the competing intentions, interests and preoccupations of hosting a sports event. However, there are marginalised groups in these analyses as empirically, and theoretically, these studies do not focus on young people but homogenise discussion about participation to the whole population. A further contextual and literature review

point, therefore, must be the appeal to ‘inspire a generation’ through the London 2012 legacy and the focus on young people.

3.8 London 2012 and young people

In the context of London 2012, the initial aim of ‘leaving a legacy for sport in the UK’ was harnessed, considerably, through young people. As demonstrated at the IOC selection event in 2005, the London bid delegation was made up of nearly a third of young people representing “East London school children from twenty-eight different ethnic backgrounds” (LOCOG, 2013, p. 37). Strategically the youthful part of the delegation represented the generation to be inspired through hosting the Games (Lee, 2006, p. 178). A symbolic and extraordinary move to show that politically, culturally and economically, the London bid was focused on ‘inspiring a generation’ with young people at the heart of hosting. The focus on young people as a bidding strategy embraced the IOC ethos enshrined in the Olympic Charter and described as Olympism:

...a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational value of good example, social responsibility and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles (IOC, 2004, p. 9).

The inspirational element and use of young people developed from a bid narrative to a central strapline for the London 2012 Games and the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim. It was used by both the organising committee (LOCOG) and UK Government bodies (such as, the DCMS) as a vision for the Games and legacy. For example, Baroness Tessa Jowell, (the then Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport during the bid and subsequent Olympics Minister) was quoted in 2005 saying, “she could not believe London had won, but promised Games that would show the country's passion for sport and provide inspiration for the next generation” (Oliver, 2005). The enactment of the ‘inspire a generation’ strapline involved a complex set of governing actors, formal programmes and crossed over many traditionally separate agendas and policies.

The reality of enacting Olympism and for London 2012 achieving the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim became centred around several different Games’ programmes and

disparate entities, such as the Cultural Olympiad, the work of Legacy Trust UK, and the International Inspiration programme (DCMS, 2008a). To an extent the host city has creative license to design and implement such programmes, however, as noted above there are operational requirements set out in the official Candidature Procedure and Questionnaire, and the Host City Contract by the IOC (IOC, 2003a; London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games Act, 2006). Formally, the IOC bidding regulation is that a host city must include an education programme that engages young people with the Olympic movement and Olympism (IOC, 2003a). The London bid team utilised the IOC's concept of Olympism and 'educational value' to show a commitment of using London 2012 to engage a younger audience and use sport to enact educational and inspirational outcomes.

In a meta-narrative review, Hwang (2018) grouped the academic debate around Olympic education into six areas: educational philosophy, critical sociology, curriculum development, educational psychology, development of evaluation measures, and policy analysis and evaluation. In terms of policy and the influence of Olympic education, scholars have used discourse to frame their investigation as it encapsulates the non-traditional governing actor of the IOC as being able to influence society. Chatziefstathiou and Henry (2012, p. 251) argue:

In relation to the Olympic movement today, it is rather obvious that a focus on young people has escalated in recent years and this is evident in the policies, programmes and interventions by the Olympic family, targeting young people around the world. The motives for this are expressed as a mixture of moral but also commercial factors.

The authors illustrate this through examples of the introduction of the Youth Olympics, London 2012's International Inspiration Project and the embrace of social media and digital participation in Olympic activities. The mixture of moral and commercial factors was referenced above in the debate around legacy and how in the context of the London 2012 bid the use of young people was as much about a credible return on investment for the IOC and Olympic movement.

Lenskyj has been vocal in the critique of the Olympic industry, especially around Olympic education. Lenskyj (2012, p. 266) grounded the analysis in the contradictions of the organisation's identification as a 'movement' yet rather than being a progressive social movement the IOC is "a thoroughly corporatized and globalized sporting and television spectacle." The contemporary spectacle and Olympism "rely on de Coubertin's view of Olympism and Olympic education as an instrument of social engineering" and in the author's view this unchallenged acceptance of the Olympic principles has been "colonizing children's minds" (Lenskyj, 2012, p. 269). In focusing on the context on New Zealand Kohe (2010, p. 488) argued that the educational programmes embedded in resources produced for schools lacked "vital critical socio-political components" allowing for a particular reading of Olympic history and philosophy. The Olympic education projects here are viewed as products rather than tools that promote a version and interpretation of the Olympic movement and values.

In contrast to this critical stance around Olympic education project, several scholars have argued for the utility of promoting the benefits of Olympism within the context of educational settings. Culpan and Wigmore (2010) acknowledge the contested nature of Olympism but see the value of developing an essential tool in education as it can facilitate the confrontation of globally developing problems, such as consumerism. Binder (2012) present the Olympic movements' connection to educational programmes as an evolution. In this understanding, the philosophical underpinnings are used to construct the aims and plans designed to enable:

educators and coaches to help their students and their athletes to see the world in a different way, see each other in a different way, change behaviours so that they act in a different way, and come to understand and experience the joys of achievement in physical endeavour (Binder, 2012, p. 299).

London 2012 offers a substantive opportunity to further this debate as the legacy aim to 'inspire a generation' directly relates to Olympism and targeting young people, moreover, the educational programme developed by LOCOG was ambitious and far-reaching the context of which I turn to below.

The London 2012 flagship education programme created by LOCOG was launched in 2008 under the branding of Get Set (LOCOG, 2012b). The programme was designed as a dynamic website to provide free resources, ideas and network for education providers around London 2012 and the Olympic and Paralympic values (LOCOG, 2012a). It was delivered via the domestic statutory education sector, namely primary schools, special education needs and disability schools, secondary schools, and further education colleges. The Get Set programme is said to have engaged “25,000 schools and 6.5million young people” (IOC, 2013, p. 6). The IOC quoted the LOCOG Chair, Lord Coe, in 2012 as saying “there are already so many exciting ways schools are getting involved and playing their part in London 2012. This is another great opportunity to run through Get Set, which will show London 2012’s commitment to put young people at the heart of the Games” (IOC News, 2012). During the planning and delivery of London 2012, there was a positive narrative around the Get Set programme and its ability to enact positive legacy outcomes.

The focus on the positive potential in the construction and pedagogical elements of IOC educational programmes tend to marginalise the political tensions and cultural questions that arise from developing a universal philosophy based educational programme. Hsu and Kohe (2015) highlighted the incongruences between Olympism (a Western construct) and non-Western cultural contexts and educational frameworks. Particularly pertinent currently as the most recent Games’ are hosted by PyeongChang (South Korea), Tokyo (Japan) and Beijing (China). Yet, the IOC is still promoting a universal message and requiring a host city to embed an educational programme based on its principles. The use of education by the IOC is on the one hand rhetorically based on universal values and framing of the power of sport and the other hand a commercial enterprise that produces a product targeted at a young consumer. The debate is underpinned by an analysis of the rationalities of the international sporting federation and how this translates into different national contexts. In the national context of the UK during and post-London 2012, there was a high level of political scrutiny of policies connected to young people and school sport (Jung et al., 2016; Lindsey, 2020).

In the political commentary and inquiry, the concept and measurement of the legacy for the education sector has been consistently cited to evaluate the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim and rhetoric around putting young people at the heart of the Games. For

example, the UK Parliament, House of Commons (HoC) Education Committee completed a parliamentary inquiry and published a report, *School sport following London 2012: No more political football*. One of the concluding statements was that in terms of London 2012 and legacy “it is telling that witnesses could not agree what the Government’s London 2012 legacy for schools would be” (HoC Vol I, 2013a, p.45). The witnesses and submissions of evidence to the inquiry included politicians, high profile public figures, policymakers, LOCOG, sports organisations, delivery agents and sponsors. The lack of agreement between a wide variety of voices is unsurprising as policy in any context is a contested terrain. Still, this inquiry does raise important questions around power and knowledge connected to the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim, the role of the Get Set programme, and the domestic policy around young people, education and sport.

The political commentary and inquiry can be contextualised into a broader debate around physical education and school sport that originated in the significant funding and policy changes made by the newly elected Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government between 2010 and 2012 (Mackintosh and Liddle, 2015). The policy statements from the Coalition Government did not share the same positivity as Lord Coe’s report cited above about the momentum around the Get Set programme and London 2012’s commitment to young people (IOC News, 2012). In January 2012 the DCMS strategy for youth sport noted:

Since London won the right to stage the Games in 2005, participation rates amongst young people have fallen, with many of our major sports – including Football, Tennis and Swimming – seeing declines in the proportion of 16-25-year olds regularly taking part (DCMS, 2012a, p.3).

The evaluations from the IOC and LOCOG (above) citing the number of people engaged with the Get Set programme and praising the commitment of putting young people at the heart of London 2012 (LOCOG, 2012a, 2012b; IOC News, 2012) contrasts with the UK Government assessment cited here as declining participation rates of 16-25-year olds. The difference demonstrates tension and contrast between how governing actors evaluated and interpreted the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim and what constituted activities or

how to measure and evaluate such activities. The contrast highlights the need for broader contextualisation of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim and understanding of how it intersected with domestic political rationalities and governing technologies.

In academic literature, scholars have considered the micro-level and meso-level educational elements of the national and regional legacy programmes, collecting data directly from young people, teachers, families and local authorities (such as Chen and Henry, 2016, 2019). As mentioned in Chapter Two, Kohe (2017) used memory techniques to explore how young people understood hosting London 2012. The discussion and findings connect the voice of young people with a politicisation of sport and physical education the empirical memory fragments destabilise “notions that sport/physical education might hold a treasured, privileged or necessary important place in young people’s hearts and minds” (Kohe, 2017, p. 39). The author associates the assumptions with a “politicised...framework of overarching debates about global and local ‘healthism’ and productive citizenship, community engagement, neoliberal curriculum changes, and sustained concern about young peoples’ lives, morality and well-being” (Kohe, 2017, p. 38). The study highlights the micro-personal context of young people’s voices and how that intersects with the macro-level discourses around how young people function in society.

In contrast, Tims (2013) steers the focus from the politicisation of sport and physical activity at a macro-level and meso-level, to the Get Set programme and the micro-level opportunities it presented for schools and the agency of young people and school-based practitioners in utilising the Get Set network. The author describes the opportunities cultivated by the Get Set programme for schools in relation to the direct engagement between LOCOG and “teachers and other who work face to face with young people” (Tims, 2013, p.175). In line with Hwang’s (2018) findings, the analysis of an Olympic educational programme does depend on the disciplinary perspective of the researcher. Moreover, about London 2012 specific pieces how explicitly the researcher connects the Get Set programme to either the micro-level impact of the programme or the meso-level and macro-level influences interconnected in the formation and practices of governing.

In a meso-level programme evaluation of school's engagement with the Get Set programme Chen and Henry (2019, p. 269) through regional case studies concluded that "the complexity of the schools' contexts and features furthermore suggest a need for multiple working theories of programme impact and attention to conditions as well as to causes." Supporting this Kohe and Chatziefstathiou (2017, p. 69) concluded: "we need to facilitate a much more rigorous dialogue that first assesses the commercial and political imperatives that drive the construction of Olympic education material and how Olympic education is operationalised to meet policy ends within physical education." The suggestions made by the authors here put Get Set as a meso-level programme that interconnects political imperatives or conditions of schools with the operationalisation at a micro-level. Chen and Henry (2019, p.269) advocate that further research would be needed to understand schools' context and features better, "this form of policy assessment would be analytical and explanatory rather than being evaluative."

Scholars have conducted an analytical and explanatory policy assessment. In connecting the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim directly to UK Government policy Keech (2012, p.87 and p.94) presented the context of youth and London 2012 as the "Olympification of sports policy" under the Labour Government and the "dismantling of Labour's 'legacy'" by the Coalition Government in 2010. Keech separates governing actors and argues that legacy is "not anything to do with LOCOG, the ODA nor the IOC" instead the Coalition Government is "responsible for fulfilling the legacy claims." This separation is in complete contrast to Girginov (2016), who focuses on analytical and explanatory policy assessment of the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim from the perspective of LOCOG and government-sponsored official evaluations. Here, the legacy and London 2012 programme are framed through a "combination of political...organisational... and popular discourse" sourced from UK Labour Government documents, LOCOG and the media (Girginov, 2016, p.496). It is a limitation of both Keech (2012) and Girginov (2016) to discount or not include changes to UK Government legacy aims or the role of the organising committee and international sports federations.

Outside of the relationship between policy-based governing actors and LOCOG and the IOC, other scholars have considered the corporate side of Olympic educational programmes. For example, Coburn and McCafferty (2016) support the argument that

commercial motives fuel the IOC by highlighting the role of Coca Cola in the sponsorship of the IOC activities around schools during London 2012 in Scotland. The authors demonstrate this relationship between Coca Cola and London 2012 is problematic when considered in conjunction with the broader educational discourse of producing young citizens. The latter are aware of health risks such as obesity. The authors attributed this to neoliberal tendencies through the lens of Giroux and how Coca Cola can be viewed as “private sponsorship in a neo-liberal ideology, whereby ‘the state makes a grim alignment with corporate capital and transnational corporations’” (Giroux, 2005, p. 210 as quoted by Coburn and McCafferty, 2016, p. 24). In the authors’ discussion legacy:

...was sold to a consuming host population as an opportunity for country-wide economic growth, with benefits in health and well-being that in keeping with the ideals of the Olympics movement. However, we argue that the alleged altruistic case for Olympic sponsorship to support human flourishing, harmony and global peace can be best understood as support of product placement, fierce brand protectionism that enhanced the reputation, trust and value of corporate iconic brands, one of which was Coca-Cola (Coburn and McCafferty, 2016, p. 24).

The argument is symptomatic of the wider debate between the contradictions of the Olympic movement and its attempts to be driven by ethical motives and economic motives. Scholars, including Lenskyj (2012), Coburn and McCafferty (2016) and Kohe (2017) have used the rationality of neoliberalism and commercialisation of the Olympic industry to underpin the analysis of contradictory governing technologies, such as the Coca-Cola sponsorship mechanism used by state agencies to fund school-based programmes. The Get Set programme can be interpreted as a technology of policy and legacy to further a variety of private, public, and non-profit interests.

What is particularly interesting is that no one governing actor is solely dominant over the governing technologies and political rationality of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim and Get Set programme. Instead, the funding, shaping of the delivery systems, the scope of exercising authority, and dissemination of information interconnect with the organising committee, UK Government, corporate sponsors, and the international sporting federations, amongst others. In the various studies cited in this subsection, there is

acknowledgement and engagement with varying aspects of the complexity of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim and Get Set programme. However, there is a distinct empirical gap around trying to analyse and explain policy through perspectives of different governing actors, such as LOCOG, Government agencies or other non-governmental education actors. The views of multiple governing actors will contribute to understanding political rationalities and governing technologies across the life course of London 2012. An organisation and aspect of Get Set that has been frequently overlooked is the Paralympics, LOCOG and BPA.

3.9 Legacy and the Paralympics

To date the most current empirical and theoretical debate around London 2012 and young people has been connected to the role of the Olympics, IOC and the discourse around able-bodied participation (Misener et al., 2013; Brittain and Beacom, 2016; Brown and Pappous, 2018a, 2018b; Kerr, 2018; Howe and Silva, 2018). The domination of the IOC and the Olympics in the debate can be attributed to several contextual factors. Most notably the centrality of the IOC to developing the Olympic Games as its primary event since the late 19th century. The IPC and the Paralympics have developed in a relatively shorter amount of time as the movement established a grew post World War II (Legg and Steadward, 2011). The relationship between the IOC and IPC, Olympic and Paralympic Games is often conflated to being strong and formal. Yet, historically the Paralympic movement has maintained separation and autonomy of the IOC, working in parallel rather than directly together (Brittain, 2016b). As more attention has been paid to the Paralympics and IPC in scholarship, the nuance and visibility of the international sporting federation have increased (Misener et al., 2013). However, a growing critique of sport mega-event literature and debate around legacy is the lack of visibility or inclusion of the Paralympic movement (Misener et al. 2013; Gold and Gold, 2017b; Kerr 2018; Pappous and Brown, 2018).

London 2012 represents a significant context to changes in the nature and extent of the federation’s relationships and the visibility of the IPC and Paralympics during the bidding and planning stages of a Games (Kerr, 2018). Around the time that London was preparing to bid for the 2012 Games, the international sports federations were implementing

agreements between each other to foster further collaboration. Formal agreements between the IOC and IPC around financial, branding, commercial opportunities and facilities, for example, the agreements in 2001, 2003 (Gold and Gold, 2017b) and most recently in 2018 the work of the past decade has led to a “historic long-term agreement establishing a partnership between the two organisations until at least 2032” (IPC, 2018). Beyond the tangible partnerships and agreements, there is a limited amount of empirical material that considers the informal and intangible ways that London 2012 is significant for the Paralympics and IPC.

In larger volumes of disability, such as Gilbert and Legg (2011), and Brittain and Beacom (2018) encourage researchers to develop critical perspectives of systems associated with disability and sport as there are scant debate and representation of the tensions around the Paralympics and elite sport, disability and grassroots sport, and the everyday disability rights movement. Although it is not possible to purely focus on the Paralympic aspect in my thesis, given the inclusion of the Paralympic values in the Get Set educational programme it will have to be a point of critical exploration. In terms of London 2012 and the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim the origins and discussion around disability sport in what I see as part of broader ableism discourses intersect the language around the interpretation of legacy.

The complex and multidimensional phenomenon of disability is integral to the Paralympic movement, and since its inception during World War II has embraced multiple international voices and perspectives on disability and the role of sport (Legg and Steadward, 2011). Scholars have attributed the Paralympics as a significant platform for sporting and non-sporting achievements in the disability movement, for example, Gold and Gold (2017b, p. 114) stated:

As the summit of disability sport, the Paralympic Games have played a major part in changing social attitudes by emphasizing achievement rather than impairment and by accelerating the agenda of inclusion. They have also forced changes in official attitudes in countries where disability was ideologically problematic, if only to accommodate international opinion when bidding for the Olympics – given that the Paralympics are now closely linked to that process.

As noted in Chapter One and Two, London 2012 was one of the first host cities to embrace the ‘one bid, one city’ approach that the IOC introduced in the early 2000s, in conjunction with the IOC (Kerr, 2018). The level of analysis used by Gold and Gold (2017b) above around the changes to ‘official attitudes’ linked to the bidding process of the Olympic and Paralympic Games is an aspect that links to my thesis as I am considering the governing actors’ perspectives of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim.

About legacy before London 2012, the ability to isolate Paralympic legacy had been difficult as they were conflated under the Olympic Games and legacy structures, or not considered at all (Cashman, 2006). More recently authors, such as Legg et al. (2015) and Kerr (2018) argued that a lack of evidence and discussion is attributed to the existing power imbalance between the Olympic and Paralympic federations and brands. Gilbert and Legg (2011, p. 240) suggested that the IPC does not have a “legacy voice” and that “... most Paralympic legacies occur through a form of Olympic and Paralympic osmosis.” The inferiority is tangibly discussed here in terms of the attributes and corporate power associated with the separate sporting movements. It homogenises the inferiority of the Games with the potential effect of Paralympic legacy. However, London 2012 is said to have been the most successful Paralympic Games in history and obtained further legitimacy in domestic and international governing spaces (Kerr, 2018).

In the context of London 2012 and policy Weed and Dowse (2009, p. 173) argued that the London 2012 Paralympic Games were a “missed opportunity” waiting to happen. The major obstacles, according to the authors to the potential development of Paralympic social legacy were “intentionally and unintentionally overlooked in legacy planning” and the use of “general rhetoric with a considerable emphasis on elite sport” (Weed and Dowse, 2009, p. 172). The argument here connects to whether the Paralympic legacy should be separate from or integrated to the Olympic legacy plans. In relation to the intersection between the London 2012 Paralympics, legacy and policy Brittain and Beacom (2016, p. 516) argued “legacy aims can be viewed as facilitators for discrete areas of public policy. However, by themselves, they cannot hope to challenge long-term systemic difficulties associated with the political and economic direction of travel.” The authors focus on ableism as a prejudicial attitude towards disabled people as social

policies limit opportunities for full societal participation i.e. the lived experience of disabled people.

An under-researched element of the debate around London 2012 is the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy and Get Set educational programme. The growing Paralympic influence on Olympic and Paralympic Games education programmes is evident in the formation of the Get Set programme as the Paralympic aims and brand were given equal weighting to the elements of Olympism, illustrated here as the programme was to:

give all young people the chance to learn about and live the Olympic Values of friendship, excellence and respect and the Paralympic Values of inspiration, determination, courage and equality (LOCOG, 2012, p. 1).

However, of the studies discussed above around the Get Set programme’s and London 2012’s use of young people in the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim, very few acknowledged and utilised the Paralympic element to examine the effectiveness critically. For example, Girginov (2016), Chen and Henry (2019) and Kohe (2017) cite policy and educational documents that pertain to the Olympic legacy elements. There is little to no mention of disability-specific 2010 or 2011 Labour or Coalition Government legacy documents (DCMS and OfDI, 2010; DCMS and OfDI, 2011) or to the London 2012 bid document that explicitly highlighted and linked the Paralympic element to the educational programme. Consequently, there is a significant gap in knowledge around how the use of Paralympic values affected governing actors or acts about the Get Set programme.

In a similar trend to Olympic based legacy discussion, there is a dispute as to how to define Paralympic legacy. For example, Pappous and Brown (2018, p. 658) discussed the issues around measuring tangible and intangible legacies from London 2012 as the UK Government produced legacy documents and promises due to “having previously attracted criticism for the lack of specific legacy planning for the Paralympic Games.” To date, there is limited attention paid to the role of LOCOG as a governing actor in the context of Paralympic legacies and London 2012, moreover the inclusion of the Paralympics within the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim. The inclusion could be due to a much-cited argument that evidence of Paralympic Games’ legacies is based on anecdotal or post-hoc evidence, rather than the systematic and comprehensive studies that

have focused on past Olympic Game legacies (Misener et al., 2013; Pappous and Brown, 2018a, 2018b). My thesis counters such and has included the Paralympic element in my theoretical framework through the concept of ableism, my primary data collection by including the Paralympics in my documentary search and interview questions, and in my analysis and discussion as Paralympic related points are interweaved throughout (I develop this further in subsequent chapters).

My review highlights that legacy and education literature around London 2012 is dominated by able-bodied and Olympic-centric research. Furthermore, the then Paralympic specific research overlooks the Paralympic legacy aspect built into the Get Set educational programme and the inclusion of young people with disabilities in the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim. What is pertinent here is to demonstrate the unique context of London 2012 and the unprecedented approach taken by the bid then organising committee to develop the Olympic and Paralympic aspects of London 2012 as one Games. Moreover, the Paralympic element, disability and the role of the IPC has emerged as a significant strand in the context of London 2012 educational programmes. As noted, LOCOG used the Olympic and Paralympic values concurrently in the Get Set programme choosing to highlight the “Olympic Values: respect, excellence and friendship” and “Paralympic Values: courage, determination, inspiration and equality” alongside each other (LOCOG, 2012, p. 1). The significance of such is that LOCOG did not deliver separate educational programmes, or necessarily separate the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim between disabled young people or able-bodied counterparts. Consequently, I need to be conscious of Paralympic legacy debate and the ableism discourses that intersect with the construction of the London 2012 legacy connected to young people and the education systems.

3.10 Concluding chapter thoughts

This chapter has discussed key literature on legacy and policy. Throughout the chapter, I have identified different empirical and theoretical perspectives to demonstrate the breadth of study on London 2012 and the attributed concepts of policy and legacy. There is a trend in using neoliberalism discourses in the Olympic legacy-based literature where scholars account for an increasing managerial rationality in the bidding and hosting

process developed by the IOC and the focus on outputs of hosting. Another prominent feature is a distinct lack of scrutiny to how the Paralympic movement or legacies feature in debates around London 2012. Hence, the need to include ableism discourses and demonstrate how this interconnect with governing around legacy, education and policy during London 2012.

I have referenced multiple studies that view legacy or policy as products or as meaning-making mechanisms. What the varying discussions and pieces of evidence have justified is the relevance of a theoretical framework where the systems and actors associated with policy and legacy are not attributed to one dominant area or rationality. Instead, there are complexities in each of the conceptual circumstances and context of London 2012. This complexity has, also, driven me to want to include multiple sources of qualitative data so that I can understand and represent as many perspectives from governing actors in my analysis.

The other significant feature of this chapter accounted for the historical contexts of policies connected to young people and sport during the Major and early Blair Governments. The introduction and enactment of the Education Reform Act, the national curriculum and multiple sport policy documents account for an increased intervention by the UK Government. The aspects discussed the policy document extracts serve to highlight that before London 2012, the policy associated with young people and sport was channelled through school sport and physical education. Notably, how young people should engage with sporting activities and what benefit this can bring to society and the UK Government, such as active citizens of the future. London 2012 bid and governing technologies emerged in the context of the PESSCL strategy and Labour political rationality based on modernization.

Chapter 4 Research design

4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present and justify the research design for the empirical aspects of my thesis. The first part of the chapter discusses the methodological underpinnings to my ontological, epistemological and positionality. The midsection reviews the formation and suitability of the data collection techniques about documentary, dialogue and interview elements. The midsection is followed by a review of the structure and relevance of the data analysis framework. The final subsection brings together the practical steps taken to achieve each of the techniques described and present my research design.

Methodological texts in sport, qualitative, and social research have helped me navigate the practical terrain of research design, such as Maguire and Young (2002), Given (2008), Savin-Baden and Howell Major (2013), Smith and Sparkes (2016), and Bryman (2016). The choice and use of varying social theories and research methods is determined by several factors, such as the central research question, the scholar's philosophical underpinnings, access to data, ethical considerations, etc. There are factors that controllable and uncontrollable, for example, about data access and collection attempts to use sources that are in the realm of an Olympic and Paralympic Games can have significant practical barriers and issues. As noted by the IOC archival guidance regulations:

In principle, the public has access to the IOC's "public" archives. However, the IOC reserves the right to restrict or forbid access to certain documents, particularly when their divulgation is forbidden, either by law, or by contractual agreement, or owing to private or public interests worthy of protection. (IOC, 2011, Article 4, p. 2, emphasis in original).

In practice when I attempted to access the LOCOG archives housed at the UK National Archives (or being transferred from the BOA), there were catalogue and embargo issues (as they use the IOC public access rules) that prevented me from being able to access this data before at least 2022 (The National Archives, 2013). I will discuss how I overcame

this barrier in terms of data collection below. What is notable here is that my theoretical framework and research design represents a series of controllable and uncontrollable choices I made throughout my thesis.

4.2 Methodological underpinnings

Approaches and terminology within research design are contested and vast, especially within the social sciences and those applied to a sporting context (Maguire and Young, 2002; Smith and Sparkes, 2016). Consequently, a researcher has a considerable amount of options around research design. I have explained at the outset of my thesis that my philosophical assumptions are grounded in a poststructuralist and Foucault inspired theoretical framework. What I turn to now is how my philosophical assumptions, thesis context, literature review and theoretical framework distil into a strategy of inquiry, leading to details of the procedures of data collection and analysis.

Smith and Sparkes (2016) discussed the fundamental questions connected qualitative research as ontological (what is the form and nature of reality) and epistemological (the nature of the relationship between the researcher and knowledge). Paradigms traditionally discussed about ontology and epistemology are positivism, interpretivism and critical realism (summarised in Appendix 4). There are many texts that group paradigms in different ways, and this is frequently influenced by the disciplinary traditions and positionality (Savin-Baden and Howell Major, 2013; Bryman, 2016). A notion in political science is that ontology and epistemology is a “skin not a sweater” (Marsh and Furlong, 2018, p.184). The authors expand with three interlinked points about the importance of ontological and epistemological concerns within the research. Firstly, ontology and epistemology, if explained simply and with examples, is an open dialogue to engage with; secondly, following the post-war period of social science and dominance of a “fairly crude positivist epistemology” the debate must be public and acknowledged; thirdly, “researchers cannot adopt one [paradigmatic] position at one time for one project and another on another occasion for a different project” as the philosophical underpinnings reflect what is studied, how it is studied and the status of the findings (Marsh and Furlong, 2018, pp.185-186).

The distinctions and debate about paradigms are essential and as I discussed in Chapter One and Two, I identify with poststructuralism which has frequently been associated with the critique of rational foundations for research in the social and political sciences (Smith Maguire, 2002; Markula and Pringle, 2006; Patton, 2017). The methodological underpinnings of poststructuralism are not definitive or a distinct tradition, it formed out of a philosophical movement in the 1960s in France and scholars, such as Derrida, Deleuze, and Lyotard (Williams, 2005). Concerning qualitative research, the following statement outlines the basic tenants of a poststructuralist thesis:

The ontological assumption that reality is what is passed on through symbolic discourse; epistemological assumption: knowledge may be gained through the deconstruction of social products, language, media, institutions etc.; Purpose of the research: to understand symbolic patterns of discourse (Savin-Baden and Howell Major, 2013, p. 64).

The quote illustrates the use of the concept of discourse. The use of discourse in the broadest terms relates to language and how such informs patterns, processes, and particular social settings. The further complication is the multiple uses of discourse as a text, conversation or ideologies, the tangible and intangible formations of discourses are relative to the positionality of the researcher.

These assumptions engage with the personal stance, positionality and reflexivity of the researcher. Savin-Baden and Howell (2013) describe the interrelationship between a researcher's values and experiences is vital to acknowledge as it impacts on how you view the research subjects and research contexts. Macbeth (2010) discussed that works spanning recent decades have discussed 'negotiating the swamp' of being subjective and personally biased during the research process. In terms of my thesis, I acknowledged my connection to London 2012, sport and legacy of this section I have now shifted to be reflexive and recognise the influence of my values on the research process. I represent these in the following:

Positionality statement – London 2012, young people, legacy, sport, education and policy, are highly political contexts and concepts that invoke many personal reflections and interpretations. During the beginning stages of my research, I

wanted to perform a linear process of research to map and form a periodic analysis of policy documents and stakeholders connected to London 2012 and the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim. However, as I attempted to access data, engaged with policymakers and read previous (academic and non-academic) studies for my literature review it became clear that the context and concepts I was engaging with were not something you could map or place into regular periods. Consequently, I identified as a poststructuralist researcher who was more concerned with constructing a thesis based on discourses and power, not producing a sequential answer. I have been privileged enough to collect a significant number of documents, attend policy forums and privately interview people directly connected to my research context. Several elements of my thesis have challenged my positionality as a white, able-bodied, female, young (amongst other characteristics) researcher. In particular, the element of the Paralympics, disability and inclusion has made me reflexive as to how to ‘include’ the discourses and findings that have ruptured my own Olympic and able-bodied perspectives. I concur that researchers are not outside the societal hierarchy of power and status but are subject to this structure (Macbeth, 2010; Piggin, 2014; Smith and Sparkes, 2016). I will discuss this further in Chapter Nine, for now, it is pertinent to understand how my reflections impacted on my research design.

Beyond positionality and being reflexive my poststructuralist underpinning aligns with my decision to collect different forms of qualitative data to deconstruct the complexities of the London 2012 context about legacy and policy. An underpinning aspect of poststructuralism and a Foucauldian inspired approach is how to problematise or analyse discourses, namely the work around archaeology and genealogy.

4.2.1 Archaeology and genealogy

The archaeological aspect of Foucault’s work was outlined explicitly as a methodology in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (Foucault, 1989a) and developed in other earlier pieces, such as *The Order of Things* (Foucault, 1974) and *The Birth of the Clinic* (Foucault, 1989b) (abridged chronology of Foucault works in Appendix 3). The premise of these writings was to make/do history differently and not construct philosophical or

historical ideas around assumptions and models. This premise differed from other dominant social theories, for instance, Marxism where social hegemonic or class-based economic projects are the underpinning focuses. Gutting (2005, p. 43) states:

Foucault's history is not hermeneutic; that is, it does not try to *interpret* what we hear and read in order to recover its deeper meaning. It deals with texts but treats them not as documents but, in the manner of an archaeologist, as monuments... in the overall configuration of the site.

The broader philosophical debate is connected to the dominant enlightenment, and Kantian inspired philosophy where the understanding of truth, reason and knowledge has led to notions of a rational subject and Western-dominated thought around a “notion of universal rationality... degenerated into a pervasive instrumental logic that homogenizes the social world, emptying it of meaning and purpose” (McNay 1994, p. 5). For example, in work around the *Birth of the Clinic* Foucault demonstrates historical alternatives to the way that mental illness and madness were thought of, challenging the conceptual and belief systems, such as systems of medical practices and uses of asylums.

In the construction of a methodology and approach that brought further layers to Foucault's thinking the term genealogy developed. Foucault (1980, p. 85) discusses in a lecture from the early 1970s between the publication of his first four significant texts and his developing thought:

If we were to characterise it in two terms, then 'archaeology' would be the appropriate methodology of this analysis of local discursivities, and 'genealogy' would be the tactics whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected knowledges which were thus released would be brought into play.

The genealogical approach is most explicitly applied in Foucault's (1991c) history of the prison, Gutting (2005, p. 51) argues further that the project in this historical account “is concerned...not just with the language (analysed by archaeology) through which we know the world, but with the power that changes the world.” The ‘power that changes the world’ is a reference to the genealogical approach and power is the concept that can be used to illustrate changes. Patton (2017, p. 631) stated “genealogical analysis assumed

the burden of providing critical histories of the present” as they “identify multiple and contingent sources of the modern penal system and experience of sexuality respectively.” In this understanding, the different discourses, mechanisms and systems that produce power and knowledge create relationships and networks that influence language, rules and governing. As discussed in Chapter Two, power, therefore, is not a commodity or static entity, but a way of framing dynamic relationships between thought and systems. It resonates with my view of Olympic and Paralympic legacy, which is not a physical or static entity, but a concept that created power relations on how to define, think and govern the impacts of sport mega-events (in my case London 2012).

The use of genealogy by Foucault was influenced by Nietzsche’s construction of the genealogy of morals as it developed a contrasting view of history. Instead of constructing history around grand teleological periods and progressive changes, Nietzsche and Foucault philosophically challenged such. They suggested that complex, mundane and inglorious discourses and technologies can be used to critique historical reason (Gutting, 2005). Consequently, genealogy has been interpreted as a framework for investigating historical operations of analysing power, not creating a theory of power (Ball, 2017). In *The Education Debate* in its third edition Ball (2017) uses genealogy as a framework for policy analysis as an exploration into the UK Government’s approach to education. The concept of genealogy is used to show the “whole apparatus of reform – ideas and language, practices, incentives, subjectivities and relationships... home in on the ways which generic policy devices and specific concepts and models now influence, inform and animate education policy” (Ball, 2017, p. 118).

In another translation of Foucault texts, Dean (2010, p. 12; 2018) outlined the “critical ontology of ourselves and our present.” A phrase associated with Foucault (I have detailed in Chapter Two) is the connection of a philosophical underpinning to the view of reality and view of self, against the notion of subjectivity. About neoliberalism and Foucault, Dean (2018, p. 47) proposes that this critical ontology is part of an “intellectual-political-context” and the biographical aspects of the researcher are part of the methodological and conceptual underpinnings. It is the exploration of limits and a critical stance towards taken for granted knowledge, at both the researcher and the setting that is being genealogically described (i.e. reality).

I interpret genealogy here where the idea is not to produce the history but to use the many elements (whether it be connected to policy, education, prison systems) to disrupt and deconstruct taken for granted truths, devices and concepts. As discussed in Chapter Three by scholars such as Keech (2012), the extensive nature of London 2012 warrants descriptive and analytical scrutiny, and a genealogical approach provides this. For example, what aspects of the Get Set programme governing actors (dis)connected with the concurrent Government policy around young people; or how the brand and ownership of Get Set translated into a policy area that was framed around the collaboration of partnerships and measuring hours of physical education. To achieve such, I need to give a further explanation of the data collection techniques I used. This further detail is not to categorise my thinking about governing but inform the analytical framework I used to form the collection of my data, then synthesise and analyse my empirical data.

4.3 Data collection

At a basic level, qualitative studies privilege non-numerical, rich and subjectively based data sources, such as focus groups, historical archives, interviews, documents and field notes (Bryman, 2016). As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, there are practical limitations to why you make particular design decisions. Two significant limitations I encountered were, namely, non-disclosure agreements and archival embargo periods of voices and evidence around London 2012. Firstly, the LOCOG organisation sets ‘non-disclosure agreements’ with partners and stakeholders that they engage with across the life course of the organising committee. Public scandals have been reported in the media (for example, Wainright, 2013) and academia (for example, Nichols and Ralston, 2015) around the poor practice of this regulatory mechanism. It directly impacted on my access to data as not all the prospective sources of documentary data or interviewees were willing to consider contributing. Moreover, I needed to be mindful of anonymity and respecting the official agreements between individuals and organisations (I will expand on this below around my ethical and data management procedures).

The second limitation is around the guidelines from state and non-state based governing actors around access to public or private documentary archives. For example, the London 2012 and LOCOG collections are hosted at either a central Olympic archive in Lausanne,

Switzerland or at the National Archives in London. In line with the IOC ‘Archive Access Rules’, both sets of archives are subject to either twenty year or thirty-year embargo periods (IOC, 2011). Scholars that engage with the Olympic movement using historically informed methodologies have commented this IOC based data restriction previously. Dichter (2014), for example, comments that recent scholarship on sport mega-events relies on media sources rather than embargoed government or sport organisation archives. The impact on my thesis, therefore, was to consider how discourses and governing actors could be viewed from data that was publicly accessible and representative of the complex landscape.

4.3.1 Ethical considerations

I followed the University of Worcester’s (2015) ethical approval process and further texts that expand on the theoretical aspects of ethical research (Savin-Baden and Howell Major, 2013; Bryman, 2016). In this formal process, I accounted for potential ethical issues surrounding the collection of primary data. The semi-structured interviews (discussed below) created the most significant ethical consideration. Firstly, the recruitment of participants and using gatekeepers and opportunistic sampling method. Through my attendance of policy forums and interaction with diverse organisations, I had to account for conflicts of interest, gatekeepers or coercion. For example, a cover letter was produced (Appendix 5) to send to all organisations, participants and bodies where I was attempting to access data. Once a participant expressed an interest in the project, I forwarded an information sheet and consent form (Appendix 6). Before conducting the interview, the interviewee and I spoke through and signed the consent form, acknowledging the parameters of the study. On these documents, it was clearly explained that there were measures to preserve the confidentiality and anonymity of data, including a specific explanation of data storage and disposal plans (UoW, 2016). The potential risks to participants were further mitigated by offering full disclosure of the thesis before submission and being able to request that their data be taken out.

4.3.2 Documentary evidence

The first data source I used was documentary evidence. The ideas, concepts and speech within documents are a valuable source of data to understand better the discursive

formations and links to specific forms of practice (Prior, 2008). In my case, the documents produce and circulate political rationalities and governing technologies. Macdonald (2008) describes the advantages of using documents as data to have the opportunity to study something where access to people or observation is not possible. Of value to my thesis, the documents represent voices from government, delivery agents, Olympic and Paralympic stakeholders and varying sport policy actors, who otherwise may not have been willing to contribute evidence. Documentary evidence can take the form of official and private documents, personal letters or memos and an important consideration is the origin, author, intended audience and authenticity (Phillips, 2013; Bryman, 2016).

Bell (2014) suggests that the guiding principle around documentary data is that everything should be questioned, moreover, documentary materials should be regarded as a complementary form of data collection (I will discuss this further below concerning data analysis and triangulation). The strength of documentary materials is that it allows researchers to gather materials unobtrusively, quickly and inexpensively (May, 2001; Bowen, 2009). However, this also, connects to three regularly cited limitations of documentary materials: that it is not often clear how a researcher has used a technique to collect documents; accounted for omissions; or purely relying on documents to show an empirical picture (May, 2001; Macdonald, 2008; Bryman, 2016).

The procedure and sampling technique I followed was based on O’Leary (2004) and Bryman (2016) who advocate the steps in document analysis: plan; gather; review; interrogate; reflect/refine, and analyse. Moreover, during these stages, the authors suggest that a researcher must address the: authenticity; credibility; representativeness; and meaning. I collected publicly accessible documents from online, archival and organisational bodies. Appendix 7.1 outlines the documentary sources published between 2004 and 2016 that I formally used to construct and reflect the reality of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim, the Get Set programme and policy connected to young people and sport.⁹ I specifically collected this through (i) searches of UK Government, Olympic and Paralympic websites. And, (ii) citations to documents in academic literature, UK

⁹ I acknowledge that other documentary sources also informed my findings, such as, public service agreements, media articles and further Get Set materials. However, these were supplementary to building the contextual picture, not considered as formal sources of my analysis.

Government committees, Hansard and reports, LOCOG documents and UK Parliament research reports and inquiries, for example, the House of Lords (HoL), Select Committee on Olympic and Paralympic Legacy (2013a, 2013b).

I addressed the authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning of the documents I collected in two main ways. Firstly, I collated and collected the documentary evidence into one repository and checked the publication date, author and origin of the document. All the documents I have used and referenced originate from official sources. Therefore, it was straightforward to check and reference the authenticity and credibility of them. Secondly, I refined and analysed my documentary data at multiple stages of my data collection and analytical stages, therefore, refreshing my evidence against what I was finding in the other data sets, academic literature or my analytical findings throughout the project.

I acknowledge that a limitation of my documentary evidence is the publicly accessible nature of my sources, i.e., they represent official and public viewpoints and meanings. Consequently, I did not rely on this data set as my sole source of empirical data and analysis. Instead, I triangulated the representation and meaning with other data sets (expanded on below in subsection 4.4.1 and 4.4.3). What is pertinent to note here is that representation included using the documents as a sampling method, i.e., targeted sampling source (Savin-Baden and Howell Major, 2013), as I could highlight key organisations, officials, and potential dialogue or interviewee sources.

Moreover, in terms of meaning, the documentary evidence allowed me to familiarise myself with the different legacy and policy systems and actors (for example, not-for-profit organisations: YST; state entities: DMCS; commercial: Sainsbury's) during the respective life course phases and UK Government periods. For example, in relation to state entities during the Blair Government there was the explicit statement of "Promise 3 – Inspiring a new generation of young people" (DCMS, 2008a, p. 3). In contrast, the Coalition Government revised this statement to "harnessing the United Kingdom's passion for sport to increase grass roots participation, particularly by young people – and to encourage the whole population to be more physically active" (DCMS, 2010b, p.1). Using my theoretical framework and building on my thesis aims, I analysed the meaning

of these two statements in the context they were produced, in relation to LOCOG activities, and how they could be interpreted by other actors (see Chapter Seven, and Table 7.3 below for the discussion).

4.3.3 Political and policy dialogue

The second data collection tool I employed was twofold and based on collecting political and policy dialogue. Firstly, I secured data by attending and collecting transcripts from five Westminster Policy Forum events between 2015 and 2017 (presented in Appendix 7.2). The Westminster Forum is a “private company offering a proposition of strict impartiality in organising timely conferences on public policy”, and each forum is structured to provide “policymakers and implementers, and those with an interest in the issues, with a sense of the way different stakeholder perspectives interrelate” (Westminster Forum Projects, 2019). The five forums I attended were themed around UK sports policy, school sports, physical education, and healthy lifestyles. The speakers ranged from public, private, and non-profit national and regional organisations, such as YST, Activity Alliance, BOA, BPA, and universities. In a similar rationale and procedure to document analysis, this tool and source of data allowed me to collect a significant amount of data in an unobtrusive, quick and inexpensive fashion (May, 2001). However, it offers a different element to the documentary materials I collected because I was present in person during all the forums. I was able to hear and see first-hand how the dialogue developed and was constructed. Consequently, upon receiving the official transcripts from the organisation, I had the verbatim record and my field notes/experiences to complement. I translated this data set into more traditional techniques connected to documentary and interview data where the notes, verbatim transcripts are used to contextualise, inform and illustrate during the data analysis.

The second aspect of the political and policy dialogue was through the Hansard proceedings in the HoC and HoL, then reports and submissions of evidence in specific committees and inquiries that were set up to collect evidence around the legacy of London 2012 across its life course. For example, the HoC, Education Committee Inquiry (2013a) *School sport following London 2012: No more political football*. Terms of reference for the 2013 inquiry directly relate to my thesis:

The impact and effectiveness of current Government policy and expenditure on increasing sport in schools;

The scope, appropriateness and likelihood of success of the Government's plans for a school sport legacy from London 2012;

The impact so far of London 2012 on the take-up of competitive sport in schools; and

What further measures should be taken to ensure a sustainable and effective legacy in school sport following London 2012 (HoC Vol 1, 2013a, p.5).

An extensive range of evidence submitted to the inquiry is publicly accessible including transcribed dialogues, formal reports, and voices from stakeholders with a vested interest in terms of reference quoted above (totalling 253 pages comprising of 49 written submissions, three formal evidence sessions and engagement with visit/survey data from schools). Reports and evidence connected to inquiries also referred to other Government reports, documents and Hansard extracts so I could review and refine the documentary evidence I had collected above. However, a limitation is the potential bias of public based documents where the text is edited by the authoring governing actors to reflect their agendas and perspective, moreover links to sources were not always live or accessible. I will elaborate on this below as I use other sources of data to account for this potential limitation and triangulate my different sources of data (subsection 4.4.1 and 4.4.3).

The political and policy dialogue also acted as a strategy to construct a sample list for prospective interviewees and key governing organisations. Interviewees (discussed in more detail below) were individuals identified and contacted through opportunistic sampling techniques (Savin-Baden and Howell Major, 2013). Opportunistic sampling occurred when I had identified the subculture of governing actors connected to London 2012, education, and sport policy. Then used the committee dialogue and policy forum events to identify specific individuals and organisations to contact and send my project cover letter to (see Appendix 5). Where I could not contact or access particular governing actors to interview, I could gather their viewpoint through the political or policy forum dialogue and evidence. For example, I collected further disability and school-based perspectives from the committee and forum transcripts. This additional review was

appropriate because when I began to collate and analyse the three data sets, there were areas where I needed further empirical evidence to triangulate emerging findings around Paralympic and ableism discourses connected to Get Set.

In terms of meaning, further to the documentary evidence discussed above this data source involved direct quotations and discussions from policymakers and relevant organisations, for example, the British Paralympic Association, the Premier League, and the Youth Sport Trust. I could use the extracts to further group discourses in my data around genealogical period of the London 2012 life course. For example, in policy forums I attended between 2015 and 2017 there were retrospective memories and discussions from speakers about their experiences during London 2012. I included such information in my discussion chapters to enrich the descriptive and analytical points developed. For instance, between 2010 and 2012 during significant policy changes I used an extract from a Premier League official during a policy forum to illustrate how a private organisation interpreted the policy changes (see Chapter Eight, p.177). The anecdote and insight allowed me to illustrate governing actors' perspectives and enrich the meaning of discourses I was gleaning from my data set. Using my theoretical framework and thesis aims I analysed the meaning of the political and policy dialogue in the context they were produced, in relation to LOCOG activities, and how they could be interpreted by other actors.

4.3.4 Semi-structured interviews

The final data collection source and procedure was semi-structured interviews with twelve participants between August 2017 and April 2018 (presented in Appendix 7.3). The rationale for adding in semi-structured interviews is based on the limitations of the documentary and political and policy dialogue data for accounting for private actor and individual-based perspectives. Bryman (2016) suggests interviewees are an important source of data because they can contribute to understanding and explaining events or patterns of behaviour that are not publicly accessible. Previous sport policy-based studies have taken this approach to data collection, for example, Houlihan and Green (2006), Philpotts (2013) and Lindsey (2020). Houlihan and Green (2006, p. 51) highlight “a further key aspect of the study was the importance placed on gathering data relating to actors' subjective perceptions, beliefs, and experiences about policy programs through

semi-structured interviews.” Following a similar rationale, I collected interview data using an opportunistic sampling technique to develop a more in-depth understanding and individual perspectives of the UK policy context, the role of different governing actors, and the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim.

Interviews can take several forms, most commonly structured, semi-structured or unstructured (Savin-Baden and Howell Major, 2013). For my thesis, the most appropriate format was semi-structured interviews. Using an opportunistic sampling technique, I contacted governing actors connected to London 2012 ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim and sport policy. The rationale for contacting the interviewees was based on the documentary and dialogue research I had conducted, by this point in my project I had established an understanding of the subsystem of governing actors that connected to policy, legacy, or the Get Set programme across the life course of London 2012. The twelve participants that agreed to participate in my study are representative of private, public, and non-profit organisations that had experience with policy and legacy formation and enactment across the life course of London 2012.

The semi-structured interviews were conducted with an interview schedule (Appendix 8) where the interview was split into five sections: interviewee demographic and experience context, sector context, historical context, engagement with London 2012, and engagement with the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim. The interviewees were given the option to have the schedule before conducting the interview, and I did not conduct any follow-up interviews. The interviews lasted between 40 and 70 minutes, conducted in a variety of locations (including on the phone and face to face), and all in natural settings chosen by the interviewee. I recorded the interviews using a digital audio recorder and made notes before, during and after the interview to help collate and familiarise myself with the interview dialogue and transcripts.

Regarding the ethical considerations discussed above (subsection 4.3.1), the interviewees have remained anonymous in my findings and discussion. Post conducting the interviews I familiarised myself with the audio recordings then transcribed verbatim quotes from the oral recordings into Microsoft word documents. The data is kept following the University of Worcester Data Management Plan procedure (UoW, 2016). To account for the ethical

and management procedures together with being able to present the data I assigned each interviewee with a letter between A and L. During the analysis process I collated verbatim quotes using the interviewee letters alongside my collected documentary and dialogue data sets (see Appendix 7.3 and 9). As elaborated on below this allowed me to triangulate and enrich my analysis, plus at the data collection stages consider further interviewees and materials to collect. When I started to write up my findings and discussion, I added further detail to the interviewee letters by assigning them under an organisation type: lobby group, Olympic/Paralympic, education institution, Government, the national governing body, education charity/consultancy, or parliament. In my findings and discussion presented in Chapters Five to Eight, the quotes and points made using the interview transcription are catalogued with the interviewee letter and organisation type. The use of letter and organisation type, for example, “Interviewee I (education consultant)” balances the anonymity of the interviewees with clarity for my findings and discussion.

I acknowledge that a limitation of semi-structured interviews are the trustworthy and private aspects, i.e., how reliable is the reflection from the governing actor and does it corroborate with other sources of data (Savin-Baden and Howell Major, 2013; Bryman, 2016). My twelve interviews and interviewees are snapshots and represent particular and personal viewpoints and meanings. Consequently, I did not rely on this data set as my only source of empirical data and analysis. Instead, I triangulated the representation and meaning with the other two data sets (expanded on below in subsection 4.4.1 and 4.4.3). What is pertinent to note here is that representation trying to access individuals from different life course stages of London 2012, different organisations, and with different perspectives on legacy and policy (highlighted in Appendix 7, Table A7.3).

In terms of meaning, I interpreted the interview data set individually and as a whole set illuminating meaning through the theoretical tenants of governmentality and dominant discourses interconnected with neoliberalism and ableism. For example, throughout Chapters Four to Eight I reference the Paralympic and disability aspects of legacy and policy, then use interview quotes to corroborate and create further meaning to how this engages with ableist tendencies or promoted more nuanced understanding of disability and the Paralympics. Using my theoretical framework and thesis aims I analysed the

meaning of the interviews and quoted extracts in the context they were produced, in relation to LOCOG activities, and how they could be interpreted by other actors (see Chapter Nine for the summary of this analytical point in section 9.2.2).

4.4 Data analysis

All three forms of my data collection were processed and analysed using two techniques - triangulation and discourse analysis – the explanation provided below accounts for how the methodological underpinnings and theoretical framework featured in this process.

4.4.1 Triangulation

The term triangulation is used to describe different forms of corroboration and enriching of data and findings, and it takes multiple forms such as member checking or combining various types of methodologies with studying the same phenomenon (Bowen, 2009). This approach is common in qualitative studies as a “strategy that allows them to identify, explore, and understand different dimensions of the units of study, thereby strengthening their findings and enriching their interpretations” (Routhbauer, 2008, p. 892). The work by sociologists, such as, Denzin (1989) raised the profile and popularity of triangulation and its utility in allowing researchers to render a fuller picture of research as well as increase the trustworthiness of the design and findings. In the studies, I cited in Chapter Two, a common trend was to use multimethod qualitative approaches to understand different dimensions of the units of study or layers of concepts to strengthen and enrich findings and interpretations. Moreover, where my thesis aims to consider two ideas concurrently (legacy and policy), this technique will allow me to incorporate interrelated phenomena.

The primary three sources of data - documentary evidence, political and policy dialogue and semi-structured interviews - are part of my triangulation technique used to account for multiple means of data collection to explore a single phenomenon (Bowen, 2009). My use of triangulation relates to the ‘triangulation of data sources’ where each type of data I use should yield contradictory or complementary evidence, and in turn provide different insights regarding policy and legacy (Denzin, 1989; Routhbauer, 2008; Bryman, 2016). Furthermore, it counteracts the limitations above on relying on publicly accessible documents or dialogue because I can corroborate my findings across data sets and “thus

reduce the impact of potential biases that can exist in a single study.” (Bowen, 2009, p. 28). The triangulation of my data counters such limitations and provides a visible and rationalised process for developing my findings and analysis.

4.4.2 Discourse analysis

Discourse can be used as a concept in many different guises. Broadly discourse analysis is a cluster of related methods for studying language, construction of a phenomenon, relationship to contexts (Potter, 2008). Academics use discourses as a way of examining different values and systems across the sporting landscape. For example, sport policy-based studies (Piggin, 2014); sports education and policy-based studies (such as Penney and Evans, 1999; Flintoff, 2013); Olympic movement-based studies (such as Chatziefstathiou and Henry, 2012); and disability sport-based studies (such as Wickman, 2011; Hammond and Jeanes, 2018). There are nuances to the way discourses are used in these studies. However, a common trend is that identifying and examining a discourse can help explain how different values and interests are promoted and expressed through artefacts, such as policy texts, and how others are marginalised or overlooked.

I interpret discourse from a Foucauldian perspective wherein its purest form it allows a researcher to view concepts, such as legacy, as complex social constructions of ideas, knowledge and systems of thinking (Henry et al., 2005). Foucault (1972, p. 38) discussed that discursive formation allows you to think beyond “words that are already overlaid with conditions and consequences... such as, ‘science’, ‘ideology’, ‘theory’” (emphasis in original). According to Patton (2017, p. 631), Foucault and prominent proponents of his work “identify singular formations of discourse, where, the discourse was defined with reference to statements.” This understanding is valuable for my thesis as I can move away from attempting to create parameters around the concepts of legacy and policy. Instead consider the systems of thinking associated with legacy and policy in the context of my thesis.

Viewing reality in this discursive way is often criticised for being too abstract and nihilistic (Curtis, 1995; Brocking et al., 2010). Furthermore, due to the number of different approaches to interpreting discourse analysis, there is not a unified step by step model, and discourse analysis is often associated with an ‘anything-goes’ approach

(Savin-Baden and Howell Major, 2013). I think there is a balance between using discourses to resist using words that are 'overladen' with conditions and consequences with the ability to articulate and evidence discursive formations. In this vein, I advocate for the approach taken by Piggin (2014) where discourses are understood as replicable events, acts or systems of communication and are formed through the regularity and emergence of statements connected to historical contexts and rationalities of power and knowledge. Such are present in the text, speech, imagery and everyday interactions where discourse is used to construct a particular social setting, acknowledging that language contributes to how we see and understand the world (Piggin, 2014; Wickman, 2011; Hammond and Jeanes, 2018).

Flintoff (2013, p. 156) described that "discourses are not simply sets of ideas that can be accepted or dismissed but...are about language and meanings, about knowledge and power and their interrelationship, and about what can be said and by whom." Moreover, discourse analysis associated with poststructuralism and Foucault tends to be more theoretically guided through genealogical interpretations of concepts and institutions (Potter, 2008). Translating this into research around sport policy Piggin (2014, p. 24) in direct relation to discourse analysis and sport policy analysis articulates:

A discourse (such as madness, neoliberalism, health promotion or coaching) governs the way a topic can be meaningfully talked about, reasoned about and it influences how ideas are put into practice. While a discourse produces a way for a topic to be discussed, and defines an acceptable and intelligible way to talk, write and conduct oneself, it also rules out, limits and restricts other ways of talking and conducting oneself. This is not to say that only one discourse is present in each social setting. Indeed, it is the interplay of different discourses that is often of interest for discourse analysts.

The points made here by Flintoff (2013), Potter (2008) and Piggin (2014) are useful because the formation of discourse is not the central focus per se. Discourse analysis is more about considering the interplay between different discourses and how such then affects the way that topics can be discussed or taken for granted. Consequently, discourse analysis complements my multimethod qualitative data collection and triangulation. I

account for this in the following subsection by documenting my research and analytical process.

4.4.3 Research and analytical process

In a combination of the discussed methodological underpinnings, data collection, and analysis techniques, I used the following steps to collect, understand, and analyse my data:

1. **Data collection:** in line with O’leary (2004) and Bryman (2016) I planned (using the timeline of the London 2012 life course and policies connected to young people, sport and education) to gather and review different documentary materials. From there, I attended, contacted and collected further data in the form of political and policy dialogue, and semi-structured interviews. I familiarised myself with the context and content of the documents and transcriptions and reflected on how the data set as a whole represented the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim. It is during these reflections (and with the addition of academic literature) I initially identified patterns of neoliberalism and ableism as discourses that linked my data sets together.
2. **Data refinement:** I synthesised the three sets of data into separate documents with extracts and quotes that related to the London 2012 ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim, the Get Set programme, and UK Government policies. In these separate documents, I performed close readings and re-readings of data to identify relevant statements and loosely triangulate. The triangulation was based on the theoretical concepts of governmentality and tracing political rationalities and governing technologies in line with my research objectives. Here, for example, I catalogued the interviewees into letters and organisation types and merged quotations into discursive points related to neoliberalism or ableism. At this point, I further reviewed the documentary materials I had gathered and identified gaps or omissions, and this was based on any policy or legacy documents that were mentioned in interviews or dialogue. For example, in discussions about the Paralympic legacy interviewees said further moments and reports that I had not collected. Post the interviews I reviewed and used the National Archives, IOC

World Library, and UK Government Web Archive to retrieve additional documentary materials.

3. **Formalise data and triangulation:** during this step I had data that was refined into the genealogical policy and legacy extracts and quotations based on political rationalities and governing technologies across the London 2012 life course (abridged overview in Appendix 9.1). To further formalise and triangulate the data, I adapted the Houlihan diagram (2016, p. 56) around selected factors influencing domestic sport policy highlighted in Chapter Three. I created four separate figures that included both policy and legacy influencing factors, and traced this across the Labour and Coalition Governments:
 - a. Labour Government (2004-2010) young people, education and sport policy (presented in Appendix 9)
 - b. Labour Government (2004-2010) ‘Inspire a Generation’ legacy aim (presented in Appendix 9)
 - c. Coalition Government (2010-2015) young people, education and sport policy (presented in Appendix 9)
 - d. Coalition Government (and Conservative Government) 2010-2016 ‘inspire a Generation’ legacy aim (presented in Appendix 9)

This step and the creation of the diagrams allowed me to focus on the legacy and policy formations and political rationalities, then further triangulate the governing technologies, i.e. the Get Set programme, the revisions to legacy documents, and varying statements around young people. Moreover, where moments and artefacts highlighted discursive intersections (neoliberal or ableist references) I could revisit and consider the data again from the documentary evidence, political and policy dialogue and semi-structured interviews.

4. **Data analysis, and presentation of findings and discussion:** the translation of data analysis into findings and discussion is an essential step in a Foucauldian discourse analysis as the critical ontological underpinnings remain a consistent balance to how you write and structure your perspective on discursive formations. The discussion in Chapter Two about levels of analysis, political power and

governing served as useful descriptive and analytical concepts to frame my findings and discussion. For example, I reviewed and revised how I triangulated the three sources of primary data to highlight the intersections between the macro-level, meso-level and micro-level of governing between legacy and policy (see discussion above in each data collection subsection; Diagrams presented in Appendix 9).

On reflection given the number of changes to policy and legacy discourses, it was not useful to simply present different levels. Instead of the discourse analysis of the political rationalities (influences on policy and legacy) then the governmental technologies (programmes, language and apparatus of policy and legacy) during different genealogical periods of the London 2012 life course emerged as a balance of the findings and discussion. Following this, I reflected and refined my triangulated data sets into periods connected to 2004-2007 (Chapter Five); 2007-2010 (Chapter Six); 2010-2012 (Chapter Seven); and 2012-2014 (Chapter Eight) about my translation of governmentality, i.e. (1) formation of governing, (2) distinctive discourses, (3) practices of governing, and (4) interactions between the levels of governing.

The steps taken here balance the criticism that a discourse analysis is too abstract and culpable to an ‘anything-goes’ approach (Savin-Baden and Howell Major, 2013). It brings together an obvious way I processed and analysed the data I collected with the theoretical, methodological underpinnings and data collection techniques I have outlined and used during my thesis.

4.5 Concluding chapter thoughts

In this chapter, I have presented and justified the positions taken in the thesis connected to methodological underpinnings, data collection techniques, and the data analysis process. The poststructuralist position I have taken promotes that ontologically reality is constructed discursively; and that epistemologically knowledge may be gained through the deconstruction of artefacts with the aim of better understanding patterns of discourse. The positionality and reflexive role of the researcher acknowledges that you cannot be

objective but must recognise the influence of personal values or position on the different elements of research design. I developed this philosophical underpinning by detailing my interpretation of genealogy and a critical ontology of the present.

I presented the three qualitative data collection techniques. The rationale for using such techniques is based on practical limitations around embargos and accessibility of data, and the strengths of combining multiple sources of qualitative data with studying the same phenomenon (see Appendix 1 for an overview). To synthesise and analyse the data, I discussed the use of triangulation and discourse analysis. The latter technique ties together the data collection with the methodological underpinnings and theoretical framework for my thesis, as discussed in the steps taken during my research and analytical process. The balance has been to reconcile my poststructuralist standpoint with a process that is visible and trustworthy. No research is without limitations, and I will return to this in Chapter Nine.

Chapter 5 “...London’s vision is to reach young people...”

So London's vision is to reach young people all around the world. To connect them with the inspirational power of the Games. So they are inspired to choose sport. I'm delighted we have with us today representatives of the next generation. Here on stage, Amber Charles, an emerging Basketball player. Amber delivered our Candidate File to Lausanne last year. And in the audience, 30 of her contemporaries, aged from 12 to 18. Why are so many here, taking the place of businessmen and politicians? It's because we're serious about inspiring young people. Each of them comes from east London, from the communities who will be touched most directly by our Games. And thanks to London's multi-cultural mix of 200 nations, they also represent the youth of the world (Coe, 2005).

5.1 Background: up to 2007

The purpose of this chapter is to consider between the bid to the formal agreements and planning of London 2012 (2004 to 2007). In the quote above, Coe highlights the expected members of the delegation to be ‘businessmen and politicians’ referencing the traditional governing actors that influence the IOC (Coe, 2005). Then, notes that the inclusion of young people represents the credibility of the London bid in engaging with the values of the IOC and Olympism to influence the ‘multi-cultural’ youth of London and the world. The assumption here is that the IOC would traditionally have valued corporate and political support, yet the London 2012 bid used non-traditional governing actors and discourse around young people to highlight the unique strength of the London 2012 bid (Lee, 2006; Masterman, 2013). Through the following chapter, I will demonstrate how the vision and pitch made during the events at Singapore around young people genealogically develop into the emergence of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim.

The bidding process for the 2012 Olympics and Paralympics culminated in July 2005 in Singapore during the IOC Executive Committee 117th session. As discussed in Chapter

Two and Three, the formation of governing by the IOC around the bidding process features moral and commercial political rationalities, these manifest in managerial and centralised technologies of governing in the bidding process, for example, economic guarantees, brand guarantees and values-based guarantees. The London 2012 bid team demonstrated an astute awareness because during the events in Singapore there were appearances by high profile UK politicians (including then Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair) in the bid delegation. A strategy typical of bidding cities to show credibility in the political and national backing of the bids. However, the London bid also juxtaposed the high-profile political elite with the inclusion of young people in the delegation. Coe, in his opening speech (quoted above) of the London 2012 bid, noted this juxtaposition.

The bid process and vision to reach young people represent what authors, such as, MacAloon (2008), Sugden and Tomlinson (2012), Horne (2013) discuss as the meaning-making and rationality behind a sport mega-event bid that comes from competing interests and agendas. In the findings presented below the two themes from the bid documentation (Seventeen ‘Olympism and Culture’ and Nine ‘Paralympic Games’) help to establish the formation of governing.¹⁰ Moreover, I will present how the two themes intersected from the outset with different political rationalities, governing actors and technologies specifically around young people and education. The intersection with the policy is illustrated in the final subsection where the public service agreement (PSA) system under the Labour Government highlights initial domestic governing formations of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim and educational policy.

5.2 Theme 17: Olympism and culture

As discussed in Chapter Two Olympic, education scholars, such as Lenskyj (2012), have been critical of a host city and bid not to challenge the Olympic values when translating them in educational programmes. In the bid documentation for London 2012, there is no indication of substantive consultation or discussion around the socio-political or

¹⁰ The other themes in the bid documentation are: Theme 1 – Olympic Games concept and legacy; Theme 2 – Political and economic structure; Theme 3 – Legal; Theme 4 – Customs; Theme 5 – Environment and meteorology; Theme 6 – Finances; Theme 7 – Marketing; Theme 8 – Sports and venues; Theme 9 – Paralympic Games; Theme 10 – Olympic Village; Theme 11 – Medical services; Theme 12 – Security; Theme 13 – Accommodation; Theme 14 – Transport; Theme 15 – Technology; Theme 16 – Media operations; Theme 17 – Olympism and culture.

philosophical elements of the Olympic Charter. Instead the bid fulfils the expectations of the IOC through offering endorsements from Labour Government departments and embedding the Olympism in the planned educational activities. The Labour Government involvement, to an extent, is further corroborated by publicly accessible records from the House of Commons Hansard and publications by the UK Government and Parliament around the DCMS and Select Committee connected to ‘A London Olympic Bid for 2012’ during the early 2000s. However, the inquiry and documentation focus on experts and governing actors that are Olympic and tangible legacy centred, for example, BOA, strategic planning for Transport for London, Finance and Planning and consultants (HoC, 2003). Consequently, the details around education, legacy and working with the bid committee is not within the Parliamentary reports or public discussion.

At this time the review and documentation in Parliament describes detailed reports and evidence about the bid as “confidential” and not publicly accessible to members of the public or for Select Committee discussions (HoC, 2003). The confidentiality is explained as “the Government’s view is that the full report includes commercially confidential information, and other material that might be of assistance to other applicant cities” (DCMS, 2003). Yet, the Select Committee disagrees with this rationality and states:

it has been a peculiar feature of this inquiry that almost all the significant information is under wraps—contrary to the firm recommendations of our predecessor Committee. This seems to have been because of a perceived need to protect normal market conditions over prospective sites, the integrity of any eventual tender processes and, uniquely, details that may be useful to competing cities in rubbishing a London bid. We have acquiesced to the confidentiality of a number of relevant documents provided to us. As often is the case, public discussion has been clouded, rather than informed, by partial disclosure of some details and figures in the media (with consequent partial rebuttals from stakeholders). We do not blame the press for this but rather the absence of authoritative documentation on which to base open debate (HoC, 2003, p. 22).

The governing here measures whether the London bid can fulfil the Candidature Questionnaire and the IOC requirements (including full UK Government support). A

distinct governing mechanism here is around top-down and centralised bidding. The extract from the Select Committee explicitly states that the justification for this approach is to ‘protect normal market conditions’ which links to a managerial tendency and neoliberal discourse at a macro-level, i.e. interpreting the bid process as a commercial opportunity rather than a public or non-profit enterprise.

Pertinent to my thesis is the educational elements and policy governing authorities that were consulted during the bidding process. Within the London 2012 bid documentation (submitted in 2004) there is an expansion on the focus on young people and education in themes seventeen and nine. The pre-set IOC questions for theme seventeen are around ‘17.3 Olympism and Culture’ where the bid team outlines the plan for “Educational programmes: promoting the Olympic Ideal.” (LOCOG, 2004b, p. 177). Amongst the overview, the bid document states “education is a voyage of discovery. With the endorsement of the Secretary of State for Education and Skills, children in the UK will embark on a four-year virtual journey aboard the Olympic Friend-ship” (LOCOG, 2004b, p. 177). The document references the Secretary of State for Education and Skills as well as other governing actors, including, the Mayor of London, British Olympic Foundation and the Centre for Olympic Studies and Research at Loughborough University to embed the Olympic ideals. The inclusion of established governing actors within the bid is supported by Interviewee C (Olympic/Paralympic) who reflected that:

The thing was...we worked so closely with Government that you could probably say that we were a whole team if I am honest... It was Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Department for Education... it was all part and parcel from the beginning to be fair, it was a very inclusive bid.

The reference to national, local Government and higher education is connected to a long-term strategy within the bid document where “these Ideals will provide the basis for a cross-curriculum programme of work leading up to the Games. Following the Games, these will become embedded in the academic and cultural offerings of the London Olympic Institute” (LOCOG, 2004b, p. 177). The origins of the Get Set programme are present here, and the rationale is for a cross-curriculum programme of work, rather than

directly aligning the programme to the national curriculum, school sport or physical education.

The explanation from Interviewee C (Olympic/Paralympic) above around educational elements supports that the bid process was an 'inclusive' of governing actors of prominent meso-level organisations, such as the BOA and DCMS. Yet the detail in the bid does not mention the concurrent policy or governing actors explicitly. For example, from the discussion and contextualisation in Chapter Two, a prominent organisation during this period was the YST and OFSTED and the focus on the delivery of high-quality physical education and school sport through the PESSCL strategy launched in 2003 (Phillpots, 2013). None of these organisations is cited as partners or co-producers in the London 2012 bid document. In the bidding document, the governing actor that proceeds over delivery is the organising committee working in partnership with other the UK Government, British Olympic Foundation, Mayor of London, and Loughborough University. The assumption made by the IOC is that the detail written into the bid document is based on the reality of the policy and delivery landscape of education in the UK, and the domestic governing actors (included or not in the bid) being able to work in conjunction with the organising committee.

Theoretically, this directly engages with the formation and layers of governing as the governmentalization of London 2012 cannot be reduced to a single actor. The claims made in the London 2012 bidding documents around education creates a new governing actor, the organising committee. Furthermore, the assumption is made that LOCOG would be able to work and deliver cross-curriculum materials and embed the Olympic ideals in conjunction with the UK Government, specifically the Department for Education and Skills (DfES). Yet, this interpretation is made by the international sporting federation rather than by political or policy dialogue because the bid documents and discussion were kept confidential for commercial reasons discussed above. The intersection of neoliberal and marketized governing technologies converge as the IOC creates a marketized environment for bidding and the UK Government and bid team embrace the requirements. This supports a broader neoliberal logic associated with bidding for London 2012 and the notion of an Olympic industry (MacAloon, 2008; Falcous and Silk, 2010; Lenskyj, 2012).

The neoliberal technologies of governing develop further around the role and autonomous position of the organising committee. The UK Government and the IOC (and to an extent the IPC) construct the organising committee as a mechanism that can deliver what it has promised during the bidding process in protected governing space (Girginov, 2012). In an interview, Interviewee J (Olympic/Paralympic) reflected on this making a direct association with LOCOG behaving as a private organisation:

Well, frankly, that is another benefit of being in the organising committee because we are a private sector body, we have to earn our own money to live and exist. And this is where I would also pay credit to Seb Coe and Paul Deighton and the team because there is a different version of an organising committee which says ‘culture and education, oh let everyone else do that, we will just focus on the Games.’ But, that again is to misunderstand the ecology of how these things work, unless you have a team rooted in the organising committee, you cannot forge and get the synergies with the real brand.

The reflections from Interviewee J (Olympic/Paralympic) relate to the neoliberal rationality and governing technology in the formation of LOCOG. The organising committee’s role is strengthened by its ability to produce profit and protect its brand, hence the need during the bidding process for the UK Government to guarantee legal and commercial rights to protecting the London 2012 and Olympic symbols. Roche (2017) warns against overtly standardising the neoliberal nature of mega-events and governing because it is dependent more on the political, cultural and technological contexts. As seen here, the bidding documentation and Interviewee J’s (Olympic/Paralympic) remarks, there is a political rationality and governing technologies to exercise authority and regulate the valuable assets of the Olympic and Paralympic movement. The separation of the organising committee as a private body is important concerning the educational programme and ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim as from the conception of LOCOG there was a separation between the status of the UK Government and autonomous organising committee.

5.3 Theme 9: the Paralympics

Related to the formation of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim and the development of the educational legacy programme (Get Set) is the documentation and discussion around the Paralympics during the bidding and early planning stages. As discussed in Chapters One and Three, there is a step-change in the IOC bidding process to include a separate theme of the Paralympics in this bidding cycle as part of the IOC, and IPC drove ‘one games, one bid’ movement that the London 2012 bid process was entwined with (Kerr, 2018). Gold and Gold (2017b, p. 125) described “the move towards a ‘one city, one bid’ approach for the selection of Olympic host cities was of vital importance to the IPC.” The Games in 2008 (Beijing) and 2010 (Vancouver) were the first iterations to show integration in the bid documents; however, the bidding process for the 2012 (London) and 2014 (Sochi) editions had to include plans for single organising committees and bespoke plans (including legacy) for the Paralympics.

This dynamic between the Olympic and Paralympic aspect is evident in my empirical data in the articulation of education in theme nine under the ‘Paralympics’ bid component. The bid documentation references ‘Educational Legacy’ under “9.10 Legacy, A Paralympic Legacy for all” and that “LOCOG will work with the UK’s Department for Education and Skills and educators to create Olympic and Paralympic curriculum materials for use throughout the nation’s schools” (LOCOG, 2004c, p. 193, emphasis in original). In contrast to theme seventeen (discussed above), the concept of legacy is the focal phrase here and does not use the term ‘endorsement’ from governing actors. Still, that legacy will be built through working with governing actors and utilisation of ‘curriculum materials’ in schools. This distinct Paralympic legacy demonstrates a growth in value of the IPC and Paralympic movement as the curriculum materials are to include both international sporting federations content. However, the extent to the value is not shared by all governing actors. For example, the IOC still expects distinctions between the Olympic and Paralympic elements. This continued distinction can be illustrated when in 2005 the IOC Evaluation Commission visited London and the bid team, in the official document produced by the IOC the Commission wrote:

London 2012 has proposed integrated Olympic and Paralympic Games that would minimise the planning and operational differences between them, while using innovative marketing strategies to promote their distinctiveness (IOC, 2005a, p. 73).

Education and information programme. A new Olympic dimension would be introduced into existing educational programmes for 400,000 school children. A special education pack for schools would be developed by OCOG in association with the British Olympic Foundation (IOC, 2005a, p. 79).

The evaluation discussed here does not integrate the Olympic and Paralympic Games but maintains separation of programmes and the promotion of the distinctiveness, i.e. the ‘Olympic dimension’ and ‘innovative’ marketing of the distinctive brands. Hwang (2018) commented that the London 2012 educational programme was the first education programme in the history of the Olympic Games to promote and adopt the Olympic and Paralympics values. However, as seen in the documentation materials here different bid themes and the IOC Evaluation Commission imply that the formation of the educational materials would be marketed distinctively and created in conjunction with the British Olympic Foundation. This distinction and separation is congruent with the ableist discourse where there are distinct separation and differences between the Olympic (IOC, Olympism) Games and the Paralympics (IPC, Paralympic values) as discussed by Legg and Steadward (2011) Misener et al., (2013). Empirically, a useful example is the visibility of Paralympic governing actors, for example, the BPA which is not explicitly acknowledged as a collaborating partner demonstrating that although the language and rationality of the Paralympics are integrated, this does not extend to the inclusion of all actors informing programmes.

The early 2000s and bidding process, consequently, do not have a consistent rationality or practices of governing around the Paralympics. The governing actors in the IOC, IPC and London bid team have differing interpretations of the value of the Paralympic element within the London 2012 bid. This difference can be illustrated by Interviewee L (Parliament) who shared an anecdote around the reality of the London 2012 bid cycle and the 2005 Singapore IOC Executive Committee, by describing the:

... the night before the final presentation in Singapore, where Tessa Jowell came to me and said I want to be on stage and talk about the Olympics and Paralympics, what do you think I should do? And that was a really tough call for me because the feeling from a lot of the bid process was that we just talk about the Olympics, and actually, at that point, I agreed. As much as I spent a lot of years, kind of saying, well what about the Paralympics. At that point, we are bidding to the IOC for the Olympics. And if it had been a cycle later, we could have done that because we would then be bidding for the Olympics and Paralympics. So at that point, if we don't get the Olympics, we don't get the Paralympics. It is the only time I have ever said I think that we just need to say Olympics because we just had to be really clear in what we were doing and not try and take any focus; because the reality as well as there are people that do not value the Paralympics, in all sectors. So we had to be really clear in what we were doing. So for me it was we need to win the Olympics, and the rest will take care of itself. And then afterwards not once within LOCOG did I ever have to be the person that said well what about the Paralympics, not once...

As illustrated by Interviewee L's (Parliament) recollection from 2005, there was a reality of the transitional period within the IOC and the bidding cycles to when the visibility and value of the Paralympics increased and became legitimate. The broader governing formations between the IOC and IPC affected the bid team and the presentation of their plans to include (or not) the Paralympics in bid documentation and speeches. The IOC at this time still reinforced an ableist discourse where the norm was for the host city to refer to the Games as the Olympic Games and to focus on winning the rights to host the Olympic Games. Yet, there is from the extracted quote above as Interviewee L articulates a discourse of 'a tough call' and the request from the IOC did not necessarily have the leverage to override underlying thinking by UK based governing actors who saw the bid as inclusive of Olympic and Paralympic aspects.

The continued prominence of the Olympics transcends into the planning and delivery mechanisms of London 2012. For example in the IOC Host City Contract (IOC, 2005b; London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act, 2006) the signatories were: the IOC President (Jacques Rogge), IOC Chairman, Finance Commission (Richard Carrion), then

two signatories from the city of London and two signatories from the National Olympic Committee (the BOA). A representative from the BPA was not required to sign the contract. Moreover, in the UK Government bid reports and Select Committee inquiries into the bid process, the requests for evidence were to the BOA, not the BPA. Formally, therefore, the IPC and BPA were not seen as an inner voice that needed to contribute to the bidding process or stipulations connected to winning the bid at an international or national level.

The Olympic focused process, also impacted on the formation of the LOCOG Board, where at the time the IOC requirements were that:

The OCOG shall include, among the members of its board of directors and executive committee, the IOC member or members in the Host Country, the President and the Secretary-General of the NOC, an athlete having competed in the previous edition of the Olympic Winter Games or the Games of the Olympiad and at least one member representing, and designated by, the City (IOC, 2005b, p. 4).

The formation of the bid and organising committee, therefore, originate in a period where the IOC, Olympic Games and Olympism dominated the rationalities and mechanisms at an international level. However, there is evidence to suggest from my findings that the domestic landscape in London and the UK differed from the IOC and Olympic dominated Games approach.

In contrast to the international level at a domestic level, many interviewees recognised the integrated approach between the Olympics and Paralympics in LOCOG. For example, in considering the Paralympic aspect of London 2012, Interviewee E (Government) commented:

... you know what I do not even remember it being a decision. I think it was just part of it. And again, whether this just reflects a different time, but I do not ever member it being different... I think in terms of operational planning and everything, it made sense. We treated it has 'One Games.' There was not some great light bulb moment. It wasn't like that at all... and I do think that reflects the

British nation and the strong affinity with disability sports and the history of Stoke Mandeville. That perhaps does put us in a stronger background.

The background to the bid and established approach to including disability as part of a sporting plan makes sense from this interviewee's perspective. Moreover, there was no one individual driver or moment that caused this culture within the bid or then into the planning and organising committee. Genealogically the visibility of the Paralympics developed against a backdrop of integration at the domestic level, and a transitional period of separation to integration at the international level. The meso-level governing actors, such as the quote from Interviewee E (Government) above suggests that there was not one definitive moment that caused the integration with the Olympics and Paralympics. Still, it was more mundane governmental technologies, such as operational planning. This planning supports the notion of power and governing described by Miller and Rose (1992) where mundane governmental technologies give effect to governmental ambitions. What is still not completely clear is how the governmental ambitions to integrate the Olympic, and different governing actors drove Paralympic elements. The lack of direct or explicit evidence supports the notion that an ableist discourse manifests in ambitions and technologies at different levels of governing and at different forms.

The complexity and lack of clarity to governmental ambitions and development of the visibility of the Paralympic Games was reflected on by Interviewee K (Parliament) who described the formation and creation of the London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act in 2006:

...and it was called the Olympics and Paralympics 2012 Bill. But, this is where you have to be careful, you apply what you know now rather than thinking about how it was at the time, and I am trying to be really honest, and I think at the time we largely thought about the Olympics. We were good about saying this is going to be more than the Olympics and what about the Paralympics, but that might have been 5 or 10% of our thoughts, but then as it got nearer and nearer, and we realised how good this could actually be. It then probably became 60% to 40%... and it is now just as important, so in one sense that is a good legacy... a fundamental shift in the acknowledgement of the Paralympics.

The reflections from Interviewee K (Parliament) and Interviewee E (Government) contrast. This contrast suggests that for some governing actors the treatment of London 2012 as ‘One Games’ made sense (Interviewee E, Government), whereas for others it was a slower realisation of the importance (Interviewee K, Parliament). The differing interpretations highlight the backdrop of a complex landscape of disability rights and visibility of the Paralympic movement during the 2000s when at an international and domestic level the macro-political rationalities in sport and broader terms were still formed on governing through a medical model of disability and ableist discourses (Rhodes et al., 2008; Kitchin and Howe, 2014).

Post-interview with Interviewee K (Parliament) I did further documentary research into the original London Olympics Bill. An HoC research paper was originally formed around understanding the background to the Bill (HoC, 2005). Although it does reference and recognise the Paralympics, the language and phrasing is predominately about the London Olympics. Between this HoC research paper in July 2005 and the enactment of the Bill and the London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act in March 2006, the decision must have been discussed and made as noted by Interviewee K (Parliament) to include the Paralympics in the title of the Bill.

In terms of policy there is evidence from the early 2000s and immediately post winning the rights to host London 2012 that other governing authorities had begun to push for greater visibility of the Paralympics in domestic education delivery and structures. For example, the BPA and the National Association of Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers (NASUWT) launched ‘Ability vs Ability’ in November 2006. The General Secretary of NASUWT described that “since 2002 NASUWT has been working with the DfES and BPA on the roll-out of Paralympic curriculum packs for primary and secondary schools” (Skills Active, 2006). The programme is directly referenced by Minister for Sport in December 2006 when asked in the HoC to account for “improvements in opportunities in physical education and school sport for disabled young people” (Caborn, 2006). The Minister for Sport responded with several programmes and apparatus within the PESSCL strategy targeted at young people with disabilities:

A national working group comprising the Youth Sport Trust, Sport England, UK Sport and the British Paralympic Association have been working in partnership to create a playground-to-podium framework. The framework combines the expertise and functions of these four agencies along with governing bodies of sport, disability sport organisations, school sport and county sport partnerships to ensure England is able to identify and support talent leading to the 2012 Paralympic Games. The framework is due to be released in February 2007.

In addition, the Government have also funded the development of the new Paralympic Education Resource “Ability vs Ability” which is a web-based cross-curricular resource developed by the BPA and the NASUWT. The project aims to raise awareness of disability, disability sport and the Paralympic movement through education.

The inaugural UK School Games [UKSG] was held in Glasgow in September 2006. The UKSG will be held annually to 2011 providing opportunities for talented young athletes to showcase their skills as well as giving them the experience of competing in a multi-sport event. The 2006 event featured two disability sports—swimming and athletics—and provision for disability sports will increase in future years (Caborn, 2006).

The comments from the Minister for Sport do not directly relate to the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim, LOCOG or the Get Set programme. Instead, it demonstrates that before the formation of LOCOG etc. there was political and policy debate over the inclusion and visibility of the Paralympic movement and disabled young people. This debate contributes evidence to the gap in knowledge around the Paralympics and a perceived ableist discourse in governing formations. It counters academic perspective developed by scholars who focus on the participation and general legacies around London 2012 Paralympics, such as, Weed and Dowse (2009), Brown and Pappous (2018a, 2018b) advocating that at a meso-level and micro-level of governing the Paralympics. The potential of the Games was not leveraged in enough time because they base their evidence on the planning period of London 2012 and the delayed Paralympic legacy documents released by the UK Government in 2010 and 2011. The evidence I presented here

highlights that the bid documentation (LOCOG, 2004c) and wider policy formation and enactment through PESSCL (2003a) and comments above by the Minister for Sport (Caborn, 2006) recognised the Paralympics and disabled children as a distinct population that warranted visibility, integration or separate programmes. Consequently, the change in visibility and legitimacy of the Paralympics and BPA in the UK pre-dates London 2012 legacy plans and this needs to be contextualised in the analysis.

5.4 Emergence of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim

The phrasing throughout the formal London 2012 bid documentation, bid speeches and IOC bid evaluations highlighted how an educational programme would be delivered, for example, the production of curriculum materials (LOCOG, 2004b, 2004c). Yet, beyond winning the bid, there is no direct blueprint to how a Games or attributed educational programmes or legacy promises should be delivered (Hwang, 2018). Bloyce and Lovett (2012) suggest that the bidding and planning processes are distinctly different. The academic literature neglects this difference between bidding and planning around London 2012 and legacy as very few scholars cite the original bidding documents or use the bidding process as the starting point of their contextualisation or data. Instead, the focus is on the translation of the bidding documents into the delivery process. A common assumption pertinent to my thesis is how and when the phrase ‘inspire a generation’ consistently became a strapline or legacy focal point. As noted above, it was not extensively used in the formal bid documentation. The ‘inspire a generation’ phrase and related legacy promise and targets emerged from some UK Government and LOCOG based rhetoric and documentation post the bidding phase.

The assumptions around the emergence of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim is perpetuated as studies related to education and London 2012, such as Jung et al. (2016) and Kohe and Bowen-Joes (2016) cite varying policy and strategy moments that form or contextualise their interpretation of the legacy aim. For example, Jung et al. (2016) focus on six UK Government policy documents and media articles with no inclusion of the LOCOG or Get Set programme materials or strategy. The authors interpret the Olympics as an influencing discourse on physical education and school sport policy and delivery (Jung et al., 2016). In contrast, Kohe and Bowen-Jones (2016, p. 1214) view that

“LOCOG cleverly aligned its legacy strategy with the UK sport and education policies to enhance all levels of sport participation.” Here the authors see the organising committee as central to creating the legacy strategy. Therefore the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim. Neither piece discusses where the term legacy or the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim originates from in official or unofficial sources. Although the discourses and strategies interconnect, there are assumptions made to who is responsible for the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim.

The discussion point here is around how legacy was driven between bidding and into the planning phase of London 2012, and by what governing actors. As discussed in Chapter Three and above the initial bid climate was put together as a credible return on investment for the IOC, not necessarily with long term policy objectives (Masterman, 2013). Armour and Griffiths (2013) and Bloyce and Lovett (2012) both cite a 2007 privately produced legacy research document commissioned by the DCMS that recommended that legacy programmes would need to be embedded in existing UK Government programmes and areas to achieve the success in the long term. In direct relation to UK Government legacy activities and Games delivery Jeremy Beeton¹¹ contradicts the DCMS legacy research document as he views the reality of London 2012 as far more complex, he comments:

that with £400 billion of government projects currently under management, government should be the most informed, intelligent client for major projects in the UK. From his background in construction project management, the Olympics were not large in terms of the size of the project; what made delivering them so uniquely challenging was the complexity of the Games, and the fact that no-one was ultimately in charge. The scale of the Games had rapidly evolved, with the project being the equivalent of setting up a FTSE-100 [Financial Times Stock Exchange] company to operate for six weeks and then collapse immediately afterwards (Institute for Government, 2012).

My documentary findings suggest that during the early period of planning for London 2012 this ‘unique challenge’ and ‘complexity of the Games’ was also the case around

¹¹ The Director-General of the Government Olympic Executive (from 2007 until disbanded post-Games)

educational legacy and programmes. The ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim intersected with the formation of LOCOG, and the formation of UK Government legacy planning which are not necessarily consistent, i.e. no-one was ultimately in charge of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim. The rhetoric and plans in the bid documentation fed into the organising committee, which was a private and autonomous organisation, whereas the UK Government and connected organisations understood legacy from their own interpretations and public interests. Theoretically, this complex planning environment can be analysed through governmentality and power employed and exercised through a “net-like organisation” (Foucault, 1980, p.98). Neither the public or private organisations have ultimate control of London 2012 and legacy activities, and rather there is a regulated freedom made up of rationalities and technologies connected to UK Government practices and the international sporting federation practices.

Further to this understanding of power and legacy, the UK Government did not designate one individual department as shaping the activities and legacies connected to young people. Attempts to develop the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim is present in two governmental authorities and technologies in 2007. Firstly, a DCMS (2007, p. 4) authored pamphlet *Our Promise for 2012: How the UK will benefit from the Olympic and Paralympic Games*. The third promise and plans were related to “inspire a new generation of young people to take part in local volunteering, cultural and physical activity.” As noted in Chapter Three, the specific education element was listed as to “create a London 2012 Education Programme to ignite the interest of children and young people through the Games” (DCMS, 2007, p.4). In the pamphlet, there is no explicit reference to ongoing policy or activities (such as PESSCL), the only existing programme referenced in the UK School Games. However, that is concerning “talented young athletes” as part of the promise to “make the UK a world-class sporting nation” (DCMS, 2007, p. 2). At the end of the pamphlet, it links to organisations and getting involved, including the home nation sports councils. The link for the educational programme in this pamphlet is referenced as “access new educational resources available for teachers, parents and students through “On Your Marks” (DCMS, 2007, p. 7). Then the listed contacts are DCMS, BOA, BPA, GLA, ODA, and LOCOG. Against each contact, there is a blurb to what each body is responsible for in the legacy landscape. However, this is framed in terms of programmes

and activities rather than broader legacy aims. The only reference to legacy is that the GLA is “responsible for the legacy of 2012 for Londoners” (DCMS, 2007, p. 8). The documentary evidence suggests here that the DCMS drove practices of governing and governmental technologies but did not embed or explicitly reference to broader political rationalities or pre-London 2012 policies related to young people.

The second important governing authority in this period and the emergence of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim is the HM Treasury, and the association with pre-existing governing structures, the PSAs. In 2007, HM Treasury released the following document:

Public Service Agreement: Delivery Agreement 22: Deliver a successful Olympic Games and Paralympic Games with a sustainable legacy and get more children and young people taking part in high quality PE and sport (HM Treasury, 2007).

The thirty-six-page document published in October 2007 (herein PSA 22) set out the vision, measurement and delivery strategy to complement the previous year’s legislative London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act 2006 and signing the Host City Contract (IOC, 2005b). It was in line with the broader governmental ambitions at the time connected to the Labour Government’s drive for modernization of public services. Scholars have attributed the modernization agenda to a hybrid model of neoliberal and managerial governing of individuals and organisations, with a concurrent commitment to the UK Government responsibility of improving social conditions in a marketized welfare state (Finlayson, 2011; Houlihan and Lindsey, 2012). It is akin to the arguments made by Rose and Miller (1992) and Dean (2010) that political power and governing are as much about creating complex systems of political mechanisms which do not constrain citizens but form the citizens as part of the governing process.

The rationality in the PSA 22 entwines the London 2012 connected to young people, in contrast to the DCMS legacy pamphlet there is extensive detail. The PSA 22 (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 3) references six ‘visions’ and three directly connect to London 2012 and young people:

Vision 1.3 The Government is also committed to creating new opportunities for all children and young people in England to participate in high quality physical education (PE) and sport. These opportunities will contribute not only to the 2012

legacy, but also other government policies to promote the health and well-being of children and young people.

Vision 1.5 The Games will motivate increasing numbers of children and young people to take up and maintain their participation in PE and wider sporting opportunities. Building on its vision for school sport, the Government's aim for 2008-11 is that, in addition to at least 2 hours per week of high quality PE and Sport in school for all 5-16 year olds, all children and young people aged 5-19 will be offered opportunities to participate in a further 3 hours per week of sporting activities provided through schools, Further Education (FE) colleges, clubs and community providers. This will create a sustainable legacy both in terms of future elite success and grassroots sport.

Vision 1.6 Participating in PE and sport will contribute towards improving children and young people's health and well-being. In keeping with the Olympic spirit, the Games will also be the catalyst for international development through sport, as the Government and its partners bring new sporting opportunities to young people in a range of developing countries.

The visions are a hybrid of content and language between the previous London 2012 bidding documentation (LOCOG, 2004a, 2004b) and the PESSCL strategy (DfES, 2003a, 2004). The visions outlined make no direct mention of the Paralympics or disabled children, to LOCOG and the London 2012 educational legacy programme, or the requirement of the IOC for host cities. Instead, the formation of governing assumes that policy and legacy are interchangeable concepts that will organically “not only to the 2012 legacy but also other government policies to promote health and well-being” (HM Treasury, 2007, p.3). The language and assumptions do not significantly involve communication around the Olympic movement, Olympism or Paralympics values. Instead, it uses managerial vocabulary connected to the traditional formation of young people and sport, i.e. participation in physical education, measured by hours of activity, and related to broader health agendas.

The delivery strategy (HM Treasury, 2007, pp. 14-19) is presented in the PSA 22 document through detail around the policy context, responsibility and work strands; then

consultation and user engagement; governance and accountability; and continuing involvement with the general public across the UK. As noted in Chapter Three, the Blair Labour Government had created the standalone youth sport PESSCL strategy to establish a national infrastructure and a more efficient system around school sport and physical education (Bloyce and Smith, 2010). The PSA 22 document (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 14) states that the extensions to the current strategy are:

- engages more children and young people in high quality PE and sport in school, the Further Education sector and the community;
- extends sporting opportunities for children and young people with disabilities and special educational needs;
- inspires more young people to take part in competitive sport, backed up by more competition managers and coaches; and
- encourages and helps support more young people to become leaders and volunteers in sport.

The language here further supports the point above that the PSA 22 document is part of the broader Labour Government modernization governing strategy. Moreover, pertinent to my discussion in Chapters Two and Three, it connects to neoliberal and ableism discourses. In relation to ableism, the statement “extends sporting opportunities for children and young people with disabilities and special educational needs” (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 14) implies that prior to 2007 disabled young people had been excluded from policy. On the one hand, this highlights and supports that the Paralympic Games increased the visibility of disabled young people and a more expansive understanding of what intersectional characteristics make up an active citizen aligning with a governmental ambition and political rationality around broader notions of active citizenry (Green, 2006). On the other hand, from empirical evidence presented in Chapter Three and the previous subsection the term ‘extends’ in the PSA document is erasing the inclusive governmental technologies present in previous policies connected to young people and sport (e.g., 2003 PESSCL strategy and Caborn announcements in 2006 around ‘Ability vs, Ability’). A tendency in the PSA 22 document is to decontextualise the ableist discourse of an expanded or erased interest and inclusion of disabled young people by

implying the public service agreement is recognising and extending provision for this population.

The neoliberal point is most notable in the third bullet point where a continued focus on measurable performance and standards which are associated with the centrally set targets of PSAs and modernization in the Labour Government (McDonald, 2005; Painter, 2012). Pratt (2016, pp. 891-892) suggests a modernization agenda linked with neoliberalism has been present in the education sector and education policy since the Education Reform Act, such as an increasing market based and “techno-rational” outlook in the education sector. Moreover, organisations, such as, OFSTED have allowed UK Governments to inspect schools and “exerts considerable control over what is seen as legitimate, both in terms of outcomes and teaching/learning activity” (Pratt, 2016, p. 892). Legacy in this sense intersected with the PSA and broader education based governing technologies because London 2012 represented a set event target and timeframe and the ability to rationalise different programmes through delivery and performance, for example, “extend sporting opportunities... take part in competitive sport.” HM Treasury, 2007, p.15). The centralised measures and macro-level governmental ambitions are connected to a meso-level network of actors who should achieve the objectives of the PSA 22. The document cites the DCSF and DCMS; then the delivery responsibility is extended to other governmental departments, for example, DH (links to Healthy Schools and obesity), OFSTED, Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, Local Authorities, NGBs, and external bodies contracted by the Government (HM Treasury, 2007, p.15).

A focus of the previous studies (for example, Piggin et al. 2009a, 2009b) into sport policy encourage critical reflection on the homogeneity of the overall governing rationality of a Government at a macro-level. The PSA (2007) and DCMS (2007) documents presented above highlight incongruence in the UK Government rationalities and technologies to how policy and legacy intersected. This incongruence is further corroborated by evidence given during the HoC 2013 Education Committee inquiry, Dame Tessa Jowell, former Olympic Minister in the Labour Government reflected that:

... policy has suffered to some degree through fragmentation across Government. That was a struggle that we had when we were in government—to achieve proper

lockstep between DCMS [Department for Culture, Media and Sport] and DFE [Department of Education]. Also... there is an important role for the Department of Health (HoC Vol II, 2013b, Ev 35).

Supporting this point further Baroness Campbell, former Chair of the YST (amongst other high-level sport governance roles):

My instinct around school sport is that unless it is embedded in education; unless head teachers see this as value; and unless Ofsted is seen to be inspecting it and valuing it, it is always going to be an add-on. I agree with Tessa. There are three huge Departments here, and I do not know that we have ever found the real answer to this. I remember, in the early days, trying to put a strategy together. I used to run from DCMS to DFES and then dash into DOH. It was trying to pull together those three agendas. For me, school sport must be embedded in education (HoC Vol II, 2013b, Ev. 35).

The retrospective comments by prominent figures support the scepticism of what had been written into the policies. Moreover, the ability for policy and legacy to translate into effective governing and implementation. Although the PSA 22 was comprehensive and precise, it was written by the HM Treasury suggesting that in the UK Government there was fragmentation and disagreement to what ministry or department had ownership or responsibility for enacting the PSA system and integrate London 2012 legacy formation. Internal tension within the UK Government was noted in my interviews, for example, Interviewee B (Lobby group) commented:

The idea of joined-up Government at a national level is a complete myth, and I think it always has been a myth. I think the Government talks in a sports context, more about joined-up Government now more than it has at any other point. Apart from actually delivering the Olympic and Paralympic Games where Government did work actually really effectively together. So there is actually very little meaningful cross-over between what DfE do and what DCMS do.

The comment here illustrates the tension in the UK Government with regards to who is the dominant Governmental authority in school sport and what that means for relations around London 2012 legacy and education. This tension supports wider scholarly

discussion from Houlihan and Green (2006), Lindsey (2020) and Phillpots (2013) that fragmentation in the UK Government consistently hinders other relations around broader sport policy and into the education and school sports landscape.

It must be noted Interviewee B felt that the Olympic and Paralympic Games delivery produced effective joined-up UK Government practices, such as actual construction of the Olympic Park. It is the longer term and established cross-over between the DfES and DMCS that Interviewee B (Lobby group) was sceptical about in terms of ineffective governing. This scepticism is supported by a research report by the Institute for Government where two “problem areas” were identified in delivering the Games, and one was security and the other legacy. The report quoted a DCMS senior civil servant reflections from the early stages of bid planning, saying:

I remember us [DCMS] trying to persuade ministers to be formal and to the Cabinet Committee to oversee the legacy. Ministerial time was always focused on delivery considerations... legacy suffered from not having a nice collective agreement and mandate on legacy in 2005 (quoted in Norris et al., 2013).

In terms of education, other interviews different governing actors had perspectives on whether it was the UK Government fragmentation or the broader sport or education landscape that was fragmented. For example, Interviewee C (Olympic/Paralympic) about the sport and physical activity landscape discussed that:

The [sport] landscape is littered with organisations that are doing brilliant work, but when you have a landscape that is littered with brilliant organisations, the end-user can be very confused, very quickly to who's doing what. What we are brilliant at in this country is working in silos. And being terribly concerned that our patch might be grabbed by someone else.

However, in contrast, Interviewee D (Education Institution) when discussing the same topic reflected that “the fractures are in the education system, not necessarily in the sport system.” When talking about legacy and policy, it cannot be assumed that one particular Labour Government department, i.e. DCMS or DfES had the scope to formally integrate or rationalise how the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim or LOCOG educational legacy programme. This assumption can be attributed to the wider context described by the

contrasting perspectives of the interviewees and inquiry dialogue to whether it is the sport or education authorities that are fractured, fragmented or working in silos. Furthermore, the measurements developed by the HM Treasury during this period served to create more national standards controlled by technocratic measures, such as hours of high-quality physical education. The emergence of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim, therefore, is not straightforwardly attributable to either the UK Government or LOCOG documentation or governmental ambitions.

5.5 Concluding chapter thoughts

This chapter has served to evidence and analyse the formation of governing around the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim and formation of the London 2012 educational programmes. The period represents, as summarised by the concluding points that the varying initial interpretations of legacy governing create a complex political power. Although not conclusive or determining for the entire life course of London 2012, this chapter will allow me to build and contextualise my findings and discussion in the following three chapters. This chapter offers a timely revisit and analysis of the London 2012 bid documentation and early period of legacy formation as it is a frequently neglected area of scholarship, yet as noted this is important for the understanding the meaning-making and entanglement with broader discourses around policy and legacy.

In previous literature the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim has been an assumed focus of all governing actors involved in London 2012 from the outset, however, as presented in the bid documentation and emerging governing formations it is not as straight forward. The formal bid documentation constructed programmes that were endorsed or supported by domestic UK Government actors, with no explicit mention of current policy context or other governing actors, such as, the YST. This lack of connection to other organisations contributed to the assumptions by the IOC and IPC, more broadly, supporters of the London 2012 bid that the programme or legacy aims could be translated into the domestic landscape and achieved.

Concerning young people and education, the assumptions made about governing rationalities are further illuminated when considering the Paralympic element. The governing technologies from the IOC and IPC for the Paralympics to be visible and

integrated yet separate promote a mixed understanding of how that can translate in educational or legacy programmes. As noted, the domestic visibility of the Paralympics had been recognised by the Minister for Sport, for example, activities around the School Games, Ability vs Ability and Playground to Podium. This period demonstrates acknowledgement but not clarity to how the Paralympics and disabled children can be governed through the rationalities and technologies of policy or legacy. This period is important for contextualising the interpretations and analysis of London 2012 legacy during the delivery and post Games commentary (discussed in the following chapters).

What the PSA 22 (HM Treasury, 2007) and DCMS legacy pamphlet (2007) documents demonstrate that initial formation of governing around young people, education and legacy did not substantively engage with London 2012 bid documents. Instead, the documents represent a continuation and adaptation of the Labour Government's modernization agenda where centralised managerial practices of governing are connected to collaborative approaches to delivery. This distinctive neoliberal discourse gives the illusion that many people are contributing and responsible for policy. Yet, fragmentation and complexity allow for central targets to become the focal point and limited critical debate about the rationalities. The fragmentation, coupled with the confidentiality around the bid formation and the formal mechanisms of legacy attributed to the organising committee, demonstrates 'net-like' political power and governing. The intersection between policy and legacy around young people, therefore, emerges from various authorities. The following chapter will now consider how the different governing actors interpreted the emerging 'inspire a generation' legacy aim into the planning phase of the London 2012 life course.

Chapter 6 “Legacy is one of the central reasons...”

Legacy is one of the central reasons to why we bid for the 2012 Olympics. Last week, to coincide with the visit of the international Olympic evaluation commission, I published our legacy promises document, which is not of itself new policy, but brings together existing policy in relation to sport, regeneration, young people, the environment, and the wider benefits to the United Kingdom of hosting the Olympic games (Jowell, 2007).

6.1 Background: 2007-2010

The purpose of this chapter is to consider the period of continued planning by the Labour Government, and the development of the Get Set programme by LOCOG (2008-2010). Two years after London won the rights to host the 2012 Olympics and Paralympics, the Labour Government released a legacy action plan. As illustrated by Jowell in the quote above, the planning and governing up until 2010 was an attempt to galvanize legacy programmes and outcomes from existing policies rather than create a new separate system. In Chapter Five, I argued that between the London 2012 bid documentation (LOCOG, 2004b, 2004c), DCMS legacy promises pamphlet (DCMS, 2007) and the PSA 22 (HM Treasury, 2007) the governing was complicated by a mixture of domestic and international governing technologies, namely, the integration of the Paralympics. Moreover, the governmental ambitions written into both bid documentation and policy documentation were based on assumptions that legacy and policy around young people had translatable rationalities.

The variable **interconnections between policy and legacy in the previous chapter highlight** that the emergence of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim is not straight forward. In policy terms, the HM Treasury through PSA 22 (2007) constructed centralised and managerial targets for physical education and school sport policy (PESSCL) that involves

the DfES, DCMS, DH among other connected and contracted governing actors, such as, YST and OFSTED. However, there is no explicit mention of LOCOG or the London 2012 educational legacy programme. In legacy terms the bid documentation, Host City Contract and London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act do not guarantee who is responsible or accountable for the educational legacy and the emerging legacy aim to ‘inspire a generation.’ Instead, the references are to produce an educational programme that embeds the requirements of the IOC to promote the Olympic movement and values. Consequently, at this point, the intersections between policy and legacy are based on assumptions, requirements, and visions, rather than substantively interconnected governing technologies.

The formation of the legacy action plan and an additional sports policy document by the Labour Government in 2008, then the launch of activities by LOCOG will form the basis of this chapter. In Chapter Two, I discussed that legacy debate is often reduced to the outputs and products of programmes, rather than the distinctive discourses that constructed them, such as neoliberalism. In this chapter, I will continue to document how legacy and policy formed through neoliberal governmental technologies and political rationalities. Moreover, I will explore further how the rise in visibility and legitimacy of the Paralympic elements ruptures an ableism discourse the formation of the Get Set programmes, and the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim.

6.2 Legacy action plan

The DCMS (2008a) *Before, during and after: making the most of the London 2012 Games* document represents a more detailed legacy. More detailed, in comparison to the leaflet that was released in the previous year by the DCMS (2007). As noted in the last chapter the detail in the 2007 pamphlet is very brief, and there is no explicit mention of the Get Set educational programme. It is not until 2008 that the DCMS about legacy promises releases further detail and more information is given regarding the legacy around young people in the form of a legacy “action plan” (DCMS, 2008a, p.2). In the HoC a statement is made by Jowell (2008) as the Minister for the Olympics and London:

A robust and transparent governance system has also been put in place to drive progress, and this will be monitored alongside the delivery of PSA 22—a

successful Olympic Games and Paralympic Games with a sustainable legacy, with more children and young people taking part in high quality PE and sport.

This is the Government's first detailed statement on legacy, and it is the first time that a host city has published such a document before their Olympiad has even begun. Further programmes will be created, and existing programmes and ideas developed over the next four years. We will report on progress regularly.

The political context of this statement and document is in the backdrop of political and policy change in 2007 as Gordon Brown took over as the Leader of the Labour Party and the Prime Minister. Despite a change in leadership, the approach to London 2012 and legacy is continued in governing structures around the PSA 22 document and system. The rationality behind the DCMS (2008a) publication and links to the PSA system can be attributed to a neoliberal discourse and managerial rationality of being able to account for public funding and the return on investment of hosting a Games. For example, Jowell uses the language of a 'robust and transparent governance system to drive progress' between the PSA 22 and sustainable legacy. The claim of transparency is frequent within policy influenced by managerial mechanisms (Piggin et al., 2009b) as it shows a willingness for policymakers to be scrutinised. This scrutiny is a contradiction to the bidding phase discussed in Chapter Five, where confidentiality was the priority around the London 2012 political and logistical proposals based on the commercial nature of the IOC bidding procedure and Games. The change in language and governing suggests that the Labour Government began to take ownership of the delivery of London 2012 rather than maintaining the private and corporate technologies encouraged by the IOC.

Jowell's (2008) statement in the second paragraph publicly notes that the level of UK Government involvement and public planning around legacy is unprecedented. Again, to reference back to the bid documentation (LOCOG, 2004a), Host City Contract (IOC, 2005b) and London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act (2006), there is no definitive or contractual guarantee to be made by the hosting city that legacy is achieved or planned. Instead of the IOC loosely has the mission of "promoting a possible legacy from the Olympic Games to host city and host country" (Tomlinson, 2016, p. 3). Although proactive and unprecedented there is no direct evidence or rationale as to why the UK

Government involvement will be useful or beneficial. Moreover, it is the interpretation of the Labour Government, not Parliament, the organising committee or host city that has set the national promises and legacy action plan. The aims of the host city and LOCOG are isolated to specific requirements written into the bid documentation. The intersection here is the distinct development of broader and national legacy aims that target the whole population of young people (by the Labour Government) versus a more isolated and controlled set of activities and ambitions by LOCOG.

The promise and rationale can illustrate the governmental ambition of the Labour Government at the beginning of the legacy action plan, Jowell commented that winning the rights to host London 2012 is

The prize is the greatest in a generation – the chance to turn the rhetoric of legacy into fact. Faster progress towards a healthy nation. Higher aspirations for young people in their work and their play. A stronger community, bound by self-belief and the knowledge that Britain has hosted the greatest ever Games (DCMS, 2008a, p. 2).

What is interesting to compare is that in 2004/5 the bid team did not link young people as a target for progress towards ends of ‘higher aspirations’ a ‘healthier nation’ or ‘stronger community.’ Instead the initial bid rhetoric was “London’s vision is to reach young people all around the world. To connect them with the inspirational power of the Games. So they are inspired to choose sport” (Coe, 2005). The translation of this vision into the words articulated in the legacy action in 2008 is to rationalise legacy and young people for the betterment of society, health, and community and individuals. This translation of legacy is more akin to the Labour Government sport policy and strategies in the early 2000s around PESSCL and using sport for addressing broader societal issues (Green, 2006; Devine, 2013).

Promise three in the legacy action plan ‘inspiring a new generation of young people’ is in line with the academic position of Chatziefstathiou and Henry (2012) who discuss the direction of the IOC and its use of young people to create active citizens. Plus, this is in line with the argument from Green (2006) that in the domestic UK policy children are valued as active citizens in the neoliberal sense of being more active and being more

responsible for their well-being and health. The rationality of including young people as policy targets is realised through non-sport or education political rationalities, for example, the *Every Child Matters: Change for Children* national framework (DfES, 2003b) and subsequent *The Children's Plan* (DCSF, 2007). The political climate around young people within the international sports federations and Labour Government is notably around citizenship and the relationship between the state, society and young people. The target population being rationalised at the centre of this governing was young people assumed to want to be inspired, healthier and a better citizen within society, guided by the mechanism of legacy.

The legacy action plan (DCMS, 2008a) highlights LOCOG as a governing actor. It describes LOCOG and their role in “designing an innovative education programme for London 2012 to reach hundreds of thousands of young people around the UK, including those at the margins of mainstream learning” (DCMS, 2008a, p. 46). LOCOG is given a distinct role through the delivery of the Get Set educational programme that:

will enable schools, colleges and local authority education providers to gain the right to use an educational version of the London 2012 brand by organising projects based around the Olympic and Paralympic values. To qualify, children and young people will draw up proposals for how they would use and apply the values in their lives and communities (DCMS, 2008a, p. 46).

The statements in this document show a nuance to the governing dynamic between LOCOG and the Labour Government. It is connected to the ‘brand’ of London 2012 and others being able to ‘gain the right’ to use the brand through the Get Set programme. In ambiguous language, the action plan outlines their view of ‘what we mean by legacy’ which is not premised on brands or rights but as a collective power to inspire ‘all of us’ as stated here:

The ‘legacy’ of the London 2012 Games refers to the imprint they will leave. It is therefore not just what happens after the Games, but what we do before and during them to inspire individuals and organisations to strive for their best, to try new activities, forge new links or develop new skills. The Olympic Games and Paralympic Games have a unique power to inspire all of us as individuals, to

motivate everyone to set themselves a personal London 2012 challenge. Many of the benefits will come from enhancing existing programmes, and within existing Departmental budgets (DCMS, 2008a, p. 8).

The understanding of legacy and more broadly, the governing outlined within the document shows a clear link between “enhancing existing programmes, and within existing Departmental budgets” (DCMS, 2008a, p. 8). However, as noted above and will be reflected below, the reality of the practice of embedding legacy across distinctively different Labour Government departments is not a straight forward or non-political task. Interviewee E (Government) commented about this period that:

And so when I arrived in 2008 there was. Still, I am pleased to say, quite a lot of work to be done around the definition of the word legacy. Obviously, the high-level commitments had been given in Singapore to win the bid, on the inspiring a generation and on involving young people in sports and that sort of thing. And the challenge for us at that point was really to start turning those into a proper structured programme for legacy, but right across the piece. The social, economic, regeneration, covering the whole broad span of legacy... and to go into each sector and have a consultation with all the Government departments, I think there was eighteen at the time. And the Mayor, the local authorities, the IOC, blah, blah, blah, a whole range of stakeholders to work out what was doable... it was a question of using the Games to help them (existing Government departments and budgets) capitalise and maximise their programmes, refocus them and get the biggest bang for their buck in existing programmes. And, that was quite an interesting challenge, as you had to help different stakeholders see their self-interest... to turbo-charge things that they might have been thinking about etc.

The reflection here supports the academic debate that legacy is not a product that a host city or organising committee can control and maintain. Instead, that within the formation of macro-level and meso-level governing, there is a significant amount of self-interest and governing from various authorities (Sugden and Tomlinson, 2012; Tomlinson, 2016). On the one hand, London 2012 and LOCOG legacy activities were governed through the interests and regulations of international sports federations. In contrast, the Labour

Government considered legacy from varying departments self-interest and to enhance their existing governmental ambitions.

Concerning education, the legacy action plan connects legacy promise three ‘inspiring a new generation of young people’ to school sport policy and schools, claiming:

We will transform the lives of young people through sport. The Government’s target that all pupils should be offered a minimum of two hours a week of sport has been met by most schools. We now want to offer all 5 to 16 year-olds in England five hours of sport a week by 2012, with three hours on offer to 16 to 19-year-olds. The PE and Sport Strategy, with a network of sports coordinators based in every school and college, is key to delivering this goal. All of this will be made possible by inspirational teachers and coaches, alongside modern facilities (DCMS, 2008a, p. 3).

The detail in this quote introduces updated targets from the PSA 22 to a five- and three-hour offer to increase the performance and output of the strategy, and this directly links to another announcement by the DCMS in 2008 and an updated sport policy document.

6.3 Playing to win

The DCMS produced another document in 2008 *Playing to Win: A New Era for Sport* (DCMS, 2008b) drafted under the guardianship of Andy Burnham, the then Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport. The length and structure are a departure from the last Labour Government sport policy in 2002 (discussed in Chapter Three) as it is written without the Strategy Unit and is significantly briefer. The perception and analysis of this policy period within academic literature has produced a number of interpretations to shift in policy objectives. For example, Devine (2013) discusses how strategy in 2008 and build up to the London 2012 Games represent an abandonment of the ‘sport for social good’ and a resurgence of a ‘sport for sport’s sake’ policy stance. The shift in policy discourse is evident in the broader policy statements which do not speak of groups that need additional assistance but back to a vision “to give more people of all ages the opportunity to participate in high-quality, competitive sport” (DCMS, 2008b, p. 3). This shift realigned a clear focus on sport rather than the broader context of social and welfare development through sport (Bullough, 2012). This is demonstrated by the statements and

language used within the DCMS (2008b) policy document. For example, in the opening notes, Burnham then-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport stated:

The sporting landscape has changed. Out of the confused structures of previous years has come a structure that puts three bodies in charge of the main building blocks of sporting success across England and the UK: PE and school sport (Youth Sport Trust), community sport (Sport England) and elite sport (UK Sport) (DCMS, 2008b, p. 6).

The concise and relatively brief policy document overtly simplifies the landscape and clearly outlines three areas of policy implementation: physical education and school sport, community sport, and elite sport. What is prominent are statements around who is accountable and who should access sporting opportunities. The 2008 strategy departs from the comments of the 2002 Labour strategy that outlined the structures around sport to be “extremely complex” (DCMS and Strategy Unit, 2002, p. 38) to recognising roles of crucial national organisations within and beyond the national curriculum. In terms of young people, the 2008 policy comments “Sport England will work closely with the Youth Sport Trust... Sport England’s County Sport Partnerships will work with local authorities who will play a key role” (DCMS, 2008b, p. 11).

Philpotts (2013, p. 197) described this period in terms of sport and education policy as “the restructuring and rationalization of sport provision in England and the transition from PESSCL to a new strategy named PESSYP.” The PESSCL strategy is celebrated as a success in reversing the trend of declining school sport through statistics around the number of children and young people who participate in 2 hours of PE and sport each week. The *Playing to Win* document then states:

We want to go further. To answer our challenge to increase the offer to young people, the new PE and Sport Strategy for Young People (PESSYP), backed by at least £783 million over the next three years, aims to create a world-leading system for PE and sport for all children and young people (DCMS, 2008b, p. 11).

The document here uses the language of the PSA 22 vision around ‘world-leading system for PE and sport’, but it does not explicitly reference LOCOG, legacy or the ‘inspire generation’ aim connected to London 2012. In the 2008 document the DCMS policy is

explicit about their continued major role and influence of traditional governmental and non-governmental organisations. Such as, the YST who is “to support the delivery of the PE and Sport Strategy for Young People, working with Sport England and led by DCMS and DCSF” (DCMS, 2008b, p. 8). In many academic studies, the role of the YST and critical individuals connected to the organisation and Labour Government thinking have been well documented (Bloyce and Smith, 2010; Phillpots, 2013). What is problematic in this period is the lack of distinctive connection or rationality of how LOCOG and YST can function together. The position of YST in the DCMS (2008a) sport policy contrasts with the legacy action plan (DCMS, 2008b) where educational legacy is built around the activities of LOCOG and its Get Set programme.

Instead of taking responsibility for legacy the Labour Government policy extends the liability of legacy to “everyone involved in the running of sport in this country has a responsibility to translate our Olympic host nation status into a legacy for generations to come” (DCMS, 2008b, p. 3). The use of the phrase responsibility interlinks with the governmentality theorising that governing is about facilitating the duty of collective bodies that they are part of the rationality, i.e. giving ownership and responsibility of legacy to the micro-level of governing. What is problematic, as discussed in the previous chapter, is the fragmentation and siloed meso-level working between governing authorities, such as YST and LOCOG. This fragmentation is notable between Government departments and ministers, as the two 2008 DCMS documents about policy and legacy frame governmental ambitions and political rationalities of legacy in different ways. On the one hand, in the policy document, it is expected by the DCMS for ‘everyone involved in the running of sport’ to be responsible for legacy. When on the other hand, the political rationalities of legacy are fragmented between LOCOG activities and concurrent activities outlined by the DCMS in their legacy action plan, i.e. not everyone but specific roles. This complexity is reflected by a Downing Street adviser quoted in Norris et al. (2013, p. 28) “we made legacy too complicated – we could have just done one thing and made it school sport.” The authors analyse this as ‘legacy clutter’, but in my analysis, there is a definite challenge for the Labour Government departments (within departments) to agree on what the macro-level political rationality of legacy was, and how that transcends into meso-level and micro-level governing technologies. One

organisation that did not form legacy clutter was LOCOG who in the same year, 2008, launched a clear educational programme, Get Set.

6.4 Launch of Get Set

Another milestone in 2008 was when LOCOG started the London 2012 education programme in conjunction with the closing ceremony of the Beijing 2008 Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG, 2012b). As discussed in Chapter Three, the programme was called Get Set and aimed to:

give all young people the chance to learn about and live the Olympic Values of friendship, excellence and respect and the Paralympic Values of inspiration, determination, courage and equality (LOCOG, 2012a, p. 1).

In relation to content and philosophy, the launch of the Get Set programme demonstrates a distinct rupture in an ableist discourse interconnected to the separation and distinct elements of the Olympics and Paralympics. Here, the formation of governing and meso-level governmental technology of the main programme aim are framed to include both Olympic and Paralympic values. The significance of using a capital 'V' for both sets of values also recognises a nuance that the Olympics have Olympism as a commercially and moral project, but the Paralympic movement prior to London 2012 in the UK did not have as sophisticated brand or philosophy (Kerr, 2018; Pullen et al., 2019). A point of formation and distinction by varying actors was to promote and capitalise on the visibility and growing legitimacy of the Paralympic brand and philosophy, this was driven by organisations such as the IPC or BPA and part of a rise in public coverage and interest (Brittain and Beacom, 2016). Instead, the LOCOG documentation represents the macro-level of governing as the content being simultaneous, concurrent, and equitable in relation to the 'Values' included to both movements. However, the language and inclusion of Paralympic and Olympic values should not be used to assume that there was a broader inclusion in visibility or legitimacy at every governing level, as discussed in relation to Olympism and its paradoxes in Chapter Three (Coburn and McCafferty, 2016) and to the limits to current understandings of the Paralympic Games in the context of the UK discussed in Chapter Two (Pullen et al., 2019).

Such debate is supported by my interview data where at a meso-level two interviewees discussed how there were both positive and negative impacts to governing and delivery as ableist discourses were ruptured and issues around disability became part of governmental ambitions beyond the organising committee. Describing limitations, Interviewee F (National Governing Body) stated:

Generally, it is quite hard to get into SENDs [special educational need or disability schools], there are exceptions, but generally it is really, really, difficult ... and whatever anyone tells you, para-sport has not been merged into community sport. It might be happening in the same place and involve the same volunteers, but it has not merged (Interviewee F, National Governing Body).

In contrast to the limitations above, Interviewee D (Education Institution) described:

...yes, I think 2012 was brilliant for just completely transforming people's perceptions of disability and ability. Well, it just transformed it, the way it was covered, the stars that came out of it. I think it created a paradigm shift and our new facility is so well-designed to be an accessible building... We're just renewing our strategy now, and the accessibility in there needs to be a part of that. You know about what the programmes are and whatever that sit behind it. How are we driving that? I just feel like that we have moved into a different dimension in terms of disability sport (Interviewee D, Education Institution).

The responses here support previous academic debate that states the interpretation and pace of rupturing interconnected to the Paralympics and ableist discourses is contextual to the individuals and the organisations (Kerr, 2018; Pullen et al., 2019). Moreover, it provides for empirical illustration to highlight the rise in consideration of Paralympic legacy and its impact on the education sector and young people, not only were LOCOG considering this directly but other governing actors' saw the planning and delivery as a way to highlight limitations and opportunities to discuss disability and education. This counters the perceived understanding that Paralympic legacy was a 'missed opportunity' or overlooked as it had been in previous editions (Weed and Dowse, 2009; Brown and Pappous, 2018a, 2018b). A consideration for my thesis question is how this rise, consideration, and discussion formed through governing mechanisms, and the evidence

presented here suggests that the protected funding for LOCOG (i.e. not influenced by other state, commercial, or not-for-profit entities) to construct a single educational programme for London 2012 influenced the ability of LOCOG actors to promote Paralympic values concurrent to the more traditionally dominant Olympic values.

The element of protection and ownership for LOCOG is important, as they designed the Get Set programme around a centralised digital platform controlled and regulated by the LOCOG Head of Education and team. In an overview of the programme, LOCOG described:

Get Set provided free resources and ideas to help teachers link learning to the London 2012 Games. The programme was supported by an engaging digital platform. Get Set provided teachers with flexible, cross-curricular learning resources such as interactive games, facts and project ideas for students aged 3-19 years, and used the Olympic and Paralympic Values to make London 2012 and the Olympic and Paralympic Movements accessible and relevant to young people.

The programme was not prescriptive and allowed teachers to decide how they wanted to engage with the Games, enabling the widest range of schools to take part. In total, nearly seven million children learned about the London 2012 Games in schools and colleges across the UK.

Schools could share their work on the Olympic and Paralympic Values with the London 2012 Education team through the Get Set network, the official London 2012 reward and recognition scheme for schools and colleges (LOCOG, 2012a, p. 1).

The framework and delivery of the Get Set programme is a continuation of the IOC and Olympism based “moral project” that Chatziefstathiou and Henry (2012, p. 247) trace through the history of the modern Olympiad. Another dimension of how we can interpret the Get Set programme is the explicit alignment to marketing and corporate imperatives which strengthen the IOC presence and brand in the target population of young people. For example, in the above statements the embrace of digital participation and uses of social media within the Get Set model to embrace commercially and modernising motives

expressed by the IOC implicitly and explicitly through its political rationalities and governing technologies (Lenskyj, 2012; Coburn and McCafferty, 2016).

Concerning governing the language around the programme is ‘not prescriptive’ but driven by a Get Set network that functioned through a ‘reward and recognition’ scheme that is aligned to a managerial practice and a neoliberal discourse. Culpan and Wigmore (2010) argued that Olympic education could become essential tools to confront global development problems, such as consumerism. Yet, here the Get Set programme is designed around consumerism where the end-user and collective bodies at the micro-level of governing are recognised for engaging and interacting with the central product, i.e. the ‘reward and recognition’ element of the Get Set network. This approach is further illustrated by the ‘structure and strategy’ of the Get Set programme described by Jackie Brock Doyle, who was the LOCOG Director of Communications and Public Affairs:

On top of Get Set were built three further levels of activity: the Get Set network, which invited schools to share their activities and the impact the Games were making in their school, in return for which they were given a plaque, branding and priority status for mascot and athlete visits, and tickets; Get Set Goes Global, which encouraged more than 20,000 schools to learn about and celebrate other countries and their athletes and created more than 386 links between UK schools and schools around the world; and Get Set Plus, which provided a coordinated structure for commercial stakeholders to deliver their contribution to Games-inspired education (HoC Vol III, 2013c, Ev w11).

In line with the IOC’s viewpoint, the LOCOG rationality and ambitions of the Get Set programme can represent ways for the brand to provide commercial opportunities for private organisations and returns on investment. The governmentality of this education programme is connected to a distinct neoliberal governing discourse where the organising committee could engage private and public organisations into a model that revolved around the brand and appeal of London 2012. LOCOG primarily utilised the education sector as access to a market of young people and schools which could produce commercial opportunities for the organising committee. The focus is a drive for profit

rather than governmental technologies that create long term and embedded legacy for the young people and schools.

Rather than being influenced directly by the targets around physical education and school sport in the PSA 22 (HM Treasury, 2007), legacy action plan (DCMS, 2008a) or sport policy (DCMS, 2008b), the LOCOG programme was aligned to the international sports federation approach system of governing. The IOC praised the nature of the Get Set programme:

The programme was complementary to the IOC's own Olympic Values Education Programme. The core of Get Set was created and run by the LOCOG Education Team whilst, from this central hub, a complementary network of "Get Set Plus" strands was created by LOCOG commercial and public partners (IOC, 2013a, p. 38).

The assessment by the IOC highlights the centralised model for delivery as LOCOG. As discussed in Chapter Three, the IOC and the Olympic Charter maintains that the movement is governed autonomously and with a non-political stance. In governing terms, the client of the private company LOCOG was the IOC (Norris et al., 2013; Nichols and Ralston, 2015). Consequently, the expectation is not for the educational programme to be embedded effectively within policy but to fulfil the requirements of an Olympic education programme set out in the IOC Candidature Questionnaire.

6.5 Maximisation of legacy

At this point in the chronology of London 2012, many commentaries jump between the 2008 activities around the legacy action plan and launch of programmes to the general election and change in UK Government in 2010 because there are drastic changes to the structures and objectives connected to legacy and policy. For example, Griffiths and Armour (2013) and Bretherton et al. (2016) cite headline moments as the bid, legacy action plan and PESSYP announcement in 2008, then into the reconfiguration of policy in 2010 by the newly elected Coalition Government. However, my findings and other literature suggest there were other moments where the legacy connected to young people can be evidenced and analysed between 2008 and 2010. For example, Bloyce and Lovett (2012, p. 370) cited the Commission for a Sustainable London 2012 as reported in 2010

before the change in Government that they had a “cause for concern as it is not clear who is actually accountable for delivery.” This quote is about responsibility for the participation legacy promises made by the DCMS in 2008 and, according to the authors, highlights a myriad of documents and partners contributing to an increasingly complex policy landscape. This subsection details the complex policy landscape of legacy alongside the crowded policy space of physical education and school sport (Bloyce and Lovett, 2012; Jung et al., 2016). Before the general election in 2010, there were attempts by Labour Government departments and offices to maximise legacy, and this differs from the documents discussed above as they relate to young people and disabled young people in much more specific political rationalities. Furthermore, this period shows developed intersections between the Labour Government and LOCOG programmes and apparatus.

In 2009 the enactment of the ‘London 2012 Education Legacy Programme’ is published on the DCSF (2009c) website which acknowledges the activities by LOCOG and significantly references the Olympic and Paralympic values and the Get Set programme. The national maximisation of legacy is again against the rationality and enactment of cross-departmental objectives (i.e. joined-up UK Government), it states:

The Department, jointly with the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS), is the Government Departments responsible for ensuring that the educational benefits of the Games are maximised nationally and provide a lasting legacy, particularly to the children and young people of the 2012 Olympic generation (DCSF, 2009c).

The DCSF website listed two documents the *2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Getting involved in the London 2012 Games. Your imagination. Be inspired* for Primary schools (DCSF, 2009a) and for Secondary schools (DCSF, 2009b). Within the documents and aims, there is limited mention of PSA 22 or the legacy action plan. Instead, the language and focus is on *Every Child Matters* (DfES, 2003b) and *Children’s Plan* (DCSF, 2007). The broader educational focus is shared by Jim Knight, who as the Minister of State for Schools and Learning spoke in HoC in 2008, stating:

We are developing detailed plans for a 2012 Education Programme of opportunities linked to the games which will support key policies and priorities,

and in particular the five Every Child Matters outcomes and our commitments set out in the Children's Plan. This programme will be launched in September 2008 and will run through to 2012, with projects coming on stream at different times as part of a strategy to maintain interest in the games over the four years up to 2012.

The involvement of educational institutions in the programme will be voluntary and the design of the programme is on the basis that opportunities for young people and institutions will be offered in a coherent way that supports and can be delivered alongside their existing work.

We anticipate that much of the activity will not be centrally driven but rather be planned and implemented locally within individual schools and communities and we are working with the nine English regions, through the 2012 Nations and Regions Group, to capture and share the large number of grass roots activities which we expect to take place in individual schools (Knight, 2008).

The approach described by Knight, the DCSF documents and website counter the notions that the Labour Government shifted in 2008 to a 'sport for sports sake' rationality as argued by authors, such as Devine (2013) and Bullough (2012). Instead, the DCSF link London 2012 and the educational legacy programme beyond sport to educational benefits that are part of non-sport young people agendas. Furthermore, the Minister outlined a different approach to the PSA 22 (HM Treasury, 2007) document where legacy contributed to the national targets around physical education to local and regional implementation. There are contrasts here between the DCSF and the interpretation of the 'inspire a generation' legacy and its implementation, then the DCMS and HM Treasury drove plans and targets.

Moreover, the DCSF interpretation of legacy here is to use LOCOG activities and frame legacy around the promotion of the "Olympic and Paralympic Values" (DCSF, 2009c). The DCSF (and subsequent DfE) took further ownership of the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim as they commissioned research reports around the education legacy programme, such as, *The London 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games – Children and Young People's Perceptions and Involvement* (Johnson et al., 2008) and *Schools' and colleges' engagement with the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games: PE*

and Sport (Bunt et al., 2011). The investment and publication are not endorsed by LOCOG or other Olympic and Paralympic governing actors. Instead, they are to inform policy, delivery and outcomes of London 2012. Again, to the point above the reports and outcomes contrast with the DCMS and HM Treasury measurements, as the DCSF research focuses on the Get Set programme and Olympic and Paralympic values, not on the PSA 22 or PESSYP targets around physical education and school sport. The differences observed here are evidence that political rationalities around governing in the Labour Government (i.e. modernization agendas) and hosting a sport mega-event (i.e. managerial discourses) during this period do not produce homogenous interpretations of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim. There are distinctively different interests and technologies from LOCOG to the DCMS, to the HM Treasury, to the DCSF.

An implication of the different interpretations of legacy at a national level is the coherency of legacy programmes alongside policy implementation at the meso-level and micro-level of governing. The responses from interviewees considered this period from the perspective of the meso-level and micro-levels of governing. For example, Interviewee C (Olympic/Paralympic) from a non-governmental perspective sympathised with the governing actors involved in the domestic education sector, stating:

I think that there have been so many policy changes over the last ten years that the sector, again, and the end-user and by that, I mean schools and teachers are confused with the number of changes. And not really sure of what to do. And they will jump through the hoops so that they get money for things, that are either properly ring-fenced and supported; or in fact is just thrown out into the market and gobbled up by those that can find a way of getting it. Without necessarily having a strategic competency or a strategic understanding of what they are trying to achieve. I think that schools and teachers do an incredible job at being able to deliver against a very difficult background.

The comment here from the interviewee problematises the amount of policy and strategies regarding the schools and collective bodies who are trying to translate it into their everyday reality. London 2012 formation of legacy coupled with the educational legacy programme and sport policy is not something that is easily understood. However, as seen

with the PSA 22 and policy targets, then the reward model of the Get Set programme this will not prevent micro-level governing actors from accessing or accepting money and resources. The ‘inspire a generation’ legacy affected policy in this sense by further diluting clarity over the responsibility and stability of strategy and funding around young people and sport in schools.

The clarity issue is accentuated by Interviewee H (Education charity/consultancy) referring to the many policy changes below, they commented:

Inspire a generation was a great phrase, but no one owned the responsibility for it, no one really determined ‘well what do you mean by that?’ Other than you are inspired by the London Games, and then you are going to go and do something about it. What resulted was a range of campaigns, such as, Join In and lots of others that promoted young people to do some great stuff. But, then when they went to clubs, they went to their local providers, there wasn’t space for them, or the facilities weren’t right for them... so the thought was right but the infrastructure to support it wasn’t there... one organisation coordinating it, the clarity was never there.

The comment from the interviewee here illustrates the impact of the macro-level ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim having mixed interpretation and implementation through the HM Treasury (2007), DCMS (2008a, 2008b), LOCOG 2008 Get Set launch and the DCSF (2009c) programme. The mixed political rationalities of legacy in the UK Government authorities and the centralised Get Set programme did not converge. The Government and organising committee did form a clear and joined-up system wherein reality schools (and other providers) and young people could capitalise on the vision of the Games at a meso-level and micro-level. I argue that from the evidence the separate formations of governing from LOCOG and then UK Governmental authorities created unstable political rationalities at the macro-level of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim that affected the implementation of governmental technologies at the meso-level and micro-level. This separation highlights that the “net-like” understanding of power (Foucault, 1980, p. 98) can produce ineffectual power relations and alliances that in

theory, should be forming alliances. Still, in reality, the political rationalities and governmental technologies do not align.

Although there was confusion and complexity around the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim, I also found a component during this period where the legacy around young people was maximised. An intersecting discourse and governing target between the LOCOG education programme, DCSF London 2012 legacy education programme, and the physical education and school sport policies was around disabled young people and the visibility of the Paralympics. During this period of the London 2012 life course and Labour Government, this aspect of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim was maximised by multiple governing actors. This inclusion of the Paralympics and disability supports the argument from Brittain and Beacom (2016) that for discrete policy areas legacy aims can be viewed as a facilitator for broader aims around disability rights and ableism.

Extending this into my empirical findings, the use of the Paralympic values and inclusion of further programmes around disability ruptured an ableist discourse around how the London 2012 ‘inspire a generation’ legacy can be interpreted. In the documents discussed in the previous subsections, the PSA 22 described an extension of the PESSCL strategy that was to increase “sporting opportunities for children and young people with disabilities and special educational needs” (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 14). In the DCMS (2008a, pp. 21-22) legacy action plan, there was a reference to the development of disability multi-sports clubs through School Sport Partnerships and disability events in the UK School Games. In the DCMS (2008b, p. 13) document disability is referenced about physical education and sport for young people, again, around the development of multi-sport clubs for young people with disabilities. And, then in the LOCOG Get Set programme the Paralympic values were combined with Olympic values to encourage “young people to explore ... perceptions of disability” (LOCOG 2013b, p. 1). The presence of the Paralympics demonstrates the visibility of the event and young people with disabilities within policy and legacy.

When discussing the Paralympic aspect of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim Interviewee A (Lobby Group) reflected on the education sector specifically, saying that:

I think probably that the education sector was maybe better than others in understanding the power that it [London 2012] could do to address or use it to talk about disability and inclusion in a really positive way. And that was partly around some of the Get Set programme stuff [which] was very much about that, but I think that it was also true in other ways... A general trend [emerged] in the education sector amongst... disability and about inclusion generally.

The general trend alluded to by the interviewee response here references the political rationalities around disability in the Labour Government connected to the broader *Every Child Matters* (DfES, 2003) policy. Interviewee I (Education Consultant) about the Paralympic legacy of the Get Set programme stated it was “massive, completely intended... we knew from our research with teachers, our research with young people, and our research with influencers that actually there was a massively big win in terms of social inclusion, in terms of demystifying impairment.” Arguably the most detail and rationality for education-based legacy around young people can be seen in the planning around the Paralympics and young people with disabilities within a broader inclusion agenda in education and policy. This detail contrasts to existing academic perspectives which view the Labour Government as overlooking the Paralympics and disabled communities in the legacy planning (e.g. Weed and Dowse, 2009).

In 2013 during the HoC Education Committee inquiry Tessa Jowell, Sue Campbell and Tanni Grey-Thompson discussed the London 2012 legacy approach as the committee directly asked:

I wonder whether you think that the Paralympic legacy should be seen in the same package as the Olympic legacy, or as something slightly different in terms of legacy mission and legacy targets? (HoC Vol II, 2013b, Ev 33).

Jowell: The Olympic bid saw equivalence—one vision— between the summer Games and the Paralympic Games and, as Tanni said, that was the first time ever. In every aspect of the legacy, we sought that equivalence, but Tanni and Sue are sort of right in what they are saying, directly and indirectly: you have to assume that, with disabled children, it is always more difficult, and that implementation,

however generous the strategy, is not as effective for disabled children as it is for able-bodied children (HoC Vol II, 2013b, Ev 33).

Campbell: In terms of the legacy inside education, it should be a fully integrated and fully equitable legacy. If we are talking about every child accessing high-quality physical education, that should mean every child. If we are offering every child the opportunity to step into competitive sport, if they so wish, it should be every child getting that opportunity (HoC Vol II, 2013b, Ev33).

Grey-Thompson: Looking at the legacy, Sue is absolutely right that in education most children don't care whether it was the Olympics or Paralympics. What the Paralympics did was to allow disabled people to be sporty and valued for being good at sport, which probably hadn't happened before (HoC Vol II, 2013b, Ev 33).

From a governing perspective, it is the political rationality, and macro-level agreement around 'one vision' is explicit, moreover, through meso-level and micro-governing practices, the offer and delivery for every child should be the same. The Labour Government recognised the visibility and importance of the Paralympics to affecting policy associated with young people, education and sport. In 2010, their final year in political power, the Labour Government released another legacy document focusing on *The London 2012: a legacy for disabled people* (DCMS and OfDI, 2010). The report is based on disability, legacy and the Paralympics and "a sixth legacy aim was added, to develop the opportunities and choices for disabled people" (HoL, 2013a, p. 23). In contrast to the previous legacy and policy documents, it has a more prominent narrative around the legacy for disabled people and harnessing the presence of the Paralympics and IPC. The DCMS and OfDI (2010) document has the subheading of 'setting new standards, changing perceptions' and was produced by the DCMS and the Office for Disability Issues. There is a limited amount of academic debate or discussion about this legacy document because it was released in the final months of the Labour Government, therefore, not a headline legacy source. The policy studies I have cited and engaged with so far consistently focus on the headline Labour Government document as the DCMS (2008a) legacy action plan.

The vision in 2010 was co-produced by the DCMS and the Office for Disability Issues (OfDI) showing that the Paralympics were a vehicle for broader change beyond sport. The initial vision is to use London 2012 to “rapidly accelerate progress towards the [Labour] Government’s goal of delivering disability equality in this country by 2025” (DCMS and OfDI, 2010, p. 1) and this will be achieved by:

Helping to bring about lasting change in society’s behaviour towards disabled people to achieve greater social justice.

Boosting participation of disabled people in sport and physical activity.

Improving facilities and services that businesses offer to disabled people (DCMS and OfDI, 2010, p. 1).

Similarly, to the language and governance structure of the legacy action plan and Get Set programme, this document states that the “main organisations involved with delivering the Olympic Games and the Paralympic Games are LOCOG and the ODA” and other key partners are listed as Mayor of London, BOA and BPA (DCMS and OfDI, 2010, p. 11). In contrast to the previous chapter and the bid period, the BPA is listed as a key partner. The inclusion of the BPA shows a shift in governing formation as during the bidding process and formation of LOCOG the BPA was less visible as a national and formal partner.

Beyond the overall vision and plans the DCMS and OfDI (2010) document goes into detail of three overall achievements. The broad aims do not include the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy explicitly. Regarding young people and education, the document connects to the aim “influencing attitudes and perceptions” by “promoting the Paralympic Games and its values of determination, courage, inspiration and equality in schools through the London 2012 ‘Get Set’ programme” (DCMS and OfDI, 2010, p. 4, p. 20). Contrary to the previous DCMS (2008a), this document directly interconnects with the Get Set programme and using the macro-level Paralympic values to influence micro-level behaviour. The governing technology to influence attitudes and perceptions is formed through “providing new materials to enable schools to better engage with children and young people, help change attitudes and perceptions, and help the shift away from the medical towards the social model of disability” (DCMS and OfDI, 2010, p. 20). The

nuance in the language in this statement demonstrates the expansive view of disability discussed by Rhodes et al. (2008) and based on non-sport and non-Paralympic ableist discourse.

The DCMS and OfDI (2010) document, therefore, intersects with the developments and changes to the international and UK disability rights landscape. The Labour Government engaged significantly with policy around disability, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Labour driven *Every Child Matters* policy agenda (DfES, 2003). For example, in 2007 the Labour Government published *Aiming High for Disabled Children* and the *Children's Plan* both which stressed the promotion of disability equality across public sector provision, including education (Murray and Osborne, 2009). Broader political rationalities from national and international non-sport Conventions and policies add layers of the governmental ambitions. For example, the detail of the DCMS and OfDI (2010) legacy document maximises the Get Set programme, London 2012 Paralympics, and directly influences meso-level and micro-level governing in school settings.

To achieve the governmental ambitions, the DCMS and OfDI legacy document engages with education-based bodies. This approach cultivates a broader legacy around young people and “other support for schools and local authorities” and combatting “a key issue for disabled children and young people was their invisibility in the curriculum” (DCMS and OfDI, 2010, p.20). The plan is to consult with the Qualifications and Curriculum Development Agency as to “how to help them understand the issues and challenges faced by disabled people through the issues and challenges faced by disabled people through a social, rather than medical, model of disability. We will work closely with LOCOG to link this initiative with the ‘Get Set’ programme” (DCMS and OfDI, 2010, p. 20). Neither the Qualifications and Curriculum Development Agency or LOCOG have public records of performing the consultation or producing resources around models of disability. Consequently, although, the DCMS and OfDI (2010) legacy document represents an attempt to bring together the legacy rationalities with longer-term policy and implementation measures at the meso-level of governing there are distinct limitations to the ability to achieve such. For example, the timing of the document is important as it was published in March 2010 and the Labour party lost formal political power through a

general election in May 2010, which was followed by a hung parliament and subsequent agreement and formation of a Coalition Government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.

6.6 Concluding chapter thoughts

The governing around legacy and policy until 2010 was centralised and top-down from both the Labour Government actors and the LOCOG actors. The multiple policies and strategies that have been associated with the Labour modernization agenda were perpetrated by the hub and spoke formation of the London 2012 Get Set educational programme. The findings and discussion presented in this chapter have shown how the various authorities created multiple macro-level-and meso-level governing technologies, for example, the concurrent use of physical education hours and then the promotion of values-based London 2012 resources. The political rationalities for the governing interconnect with the governing actors' agendas of brand protection and broader policy around young people and society. At this point in planning the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim affected discourses around policy associated with young people and sport by confusing how governing functioned coherently between legacy and policy, and who had responsibility for them.

Where other governing actors, such as LOCOG, BOA, BPA, YST could have pushed for clarity, the organisations were complicit in functioning within or outside this governing system. As discussed in Chapter Three is the BOA and BPA taking a non-political stance within domestic issues as their international governing federations proactively seek to maintain autonomy from political or domestic powers. This links back MacAloon (2008) and Lenskyj (2012) standpoints that there is an unquestioned good around Olympic affairs and the products produced through Olympic education programmes. The link is that the process of 'winning' the rights to host an Olympic and Paralympic Games encourages a focus on meeting targets, not questioning the political rationalities of governing technologies. Moreover, this translates into the political rationality of LOCOG who launched the Get Set programme in line with IOC guidelines and requirements, rather than or in compromise with the Labour Government or other governing actors.

The later discussion in this chapter considered the emergence and visibility of the Paralympics. The IPC and LOCOG are prominent actors in the visibility of disability as the bidding documentation and Get Set programme explicitly included the Paralympic aspect of the Games. The inclusion of Paralympic values in the Get Set programme intersects with growing interest by the Labour Government in creating Paralympic legacy and inclusive policy for young people. An area that is developed is around young people and sport but not within the existing physical education and school sport policy but as a separate legacy and policy governing technology. The emergence of the Paralympics, therefore, is not systematic or strategic. However, there are examples from the documentary, dialogue and interview data where the distinct discourse of ableism is ruptured and intersects both legacy and policy governing. Yet, as noted, the general election in 2010 changes to macro-political rationality driving the UK Government and interpretations of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim. I will turn to this in the next chapter.

Chapter 7 “...to talk about 2012 is missing the point...”

...and this got me thinking. I am really bored reading the negative media on this. I do believe 2012 has left a huge legacy for sport in this country, but to talk about 2012 is missing the point... I see each sport as a huge ecosystem that constantly needs re-balancing as people come in and out, move around, as funding, resources and media profile shift, and external factors intrude (Phelps, 2015, pp. 58-59).

7.1 Background: 2010-2012

The purpose of this chapter is to consider between the planning and up to the delivery of London 2012 (2010-2012). Annamarie Phelps (then Chairman of British Rowing) made the above statement in the context of the launch of the Conservative Government DCMS (2015) *Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an active nation* in a policy forum. This quote from Phelps succinctly describes the limitation of focusing purely on the year 2012 as the pinnacle of policy and the legacy process. In Chapter Six, I argued that legacy and policy around young people up to 2010 had perpetuated confusion around rationalities, objectives and strategies to systems of governing. Furthermore, with a focus on the product, brand and meeting targets the technologies of LOCOG educational programmes and Labour Government (DCMS, 2008a, 2008b) policy were not significantly questioned or resisted. Moving into 2010 and a change in UK Government the ‘huge ecosystem’ that Phelps’ describes is re-balanced by several changes and revisions to broader policy and specific legacy connected to the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim. In this chapter, I will use this as the base of my argument, and how the Coalition Government legacy and policy formation rebalanced the sporting ecosystem with changes at the macro-level and meso-level of governing. The general election influences the changes in 2010, continued

response to the 2008 financial crisis, and a change in guardianship over policies associated with young people and sport.

The 2010 general election ushered in a new UK Government, a Coalition (2010-15) was formed between the Conservative and Liberal Democrats because the general election yielded a hung parliament. The political context at the time had unprecedented factors in the convergence of hosting a sport mega-event, recovering from an economic recession, and governing through a Coalition Government. Although the UK has experienced these phenomena at varying moments in its history, the three together posed a unique set of circumstances. In varying degrees of detail, academic literature has accounted for this context in consideration of London 2012 legacy. For example, Bretherton et al. (2016, p. 619) argued the Coalition Government in 2011 used negative figures around sports participation targets to abandon previous Labour Government approaches which represents “a crucial event in the development of legacy of London 2012.” It is productive, therefore, to consider the changes to legacy and policy between the outgoing Labour Government and the incoming Coalition Government.

Girginov and Hills (2008), Phillpots (2013), and Lovett and Bloyce (2017) all comment that the 2008 economic global crisis had financial and political repercussions for the formation of legacy and policy. Griffiths and Armour (2013, p. 216) described the changes in UK Government leadership and subsequently policy represented a “different ‘take’ on Olympic legacy from that envisaged at the time of the bid; essentially the focus is much more on (traditional) competitive sport and rather less on the wider Olympic (Olympism) aims.” My examination in this chapter is useful for understanding how much the ‘different take’ on London 2012 legacy concerning political rationalities influenced governing technologies connected to young people, the Get Set programme, and the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim.

7.2 Structural reform plans

The global economic recession in 2008 gave leverage and urgency to the Coalition Government’s national financial budget announcements and documentation in the first six months of their term. A five-year fiscal mandate was proposed, which in terms of

public sector funding was a review and intended saving of over £80 billion (HM Treasury, 2010). The Comprehensive Spending Review in October 2010 outlined:

The Spending Review is underpinned by a radical programme of public service reform, changing the way services are delivered by redistributing power away from central government and enable sustainable, long term improvements in services. This programme is built on the Coalition principles of increasing freedom and sharing responsibility... (HM Treasury, 2010, p. 8).

On the one hand, this extract is promoting bottom-up, and citizen-led governing with freedom and shared responsibility to form and regulate their services. Yet, it is coupled with a significant reform of Coalition Government departments and functioning in both infrastructure and funding terms. The language around ‘increasing freedom’ and ‘sharing responsibility’ is a critique of the previous governing practices where there was ‘too much government’ and the Prime Minister, David Cameron, promoted the formation of a ‘Big Society’ in the UK (Williams et al., 2014; Mackintosh, 2014; Zehndorfer and Mackintosh, 2014; Mackintosh and Liddle, 2015). Although the Coalition Government moved away from the modernization political rationality of the Labour Government, the ‘Big Society’ approach does not necessarily lead to a significant shift away from neoliberal discourse and rationalities. Argued by Dean (2010, p. 258), neoliberal approaches to governing include developing ways to create freedom and devolving authority onto local bodies and “risk is thereby devolved onto individuals, communities and workplaces, and managed by mechanisms that endeavour to provide transparency and accountability.” The risk in the context of London 2012 and legacy connected to young people would have been the Coalition Government and contributing authorities not meeting the objectives and targets set in the earlier planning stages for the Games, especially the PSA 22 (HM Treasury, 2007) and legacy action plan (DCMS, 2008a).

The neoliberal discourse associated with the Coalition Government and their approach to the economic crisis and recession is austerity (Williams et al., 2014; Ball, 2017; Findlay-King et al., 2018). The impact on sport and education is discussed under a discourse of austerity, for example, national disability sport organisations resources (Brown and Pappous, 2018b), and the role of professional football clubs in the delivery of English

primary physical education (Parnell et al., 2017). Williams et al. (2014) note the neoliberal language in the Coalition Government advocates reforms towards localism as ‘fairness’ and ‘efficiency’ which underpin the logic to reduce the state’s public service supply. Painter (2012) describes a notable shift in the dismantling of the previous Labour Government public service agreement regime in the next twelve months of the Coalition Government. Concerning the London 2012 legacy, this is important because the PSA 22 (HM Treasury, 2007) had outlined national measures and agreements to what the Labour Government would deliver (as discussed in Chapter Five).

The reforms through austerity impact all Coalition Government departments through the introduction of structural reform plans and departmental business plans before the October Spending Review. The political rationality is associated with the discourse of neoliberalism and the agenda of localism which is “a radical wave of reforms to welfare, local governance, and public services... attuned co-opted and attuned to the objectives and values of neoliberal conservatism” (Williams et al., p.2798). The governing technologies connected to this reform is illustrated by the review of the DCMS in July 2010 as the build-up to the October 2010 Spending Review, the document declared that:

Structural Reform Plans are the key tool of the Coalition Government for making departments accountable for the implementation of the reforms set out in the Coalition Agreement. They replace the old, top-down systems of targets and central micromanagement.

The reforms set out in each department’s SRP [structural reform plans] are designed to turn government on its head, taking power away from Whitehall and putting it into the hands of people and communities. Once these reforms are in place, people themselves will have the power to improve our country and our public services, through the mechanisms of local democratic accountability, competition, choice, and social action (DCMS, 2010a, p. 2).

The language in this statement aligns directly to moving away from a modernization agenda with ‘old, top-down systems of targets and central micromanagement’ to a localism agenda where political rationalities and governing technologies have ‘local democratic accountability, competition, choice and social action.’ Under the guise of

austerity and continued influence of neoliberal discourses, there are economic, political and social reforms show how the Coalition Government positions its macro-level governmental ambitions.

The Structural Reform Plans also involved the dismantling of the Labour Government PSA system. One official from the civil service reflected that the removal of the PSA systems created “the position that government cannot commit to outcomes but can commit to inputs” (quoted in Panchamia and Thomas, 2014, p. 8). The reflection here is contextualising the different understandings the Labour and Coalition Government’s had. In particular, the role of the policymaker and the Coalition issue with the PSA system during the Labour Government as it committed the UK Government to outcomes and delivery at the meso-level and micro-level of governing. Commenting further, another member of the civil service said that historically the PSA system would be unthinkable, they remarked:

Permanent secretaries [during the Labour Government] began to accept that delivery was a major part of their day job – whether it was reducing crime in the Home Office or raising educational standards in the Department for Education. This would have been unthinkable in the 1970s and 1980s, when most officials thought they were supposed to focus only on policy formulation and legislation (quoted in Panchamia and Thomas, 2014, p. 12).

Considering the PSA 22 (HM Treasury, 2007) and the legacy action plan (DCMS, 2008a), there was a clear Labour Government centralisation and leadership around contributing to the achieving legacy outcomes and realising the promises made during the bid and formation of London 2012. However, unlike the physical delivery of the Games, the (DCMS, 2008a) legacy action plan and PSA 22 (HM Treasury, 2008) mechanisms were not guaranteed in the London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act 2006 or the Host City Contract (IOC, 2005b). Consequently, the Coalition Government were committed to delivering the Games. Still, they could rethink the role of policy, the role of legacy and the functioning of the UK Government about the more extensive legacies.

The Coalition Government did reconsider the role of legacy and London 2012 (Keech, 2012; Griffiths and Armour, 2013; Bretherton et al., 2016). For example, the Secretary of

State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Media, Jeremy Hunt, made the following statement to the HoC in December 2010:

In the coalition agreement we committed ourselves to producing a safe and secure games that leave a lasting legacy. Our task is not only to ensure that the games are a success as iconic sporting occasions but also that we make the most of the games for the nation.

This is a statement on behalf of the UK Government. However the games' legacy is being driven across the UK and beyond by a rich variety of organisations, communities and individuals, including: the London Organising Committee for the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG) and the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA); the British Olympic Association (BOA) and British Paralympic Association (BPA); Sport England and UK Sport; the Mayor of London, the Olympic Park Legacy Company and the host boroughs (Barking and Dagenham, Greenwich, Hackney, Newham, Tower Hamlets, Waltham Forest); the Nations and Regions Group established by Government and LOCOG to achieve maximum benefits from the games and their legacy across the UK; devolved Administrations in the nations and a large number of other local authorities across the UK; the games' sponsors and other businesses; and many third sector organisations operating at national and local levels (Hunt, 2010).

The statement is vague to what the 'lasting legacy' will be, moreover, what role the Coalition Government has in the legacy because it only lists arm's length public bodies, devolved administrations, and then varying private and public organisations.

The separation between the Coalition Government and LOCOG during the transition period between the Labour and Coalition Government worked to the advantage of LOCOG as the official programmes around London 2012 were not under review or affected by the PSA and structural reform plans. In contrast to the DCMS and other Government departments' structural reforms or spending reviews, there was no substantive review or a radically new approach to the delivery of London 2012 by LOCOG. This contrast demonstrates political power cultivated by international sporting federations in domestic political systems because the organising committee and

governmental technologies around the Host City Contract can be sustained within considerable changes to domestic political and economic circumstances. Such a position is not problematised by LOCOG officials, in contrast in direct relation to the Get Set programme, Jackie Brock Doyle, Director of Communications and Public Affairs at the LOCOG commented:

Thanks to the structure put in place and for the strong support of both the previous Labour Government and the incoming Coalition Government, our work was not hindered by the change in administration in 2010, and in a way that will continue to inspire change and enhance lives for years to come (HoC Vol III, 2013c, Ev w11).

The reality of LOCOG is that the benefits of an organising committee being politically and financially protected from local or national political change is seen in the meso-level delivery of the Get Set educational programme. The meso-level of governing around outputs and plans supports the arguments made by Raco (2012) and Nichols and Ralston (2015) that an organising committee actively seeks to regulate its freedom between the public and private partnerships. The partnerships are to the benefit of LOCOG because they protect the ability to achieve event management and preserve corporate regulations. This protection adds an extra layer of governing to the formation of the Get Set programme. The ‘inspire a generation’ legacy was protected and continuous in the governing of LOCOG and its governmental technologies, whereas concurrently, there was significant Coalition Government vulnerability and reform to rationalities and mechanisms.

As noted above, the delivery of the Games and the Host City Contract does not explicitly include social legacies (i.e. the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim) but focuses more on the protection of the Olympic brand, tangible programmes and event delivery (i.e. the Get Set programme). The governing around legacy, therefore, should not be conflated with the product and event delivery of the Games. In the current debate around legacy and creating more opportunities for sustainable legacy processes scholars, such as Girginov (2011) Leopkey and Parent (2017) advocate for legacy being seen as a governance issue between the state, society and global actors. However, here LOCOG, maintained a non-

political stance and did not challenge or comment on the changes to the direction legacy by the Coalition Government, or review their practices considering changes in economic and political circumstances. Legacy as governance, consequently, applies to the objectives and outcomes that are included in the Host City Contract, rather than the bid documentation vision or legacy aims constructed by domestic authorities. The use in separating the governing bodies is to understand that the power relations created by policy and legacy around young people are interpreted and rationalised in different realities and knowledge formations based on being a public, private, or non-profit governing actor.

7.3 Vulnerability of policy and legacy

Reflecting on the systems that were constructed around legacy and young people across the Labour and Coalition Government, Lord Addington during an evidence session with Dame Tessa Jowell (former Olympic Minister) and Ken Livingstone (former Mayor of London) in the House of Lords stated:

Just to move on here, it is clear that sport enjoyed its position of dominance because it had the backing of Government as a whole. It is also clear that the Department for Education will occasionally have other priorities, especially if something is somebody's particular baby at the time. You are always vulnerable (HoL, 2013b, p. 374).

The moment that illustrates the vulnerability of the infrastructure around Labour's approach to young people and sport is the removal and revisions to the 'inspire a generation legacy formation (DCMS, 2008a), the PESSYP strategy (DCMS, 2008b), the Education Legacy Programme (DCSF, 2009c), and disabled young people and legacy (DCMS and OfDI, 2010) by the newly rebranded Department for Education (DfE). The removal and revisions happened within four months of the Coalition Government coming into political power. The rationale for the cancellation of the infrastructure and funding was based on the DfE's priority to "no longer fund a range of arm's length bodies that are not properly accountable and cost a lot of money. We are closing some down and will reform the rest to make them more accountable and efficient" (DfE, 2010a, p. 4). For example, the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority tasked by the Labour Government in consulting and reviewing the visibility of disabled young people in the curriculum (as

discussed in Chapter Six) was dropped. The pace and delivery of these changes resulted in the public and political debate around physical education and school sport.

In both policy and legacy-based scholarship, this is highlighted as a headline change in rationality and governing around young people, sport and legacy. For example, MacKintosh and Liddle (2015), Bullough (2012), Wagg (2015), Bretherton et al. (2016), Lovett and Bloyce (2017) highlighted in their findings that the constraints post the changes challenged the meso-level and micro-level of delivery. The challenges were heightened as it was such a divergence in policy and provision by the Coalition Government from the previous Labour Government. During the Labour Government, there had been the promotion of arm's length bodies around young people and PESSYP, notably, the YST. Michael Gove as Secretary of State for Education announced through a public letter to the YST on the 20 October 2010:

The best way to create a lasting Olympic legacy in schools is to give them the freedom and incentives to organise it themselves, for themselves, rather than imposing a centralised government blueprint.

I can confirm therefore that the Department will not continue to provide ring-fenced funding for school sport partnerships. I am also announcing that the Department is lifting, immediately, the many requirements of the previous Government's PE and Sport Strategy, so giving schools the clarity and freedom to concentrate on competitive school sport (DfE, 2010b, pp. 1-2).

The drastic redirection of strategy and funding caused a public debate about the issues around physical education and school sport policy. Lindsey (2020) analysed the broadsheet media around physical education and school sport policy between 2004 and 2017, finding that there was a dramatic spike in 2010 and 2012 in media coverage on the policy issue. The month of the Olympics in 2012 is most notable as broadsheet newspapers published “122 articles covering” physical education and school sport linking the debate directly to promises regarding the Games’ legacy for young people (Lindsey, 2020, p. 36). Beyond this media debate the findings from my interviews support that governing actors associate the change in Government from Labour to the Coalition and discontinuation of the PESSYP strategy to affect the legacy promise extensively and aim

to ‘inspire a generation.’ For example, Interviewee A (Lobby group) names the politician directly and focuses on the Secretary of State for Education, not the HM Treasury, DCMS or other governing authorities:

When Michael Gove took the money away from them [schools] that is still seen as a seminal negative moment around the impact, because just as we were at a time that we were building up to 2012 and talking about inspiring a generation we seemed to be taking away a lot of the money around it.

The relevance of leadership during this period of policy change has been discussed by Zehndorfer and Mackintosh (2014). They argue the role of individuals across UK Governments need to be recognised as an influencing factor for physical education and school sport policy negative moment. Many other governing actors, such as YST, media, national governing bodies of sport had advocated for and supported the previous PESSYP strategy (Zehndorfer and Mackintosh, 2014; HoC, 2013a). In my interviews, this point is raised as Interviewee G (Education Charity) comments that the change is not surprising. Still, taking the evidence of progress and success in the previous policy there is little rationality other than school sport and physical education policy being ‘political football’ between changing UK Governments, they commented that:

The reversal of policy at the changing Government is not surprising but in the context and proximity of an Olympics and Paralympics on the horizon, a pretty strong evidence base on delivering on both increasing numbers participation, but also, sports colleges were fastest improving colleges in our education system... So, it felt and still does feel very frustrating... So, that term ‘political football’ from the 2013 inquiry does resonate as it [physical education and school sport policy] has either been a pet project or pet hate for Government leaders or people in responsibility (Interviewee G Education charity).

What is notable in my empirical data is the changes in 2010 were reduced to the announcement by Gove and the funding cuts to the PESSYP strategy. Very few of the interviewees recognised the removal of other Labour Government legacy and policy infrastructure, moreover the protection of LOCOG. Instead, the responses from interviewees focus on the specific cuts to funding, the public announcement by Gove, and

its impact on the Coalition Government. For example, Interviewee B (Lobby group) discusses:

... and it [school sport partnerships] was gone within the stroke of a pen. I think what was fortunate was the timing of the Games because it was so politically embarrassing to be seen to be slashing school sports pending at the same time as spending nine billion-plus of public money on hosting an international event. That probably then led to things like Primary PE Premium and some of the investment back into schools.

The interviewees' reflections highlight an assumption that the physical education and school sport policy and funding were the central programme for the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim. Given the level of media coverage and the public nature of Gove's announcement, this is not surprising. However, given the evidence I have presented in Chapter Five and Six, it shows that this 'seminal negative' moment dominates governing actors' perspectives when reflecting on the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim. The further nuance to the DCMS (2008a), DCMS (2008b), DCSF (2009c), DCMS and OfDI (2010) are conflated into this one funding announcement. A consequence of that was the inability of governing actors to separate LOCOG and Labour Government activities, moreover, recognise the different Labour department approaches to the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim.

The Coalition Government released a revised London 2012 legacy document to replace the Labour Government legacy action plan (DCMS, 2008a). It was called *Plans for the Legacy from the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games* (DCMS, 2010b). It is a 16-page document that refocuses plans onto four areas which are different in language and structure to the previous Labour Government five promises (six including the additional Paralympic promise) Table 7.3 overleaf compares the two sets of areas and promises.

Table 7.3 Comparing Labour and Coalition Government legacy documents

Labour (DCMS, 2008a)	Coalition (DCMS, 2010b)
Promise 1 – Making the UK a world-leading sporting nation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Harnessing the United Kingdom’s passion for sport to increase grass roots participation, particularly by young people – and to encourage the whole population to be more physically active
Promise 2 – Transforming the heart of East London	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exploiting to the full the opportunities for economic growth offered by hosting the Games
Promise 3 – Inspiring a new generation of young people	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promoting community engagement and achieving participation across all groups in society through the Games; and
Promise 4 – Making the Olympic park a blueprint for sustainable living	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensuring that the Olympic Park can be developed after the Games as one of the principal drivers of regeneration in East London.
Promise 5 – Demonstrating the UK is a creative, inclusive and welcoming place to live in, visit and for business	

The first notable change is the removal of the phrase to ‘inspire a generation’ in the headline focus areas. It is replaced by “harnessing the United Kingdom’s passion for sport to increase grassroots participation, particularly by young people – and to encourage the whole population to be more physically active” (DCMS, 2010b, p. 1). The change in language is semantic but also symbolic to the Coalition Government not delivering legacy using the same language, scale or legacy action plan developed by the previous Labour Government (Keech, 2012).

In discussion with interviewees, the response was based more so on the Games delivery, rather than the post-Games legacy plans. Interviewee E (Government) suggested that there was bi-partisan support throughout the process and planning of London 2012:

I have developed a slightly personal catchphrase... survival was quite a good measure of success in the sense that during high profile projects it is not uncommon to have quite a churn of people at leadership or senior level, but actually there wasn't and with 2012 the main players remained the same all of the way through... and bi-partisan means general support for what was trying to be achieved. – Hugh Robertson to Tessa Jowell – shadow then Olympic Secretary, and Tessa Jowell staying on the Olympic Board.

Interviewee E (Government) measures bi-partisan support here as Games delivery leadership. In contrast, the differences in the revised Coalition legacy document (Table 7.3 above) suggest otherwise when considering the legacy connected to young people. Although there was bipartisan support for the efforts of LOCOG and other UK Government bodies delivery the London 2012, there was not bi-partisan agreement on longer-term legacy promises and delivery. Beyond the headline focus areas, the initial detail around the revised young people legacy plans focus on physical education and school sport policy. The first page of the document states “the Government is committed to delivering a sporting legacy for young people and bringing back a culture of competitive sports in schools.” (DCMS, 2010b, p. 2). The exercise of political power here is to use legacy to impact on the governmental ambitions directly and macro-level political rationality, i.e. shift the discourse and focus onto competitive sports. The role of the Olympic and Paralympic values is not directly referenced, nor is the Get Set programme.

In terms of the Get Set programme, as noted, the activities by LOCOG are not directly impacted on by the change in Coalition Government or revised legacy plans (DCMS, 2010b). As indicated above LOCOG the public comment from Jackie Brock Doyle took the position that they were pleased with the support from the Labour and Coalition Government. This comment can be related to the meso-level delivery of the Get Set programme. However, there is a notable shift in the macro-level visibility and prominence

of LOCOG activities in the formation of legacy and young people by the Coalition Government. For example, the presence of the Get Set programme within the DCMS (2010b, pp. 9-10) legacy document is mentioned only once as a way of engaging “children at home” in “promoting inclusive and disability equality.” Instead of the Get Set programme being as a central element of the Labour legacy promise to ‘inspire a generation’ of young people (DCMS, 2008a; DCSF, 2009c), the Coalition legacy document states:

School sport is in a good position in this country – and we give thanks to the thousands of people in schools, and in communities, who make sport happen every day. However, levels of competitive sport are not as high as they should be (DCMS 2010b, p. 2).

Arguably here there is a distinctly reduced focus on the values of the Olympics and Paralympics or working closely with LOCOG around the educational programme as the legacy commitment is predominantly about competitive sport. The reference and presence of the Olympic and Paralympic values shifted to grassroots sport in the revised Coalition Government legacy plans:

We will inspire people to make sport happen at the local level, embedding the Olympic and Paralympic values in grassroots sport, by Sport England funding the recruitment, training and deployment of 40,000 sports leaders as the next generation of sports volunteers to organise and lead grassroots sporting activities (DCMS, 2010b, p. 4).

Instead of the Olympics and Paralympic values and the Get Set programme being prominent in the delivery of the Coalition legacy through the education sector and school sport, the statement above repositions it about community sport and Sport England as a delivery partner. The development of school-based legacy and engagement with schools is described through, the “new, inclusive School Games” that is “being led by the Youth Sport Trust... we are determined that the School Games builds on existing strengths of the school sport system, renews our focus on competitive sport for all, and delivers a truly inspirational sport legacy for young people” (DCMS, 2010b, p. 3). Here there is continuity and contradiction in the meso-level of governing as the arm’s length body of

YST is still featured in the delivery of national legacy programmes. There is, however, a change in the level of funding and responsibility of the YST through the discontinuation of the PESSYP strategy. This level of change highlights that although there is a different ‘take’ on legacy (Keech, 2012; Griffiths and Armour, 2013; Phillpots, 2013; Bretherton et al., 2016) of the previous Labour Government’s political rationality and governing technologies, it is not absolute or complete abandonment. More needs to be done to understand the continuity of political rationalities and governing technologies to add more nuance to the debate. This need for nuance developed in my empirical findings through further actions by the Coalition Government around disability, youth and School Games policy and programmes.

7.4 Repositioning youth sport and legacy

The years 2010 and 2011 comprised of a myriad of statements, debates and documents around the interpretation and planning of legacy and policy around young people and London 2012. As discussed above a focus has been on the discontinuation of the PESSYP Labour Government strategy. However, other areas were also dismantled and revised. Concerning Paralympic legacy documents, many authors, such as Brittain (2016b) and Brown and Pappous (2018a) have been critical of the timing of papers produced by the Labour and Coalition Governments. I evidenced this in Chapter Six, when the Labour Government formed the standalone legacy document directly related to disabled people two years after the initial legacy action plan (DCMS and OfDI, 2010). What is significant here is that the Coalition Government continued to have a separate Paralympic legacy document as they published a revised paper in 2011 (DCMS and OfDI, 2011). This shows continuity between the Labour and Coalition Government as rather than presenting Paralympic legacy as integrated into their broader revised legacy plan (DCMS, 2010b) the Paralympic legacy was produced as a standalone document. The continuity and focus from the respective UK Governments were noted in my interviews as several respondents wanted to highlight the visibility of the Paralympics. For example:

I would see if any legacy has come out of 2012... it is the breakdown of perceptions of people with disabilities and that is not just from a sporting

experience... treating people with disabilities as normal people, as one to a better phrase (Interviewee H, Education Charity/Consultancy).

... and I know you haven't asked me this question yet, but without a doubt the inclusion of young disabled people in physical education and school sport has been one of the most massive legacies, without a shadow of a doubt (Interviewee G, Education Charity).

Here the framework of governmentality is useful as the analysis is about governing technologies as well as changes in political rationalities. Although there were similar political rationalities in constructing bespoke Paralympic legacy documents between the Labour and Coalition Governments, there were distinct shifts to how policy and legacy were enacted through governing technologies. For example, the role of LOCOG is repositioned by the Coalition Government as they reference the Get Set programme as a “flagship community legacy project” and suggests “LOCOG, Sainsbury’s and Channel 4 are working together to inspire every school in the country to join in” (DCMS and OfDI, 2011, p.36). The inclusion of the private organisation, Sainsbury’s, and the public-service television network, Channel 4, is a new formation of governing that aligns LOCOG away from education and Government departments and towards other arm’s length or sponsoring entities in relation to community projects.

The Coalition Government Paralympic legacy document focuses more on the activities being done to achieve a participation legacy for disabled people. There is a distinct shift from the Labour Government approach. As Labour, explicitly outlined they wanted to work closely with LOCOG around Get Set and the arm’s length department the Qualifications and Curriculum Development Agency to explore the medical and social models of disability to change micro-level attitudes and apparatus, such as the curriculum (DCMS and OfDI, 2010). In contrast, the Coalition Government approach is framed in terms of participation and delivering sporting opportunities, with limited reference to models of disability or the need for consultation. For example, the Coalition Paralympic legacy document states:

there will be a significant disability sports element to help remove barriers to sport and physical activity for disabled people, with the aim of reversing the trend of

reduced participation among disabled adults, widening sports opportunities for disabled children, young people and adults and increasing the supply of accessible facilities (DCMS and OfDI, 2011, p. 23).

The political rationality here is a shift from the Rhodes et al. (2008) and Labour Government approach to an extensive and more nuanced understanding of disability in schools and young people at meso-level and micro-level. In focusing on participation and facilities, the Coalition Government have reverted to a medical model understanding of disability and how sport contributing to disability is directly to the young person, not changing other perceptions and practices in the curriculum. The academic argument by scholars, such as Weed and Dowse (2009), focus on the ‘missed opportunity’ of Paralympic legacy with the timing and infrastructure of governing technologies. Whereas, here using an ableism discourse and the political rationalities to analyse the policy demonstrates a much more nuanced ‘missed opportunity’ for the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim and Get Set programme. As the revisions by the Coalition Government remove and hinder the potential effects on macro-level, meso-level, and micro-level understandings of disabled young people in school and policy settings that were set out in the Labour Government document (DCMS and OfDI, 2011).

The quoted ‘widening sports opportunities for disabled children’ in the Coalition Government document extract above is delivered through the “School Games” and the “Change4Life Sports Clubs” with the document outlining the meso-level funding and structure for the programmes (DCMS and OfDI, 2011, p.20-21). The School Games is a compelling example of the continuity in governing technologies during the transition between the Labour and Coalition Government. In the 2011 Coalition Government Paralympic legacy document, it is stated that “to inspire children across the country to choose sport, and to incentivise schools to set their ambitions high, we are creating a new, inclusive School Games” (DCMS and OfDI, 2011, p. 20). The use of the term ‘new’ is misleading as the UK School Games were created in 2006 by the Labour Government, as discussed in Chapter Five, the Minister for Sport at the time referenced the inclusion of disabled activities (Caborn, 2006). Interviewee G (Education Charity) reflected on this point through an anecdote involving Jeremy Hunt as Culture Secretary in the Coalition Government, recalling:

Between 2010 and 2012 after the cuts to the School Sport Partnerships and that PESSCL strategy and before the PE and School Sport Primary Premium, the only thing that survived were the School Games. And Jeremy Hunt managed to do a very clever thing and square the circle between his Government looking at the old PESSCL strategy and finding the weak point... [Hunt] saw the Level 4 UK school Games that had been running since Richard Caborn had kicked it off in 2006, saw that and said can't we create a pyramid and pathway for children from inter-house all the way up ... But can we also make it an entitlement and a right to every child, not an exclusive opportunity for the most talented and the most able. And he [Hunt] really bought into that in particular around disability.

In concluding reflections Interviewee G (Education Charity) attributed the inclusive approach to the School Games to a convergence of influences including the 'support' of Hunt, the 'tidal wave' climate around the Paralympics,' and a 'top-down directive', stating:

I think that if Jeremy Hunt had not said this School Games thing, which he was going to put his weight behind at DCMS and then continued to support it at the Department of Health. If he had not stuck his head above the parapet and said the number one thing is that this must be inclusive. I do not think that we would have seen the transformation in schools. So him saying that and as I said, that kind of top-down directive, that if you want to get your funding for a School Games Organiser and the programme it has to be inclusive. Combined with the tidal wave of popularity for the Channel 4 programming and everybody else that did great stuff. The two kind of came together as like the planets were aligning. So if Jeremy Hunt had introduced the School Games at any other time in our history without an Olympics and Paralympic Games it would not have achieved that. Equally, if he hadn't said this competition must include disabled children, I don't think it would have done. It would have happened in a few places where there were really good SENCOs [Special Educational Needs Coordinator] or special schools that were championing it, and it would have been a patchwork quilt really.

The understanding and evidence presented by Interviewee G (Education Charity) shows that between 2010 and 2012, and the perceived turmoil of physical education and school sport policy there was a governing technology in the School Games that capitalised on London 2012 and previous Labour Government programmes. Often the conversation is about Michael Gove and DfE cutting funding to the PESSYP strategy. Where here, the Interviewee G (Education Charity) picks up the nuance of the role Jeremy Hunt and DCMS they played in driving an inclusive agenda in a top-down form that enacted the ‘transformational’ direction and delivery.

The examples of the Paralympic legacy documents and the School Games interconnects to the discussion point around levels of governing and the cross-governmental interpretations of legacy and policy around London 2012. As distinguished by Interviewee E (Government) in the extract below, the Schools Games was a ‘big opportunity’ for the Coalition Government as it did not own the Get Set programme, they reflected:

The one thing about an Olympics is that you have to be clear about the different roles and responsibilities for the different organisations. And so LOCOG, for example, develop the idea for the Get Set programme. That wasn't a Central Government thing in my recollection, it may have been a seed from Government I don't know, but certainly Get Set was owned and basically run by LOCOG. Obviously with the close assistance of Department for Education. And whereas Central Government was in a much more direct drive for elements like the School Games which Jeremy Hunt at the time saw as a big opportunity to create what he hoped would become a school Olympics Style thing, so that was more for Central Government (Interviewee E, Government).

As discussed in the previous anecdote by Interview G (Education Charity), the role of Hunt is important. The role of Hunt and the DCMS is also important for understanding how legacy from London 2012 differed internally between the Coalition Government DCMS and DfE departments. The differences highlight what Foucault (1980) warned that political power is not formed through a homogenous governing actor, here I translate this

as understanding how the Coalition Government were not homogenous in the political rationalities connected to young people and sport.

A distinctive difference between the departments is evident in the *Creating a Sporting Habit for Life, A new youth sport strategy* (DCMS, 2012). The opening 'Foreword' relates the context for the policy to "2005, when Lord Coe and the rest of the bid team triumphed in Singapore, they did so with a simple promise: choose London and we will inspire a new generation to take up sport" (DCMS, 2012a, p. 1). The document juxtaposes the visionary rhetoric from the London 2012 bid with the statement that "a new approach in England is needed - a more rigorous, targeted and results-orientated way of thinking about grassroots sport, which focuses all our energies into reaching out to young people more effectively" (DCMS, 2012a, p. 1). The statement implies that the previous Labour Government strategies were not rigorous, targeted or results-oriented, without a thorough argument or evidence to justify this claim. Given the evidence presented in Chapter Five, the PSA 22 (HM Treasury, 2007) the Coalition Government claim is framed with grassroots sport, rather than physical education and school sport.

The DCMS (2012a) youth sport strategy political rationality does not have any explicit endorsement from the DfE; the involvement of the DfE is reduced to the governing technology of funding. For example, the School Games is cited as:

Sport England, together with the Departments for Culture, Media and Sport, Health and Education are investing over £150m (both Exchequer and Lottery funding) in the School Games up to 2015. In addition, the School Games is being sponsored by Sainsbury's – bringing in an additional £10m over the next four years – alongside a variety of other private sector partners (DCMS, 2012a, p. 5).

The document continues and in detail, discusses how the School Games is the key programme to "building a lasting legacy of competitive sport in schools" (DCMS, 2012a, p. 5). The extract mentions the role of Sainsbury's and the inclusion of private organisations to fund and deliver the School Games. The neoliberal discourse is prominent here is the explanation of the School Games governing technologies, in line with broader Coalition Government austerity and localism agendas the meso-level programme is a hybrid of public and private investment.

In January 2012 it was clear that the School Games were the meso-level to micro-level plan that underpinned the Coalition Government legacy objectives around young people. In the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee evidence session with Jeremy Hunt highlighted that:

The whole point of that competition [School Games] is that it will be something that does not just happen in 2012 but it happens in 2013, 2014, 2015 and for many years to come. One small example of why that programme will be an incredibly important programme is, for many of those schools, they will be doing Paralympic sport for the first time, which will make a massive difference to disabled children in those schools (HoC, 2012, Ev. 65, p. 9).

The explanation and promotion of the School Games are in line with the delivery of the Get Set programme as there is a clear centralised and prescribed programme that promotes technologies of governing around youth sport, especially the link to the Paralympics and disabled young people. Yet it does not account for how this intersects with the DfE school sport and physical education policies which during 2010-2012 (as discussed above) were in a period of instability (Griffiths and Armour, 2013; Lovett and Bloyce, 2017).

The DCMS (2012a) strategy document and concurrent debate about funding school sport and physical education policies create confusion as to how the DCMS's and DfE's approaches to young people intersect with each other, or LOCOG and educational legacy activities. The quote from Baroness Billingham below is taken from a question by a peer during the YST oral evidence session in the HoL's Select Committee on Olympic and Paralympic legacy in 2013:

One way in which Governments avoid being criticised is to produce something that is so confusing and that people do not understand, and then they are never going to be criticised. I fear that some of the things that we are doing now in this field fall into that trap. We have already had Primary School Sports Premium; we have School Sport Partnerships. My question is about Youth Sport Strategy. Now, people do not understand how these things interconnect (HoL, 2013b, p. 971).

What is even more pertinent to my thesis is that the School Games is an example of how governing young people and legacy is framed around regulated governing from central

authorities who promote the content and structure that schools must participate in the plan. This framing contrasts with the funding that the DfE would introduce in 2013 and the Baroness has mentioned concerning the physical education and sport premium. I will expand on this in Chapter Eight. The analytical point here is that period between 2010 and 2012 is a contested time for the Coalition Government to govern policy and legacy associated with young people relates to the point that the Coalition Government cannot be reduced to one homogenous governing actor. Moreover, school sport and physical education policy must be differentiated from youth sport policy. Otherwise, as interviewees and quotes allude to there is confusion and a lack of understanding of how everything interconnects.

7.5 Prime ministerial statements

Further to the point about school sport and physical education policy, youth sport policy, and the Get Set educational programme, the Coalition Government did not account for how LOCOG influenced long term legacy aims connected to young people. The lack of substantive engagement by the Coalition Government with the rationality or technologies of the Get Set programme or how it could be embedded into the youth sport or school policies suggests that it did not influence the mainstream thinking of Coalition Government. Instead, the governing of education and young people beyond 2012 is focused more on establishing a policy that can be controlled by the Coalition Government. The prioritisation of such is notable as in August 2012 the Prime Minister (not a DfE or DCMS or London 2012 representative) made a public announcement about Olympic (not Paralympic) use in targeting primary school. The extracted statement here is a direct vision from the Prime Minister:

I want to use the example of competitive sport at the Olympics to lead a revival of competitive sport in primary schools. We need to end the ‘all must have prizes’ culture and get children playing and enjoying competitive sports from a young age, linking them up with sports clubs so they can pursue their dreams. That’s why the new national curriculum in the autumn will include a requirement for primary schools to provide competitive sport (PM Office, 2012).

From a governing perspective the weakness of accountability of legacy is exposed in this statement as the London 2012 based authorities have no vested interest or accountability to challenge the UK Government rationality and statements. The weakness raises concerns firstly about the position held by Olympic and Paralympic authorities in relation to be non-political yet politically complicit. Then, secondly with the Prime Minister's use of expert evidence and partners in public statements to justify and support the actions taken, especially when they are based on promoting competitive sport rather than moral values.

The Prime ministerial statement is formed as statements to directly impact on the young person. Moreover, are in direct contrast to governing from a distance or localism principles, it states what the outcomes should be, for example, "it will also teach older children to compare their performances to achieve their personal best for the first time" (PM Office, 2012). Instead of the Olympics and Paralympic values as the prominent form of inspiration, it is the examples of high performance, comparing to others and achieving an individual goal. Here, the interpretation of governing the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim is reduced to a neoliberal formation of a young person where individualism is promoted in the light of elite sporting ideals, not moral values. Although the political rationality is not advocating the localism agenda, it is reinforcing the broader neoliberal principles underpinning the Coalition Government.

Further to the comments above about the direct governmental ambition of the announcement and funding, the Prime Minister's Office statement includes the language of legacy and London 2012 to add credibility and expertise to the ideas in the statement. For example, the BOA and BPA are cited as partners to deliver the School Games and the then President of the IOC Jacques Rogge is cited as praising the UK Government for producing "a blueprint for further Games hosts" (PM Office, 2012). The role of the Get Set programme and LOCOG are not referenced. Instead, London 2012 and the authorities connected to the IOC, BOA and BPA are being used as experts to underpin the rationality and actions beyond London 2012 for the Coalition Government. The changing nature of relationships and discourses across the London 2012 life course between the Olympic and Paralympic governing actors and the UK Government is highlighted here. Right up until the point of delivery of the Games, the intersection between the governmental ambitions

was dynamic and often representative of the self-interest of the governing actor. For example, here the BOA and BPA are quoted in a political statement at the request of the Prime Minister, rather than declining and keeping political neutral (as is often the case) the organisations endorse the statement in the role of an expert.

The creation of experts is seen as a technique of governing and as Rose and Miller (1992, p. 286) argue “have come to play a crucial role in establishing the possibility and legitimacy of government.” The transition between delivering London 2012 to the legacy and evaluation period produce a circumstance where legacy and policy are reduced back to experts and outputs, i.e. reference to the Olympic and Paralympic authorities then the direct reference to the outcomes at the level of young people. What is not immediately clear is how the promotion of competitive sport and performance-driven attitude in young people is consistent or complementary to the Olympic and Paralympic values. The incongruence supports what has been highlighted in different contexts by other scholars, such as, Hsu and Kohe (2015) and Lenskj (2012) where the construct of a universal and values-based educational programme marginalises political tensions. From the statements by the Coalition Government presented here, it is a contradictory balance of wanting the credibility and attention brought from London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic governing authorities and the event, but not a substantive engagement or promotion of the values and educational programme promoted by the same authorities. Furthermore, LOCOG, BOA, BPA and IPC are complicit in the marginalisation of political tensions and the political use of the event as they endorse and support the Prime Minister’s statement.

7.6 Concluding chapter thoughts

The background for this chapter was to consider the general election in 2010, continued response to the 2008 financial crisis, and a change in guardianship over policies associated with young people and sport. The academic debate cited in the introduction to this chapter focuses on the abandonment and different ‘take’ on London 2012 legacy and the drastic reduction in funding and change in direction released by the DfE in 2010 (Keech, 2012; Griffiths and Armour, 2013; Bretherton et al., 2016). The empirical findings I have presented in this chapter illustrate how the governing of legacy and policy associated with young people during the transition between the Labour and Coalition

Governments was vulnerable. The extent of the vulnerability depends on the perspective and position of the governing authority and programme. For example, if evidence and analysis focus simply on the Get Set programme, then there was a continued delivery through schools and meeting of the IOC and IPC requirements. However, if the focus is on policy and legacy built through UK Governmental documents, then there were changes to governing. Still, not homogeneously across the Coalition Government or policies, instead, there is a construction of a divide between school sport and physical education policy and youth sport policy.

The rationality for governing the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim did change, but it was not an absolute abandoning all the political rationalities and governing technologies of the previous Labour Government legacy plans and policies. From my analysis, the political rationality of modernization under the Labour Government was replaced by austerity and localism under the Coalition Government, and this has a significant impact on the school sport and physical education policy formation and practices of governing. However, governing authorities did manage to maintain or adapt governing technologies and programmes to maintain their practices within the turbulent policy context of physical education and school sport policy. For example, the continued activities around Get Set and separation from policy changes (HoC Vol III, 2013c, Ev w11), the revised and reduced role of Paralympic legacy plans (DCMS and OfDI, 2011), then the development and rebrand of the School Games under the auspices of a youth sport strategy (DCMS, 2012a). A problematic aspect of the revisions included the narrow interpretation of the Paralympic legacy and young people which was reduced by the Coalition Government to participation. The Labour legacy plan in 2010 (DCMS and OfDI, 2010) was more progressive in terms of capitalising on the ruptures to the macro-level and meso-level political rationalities and governing technologies connected to ableism. However, this aspect was revised by the Coalition Government and has yet to be significantly problematised by academic scholarship.

The changes and continuity support the idea described by Phelps at the beginning of the chapter that the sport is an ‘ecosystem’ that is rebalanced and dynamic. It can be extended that legacy is an ‘ecosystem’ that is rebalanced rather than fixed or constant. In relation to previous literature around legacy and young people, such as, Keech (2012), Tims

(2013), Griffiths and Armour (2013) the London 2012 ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim should not be conflated with the LOCOG planning and Get Set programmes guaranteed in the Host City Contract (IOC, 2005b). Instead, my empirical findings contribute to the growing argument of my thesis that intersections between policy and legacy in the domestic landscape were contingent on the utility of legacy to support or affirm the governmental ambitions of a governing actor or programme which were in flux and subject to change. Moreover, the position of LOCOG should be viewed as delivering the educational programme as a product not to resist or influence the political rationalities of governing technologies associated with domestic governing authorities and policy. The art of governing for LOCOG was to navigate the domestic ecosystem of sport and legacy to deliver the regulated programme that is accountable to the IOC and IPC authorities, not any legacy or policy promises made by domestic governing authorities. I will continue to consider this in the next chapter through the further policy documents and programmes introduced in 2012 and 2015, then evaluations and inquiries in the aftermath of London 2012 from different governing authorities.

Chapter 8 “I’m sorry school sport became tribal...”

“I’m sorry school sport became tribal, that’s probably the only thing we didn’t deliver in the same spirit as everything else was delivered” (Coe, quoted in Gibson, 2013).

8.1 Background: 2012- onwards

Lord Coe in July 2013, previously chairman of LOCOG, then acting Prime Minister’s Olympic and Paralympic Legacy Ambassador in the Cabinet Office ‘Olympic and Paralympic Legacy Cabinet Committee’ in the quote above contrasted the issue of school sport “to the strong cross-party co-operation that he said helped deliver the Games” (Gibson, 2013). The quote is relevant in terms of expressing links between legacy, political debate and policy changes connected to school sport and physical education policy. It departs from the positive comments Coe had made in the bidding and planning stages of London 2012 about the potential and momentum London 2012 had for putting young people at the heart of the Games. The understanding of the delivery of legacy is central to my final analytical chapter and to critically analyse the intersections of governing between legacy and policy during the later phases of the London 2012 life course and into the post-epoch of legacy (2012-2014¹²).

In the previous chapter, I discussed the vulnerability to legacy and policy associated with young people and sport amid structural reform plans by the Coalition Government elected in 2010. The political rationality related to the previous Labour Government was modernization, and there was a notable shift with the Coalition Government to a political rationality connected to localism and austerity in the context of the economic recession and renewal of neoliberal conservatism (Williams et al, 2014). However, as demonstrated

¹² I will include evaluation and programme documents that have been released since 2014 to further illustrate points.

in Chapter Seven although there is a notable change in political rationality, this does not translate into a continuous or consistent difference in governing technologies across the Coalition Government interpretation of policy and legacy connected to young people.

What becomes even more prominent in this chapter is that there is further division and understanding of what the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim means and who governs such legacy. I present more statements produced by the Prime Minister’s Office, DCMS and LOCOG because during 2012 and 2013 the varying authorities continued to show differences in governing technologies and political rationalities connected to young people and London 2012. Included in my analysis are the different governing authorities’ construction of legacy, for example, legacy stories (DCMS, 2012b), plans for legacy (DCMS, 2012c), legacy factsheets and evaluations (IOC, 2013a, 2013b) and specific reports about the Get Set programme (LOCOG, 2012b). Into the era beyond LOCOG and Games delivery, the political rationalities and governing technologies connected to young people are re-interpreted and translated by governing actors. In the latter part of this chapter, I consider the brand of Get Set, the growing role of private organisations, and the perceptions of the role of the Paralympics in producing legacy.

8.2 Legacy story

In 2012 the DCMS (2012b, 2012c) released more public documents to account and add to the plans for legacy connected to young people and London 2012. The continued release of statements and changes in the language of the 2012 legacy connected to young people further reinforce division within the Coalition Government, especially between the DfE and DCMS. Lindsey (2020) evidenced that during this period a lack of coordination between the DfE and DCMS was noted by political journalists and individuals involved in the cabinet-level deliberations where 2011 and 2012 policy activities related to physical education and school sport were “disrupted and fragmented” (Lindsey, 2020, p. 36). The continuation of tension between the DCMS and DfE and continued separation between school and youth remits around legacy and policy is clear in the documents I analysed. In the March of 2012 the *Beyond 2012: The London 2012 Legacy Story* (DCMS, 2012b) document is structured with statistics about the Coalition Government funding, quotes about Coalition Government policy aims, then vignettes and

quotes from people and programmes connected to activities around London 2012 (both Coalition Government and LOCOG). The DCMS (2012b, pp. 14-15; pp. 16-17) sections for young people are split between school and youth where the statistics and aims from the DCMS (2012a) youth sport strategy and School Games programme are the basis for 'legacy story' and activities. Although the domestic policy is not directly cited, the aims and evidence are the same in the two documents (DCMS, 2012a; 2012b).

The DCMS lead contrasts with statements and analysis from Chapter Five and Six where the initial bid documentation and legacy action plan cited education-based UK Government departments and agencies as important governing actors in the formation of the legacy connected to young people. Shifting from collaboration across the Coalition Government, the DCMS (2012b) document focuses on actors at a micro personal level and individual reflections to evidence legacy. The document uses snapshots from multiple governing actors, including, teachers, Olympians and students as evidence for the implementation and enactment of the legacy in micro-levels (DCMS, 2012b). The personal stories and quotes in the snapshots are the illustrations and evidence to show how the reach of London 2012 translated to the end-user. The personalisation is in line with the localism rationality of the Coalition Government where the mechanisms of policy are designed to give voice and power back to society rather than measure against fixed and centralised Coalition Government objectives. It also demonstrates a governing technology of shaping the dissemination of information so that micro-level governing actors are responsible for accounting for evidence, arguably absolving the Coalition Government and other national governing actors of ultimate responsibility of evidence of legacy.

Given the timing of the DCMS (2012b) document (March 2012) the event bodies, such as, LOCOG, IPC and IOC are concerned with the delivery and evaluation of the Games, and not necessarily the domestic authority's continuation or commitment to the bid documentation or long-term legacy. This is reflected in the school or youth sections of the *Beyond 2012* (DCMS, 2012b) document as there is no mention of or reflection on the Get Set programme. Later in the document, there is one reference to the Get Set programme where it is used as an example statistic. The use of the Get Set programme as a statistic is reforming the LOCOG programme as a way to evidence activities and ways

that “inspiration” has been harnessed as “a positive force for communities” as “24,000 schools from the Get Set network, which is teaching millions of children about the Olympic and Paralympic values” (DCMS, 2012b, p. 53). The position of the Get Set programme here, and celebration of the quantified success is not alongside the youth sport strategy or School Games programme but a separate and achieved community success. Although both directly target young people, the separation suggests that the Get Set programme and influence of the IOC and IPC are not part of long-term national policy and legacy objectives.

The visibility of the Get Set programme is a contrast to the embedded and collaborative approach advocated in the bid and planning stages by the London 2012 bidding documentation and academic studies (Griffiths and Armour, 2012). Into the latter stages of the London 2012 life course, the governing authorities can change and reinterpret how legacy features beyond the event. Interviewee E (Government) demonstrates further that although legacy was in the line of thinking from the outset, it was as much about getting that into ‘everyone’s thinking’ as they discussed:

But the key thing, it [legacy] is not a sequential process. You do not have the bid, ... win in it, and then you build and run the Games, and then the legacy. It is not an add on at the end, you do have to mainstream it as early as possible into everyone’s thinking, because then you can maximise all of the assets at your disposal through LOCOG and the ODA on all stages as you go along.

The assets alluded to by Interviewee E (Government) of Get Set were maximised by non-Government authorities and particularly the BOA and the BPA. Yet, in terms of policy and the evaluation of legacy the Get Set programme was not prominently featured or maximised by the Coalition Government.

8.3 Confusion and opportunities

In September 2012 the Minister for Sport and the Olympics in the DCMS released a written statement on sporting legacy of 2012 as “the Government are determined to deliver on the commitment to ‘Inspire a Generation’ and secure a lasting sporting legacy” in a “10 point sports legacy plan” (DCMS, 2012c). It included young people under the community, school sport and disability legacy points. Previously, Lovett and Bloyce

(2017, p. 1638) have analysed the proliferation of policy statements, programmes through “initiativitis” as an unintended outcome in the lead up to the Games. Yet, in terms of young people, the intention of governing authorities should not be assumed to be unintentional. As noted in Chapter Seven, the proliferation of statements and policies was seen in the House of Lords inquiry as a technology by Baroness Billingham and “one way in which Governments avoid being criticised is to produce something that is so confusing and that people do not understand” (HoL, 2013b, p. 971). In this period the volume of statements by varying Coalition Government figures and departments is an effective way of dispersing debate and scrutiny about legacy and young people.

A shift in this context is that LOCOG is no longer a partner, but instead, other high profile or commercial partners are introduced, such as Sainsbury’s as the continued sponsor of the School Games (DCMS, 2012c). A consistent governing actor that has appeared in my documentary analysis, forum dialogue and interviews is the role of Sainsbury’s. In and amongst the “disrupted and fragmented” activities around physical education and school sport policy (Lindsey, 2020, p. 36) and “initiativitis” of legacy and policy programmes (Lovett and Bloyce, 2017, p. 1638) private governing actors took advantage of opportunities connected to London 2012. In the context of the London 2012 ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim and the education sector, Sainsbury’s engaged extensively with the School Games and aspects of Paralympic legacy and have continued to do so. For example, in 2017, Barry Horne, Chief Executive, English Federation of Disability Sport (now Activity Alliance) described:

What came together back in 2012 was a desire from ourselves and the other home nations, organisations focusing on disability sport, to look at a response for young people, and Sainsbury’s who were the first ever exclusive sponsor of a Paralympics, not combined Olympics and Paralympics, they were really captivated by what we could do. So we developed a programme [All Inclusive Physical Education training scheme] which operates right across the UK, the EFDS [now Activity Alliance] lead it, in England we work with Youth Sport Trust to deliver that programme... (Horne, 2017, p. 54).

The year before, at a similar policy forum, Dr Niamh-Elizabeth Reilly, a representative from Youth Sport Trust, referenced:

...obviously the [London 2012] Paralympics created a massive impact on inclusion in our country and especially on young people because of how we tagged into London, but we've developed a Paralympic challenge in partnership with Sainsbury's and we've got a lot of schools engaging in that and counting down to Rio and trying new Paralympic and inclusive type sports (Reilly, 2016a, p. 25).

Sainsbury's has been an active and influential partner in the landscape of young people and legacy, for example sponsoring the School Games (DCMS, 2012a, 2012c); and then, creating their initiatives, for example, those mentioned above All-Inclusive Physical Education training scheme (Horne, 2017). This chronology is not systemically accounted for on their organisational website or other official reports about London 2012. The meso-level programmes have been in partnership with traditional delivery agents, such as YST, Activity Alliance. Sainsbury's capitalised on opportunities and assets developed by LOCOG. For example, the rise in visibility of the Paralympics created a good return on investment and Sainsbury's subsequently sponsored the BPA on a more permanent basis post-London 2012 (Horne, 2017).

The activity of Sainsbury's has been praised in post-Games evaluations of London 2012 with the organisation being a constant example of "commercial partners" and "corporate support" as highlighted in the following two extracts:

As the first ever Paralympics-only sponsor, retail giant Sainsbury's highlights the corporate support behind the London Paralympics – which is not only helping to boost the profile of the Games, but also contributing to wider understanding of disability issues (DCMS, 2012b, p. 58).

Commercial partners have put in place programmes inspired by the Games, such as the £1 million Sainsbury's Active Kids for All Inclusive Community Training Programme, which will create a workforce able to deliver sport opportunities to disabled people, complementing the Active Kids for All Inclusive PE Training (UK Government and Mayor of London, 2013, p. 30).

The role of commercial sponsors has been problematised in relation to London 2012 and meso-level educational programmes. I discussed Coburn and McCafferty (2016) and their criticism of product placement and corporate motives of Games sponsorship concerning Coca Cola. When I looked for academic and non-academic research and evaluations of the activities of Sainsbury's, there is no debate about their governmental ambitions or political rationalities. Instead, as described above, governing actors and documents form positive accounts of how the funding, programme construction and quantitative statistics show corporate support and involvement.

Given the evidenced praise and influence of Sainsbury's, it is problematic that the same level of scrutiny (i.e. corporate motives in the Coburn and McCafferty, 2016 piece) has not been extended to the activities of the Sainsbury's. Instead, the operations have gone mostly unchecked, with corporate involvement legitimised in the construction and delivery of programmes connected to young people, especially disabled young people. This lack of scrutiny could be attributed to the connection to ableism discourses, where potentially the target of disabled young people makes the corporate partner's political rationality assumed to be inherently valuable and useful (Thomas and Guett, 2014; Hammond and Jeanes, 2018). The macro-level of governmental ambition connected to an inclusive society has allowed assumptions around who is appropriate to fund and deliver at a meso-level, without significant consideration to the origins, assumptions or micro-level context of delivery. The point is not to say that Sainsbury's are problematic. Instead, it is that there is a lack of understanding and criticality to how in the UK context and the post-London 2012 space of inclusivity and disabled young people are being governed through different organisations.

Lord Wrigley raised the point around inclusive society and the micro-level of disabled young people participating in sport in the House of Lords inquiry:

You mentioned schools. If it is a challenge sometimes to get the resources and the teachers with the background to bring children on in schools in the generality, is that much more when you are talking in terms of disabled children? It is so easy to think of activities as opposed to sport, and to parking them in the library or

something, rather than involving them. How may we overcome that? (HoL, 2013b, p. 102).

In answer to the question, the Head of the BPA Tim Hollingsworth gave this answer:

It is one area where, to go back to the commercial point that was raised earlier, we have a programme now, instigated through our relationship with Sainsbury's. They are investing close to £1 million in specific disability inclusion training for PE [physical education] teachers in mainstream schools, because it is a massive gap. PE [physical education] teachers desire to involve disabled children but, quite often, they did not actually have the capability or the awareness of how to do it. To overcome that thing where, yes, disabled children are not included is a fundamental challenge that we are trying to address.

This scheme that is in place now is by no means going to be the answer to everything, but it is a very good example of how you can practically intervene, because of the new profile that the sport has got that a sponsor like Sainsbury's will commit resources to (HoL, 2013b, p. 103).

The answer described by Hollingsworth brings together the discourses of ableism and neoliberalism as the commercial visibility of the Paralympic movement and the investment by Sainsbury's is promoted to overcome institutional ableism in school sport and the involvement of disabled young people. The point does not directly relate to the content of Get Set or values, but more so, to the step of giving disabled young people more visibility. The productive power of neoliberal forms of corporate involvement in educational delivery has served a purpose in rupturing ableist discourses of governing young people at a meso-level and micro-level of school sport. However, this is caveated with the discussion about the role of Sainsbury's and commercial partners in being accountable or transparent about their vested interests and values.

The growth of private organisations involved in legacy and policy connected to young people, sport and education post-London 2012 is also present in the Coalition Government announcement to invest money directly into primary schools. The context for this investment is described by Interviewee A (Lobby Group) who commented "which is partly why I think immediately after the Games one of the key aspects that Seb Coe got

involved in and for the first time there was an inter-ministerial group and there was a focus on what to do and that led to the creation of the PE in sport premium [primary physical education and sport premium].” Between the Michael Gove 2010 announcement (discussed in Chapter Seven) and cancellation of centralised funding through the previous Labour Government’s PESSYP strategy, the Coalition Government announced the physical education and sport premium for primary schools.

The announcement does not come from the Secretary for Education, instead of from the Prime Minister’s Office, which outlined the “150 million for primary school sport in England” (PM Office, 2013). In contrast to the statement made by the Prime Minister in 2012, there is no reference to the legacy promises, LOCOG, BOA or BPA. Instead, the formation of the policy is based on distinctly domestic actors and making sure that:

...the Games count for the future too and that means capitalising on the inspiration young people took from what they saw... create a culture in our schools that encourages all children to be active and enjoy sport, and helps foster the aspirations of future Olympians and Paralympians (PM Office, 2013).

The language has changed from the “we need to end the ‘all must have prizes’ culture and get children playing and enjoying competitive sports” (PM Office, 2012) to emphasise aspirations and encouragement. As well as changes from regulatory mechanisms of the national curriculum to direct economic investment in primary schools (PM Office, 2013). Quoting the Secretary of State for Education in the 2013 announcement, Gove reiterates a localism approach to this investment and states: “we have listened to teachers, and to OFSTED, who have said that sport provision in our primary schools is far too often just not up to scratch. That is why we are putting money directly into the hands of primary headteachers to spend it on improving PE in their schools” (PM Office, 2013). The aspirational language in the announcement of the premium, and then the affirmation of a localism rationality promotes simultaneously individual-orientated and centrally targeted policy. The statement made it clear that headteachers would have decision making power over the allocation of the funding if the money is spent on creating a culture to foster activity and elite aspirations. This decision making has been subsequently governed through the production of guidelines of how to

spend the physical education and sport premium for primary schools (All-Party Parliamentary Group on Fit and Health Childhood, 2019).

Griggs (2013, 2016) argued the primary school target and funding in the immediate term led to an unregulated market of primary school physical education delivery and several schools outsourcing to external and private providers. The prominence of private providers is supported by the experts who are featured in the Prime Minister's Office (2013) announcement as the domestic actors do not feature YST, Association for Physical Education (AfPE) or other non-profit bodies. Instead, in a development like Sainsbury's, LOCOG and Get Set, there is an encouragement of private providers to contribute to the delivery of the governmental ambitions. Bill Bush, the Executive Director of the Premier League, reflected in a policy forum in 2016 that the Coalition Government were in conversation for how to enact the primary physical education and sport premium:

So in 2013 to coincide with the schools premium and at Michael Gove's request we said that we would create a programme to be able to respond to the school premium. So age qualified coaches with the right kind of skills going into schools on the basis of the offer was the very beginning but it has got a lot more elaborate than that (Bush, 2016a, pp. 57-58).

The reflection here from the Premier League representative alongside the inclusion of other private bodies in both statements and policy, such as Sainsbury's, demonstrates the continued encouragement by the Coalition Government for private authorities to deliver policy associated with young people and sport at a meso-level and micro-level. This is not dissimilar to the governing formation of London 2012 and the Labour Government's agreement for LOCOG to be a private company limited by guarantee and to respect and uphold commercial demands made by the IOC through the 2006 London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act. Both the Labour and Coalition Governments respectively fostered neoliberal dynamics of accepting market mechanisms and a restricted remit of the state. The argument from Griggs (2013, 2016) of creating an unregulated market oversimplifies the more deliberate political rationality of the Coalition Government to devolve responsibility away from the Coalition Government and into other private, public, and non-profit organisations. The shift in governing technology here is still to

fund meso-level programmes but not in an unregulated manner. Instead through the shaping of systems and dissemination of information, for example, encouragement of the Premier League to create a programme and the guidelines produced for headteachers to inform decision making.

8.4 LOCOG brand and product

To this point in the final analytical chapter, I have focused on the role of the Coalition Government and examples of other voices endorsing or sponsoring announcements and programmes. Post London 2012 LOCOG and the IOC produced ‘story’ and ‘report’ based documents to evaluate and account for the organising committee’s activities during the life course of London 2012 (LOCOG, 2012a, 2012b). The level of detail and accessibility of the documents is subject to the IOC regulations. Sensitive material can be embargoed, for example, the Neilson report produced for LOCOG about Get Set is not publicly available, but the research findings are included in LOCOG reports and IOC factsheets (LOCOG, 2012a, 2012b, 2013; IOC, 2013a, 2013b). The two prominent and publicly accessible documents that feature the Get Set programme are featured in the discussion below.

The first LOCOG produced report *The Get Set Story: How London 2012 Inspired the UK’s Schools* (LOCOG, 2012b). The ‘story’ here is presented in the format of a project overview with statistics, and examples of engagement and the “significantly increased the educational footprint and legacy potential of London 2012” (LOCOG, 2012b, p. 28). The statistics and quotes were produced by schools and colleges who shared their activities through the incentivised Get Set network, then a series of Nielson and LOCOG quantitative and qualitative research studies. The evaluation and report documents produced by LOCOG are positioned with a rationality to evaluate their programme with identified objectives and measures, i.e. in a scientific way (Piggin et al. 2009a, 2009b). The approach by LOCOG and the IOC is substantially based on a corporate view of producing a short-term programme rather than a long-term embedded contribution to policy or broader UK Government legacy or policy objectives.

Moreover, in the LOCOG (2012b) ‘story’ of the Get Set programme, there is no direct mention of UK Government objectives or coordination with policy. The success and

membership of the Get Set network is focused on the role of the BOA and BPA, then partners who supported additional programmes through the Get Set + range. Where “36 programmes generously produced by our sponsors, partners and stakeholders... these programmes were all of an exceptionally high quality and ranged from those that engaged a relatively small number of schools through to programmes that encompassed the whole of the UK” (LOCOG, 2012b, p. 28). The perceived success of this model and programme is evidenced by the BOA and BPA being announced as the future custodians of the Get Set programme. This handover process involved transferring the infrastructure, brand, existing content, and the database of UK schools. The transfer of the database is viewed by LOCOG as a ‘strong legacy’ as stated in the extract below:

The Get Set database developed from our education programme has been given to the British Olympic Association and British Paralympic Association to develop and evolve. More than two million children participated in the Get Set programme in 85 per cent of UK schools. This is a strong legacy that will continue to deliver on our vision to inspire young people (LOCOG, Volume 3, 2013, p. 120).

In contrast to other tangible LOCOG or ODA activities or structures, such as the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park,¹³ the ‘strong legacy’ of Get Set programme is restricted to the ownership of the BOA and BPA without a formal sharing agreement with other parties, such as public or non-profit organisations. The Get Set programme is governed through the British Olympic Foundation, which is the “charitable arm” of the BOA and “responsible for the development of the Olympic Movement” (Team GB, 2019).

The larger 2013 *London 2012 Olympic Games Official Report* produced by LOCOG further illustrates the positive and universal success of the Get Set programme promoted in the LOCOG (2012b) document, as the 2013 report stated:

Overall, London 2012’s education programme succeeded in delivering the vision of inspiring young people in the UK and around the world, changing attitudes, encouraging education, inspiring participation in sport, and promoting young

¹³ Formed in 2012 the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park is owned by the London Legacy Development Cooperation and is a Mayoral development corporation established under the power of the Localism Act 2011.

people's interest and engagement in the Games. Thanks to the structure put in place, it was able to do this unhindered by a change in Government, and in a way that will continue to inspire change and enhance lives for years to come (LOCOG, Volume 3, 2013, p. 91).

The formation of governing by LOCOG under the Get Set programme is an example of a neoliberal discourse around the restriction of the state-based remit, and the ability to generate commercial and moral purposes within a centralised non-state-based structure. Notably, here a digital database with private individuals' details is passed onto the BOA and BPA without a formal consideration to the climate in 2013 where other areas of policy, such as the physical education and sport premium grants are being referred to as unregulated and privatising markets. As discussed in the subsection above, Griggs (2013, 2016) argued the Coalition Government policy produced an unregulated market of primary school physical education delivery, with several schools outsourcing to external and private providers. Here, LOCOG, BOA and BPA should be considered as an external and private provider. Yet, the organisations are given a special status due to their brand and connection to the IOC movement. The moral imperatives associated with Olympic and Paralympic values afforded LOCOG, the BOA and BPA an ideal pathway to align themselves as ethical custodians of a commercially valuable database and programme.

In reference to this alignment, brand, and the London 2012 development of the Get Set programme Interviewee I (Education Consultant) commented:

... because it is undoubtedly true that every brand and every sporting organisation has a set of intellectual property which they protect. The International Olympic Committee and the International Paralympic Committee protect their intellectual property extremely rigorously. And, so because of one of the things that we had talked about was the fact that this was everyone's Games. We had to negotiate with them to say, you know, there are community groups and youth groups and huge numbers of people who will want to be part of this; but who will not be official sponsors or official partners and so, you know, the official programmes like International Inspiration and Get Set had the rings and we could take them into schools, we got the schools to do loads of stuff with them.

The quote here illustrates the continued problematisation of the IOC's motives as being a mixture of moral and commercial factors (MacAloon, 2008; Lenskyj, 2012; Chatziefstathiou and Henry, 2012). The commercial factor of the Olympic rings and IOC movement, then the IPC and their role promoting equality garnered significant support in the context of London 2012, summarised by the former CEO of the BOA, Bill Sweeney, who stated:

Our ability to attract and retain commercial partnerships is critical to us, perpetuating that cycle of success underpins our ability to generate revenues to reinvest back into Olympic competition, and all of our income is invested into achieving sporting success through our finest athletes and the nation responds by ranking the Team GB brand as the third most loved entity in the UK, number 1 in the National Health Service, number 2 are the Armed Forces, and number 3 is Team GB (Sweeney, 2016b, p. 52).

Affirming this statement by Sweeney interviewees highlighted the position of the London 2012 governing authorities. For example, Interviewee F (National Governing Body) commented:

the Olympics for all intents and purpose is a council or GLA [Greater London Authority] or a mini DCMS [Department for Culture, Media and Sport] that explodes and has infinite budget and pull power on staffing... every other major event does not have that kind of pull or kind of pressure on them.

The interviewee reflected here that LOCOG and the governing of the Olympics and Paralympics are extraordinary in that they have the infrastructure of a local or national Government organisation. About Get Set, Interviewee I (Education Consultant) commented that:

It is quite unusual that the thing [Get Set] is more consistently delivered than the standing Government policy. It is kind of quite weird, but you know LOCOG was run unbelievably well by the senior leadership team... created a huge amount of momentum and inspiration... Get Set is still out there in nearly 80% of schools, but it is a kind of push mechanism.

The ‘push mechanism’ described by Interviewee I (Education Consultant) reconciles the Get Set programme as a meso-level governing technology that was protected from changes to political rationalities and governing technologies across the Labour and Coalition Government. The protection and role of the Get Set programme is seen as positive and a reflection of how well the private organisation of LOCOG was run, moreover how it sustained ownership of the programme and brand. Concerning this and the Get Set ownership, Interviewee E (Government) described the handover to the BOA and BPA as a positive next step beyond London 2012. They commented:

Yes, I do I think that the BOA and BPA was the natural fit for it [Get Set] because they are the custodians of the Olympic brand for the UK... it is an extension of the brand and the Government doesn’t own the brand, the BOA and BPA are the national repository. And, of course, the Department of Education would value that because it gives them a turbocharge for their own programmes within schools, so it is a benefit for them. I personally think it is a win-win. It is a hugely powerful brand and a lot of people want to have an association with it. In ways that often cannot be quantified.

As custodians, the BOA and BPA can control and manage how this develops; currently, the Get Set website is still up to date and accessible for the use of schools and the public. It does not document systematically what further partnerships have been secured or what broader objectives it has. However, such information is hosted by the British Olympic Foundation (connected to the BOA), which again is not comprehensive (Team GB, 2019). Currently, programmes are listed on the Get Set website as part of the Get Set+ network were “Olympic and Paralympic opportunities... delivered by Get Set’s partners and associated organisations” (Get Set, 2019). Moreover, the additional Get Set programmes have been evidenced as a continued legacy of London 2012 by the Coalition and Conservative Governments and Mayor London documents *Inspired by 2012: The legacy from the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games* (UK Government and Mayor of London, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016). The documents track legacy programmes and case studies from London 2012, such as the School Games or other non-education related points of interest. Concerning, the Get Set programme, the documents have reported

about further programmes developed by the BOA and BPA through the auspices of Get Set (presented in Table 8.6 below).

Table 8.4 Continued national programmes connected to the Get Set programme (2013-2019)

Programme name	Published funding and delivery detail	Design detail
Get Set to Plan Your Legacy (Team GB, 2013)	Funded by the Department for Education through grants to 105 schools	Designed to support the delivery of activities by young people
Get Set for Community Action (YST, 2016)	Funded by the Big Lottery Fund, supported by the British Olympic Foundation and BPA, delivered by the YST	Designed to support teenager's delivery community activities in the run-up to the Rio de Janeiro 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games
Get Set "Road to Rio" (Spirit of 2012, undated)	Funded by the Spirit of 2012	An extension of the London 2012 programme this focused on the Rio de Janeiro Olympic and Paralympic Games, including launching a mobile phone application
Get Set to Play (British Olympic Association, undated)	Delivered and funded in partnership between P&G and the British Olympic Foundation	Designed to help make primary school playtimes more active and more positive through the Olympic Games and Olympic Values
Get Set to Eat Fresh (Aldi, 2019)	Delivered and funded in partnership between the Team GB,	Designed to encourage students 5 to 14 to cook and eat healthy, fresh food

	Paralympics GB and Aldi	
Get Set for the Spirit of Sport (UKAD, 2019)	Get Set for the Spirit of Sport”	Designed to “work with education partners to develop education programmes for schools that take a young person on a clean sport education journey from the age of 7-16” produced in partnership with UK Anti-Doping Agency
Get Set “Travel to Tokyo” (Edcoms, 2019)	Supported by multiple partners including, UK Active, EdComs, Team GB and Paralympics GB. The National Lottery and Sport England fund it	Designed to inspire children aged 5-11 and their families to try new activities and get active together.

The continuation of Get Set (as presented in Table 8.6 above) has benefitted from further Coalition and Conservative Government department funding (DfE), Sport England, UK Anti-Doping (arm’s length departmental public body), Big Lottery funding (arm’s length non-departmental public body), Spirit of 2012 funding (endowment/London 2012 legacy charity), and commercial funding (P&G, Aldi). The enterprising success of Get Set is productive and further demonstrates the power of the Olympic and Paralympic brand. The different campaigns are aligned to commercial, state or societal interests that interconnect with Olympic and Paralympic sport, for example, healthy living, community action and family activities. As a gatekeeper for the Get Set programme, the BOA and BPA have the space to continue to boost the longevity and reach of the programme. However, it remains still closely aligned to the universal message of Olympism and Paralympic values. The Get Set+ programmes have not developed or included spaces for

critical debate. Instead, it is about regulating lifestyle choices, such as promoting clean sport; or promoting the commercial brand of the future Olympic and Paralympic Games, such as, Tokyo 2020. Consequently, the Get Set longevity is a ‘push mechanism’ or product, not a process of meaning-making between citizens and programme creators.

Relating this to the broader debate around Olympic and Paralympic educational programmes and legacy the Get Set programme has created a product that continues to promote the BOA and BPA brands. Olympism, the Olympic and Paralympic values used within Get Set and promoted by the IOC are interpreted and translated into the UK context as a ‘push mechanism’ and, as noted by Interviewee I (National Governing Body) and Interviewee F (Education Consultant). However, LOCOG was powerful and well run it was in the unusual circumstance of delivering a programme between different standing UK Government policies. Although as commented by Interviewee E (Government) and presented in Table 8.6 above other governing actors, such as the DfE, arm’s length bodies or commercial partners can use Get Set as a ‘turbocharge for their programmes.’ As Rose and Miller (1992) advocated, the formation of governing and knowledge is not a commodity owned by state governing actors but formed through relationships around thought and systems, i.e. here the varying interconnections of governing through Get Set. Moreover, political power does not rest solely with the formal Government and this is evident in the dynamic of the Get Set programme as the BOA and BPA act as custodians to what is a powerful influence on the micro-level of governing in schools and young people. To understand the relationships and dynamics between the UK Government and the London 2012 sporting authorities (LOCOG, BOA, BPA, IOC and IPC) many public inquiries were conducted to assess legacy and school sport.

8.5 Public inquiries

Another element of UK state apparatus is the position and role of the HoC and HoL to check and balance the activities of the UK Government. As discussed in Chapter Four, the two main public inquiries post-London 2012 were in the House of Lords and in the House of Commons Education Committee. In the report for the House of Lords *Keeping the flame alive* (2013a), the Get Set programme is not referenced instead the report describes ‘school aged sport’ and the legacy of school sport partnerships, the sport

premium, the delivery of physical education, the link between schools and communities, and then young people with disabilities. In the response document by the Government and Mayor of London there are explanations for each of the recommendations made for ‘school aged sport’ in a manner where the policy mechanism justified the governing and there was no additional need for further review or evaluation. Within the inquiry itself, there were submissions of evidence that referenced the Get Set programme. However, it was not from LOCOG, BOA, BPA or other partners. Consequently, the value of the Get Set programme was descriptive and anecdotal rather than being critical or used to raise further questions. For example, “students and staff have been inspired by the occasion and the ethos of the Olympics. Olympic values have become imbedded in schools throughout the age range” (HoL, 2013b, AfPE written evidence, p. 14). The superficial account acknowledges the presence of Get Set and its purpose. Still, it does not contribute detailed evidence of how this translated beyond London 2012 or why the influence was only ‘on occasion.’ This lack of translation can be attributed to the separation between LOCOG and other governing actors, such as AfPE in the formation and enactment of the Get Set programme.

The *School sport following London 2012: No more political football* (HoC, 2013a) in contrast to the more expansive House of Lords inquiry focused purely on school sport and London 2012. The evidence collected and submitted involved visits to schools to view the delivery and situation at a micro-level, then the opinions of many governing authorities that had a vested interest in influencing and reviewing school sport and London 2012. In further contrast to the House of Lords evidence and report, this included explicit reference to Olympism, and the Get Set programme and activities undertaken by LOCOG. For example, during an evidence session Jonathan Edwards former Olympic Gold medalist talked with the Chair of the evidence session about the value of sport and the idea that policy around young people had been a political football during London 2012:

JE: There is a real irony, in that the modern Olympic movement started because Pierre de Coubertin came over to this country to look at the education system and how it integrated sport—a healthy mind in a healthy body. Here we are, having just celebrated London 2012, and we still face this question about where sport fits

in and how important it is. We have seen the dismantling of the school sport partnerships, which was a bad move in my opinion, wasn't well thought through and left many people feeling incredulous. I would say that the people I've heard on this panel so far have perhaps been minding their Ps and Qs a little bit. I think it was a very bad decision. A lot of people would say that.

Chair: The denunciation from the earlier panels has not been as strong as yours.

JE: Indeed. Obviously, they are sitting in front of you and they're being recorded. They come from organizations and so perhaps have more to lose. I can just sit here independently (HoC Vol II, 2013b, Ev 17).

The dialogue demonstrates, on the one hand, the expertise and voice of an ex-Olympic athlete in reference to the Olympic movement with policy changes and then commenting that his independence is a benefit for speaking frankly. The independence, as discussed above around the role of the Government and the London 2012 governing authorities was not adequately challenged throughout the data presented in my thesis. An assumption (not taken for granted by Edwards above) is that a sport mega-event promotes functionality and debate about varying interests of each governing actor. In accounts by Girginov (2012), Preuss (2007; 2015) or Leopkey and Parent (2015), it is accepted that there are levels of interdependence and balances between stakeholders. However, as demonstrated here by the inquiry dialogue, there is scepticism and reluctance to challenge certain actors as they are gatekeepers to brands or funding. Consequently, for governing actors in legacy, there is a lack of independence and promotion of regulated freedom when engaging with the Get Set programme and 'inspire a generation' legacy aim.

Speaking directly about the Get Set programme and legacy, several authorities submitted evidence to the Education Committee inquiry about their interpretation of the legacy aim. For example, the Association for School and College Leaders stated:

For many schools the notion of a London 2012 legacy has been an aspirational one rather than seeing evidence of a strategic plan for take-up of competitive sports in schools or developing links with local sports clubs and national governing bodies. It appears to depend on the enthusiasm and commitment of

local teachers and coaches, rather than on a legacy strategy from government (HoC Vol III, 2013c, Ev w46).

The comment here implies that the micro-level of interpretation is key to the effectiveness of legacy, but this is attributed to local teachers and coaches, sports clubs and national governing bodies rather than to the organising committee. In another interpretation, Derek Peale, headteacher Park House School, explicitly aligned the need for bottom-up and local actors understandings of the “wider impact on school improvement, including positive outcomes concerning Social, Moral, Spiritual and Cultural Development... reflect creative approaches to the integration of sports-themed programmes such as Get Set” (HoC Vol II 2013b, Ev 62). The understanding from a headteacher and school perspective here goes some way to be an opportunity discussed by Binder (2012) that the IOC and IPC brand can galvanize a governing actor to create educational outcomes in their setting. However, this translation and understanding of the Get Set programme and values were in the minority of dialogue responses. Instead, most evidence submissions interpreted legacy in the frame of competitive sport and clubs or governing bodies as per the Association for School and College Leaders above.

In a non-school perspective, the Wellcome Trust contributed evidence to the Education Committee inquiry from their ‘In the Zone’ initiative that used sport and physiology content in a touring exhibition and experiment kits for school. In terms of London 2012, the Trust summarised their contribution as:

Part of the practical learning strand of Get Set—the official London 2012 reward and recognition scheme for schools and colleges demonstrating a commitment to living the Olympic and Paralympic values—and was awarded the Inspire Mark by the London Organizing committee of the Olympic Games (HoC Vol III, 2013c, Ev w34).

The dialogue from the Wellcome Trust, like the head teacher’s perspective above, demonstrates a more nuanced interpretation of the London 2012 educational agenda. Moreover, the ability to gain reward and recognition as an outcome for their ends. In this statement, the Get Set programme is evaluated based on the tangible reward and not substantive long-term integration into the organisation.

The interpretations of the Get Set programme raises the question about the role of LOCOG and an organising committee beyond the Games to facilitate long term legacy. As noted, current sport mega-event literature views an organising committee (Agha et al., 2011) and legacy outcomes (Leopkey and Parent, 2015; Tomlinson, 2016) to be time-limited to hosting and the disbanding of the organising committee. In this inquiry dialogue, the use and effectiveness of a programme to contribute to long term outcomes is facilitated by individual governing actors' interpretation and their ability to translate it into their circumstances. This interpretation is supported by Interviewee D (Education Institution) who argued for a business perspective:

it is based upon your circumstances, but it is also that you have got to be visionary, you have got to be ambitious, and you have got to be bold. You can't be strategically visionary and bold unless you know your business and you know your circumstances; and you know where your strengths and are... trying to be able to capitalise in your context. 2012 did, of course, it did, can you grab hold of how it helped, maybe not. It was more about a general awareness... then, the circumstances of the people and the politics of an organisation.

The business language emphasised from the comment by Interviewee D (Education Institution) and other inquiry voices quoted shows how macro-level neoliberal political rationalities have translated into meso-level and micro-level understandings of legacy and policy. The inquiry dialogue and interviewee response show a perspective from micro-level of governing that is the embrace of neoliberal tendencies, such as rewards and brand awareness. The embrace of neoliberal discourses is not problematic, but a way to function in a policy system where there is vulnerability to what Edwards refers to the in HoC Education Committee inquiry as 'bad decisions' by the Coalition Government around physical education and school sport policy.

Another prominent aspect of the HoC Education Committee inquiry was the visibility and discussion around the Paralympics and disabled young people. A representative of LOCOG submitted evidence to the inquiry that noted the Get Set programme and its use of both the Olympic and Paralympics values:

While this raised questions from the IPC about the distinctiveness of the Paralympic Games and Paralympic Values, it was strongly felt that having one combined programme would make the best use of the investment: it was what schools expected and it made sense... This helped to inspire a widespread change in attitudes towards disability, education and the Games themselves, bringing in a much higher level of engagement among young people. 69% of Get Set schools talked about the Paralympic Values in lessons, more than two thirds agreed that they had seen a positive change in young people's attitudes towards disability through their participation in Get Set and 40% of Get Set schools offered Paralympic sport to their pupils (HoC Vol III, 2013c, Ev w11).

The combined approach taken by LOCOG also featured significantly in my interviews. In the quotes below the interviewees recognise the value and culture of the organising committee, referencing the ways that there were tangible and intangible outcomes of this through 'education' and a 'common language,' and then 'step change' in practice. Arguably, here the young people were not the only generation to be inspired. Still, the formation of LOCOG inspired a generation of governing actors to think and behave differently concerning ableist discourses.

The Games educated us all to a common language (Interviewee C, Olympic/Paralympic).

Yes, the Games educated as all to a common language... made disability cool, acceptable and understandable, but real because young people experienced it (Interviewee G, Education Charity).

Yeah, I mean I think there was obviously a huge push by the Organising Committee for it very much to be the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. And I think anecdotally I have heard that they had this phrase that was basically 'What about the Paralympics?'... So every time anyone said anything within the organising committee around what would happen around the Olympics and basically was a bit of a monkey on the shoulder... 'what about that and what does that mean for the Paralympics?' And I think that was definitely a step change (Interviewee A, Lobby Group).

We set out absolutely clearly. You know we were an unusual organising committee in that we were seamlessly integrated Olympic and Paralympic (Interviewee I, Education Consultant).

The quotes support that the Get Set educational programme from bid to delivery considered young people from an able-bodied and disabled-bodied perspective, moreover, from a Paralympic-inclusive approach. The interviewees emphasise the role of organising committee and this contributes to the Gold and Gold (2017b) and Kerr (2018) arguments that London 2012 raised the visibility of Paralympic legacy and legitimacy of the BPA and IPC movements. **In my empirical data, the Paralympic values in the Get Set programme acted as governing technology** to give the Paralympic and disability-based governing authorities a voice in the legacy which counters previous evidence from other editions of Games discussed by Cashman (2006) and Gilbert and Leg (2011).

The rupturing of ableist discourses during London 2012 did not happen in a vacuum. There were broader national and international inclusion agendas during the Labour Government and United Nations (2006) 'Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities' that are essential macro-level contexts as to why governing actors recognised and enacted an integrated approach to the Get Set programme. However, the difference between macro-level and meso-level rhetoric and the realities of how legacy or change can be implemented is a thought-provoking area for reflection. The complexity and variation were present in the variety of responses I had in my interviews. I agree with Kerr (2018) that the social and political values of an individual influence the reflection of the Paralympic legacy. For example:

I think most people, myself included, were pleasantly surprised at how successful the Paralympics were and in some respects the strongest legacy will come from the Paralympics rather than from the Olympic side (Interviewee B, Lobby Group).

The positive and transformation language used by the two interviewee quotes above are contingent to their understanding of the Paralympics and disability. In contrast, other interviewees were sceptical to the extent of the influence of the Paralympics. For example,

... one of my biggest frustrations is when I hear non-disabled people tell me that London 2012 has changed the world for disabled people. And it is all non-disabled people that tell me this, I rarely get disabled people telling me this. I don't think I ever have actually. And it is their very ablest view of the Games (Interviewee L, Parliament).

... organisations have looked at that [PE and school sport] properly from an educational inclusivity point of view. I think that things have moved on hugely. Is that the same for broader education or employers? I don't know, but, as a moment in time it was huge in terms of being challenging and changing people's perceptions. Making us all ask question of ourselves (Interviewee H, Education Charity/Consultancy).

The perspectives offered in these three quotes contrast to the positive ones as they problematise the extent to which the Paralympic legacy impacts all meso-level and micro-level experiences of disability. Moreover, as Interviewee L (Parliament) commented on the perception of London 2012 Paralympic legacy is often from an ableist viewpoint. This supports other scholarly work on London 2012, such as Brittain (2016b) and Pappous and Brown (2018) who problematise the ability to measure the success of Paralympic legacies beyond anecdotal and opinion. From my empirical evidence, the Paralympics was prominent in the post-London 2012 debate around how the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim and Get Set programme affected ableist political rationalities at a macro-level and meso-level, such as the growth in visibility of the BPA and Paralympic governing authorities and programmes. **However, this should be problematised against the background of ableism, where able-bodied norms and perspectives continue to be privileged in governing practices** (Wickman, 2011; Hammond and Jeanes, 2018).

8.6 Concluding chapter thoughts

The policy and political statements during 2012 and 2013 presented in this chapter demonstrated a continued tension with Coalition Government departments over the role of the legacy connected to young people and education. The significance of the multiple Prime Ministerial statements and the changes within the language of those statements does not align with the LOCOG continuity but did seek to capitalise and utilise the brand

and expertise associated with London 2012 and related Olympic or Paralympic governing actors. The Get Set programme was not directly mentioned, instead it was the expert status used to rationalise and support an increased Coalition Government control over direct funding connected to school sport and youth policy.

The impact of the Get Set programme was further scrutinised in the middle part of this chapter. Again, the consistency and ability of LOCOG to navigate through turbulent policy periods are notable. In the public inquiries the HoLs and HoCs the dialogue does not linger on the role of the organising committee, and although governing actors raise points about values, limitations and the Get Set programme, the interest is more in the effectiveness of the Coalition Government strategy and the Coalition Government's interpretation of legacy. It provides further evidence that legacy is not a direct or intended remit for the organising committee, instead of as the Games are delivered the role of the organising committee concerning the education programme is to find an appropriate custodian of the programme. The role of the BPA and BOA is protected in the same vein as LOCOG by the brand and trademark rights of the IOC. Although, a limitation in its ability to influence or challenge policy, the brand and non-political status of the BPA and BOA is favourable as it has allowed the organisations to elongate the Get Set and Get Set+ programmes productively.

Finally, the role of the Paralympics in Get Set was more thoroughly considered. The debate about the impact of Get Set is contested but what is clear from my analysis is that productively an ableist discourse was ruptured at a macro-level and meso-level of the education programme and legacy production. To an extent, the productive nature of this can be challenged as the Paralympics has conflated and oversimplified representation of disability and sport; moreover, the micro-level of delivery still represents a multitude of challenges for achieving an inclusive approach to sport and young people. **In terms of the formation of governing and from my findings it is considered that the individual and institutional opinion of the impact of London 2012 for disabled young people reflects the culture and ethos of contextual understandings of disability, Paralympics, and interconnected to ableist discourses.**

Chapter 9 Inspiring a Generation(?)

9.1 Concluding thesis thoughts

The central rationale for my thesis was to bring together a combination of elements that intersected with the London 2012 ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim. The broader debate connected to hosting a sport mega-event and the emergence of the term legacy is the effectiveness (or how to measure claims of effectiveness) of sport mega-events in achieving wider political and societal aims. As demonstrated in Chapters One, Two and Three, the national and international contexts of legacy and policy span across public, private, and non-profit governing entities with varied interests. The wider political and societal aims of a sport mega-event, especially hosting an Olympic and Paralympic Games, therefore interconnect the elements of the market, state and society. I analysed this through a governmentality framework with a focus on governmental ambitions, political rationalities, and governing technologies. In this concluding chapter, I will bring together empirical and theoretical points structured around my overarching research question and four overarching aims.

How has the legacy aim to ‘inspire a generation’ affected policy associated with young people and sport between the bid, planning, delivery, and (ongoing) legacy of London 2012?

Driven by this central research question, in the first two subsections of this chapter, I will reflect on empirical and theoretical discussions, then, in the latter two subsections, I will explore limitations, contributions and implications of the thesis.

Overall, the London 2012 ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim has been a valuable example of the interconnections and governing actors, because it highlights points between vested interests in the target market of young people and vested interests to govern young people’s lifestyles. Throughout my thesis, I have developed evidence and analysis to explore the governing of policy and legacy connected to young people and education (illustrated by Figure 9.1a and 9.1b, p. 207 and p. 208). This endeavour has involved considering the Labour and Coalition Government governmental ambitions, political rationalities and governing technologies during the life course of London 2012, the

delivery of the London 2012 Get Set educational programme through LOCOG, and the governing technologies used by varying non-profit and private entities, such as Sainsbury's, to engage in the governing of the London 2012 'inspire a generation' legacy aim.

Figure 9.1a Illustration of my thesis design




Figure 9.1b Illustration of my overall thesis chronology, findings, and discussion

Life course stages of London 2012:	Findings: 'Inspire a generation' legacy aim	Discussion: Intersections and governing actors' perspectives
Bid and emergence 2000-2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Labour Government (Blair) ● Bid committee bid submission to IOC and formation of LOCOG ● Emergence of 'inspire a generation' legacy aim in DCMS pamphlet, PSA: Delivery Agreement 22, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Political rationalities at the macro-level of governing, e.g., neoliberalism, ableism, modernisation, austerity, localism; ● Governmental technologies at the meso-level and micro-level of governing, e.g. ownership of legacy, funding of youth sport, collection and dissemination of legacy programmes, the scope of authority between the IOC, IPC, LOCOG, and domestic governing bodies (such as DCMS); ● Governmental ambitions at the macro-level of governing. Then, how it intersects with different governing actors at the meso-level and micro-level of governing, e.g., disability/inclusion/ Paralympic, moral imperatives, active citizens, and brand protections.
Planning 2006-2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Labour Government (Blair then Brown) ● LOCOG launch of the Get Set programme ● DCMS documents, DCSF and OfDI involvement with Get Set and policy connected to young people 	
Revisions and delivery 2010-2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Coalition Government (Cameron) ● LOCOG delivery and reporting of the Get Set programme ● Structural changes across the UK Government to policy connected to young people 	
Inquiry and continuation 2013-ongoing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Coalition then Conservative Governments (Cameron and May) ● LOCOG, IOC, and BOA legacy measurement and evaluation, plus the handover over of the Get Set programme ● Public inquiries into the London 2012 and the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim ● Ongoing UK Government documents and announcements connected to London 2012 and young people 	

9.2 Analytical reflections

The first two overarching aims of my thesis were framed around genealogically considering the governing of educational programmes connected to the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim. Then concurrently sport-related policies related to young people in the education sector (illustrated by the diagrams of legacy and policy influences in Appendix 9). The genealogical approach discussed in Chapter Two and Four related to the multiple and contingent sources of power relations, in my case the governing actors and governmentality of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim (Foucault, 1980; Miller and Rose 1992; Dean, 2010). Although the language and aspirations from governing actors remained consistent in featuring young people, the formation and practices connected to the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim differed depending on the source. For example, the dynamic between the Olympic and Paralympic governing actors, then the governing actors involved in policies connected to young people and sport. This difference is most notable during the transition between the Labour and Coalition Governments in 2010, where both policy and legacy state-based political rationalities and technologies were reinterpreted, disrupted, and restructured. For example, the changes to Paralympic legacy aims between the Labour Government document (DCMS and OfDI, 2010) to the revised Coalition Government document (DCMS and OfDI, 2011).

The genealogical reflections in Chapters Five through Eight interweave with broader discussion points – who owns legacy(?) and legitimising the Paralympics(?). The discussion points (deliberated in turn below) are influenced by the latter two overarching research objectives of my thesis to critically analyse intersections of governing between legacy and policy, further exploring such through the lens of governmentality and governing actors’ perspectives. These points bring together my understanding of neoliberal and ableist discourses interconnected with the governing of the Get Set educational programme and related policies around young, people sport and education (illustrated by Figure 9.1a and 9.1b, p. 207 and p. 208).

9.2.1 Who owns legacy(?)

A distinctive point of intersection between legacy and policy from London 2012 was the ownership of macro-level political and project aims connected to young people and London 2012. On the one hand, there was a lack of ownership of the ‘inspire a generation’

legacy and, on the other hand, there was a restricted ownership of the Get Set educational programme. The bidding and official IOC process around the ‘Candidature Procedure and Questionnaire’ was a source of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim and the official organising committee education programme, Get Set. The IOC’s managerially and commercially driven bidding process acts as a neoliberal governing technology which encourages the London 2012 bid committee to offer a reductive and over-simplified outline of how they can fulfil prescribed requirements, including the education programme. The assumption made at this point by the London 2012 bid committee is that the IOC as gatekeepers to the rights to host will accept the detail within the bid document. Moreover, the governing actors in the broader landscape of sport and education will be able to translate what is originally set out in the bid document into their meso- and micro-levels of governing, such as LEAs, NGBs or OFSTED. Thus, the premise of bidding and legacy here is a return on investment for the international federation and the hosting city and nation, above other priorities of feasibility and long-term impact in the meso- and micro-levels of governing. The distinct formation of governing by the IOC and followed by the London bid committee and state mechanisms is to centralise and privilege the requirements of the international sporting federation, not debate or publicly consult the contents of the London bid. The formation of governing here relates to neoliberal discourses of accepting market mechanisms, i.e., the London 2012 bid as a contract and tender process, above the accountable and democratic responsibility of the state mechanisms for committing to a variety of economic, legal and societal guarantees in the bid documentation.

The presence of young people and education was prominent in the vision of the London 2012 bid and the details of the bid. Concerning education, the bid outlined that if successful the organising committee would work alongside Government departments, and the organising committee activities would be endorsed by varying Government departments to create Olympic and Paralympic curriculum materials. However, there is a limited mention of the existing policies connected to young people and sport (*Game Plan* policy document 2002 or PESSCL strategy 2003). Furthermore, in the bidding documentation, there is limited reference to other governing authorities beyond the state

that contributed to the rationality and technologies connected to young people and sport before the bid, such as YST or OFSTED.

The vague detail in the bidding documentation is compounded by the PSA 22 document released by the Labour Government post the success of London 2012's bid. Rather than the bid committee or organising committee having a specific position in the responsibility of legacy connected to young people, the agreement is formed in the language around the delivery of the current PESSCL strategy, i.e., set to deliver "a sustainable legacy and get more children and young people taking part in high-quality PE [Physical Education]" (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 1). It was in line with the broader governmental rationality of modernization associated with the Labour Government that scholars have attributed a hybrid model of neoliberal governing to a commitment to UK Government responsibility of improving social conditions. I.e., young people accessing high-quality physical education, through public services that are measured through a centralised managerial and performance are governing technologies such as the PSA 22 (Finlayson, 2011; Houlihan and Lindsey, 2012). In contrast, the organising committee and Get Set programme as a private sector body could focus on the brand and time-limited objectives set by the remit of the bid documentation and international sport federations expectations. The brand of LOCOG and the educational programme Get Set was built around the Olympic and Paralympic values, and the self-interest of quantifiably reaching educational institutions and to sign up to the programme, i.e., project-based aspirations that had a clear commercial and project governing rationality. In this dynamic, the initial bid and planning phase, as well as the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim, legitimised the concurrent private and public formations of governing.

The formation of governing in privileging the international sporting federations' interest by the organising committee can be problematised in relation to the 'inspire a generation' legacy aim because the IOC and IPC did not take responsibility for activities beyond the life course or parameters of London 2012. The governmental technologies imposed by the IOC around London 2012, such as trademark rights or the shaping of the organising committee as an independent and private entity, created a regulated system around what could be shared or integrated with existing programmes or objectives. The regulation restricted the non-IOC/IPC connected entities' ability to adapt or influence London 2012

activities around education. Instead, the approach taken by the IOC is more in line with a neoliberal influenced corporate entity that wants to further its market-based interests which are connected to its brand and product. The international sporting federations demonstrate the concept developed by Miller and Rose (1992, p.174) where political power is about creating a “kind of regulated freedom.” It was originally written in relation to citizens and the state. However, in my analysis, the citizen is represented here as the host city and nation, where the international sporting federation can create governing rationalities and technologies around competing and hosting the sport mega event. London 2012 through LOCOG and the Government embraced the regulation and formed alliances around the concept of legacy and education in the target of young people.

The corporate and commercialised technologies of governing used by the IOC and, vicariously through the partnership agreements, by the IPC, further erodes the myth of autonomy (Allison 1986, 1993) and problematises the continued non-political stance taken by the international sporting federations and their respective national committees. However, as the IOC and IPC are gatekeepers to engaging, hosting and competing at the largest able-bodied and disabled-bodied sporting events in the world, there are limited authorities that question the “Olympic affairs” (MacAloon, 2008, p. 2069). London and the UK governing authorities are complicit in this dynamic. This was most notable in the Parliamentary inquiries post-London 2012 by the House of Lords’ Olympic and Paralympic Legacy Committee and House of Commons’ Education Committee. In which representatives from LOCOG, IOC, IPC, BOA or BPA are not featured significantly in evidence sessions or held accountable for explaining and evidencing their roles across the life course of London 2012. Where there was a submission of evidence, it was based on extracts of the LOCOG (2013) legacy story. It offered an overtly positive and descriptive assessment of the Get Set programme and strong political and commercial support (HoC, Vol III, 2013c). In essence, these reports have not provided a sufficiently critical insight, instead reflected the dominant attitude to the Olympics and IOC.

The impact of the restricted ownership and regulated freedom connected to the Olympic and Paralympic brand and activities are twofold. Firstly, there is vulnerability to legacy and activities connected to the UK Government and state authorities. This vulnerability was explicitly demonstrated in the change in political and economic context around the

2008 financial crisis and the change in UK Government in 2010. The subsequent reconfiguring of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim by the Coalition Government was symbolical, through the language in revised legacy documents. Then, tangibly, through changes in governing technologies, i.e., funding and structure of sport connected to young people disrupted the governing of legacy (DCMS, 2010b; DCMS and OfDI, 2011). This evidence counters the idea that all the London 2012 delivery was bi-partisan and agreed across UK Government departments. Scholars and policymakers should further explore the contrast and reconfiguring of legacy around young people as a cautionary example of aiming to achieve a broader societal goal by a state entity through a sporting event. Specific attention needs to be paid to the multiple sources of political power in the state entity which do not necessarily work together or with the same political rationalities and/or governing technologies.

In the empirical evidence I presented along with other scholarship (e.g., Bloyce and Lovett, 2012; Armour and Griffiths, 2013), governing actors and reports suggested that there was inclusivity and embedded governing concerning bidding between the bid committee and the UK Government. What my analysis has shown is that governing actors problematised the lack of clarity and vulnerability of governing around legacy throughout the life course. The language of legacy and young people may have been in the mainstream at a macro-level political rationality. Still, the governing technologies in the Labour and Coalition Government did not achieve translating meso- or micro-levels of governing technologies into a legacy framework. Modernization and localism political rationalities are based on individualised and performance outcomes. In contrast, the visionary ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim created a governing ambition where momentum or capitalisation of a sport mega-event could lead to collective and aspirational outcomes. Examples, where such aspirational national outcomes were evidenced in my empirical findings, were based in the regulated governing of the LOCOG activities, such as the continuation and proliferation of the Get Set network.

Secondly and connected to regulated governing, there is the protection of the Get Set programme and its ability to be sustained beyond London 2012 by the BOA and BPA. During the changes in political and economic context, the Get Set programme governed by LOCOG was not significantly affected or reconfigured. This dynamic raises questions

to the embedded nature of the Get Set programme and the interest of the Olympic and Paralympic governing actors to move beyond delivering a product and programme. Moreover, the focus is on measurable and positive outputs outcomes, and this was explicitly demonstrated in the dissemination of information by LOCOG, IOC and other Olympic and Paralympic authorities in the success and strength of the Get Set programme post-London 2012. From a governing perspective, this promoted an uncritical collection and dissemination of information. In the broader debate around legacy and London 2012 (e.g., Girginov, 2011, Preuss, 2007; 2015, Leopkey and Parent, 2015, 2017), it is accepted that there are levels of interdependence between governing actors. In my findings and discussion, this is not interdependence and balance per se but should be considered as a lack of scepticism and reluctance to challenge certain actors as they are gatekeepers to brands and/or to funding.

The reflection here was further corroborated by governing actors' perspectives as there was a recognition of the power of LOCOG to influence the ambitions and technologies directly related to the London 2012 'inspire a generation' legacy aim. For example, perspectives illustrated the benefit of being a private sector body, with connections to Government departments, and power to attract staff and funding positions for the organising committee. The role of LOCOG and the Get Set educational programme needs to be positioned at the meso-level as a corporate and private partner in delivering and pushing governmental ambitions and political rationalities into schools to target young people. The interconnection to legacy is part of the managerial discourse discussed by MacAloon (2008) and as my empirical findings have demonstrated does not include a sufficient degree of criticality or engagement with the macro-political context or other meso-level governing actors, such as YST. Broader political changes directly impacted them.

LOCOG, the BOA and the BPA are part of the governing systems of children and young people, but they fostered restrictions and regulations to partnerships and engagement with the Get Set programme. This rationality is influenced by neoliberal discourses, where the market and delivery in the short term can be privileged above long-term critical discussion about the governing of young people through sport. In my findings, the political rationality of Olympic and Paralympic actors expressed a vested interest in accessing

young people, not in young people. In this sense, the non-political and autonomous position of the BOA and BPA should be re-evaluated, and discussions formed in analysing them as organisations with a similar rationality to national governing bodies of sport or as corporate intermediaries. The brand and sponsors of the Olympic and Paralympic movement should be visible in the debate about the rationalities and effectiveness of the sport programmes directed at young people, such as public inquiries, and national or local policies.

The relationships between the public, private, and civic organisations were a functionality of governing young people through sport and education in the UK during the London 2012 life course. The Get Set network and organisations such as YST and Sainsbury's continue to maintain this dynamic. The debate around the regulation of policies connected to young people and sport need to consider the checks and balances of the continued neoliberal dynamic of public, private and civic organisations. Corporate support and commercial partners emerged as a successful governing strategy by LOCOG and by the Labour then Coalition Government using partners such as Aldi and Sainsbury's. The theoretical point here is to view the relationships and effects of legacy as part of governing and discursively as governing actors influencing a governmentalization of regulation. The repositioning of the state and Government into an expanded understanding of governmentality means that an analysis considers other governing actors who have vested interests or issues. The relationship between the state, market and non-profit organisations is a functionality of the sport and education in the UK, the Get Set network perpetuated this and organisations, such as YST or Sainsbury's have a vested interest in maintaining this dynamic. The debate around the regulation of policies connected to young people and sport need to consider research questions around the checks and balances of the continued neoliberal dynamic of public, private and non-profit organisations in this policy area.

9.2.2 Legitimising the Paralympics(?)

A distinctive point of intersection between legacy and policy from London 2012 was the Paralympic, and disability aspects of the Get Set programme. For example, LOCOG and the DCMS are cited as being directive in including the Paralympic Values and making the School Games inclusive for young people with disabilities. Before the bidding for

London 2012, the documents and dialogue around children with disabilities and the Paralympic movement or legacy for disabled people were not consistently visible in policy discourses. The political rationalities and governing technologies discussed in the Major Conservative Government and early Blair Labour Government are predominantly able-bodied and Olympic centred. Beyond policy discourses, it is also documented in academic literature and my literature review that legacy discussions have been historically legitimised through Olympic language and able-bodied understandings of young people (Misener et al., 2013; Legg et al., 2015; Pappous and Brown, 2018). Moving this debate forward, my findings have presented that from the bidding phase through to the legacy life course of the ‘inspire a generation’ aim, London 2012 governing actors’ have shifted in their perspectives and inclusion of the Paralympics and disabled young people.

The depth, in my understanding, focuses on how the theory of ableism is to highlight inequalities in power and dominance. For example, in Chapters Five and Six the governing connected to able-bodied and Paralympics discourses interconnect through a rupturing of ableist discourses in governmental ambitions and political rationalities. The theory and debate connected to ableism allowed me to synthesise and include aspects of the policy and legacy connected to disabled young people and the Paralympics. In doing so, it became clear that the Get Set programme and ‘inspire a generation’ legacy are important points of intersection between state (e.g., DCMS), commercial (e.g., Sainsbury’s), and not-for-profit (e.g., LOCOG) could promote and capitalise on the rise in visibility and importance of inclusion and disability. Governing actors in documents, dialogue, and my interviews articulated the opportunities and limitations that connect to using ableist discourses to navigate and negotiate the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy during the London 2012 life-course. I will reflect on this further below through a series of examples from my findings and discussion.

As part of the international sporting federation context, London 2012 was one of the first cities to embrace and enact the ‘one bid, one city’ approach. Concerning the governing of young people, this explicitly translated into the Get Set programme and the parity of visibility and promotion of the Olympic and Paralympic values. In varying documents, dialogues and interview quotations, my data showed the integration was intended and an

opportunity to challenge societal perceptions and language around impairment. In relation to international sports federations, the rebalancing of power during this stage of the London 2012 life course was the inclusion of Theme 17 (the Paralympics) and a bid committee needing to account for its activities explicitly and aims around the Paralympic Games. The inclusion of Theme 17 in the bid documentation is a notable change in governing technologies around the scope of authority and visibility of the IPC and the BPA.

Before London 2012, empirical evidence and academic debates connected to Olympic educational programmes and the Paralympic legacy displayed the inferiority or homogeneity of the Olympic and Paralympic legacy (Gilbert and Legg, 2011a; Legg et al., 2015; Kerr, 2018). My thesis shows a growing legitimacy and distinction to Paralympic legacy in the broader context of disability rights in the UK, for example, the formation and inclusion of the Office for Disability Issues in co-authoring the London 2012 legacy documents. However, the growing legitimacy and visibility in Government and the Get Set programme did not directly translate into continuity in policy-based governing technologies around disabled young people. Moreover, the extent to the influence of the Paralympic aspect in the Get Set governing actors contest programme and into policy associated with young people and sport.

The language and objectives coiled the empirical moments I highlighted in my genealogical analysis in the policies produced by the Labour and Coalition Government. For example, there was disconnect in the bid documentation which referred to the opportunity for including Paralympic materials alongside Olympic materials in the education programme. Rather than developing and engaging with the Paralympic movement, plans outlined in Theme 17 of the PSA 22 document reduced the policy extension to more “sporting opportunities for children and young people with disabilities and special educational needs” (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 14). It was not until 2009 and 2010 that the DCSF (2009a, 2009b, 2009c) and DCMS and OfDI (2010) substantively engaged with opportunities of the Olympic and Paralympic values. Moreover, there is an acknowledgement of the purpose of including the Paralympic movement as the DCMS and OfDI (2010, p.20) document explicitly stated that the programmes directed at children and young people were to “help change attitudes and perceptions, and help the

shift away from the medical towards the social model of disability.” This shift in attitudes was proposed to be achieved in the education sector through the *Every Child Matters* outcomes and non-sport arm’s length bodies, such as the Qualifications and Curriculum Development Agency.

In line with the discussion points in Chapters Seven and Eight, the Labour Government funding and shaping of systems around young people was disrupted with the change of Government in 2010. The *Every Child Matters* approach and the Qualifications and Curriculum Agency were reviewed, reformed and abolished. Consequently, the Coalition Government DfE did not continue the work of the DCSF through separate publications or website presence. Instead, programmes and efforts were channelled through the revised legacy documents (DCMS, 2010b; DCMS and OfDI, 2011; DCMS, 2012c). Moreover, the research commissioned under the Labour Government through the DCSF to evaluate the role of young people in legacy activities and impact of Get Set, including the Paralympics and disability (DCSF, 2008; DfE, 2011) were not used in the public inquiries. Neither were used in Coalition Government legacy evaluation documents to enrich the understanding of the growth in visibility and debate around disability and the Paralympics. Instead, the focus post-London 2012 was on the substantial participation and opportunity of disabled young people, rather than the intangible changes to perceptions or challenges faced by disabled young people.

In my thesis, I analysed this with ableism discourses and how the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim, Get Set programme and subsequent statements about the School Games and other activities around the Paralympics and young people demonstrate a richer and more complex effect. For example, governing actors’ in the interviews and political dialogue differed in the interpretation of how the Paralympics legacy translated into the meso-level and micro-level rationalities and governing technologies. On the one hand, some of the interviewees viewed the effect of the Paralympics as introducing a common language, unusual and step change in parity of the Paralympics in the organising committee, differentiation between Olympic and Paralympic legacies, transforming perceptions, paradigm shift and a great legacy. Yet, beyond the organising committee and broader understandings of legacy other responses and reflections yielded high levels of scepticism towards the connection between perceived Paralympic legacy’s actual rupturing of ableist

discourses in broader society and non-sport issues for disabled young people, such as lived experiences in mainstream education.

In this context, the role of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim was to target young people, and the Get Set programme to challenge the previous ableist political rationalities where able-bodied and Olympic overtones had overshadowed young people and legacy. However, I would argue that the challenge, expressed through London 2012, to ableist political rationalities, does not translate into definitive or absolute rupturing of ableist governmental technologies. A notable example in Chapter Eight was the intersection of private and commercial actors in capitalising and contributing to governing technologies and the Paralympic aspect of the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim. The role of Sainsbury’s in conjunction with the BPA, YST and Activity Alliance has funded and disseminated programmes connected to inclusion and young people. Moreover, the BPA has continued its work through the Spirit of 2012 endowment fund, and further iterations of the Get Set programme. As per my findings, the visibility and legitimisation of the Paralympic Games, in being prominent in the Get Set programme and through other private actors, has affected the political rationalities and governing technologies connected to disabled young people and sport. What this should not be extended or extrapolated to is the lived experiences of disabled young people, the infrastructure of para-sport in the community or a consensus on how disabled people should be perceived. My findings represent a rupturing of governing as the Paralympics has grown in legitimacy concerning young people, however, this is not a definitive change to all levels or aspects of governing.

9.3 Methodological reflections and limitations

Throughout my thesis, I have referenced that in Chapter Nine, I would reflect on my research design as well as the limitations of my thesis. The first point to address is my advocacy of a poststructuralist and Foucauldian critical ontological stance and the intellectual-political-context (Dean, 2018). Since embarking on my thesis in 2015, the British political landscape has experienced extensive transformation and challenges. There have been three UK general elections, re-emerging debates around the 2014 Scottish independence referendum and controversies of 2016 European Union

membership referendum. The extensive political commentary in the media, professional and personal contexts has been influencing the positioning my thesis. As noted in Chapter Four, my positionality has been influenced by the specific findings (e.g., challenging my own bias around the Paralympics), but this has also been compounded by my navigation of current, turbulent UK politics. One positive reflection on this intellectual-political-context is proactive in how my thesis connects to contemporary political and academic debates. As described in Appendix 2, I have disseminated and discussed my thesis with academic and policymaker audiences. Although I advocate for symbolic and constructed understandings of reality, my thesis reflects and navigates the everyday realities of studying politics in the UK during politically turbulent times.

As acknowledged in Chapter One, the focus of the thesis was the UK Government. During data collection and analysis, there were challenges as to how to include or acknowledge the other home nations in the governing of legacy and policy. This challenge is not uncommon in UK sport policy commentaries as there are complex national identities and devolved Government systems within Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales (Jefferys, 2016). I do not think it impacted on the claims I made in the findings and analysis of my thesis as I gained depth regarding an English perspective about physical education and school sport policy. Still, I must acknowledge that my thesis does not represent the policy contexts of the other home nations and their connections to the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim. This dynamic is an opportunity for further research and debate around the devolved political rationalities and governing technologies interconnected through young people and sport as well as the growing significance of separate national identities within the UK context.

As acknowledged in Chapter Four, through my methodological underpinnings, the data I collected does not objectively or systematically include all governing actors, all pieces of artefacts about policy or recorded dialogue around London 2012 and the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim (illustrated by Figure 9.1a and 9.1b, p. 207 and p. 208). For example, I did not systematically include all UK Government department documents and perspectives, media commentary, or non-Governmental and non-LOCOG London 2012 based documents (such as the DCMS 2015 Conservative Government *Sporting Futures* policy). An opportunity for further study would be to extend my approach into future

policy documents, plus other realms of governing, such as the media commentary around the ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim or local Government perspectives. Although a limitation to my thesis, given the broad understanding of governing I created with my theoretical framework, it is an opportunity for other researchers to analyse those sources of data to add to the richness of my findings.

The data sources I selected and collected for my thesis using targeted and opportunistic (see (illustrated by Figure 9.1a, p. 207; plus, Appendix 1 for an overview and Chapter Four for further detail) reflect a challenge for bringing together academic debate and literature related to young people, education and sport. From an Olympic and Paralympic perspective educational programmes, as argued by Chatziefstathiou (2012a), are too often confined to looking at physical education or school-based programmes. To an extent, my thesis did limit data collection and analysis to the Get Set programme and the school system. However, as reflected in my triangulation and intersection of policy in the UK, there is a clear need to further differentiate between school sport, physical education, and youth sports systems. The differentiation will be valuable for Olympic and Paralympic education scholars as it will assist in a more nuanced contextualisation of the role of legacy discourses, the state and commercial partners in trying to access young people through event educational programmes.

9.4 Contribution to knowledge and implications

My thesis has attempted to be inter-disciplinary and bring together discussions and debates about the London 2012 ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim. The debates intersected with LOCOG governing activities (i.e., Get Set Olympic and Paralympic education programme), UK Government activities (i.e., policies and statements related to young people, sport, education and legacy) and governing actor perspective’s on policy mentioned above and legacy. Informed by my analytical and methodological reflections, and thesis limitations, I propose several contributions to knowledge and implications for the scholarly community and governing actors.

I would argue that my theoretical and methodological approaches explained in this thesis make an original contribution to the academic study of the intersections between legacy and policy. My thesis, in particular, has brought together established debates around

Olympic and Paralympic legacy and ‘how to measure’ (e.g., Bullough, 2012; Devine, 2013; Leopkey and Parent, 2015, 2017) Olympic education and ‘who benefits’ from (e.g., Lenskyj, 2012; Coburn and McCafferty, 2016; Kohe and Chatziefstathiou, 2017) the ‘status of’ school sport and physical education policy in the UK (e.g. Philpotts, 2013; Mackintosh and Liddle, 2015; Lindsey, 2020). My thesis also contributes to increasing the visibility of disability and Paralympic legacy (e.g., Misener et al. 2013; Legg et al. 2015; Brittain and Beacom, 2018) within academic research.

In bringing together the varying academic debates, my thesis contributes to raising further, critical discussion points around neoliberalism and ableism discourses. I achieved this by examining the political rationality for including young people in policy or legacy governing technologies, e.g., funding guidelines, programmes, initiatives, policy statements. In the neoliberal discourses of policy and legacy, governing actors are often referred to as complex, multiple stakeholders, and policies are based on corporate influenced infrastructures. To better interrogate and articulate interconnections around governing young people, there needs to be consensus, acknowledgement and detailed sophistication on the scope of public, private and non-profit governing actors. For example, the upcoming 2022 Commonwealth Games in Birmingham against the context of policy changes around young people as the DfE “School Sports Action Plan” (2019) will arguably “strengthen the existing links to the sport sector and major event such as the Commonwealth Games 2022.” My thesis has demonstrated that it is problematic to homogenise the ‘sport sector’ and event organisers need to differentiate between public, private and non-profit interests. This differentiation is not to problematise the inclusion of multiple interests, but instead to present a more nuanced appreciation for different organisations within the sports sector or major events which seek to engage with young people as part of both the planning and legacy processes.

My thesis further develops arguments made by of Allison (1986, 1993), Sugden and Tomlinson (2013), Horne (2013) regarding meaning-making, vested interests and interconnections, which should be part of forming partnerships around young people concerning policy and legacy programmes at a macro-level. How this then translates into governing technologies, enacted and interpreted in the meso-level and micro-level will still vary contextually by governing actors. Beyond sports initiatives are emerging in

other areas of research, for example, the British Academy is funding and disseminating research around *Principles for Purposeful Business* and the *Future of the Corporation* (British Academy, 2019). The purpose of this funding stream is to reformulate relationships between society and businesses and rethink notions of capitalism in direct relation to society. I think this is a productive pursuit, and one that should also include state organisations as the relationship between businesses and society is interconnected to state rationalities and technologies.

Further to notions of productive interconnections regarding self-identified non-political organisations, there needs to be a better articulation as to how such organisations (e.g. YST, Spirit of 2012, BOA, BPA, Sainsbury's) view their involvement in political rationalities and governing technologies of young people. This point does not mean that organisations need to be necessarily aligned to a particular political party or agree with governing practices, e.g., definitions of young people or formations of legacy. I advocate for a shift from simply viewing organisations as stakeholders in meso-level governing, into an understanding of how governing actors promote varying macro-level governmental ambitions that translate into meso-level and micro-level political rationalities and governing technologies. For example, the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Fit and Healthy Childhood were formed post-London 2012 who seek to influence Parliament and UK Government through charitable, corporate, and individual interests (APPG FHC, 2014). Granted there are questions about how such groups to influence or lever political rationalities and governmental technologies, but the presence and function of the group is a productive example of bringing governing actors into a more consistent dialogue about macro-level governing around young people.

Finally, my thesis has emphasised the position of young people as a governable population, especially about the Paralympics, ableism discourses, and the visibility of disability. While the thesis is aligned to London 2012, young people and the educational legacy aspect, it is contended that a similar approach could be replicated for considering other sport mega-event contexts. Although the discourses in other event contexts may not be tied to 'inspiring a generation' legacy aims or the same policy systems, there are further opportunities to consider governing aimed at broader societal aims connected to young people. Such endeavour is encouraged as this will build more empirical evidence and

theoretical debate around the role of international sporting federations, such as FIFA, the Commonwealth Games, the Asian Games, IOC, IPC, or the Invictus Games, in targeting young people. A contribution and implication of my thesis is that such research needs to account for the formation of young people at the macro-level, meso-level, and micro-level of governing. London 2012 attempted to put young people at the heart of the Games, I advocate for this sentiment in future research themes as more researchers around legacy and policy should put young people at the heart of questions and debate.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Summary of the theoretical framework and research design

Data Source	Procedure	Sample	Theoretical connection	Analytical process
Academic materials	Contextualisation and literature review	Collected academic sources around policy, legacy and education (see Chapter Three)	Informed the distinctive governing discourses (neoliberalism and ableism)	Inform the data collection and enrich data analysis.
Documentary evidence	Genealogical documentary analysis of policy and legacy governing.	Collected Government, Olympic, Paralympic, LOCOG based sources (see Appendix 7)	Governmentality, with a focus on: 1. Formation of governing 2. Distinctive governing discourses 3. Practices of governing	Genealogical approach: considering the context (produced legacy and policy diagrams, and literature review), identify and consider the political rationalities and government technologies. I revisited documents throughout as the dialogue and interview data triangulated with the initial documentary evidence.
Political and policy dialogue	Foucauldian discourse analysis	Collected in person and digital artefacts that contained dialogue connected to the London 2012 legacy and ongoing policy around young people and sport (see Appendix 7)	Governmentality, with a focus on: 4. Layers of governing	Triangulation of the official verbatim transcripts and digital sources. Notable extracts in forum debates connected to London 2012 ‘inspire a generation’ legacy aim was extracted and collated.

<p>Semi-structured interviews</p>	<p>Foucauldian discourse analysis</p>	<p>Interviewed 12 individuals through opportunistic sampling with individuals connected with London 2012, sport or education policy since the early 2000s (see Appendix 7)</p>	<p>Governmentality, with a focus on: 4. Layers of governing</p>	<p>Triangulation of the audio-recordings and verbatim transcribed quotes. Notable extracts in the interviews connected to neoliberal and ableism discourses.</p>
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Appendix 2: Examples of research dissemination

Further research and public engagement projects:

March – July 2019, Pre/post-doctoral Fellowship, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. In partnership with Tooin University of Yokohama and University Worcester to develop research, teaching and impact opportunities around sport policy, sport mega-events and disability. Project title: An analysis of the policymaking process for disability sport in Japan and the United Kingdom: 2012 – 2020.

Contributed to: 2017/18 internally funded foundation research report ‘Why are we failing our children?’ (<https://www.sportandrecreation.org.uk/policy/research-publications/why-are-we-failing-our-children>); ‘Why are we failing our children?’ a panel presentation and discussion, Sport and Recreation Alliance Sport Summit, QEII Centre London, July 2018

Conference presentations and publications:

Postlethwaite, V., G.Z. Kohe and G. Molnar. (2019) ‘Inspiring a Generation: An examination of stakeholder relations in the context of London 2012 Olympics and Paralympics educational programmes’ *Managing Sport & Leisure*. SI: Creating and Managing a Sustainable Sporting Future, 23(4-6).

Postlethwaite, V. (2018) ‘The Entanglement of Legacy from London 2012: Paralympic and Olympic reflections around the ‘Inspire a Generation’ aim,’ North American Society for the Sociology of Sport, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 31st October – 3rd November.

Postlethwaite, V. (2018) ‘Legacy, Education and Impact: Reflections on Practice Based Research,’ UK Sport Development Network, at Hartpury University Centre, 3rd July 2017.

Postlethwaite, V. (2017) ‘Key Stakeholders in the Physical Activity Debate: A Focus on the Education Sector,’ UK Sport Development Network, at Plymouth Marjon University, 17th November 2017.

Postlethwaite, V. (2017) ‘London 2012 Olympics and Paralympics Legacy: did hosting affect the conception of sport policy in the education sector?’ Carnival Research Conference, Coventry University, 9th November 2017.

Postlethwaite, V. (2017) ‘Legacy of Olympic Literature: London 2012 and Narratives from Academic Debate,’ the British Society of Sports History Annual Conference, University of Worcester, 31st August 2017.

Postlethwaite, V. (2016) [Poster] ‘The Mechanics of Inspiring a Generation’, 5th International Conference on Qualitative Research in Sport and Exercise, at University of Chichester, 30th August- 1st September 2016.

Appendix 3: Abridged chronology of Foucault

Original work (date and title)	Versions used in this thesis (published data and publisher, plus any relevant additional details)	Components considered in this thesis
1961 – <i>Madness and Civilization: a history of insanity in the Age of Reason</i>	2001 – Routledge	Examination of ideas, practices, institutions, art and literature relating to madness and Western history.
1963 – <i>Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception</i>	1989 - Routledge	The text traced the development of the medical profession and the institution of the clinic during the 19 th century.
1966- <i>The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences</i>	1974 – Routledge	Central claim that all periods of history possessed certain underlying conditions of truth (discourse) that constituted what was acceptable and changed over time.
1969 – <i>The Archaeology of Knowledge</i>	1989 - Routledge	Discussed the methodology and role of discursive practices in developing systems and changes through history.
1972- 77 - <i>Power/knowledge</i>	1980 – Harvester (extracts in edited collection <i>Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-77</i>)	Introduced and discussed the transitions between archaeology and genealogy, moreover, how this reconfigures power/knowledge in approach and debate.
1975 – <i>Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison</i>	1991 – Penguin Social Sciences	Traced the changes around punishment in French Society. Developed the power/knowledge of visibility, introduced the Panopticon and surveillance as technologies of punishment.
1977-78 - <i>Security, territory and population</i>	1994 – The New Press (extracts from essential works in the edited collection <i>Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth, 1954-1984</i>)	The text developed of the idea that political knowledge was the focal point of conceptualising a population, then mechanisms to regulate a population.

1978 – <i>Governmentality</i>	1991 –Harvester Wheatsheaf (extracts from lecture course in the edited collection in <i>The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality</i>)	Examination of the role of governing in society and populations the role and status of the state in twentieth century politics.
1978-79 <i>The birth of biopolitics</i> (Lecture course at the College de France)	1994 – The New Press (extracts from essential works in the edited collection <i>Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth, 1954-1984</i>)	The text considers varying contemporary interpretations of liberalism and neoliberalism, e.g. American neoliberalism and German ordoliberalism.
1984 – death		

Compiled and referenced using: Foucault, 1974, 1980, 1989a, 1989b, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1994a, 2994b, 2001)

[N.B. it is noted this table is not comprehensive and other Foucault texts and lectures have been published and used by scholars]

Appendix 4: Abridged philosophical underpinnings

Paradigms	Positivism	Critical Realism/ Postpositivism	Interpretivism/ Constructivism/Idealism
Ontology	Foundationalism/ Objectivism	Foundationalism/ Objectivism	Anti-Foundationalism/ Constructionism
Epistemology	Positivism Scientific and observable-phenomena is directly observable	Realism Scientific and subjectivist- phenomena are not directly observable	Interpretivism Hermeneutic and subjectivist- phenomena is not directly observable
Research Process	Generate hypothesis which can be tested and falsified	Models are hypothetical descriptions which may reveal underlying mechanisms of reality	Development of accounts to what is the most likely inference from a set of observations
Role of Theory	Theory testing, produce generalisations and explanation	Theory testing, construct a hypothetical of a mechanism	Various: reconstruction, hermeneutic, social criticism, no grand narratives, sets of meanings used to make sense of their world.
Types of Data	Quantitative privileged	Quantitative and qualitative	Qualitative privileged
Examples from relevant literature around London 2012	UEL Olympic Game Impact Study: Pre- Games Study (2010), Games-time study (2012) and Post-Games study (2015) A study to collect quantifiable data and measure the impact of hosting an Olympic Games.	Chen and Henry (2016) A regional case study approach using a Realist Evaluation framework to seek causal mechanisms that produce observed outcomes and evaluate programmes.	Bretherton et al. (2016) An examination of policy targets from hosting and Olympic Games, using the analytical framework of governmentality to discuss constructions and themes around pre-event legacy.

Compiled using: Maguire and Young (2002), Given (2008), Savin-Baden and Howell Major (2013), Smith and Sparkes (2016), and Bryman (2016)

[N.B. it is noted this table is not comprehensive and other text and terminology are used by scholars]

Appendix 5: Ethical procedure: Cover letter



Date

Dear Example,

Thank you for expressing an interest to contribute to the PhD project titled:

A quest to inspire a generation (?): A historical evaluation of education based central government policy and Olympic legacies from 2002 to the post London 2012 era.

I am writing to clarify that the data, document and information you will be sharing with the research student, Verity Postlethwaite, is in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. All data collected will be stored confidentially and securely, with the right to withdraw at any point.

The main aims of this project are:

Aim 1- To identify, map and interrogate the varying policies that constructed educational based legacy programmes through hosting the London 2012 Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games, between bidding (2002), hosting the sport mega event (2012) and potential legacy (up to present day).

Aim 2- To map and evaluate key stakeholders' experiences as related to the formation, process and execution of educational based legacy programmes from London 2012 Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games (2002- present day).

The data will be collected through document, database and policy analysis; then semi-structured interviews. All data exchange will be conducted with informed consent and if you or your organisation share information it will be done within procedure of the University of Worcester ethics and data management policies. In responding to this letter, you will be asked to confirm that you have the right to share data, and will be satisfied to discuss in what form it can be exchanged.

The participation in this project is completely voluntary. However, with the design the researcher intends to develop a way to disseminate and share the results to both academic and practitioner communities. A benefit of contributing will be directly offering data for enriching the achievement of the research aims, but also the potential knowledge transfer to yourself and your organisation when the project has been completed.

Best wishes,

Verity Postlethwaite
PhD Candidate, University of Worcester

Appendix 6: Ethical procedure: Information sheet and consent form



Participant Information Sheet -

Project Title: A quest to inspire a generation (?): A historical evaluation of education based central government policy and Olympic legacies from 2002 to the post London 2012 era.

Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read all the information in this document, then please consider whether you wish to take part. Participation in this study is completely voluntary. If you decide to take part, you will be asked to sign the attached participant consent form. If you decide that you do not wish to participate, then please hand the document back to the researcher. Regardless of your decision, thank you for your time.

What are the aims of the project?

Aim 1- To identify, map and interrogate the varying policies that constructed educational based legacy programmes through hosting the London 2012 Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games, between bidding (2002), hosting the sport mega event (2012) and potential legacy (up to present day).

Aim 2- To map and evaluate key stakeholders' experiences as related to the formation, process and execution of educational based legacy programmes from London 2012 Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games (2002- present day).

What will you be asked to do?

Procedures

If you agree to take in this study, you will participate in a semi-structured interview. The interview will be designed to ask you open ended questions that involve your current and past experiences of policy formation, process and execution around the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. This interview does not have a specified time, but should take no longer than 90 minutes. It will be conducted in a private space, and a digital recording will be made for retrospective transcription.

Risks, discomfort and the right to withdraw

The interview will ask about the participant's personal experience, as this could involve their current or past colleagues or employers; all data will be anonymised. The transcription and write up will refer to the participant under a code and pseudonyms. If at any point during the interview or in retrospective reading of the thesis, participants feel uncomfortable and wishes to withdraw, then they will be free to do so as they have the right to withdraw at any point.

Benefits

In participating in this study, you will be contributing to a unique study that is collecting data and developing a theoretical framework to understand the policy space created by hosting London 2012 and sport/physical activity in the education domain. The data will contribute both to this PhD, and future research projects as this data will be available for future use. In line with the University of Worcester ethical procedure the data will be kept confidentially and securely. There will, as a result of this project be dissemination to both academic and practitioner based outlets. These will look to benefit both the research community and wider societal stakeholders. Prior to submitting this thesis you will be contacted with the presentation of your data so that at any point you can withdraw.

What information will be collected, and how will it be used?

No personal data is collected as part of the interview, it will be your personal experiences and opinions on the questions asked. This is part of a wider interview process, once a number of interviews have been conducted this data will be collated, coded and analysed as part of the discussion in the thesis. The data will not be profiled or attributed to individuals or organisations; the intention is instead to map experiences and how key stakeholders' experiences can complement the wider aim of understanding a complex policy space.

Should you require further information please do not hesitate to contact the investigator, Verity Postlethwaite (v.postlethwaite@worc.ac.uk).

If you have concerns about any aspect of this study you should ask to speak to the researcher(s) who will do their best to answer your questions. However, if you have further concerns and wish to complain formally about any aspect of or about the way you have been treated during the study, you may contact Dr John-Paul Wilson (j.wilson@worc.ac.uk) Deputy Pro Vice Chancellor of Research, University of Worcester.

Participant consent form

Project Title: A quest to inspire a generation (?): A historical evaluation of education based central government policy and Olympic legacies from 2002 to the post London 2012 era.

Please read this form, initial each statement below if you have no objections, and sign it once the investigator has fully explained the aims and procedures of the study to you.

- I voluntarily agree to take part in this study.
- I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give a reason for withdrawing.
- I understand that information about me recorded during the study will be kept in a secure database. If data is transferred to others it will be made anonymous.
- I authorise the investigators to disclose the results of my participation in the study but not my name.
- I confirm that I have been given a full explanation by the investigators and that I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet given to me. I am aware of any possible risks or discomfort.

I agree to inform the researcher immediately if I feel uncomfortable during the study.

I have been given the opportunity to ask questions on all aspects of the study and to discuss the study with the investigators, and I have understood the advice and information given as a result.

I understand that I can ask for further information or explanations at any time.

I understand that I will not receive any money for taking part in this study.

Name (participant):

Date:

Signature:

To be completed by the Investigator:

The above named participant has been informed of the protocol and procedures for the above study and has received a copy of the Participant Information Sheet.

Name (investigator):

Date:

Signature:

Appendix 7: Methodological procedure: Data collection tables

A.7.1 Documentary evidence¹⁴

	Title of report, document or statement	Author	Date Published	Status
1.	London 2012 bid documentation	London 2012 bid committee (then LOCOG owned)	November 2004	Publicly accessible, official, candidate file
2.	Report of the IOC Evaluation Commission for the Games of the XXX Olympiad in 2012.	International Olympic Committee	March,2005	Publicly accessible, official, evaluation document
3.	Public Service Agreement, Delivery Agreement 22: Deliver a successful Olympic Games and Paralympic Games with a sustainable legacy and get more children and young people taking part in high quality PE and sport.	HM Treasury	2007	Publicly accessible, official, agreement document
4.	Before, during and after: making the most of the London 2012 Games	Department for culture, media and sport	June 2007 June 2008	Publicly accessible, official, policy document

¹⁴ Documents listed here are the main primary sources used for analysis, other documentary evidence used in discussion chapters to supplement and further illustrate analytical and empirical points are listed in the reference list.

5.	Playing to win: A New Era for Sport	Department for culture, media and sport	June 2008	Publicly accessible, official, policy document
6.	London 2012 Education Legacy Programme	Department for Children, Schools and Families	2009	Publicly accessible, official, website and documents
7.	London 2012: a legacy for disabled people. Setting new standards, changing perceptions	Department for culture, media and sport, and the Office for Disability Issues	March 2010	Publicly accessible, official policy document
8.	Spending Review 2010	HM Treasury	October 2010	Publicly accessible, official, review document
9.	Letter from Michael Gove to Youth Sport Trust	Department for Education	October 2010	Publicly accessible, policy statement
10.	Plans for the legacy from the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games	Department for culture, media and sport	December 2010	Publicly accessible, official policy document
11.	London 2012: A legacy for disabled people	Department for culture, media and sport, and the Office for Disability Issues	April 2011	Publicly accessible, official policy document
12.	Creating a Sporting Habit for Life: A new youth sport strategy, 2012	Department for culture, media and sport	January 2012a	Publicly accessible, official, policy document

13.	Competitive sport for children at the heart of Olympics Legacy	Prime Minister's Office	August 2012	Publicly accessible, policy statement
14.	Beyond 2012: The London 2012 Legacy Story	Department for culture, media and sport	March 2012b	Publicly accessible, official, policy document
15.	10 Point Sports Legacy Plan	UK Government, announced by the Minister of State, Department for Culture, Media and Sport	September 2012	Publicly accessible, Written Ministerial Statement, Online Hansard based text
16.	Learning Legacy: Lessons learned from planning and staging the London 2012 Games (Education Programme) The Get Set Story: How London 2012 Inspired the UK's Schools	London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games.	2012	Publicly accessible, official, external organisation, evaluation documents
17.	Olympic legacy boost – £150 million for primary school sport in England	Prime Minister's Office	March 2013	Publicly accessible, policy statement
18.	Inspired by 2012: The legacy from the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games (First annual report)	A joint UK Government and Mayor of London report	July 2013	Publicly accessible, official, evaluation document

19.	London 2012 Olympic Games Official Report Volume 1: Summary of the bid preparation – Candidature File; Volume 2: Commemorative Book; Volume 3: Summary of the Olympic Games preparations and Official Olympic Games results).	London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games.	2013	Publicly accessible, official, evaluation document
20.	Final Report of the IOC Coordination Commission	International Olympic Committee	September 2013	Publicly accessible, official, external organisation, evaluation document
21.	Inspired by 2012: The legacy from the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games (Second annual report)	A joint UK Government and Mayor of London report	July 2014	Publicly accessible, official, evaluation document
22.	Inspired by 2012: The legacy from the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games (Third annual report)	A joint UK Government and Mayor of London report	August 2015	Publicly accessible, official, evaluation document
23.	Inspired by 2012: The legacy from the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games (Fourth annual report)	A joint UK Government and Mayor of London report	August 2016	Publicly accessible, official, evaluation document

A.7.2 Political and policy dialogue¹⁵

	Title of event, inquiry or debate	Author	Date Published	Status
1.	<p>Education Committee - School sport following London 2012: No more political football</p> <p>Volume I – Report, together with formal minutes</p> <p>Volume II – Oral and written evidence</p> <p>Volume III – Additional written evidence</p> <p>Third Special Report – Government response</p>	<p>House of Commons: Education Committee</p>	July 2013 (report)	Publicly accessible, parliamentary body, official, committee documents
2.	<p>Committee on Olympic and Paralympic Legacy - Keeping the flame alive: the Olympic and Paralympic Legacy</p> <p>Volume I – Report</p> <p>Volume II – Oral and written evidence</p> <p>Third Special Report – Government and Mayor of London response</p>	House of Lords	November 2013 (report)	Publicly accessible, parliamentary body, official, committee documents

¹⁵ Extracts and dialogue from Hansard, media articles, non-attended events, or secondary reports used in discussion chapters are listed in the reference list.

3.	UK sports policy – funding, participation and strategic priorities	Westminster Media Forum	September 2015	Verbatim private transcript from the event
4.	Policy priorities for school sports in England - participation, quality and the role of schools in encouraging physical activity	Westminster Education Forum	January 2016	Verbatim private transcript from the event
5.	The new strategy for sport in the UK: implementation, participation and investment	Westminster Media Forum	June 2016	Verbatim private transcript from the event
6.	Sport and healthy lifestyles for children - participation, implementing the Childhood Obesity Strategy and the role of schools and local authorities	Westminster Education Forum	September 2016	Verbatim private transcript from the event
7.	Next steps for sport in primary and secondary schools - new funding, the healthy schools rating, and improving the quality of PE	Westminster Education Forum	November 2017	Verbatim private transcript from the event

A.7.3 Interviewee log

	Organisation Type ¹⁶	Interviewee Code	Interview Date	Position/context London 2012 life course (as discussed in the interview and related to their most prominent roles, geographical reach, and type of organisational setting)
1.	Lobby Group (Olympic/Paralympic)	A	August 2017	Senior leader, board member, and manager; national; state and non-for-profit
2.	Lobby Group	B	August 2017	Senior manager, political advisor, and board member; national; not-for-profit
3.	Olympic/Paralympic	C	September 2017	Senior leader and board member; national and international; not-for-profit and commercial
4.	Education Institution	D	November 2017	Senior manager and board member; regional; commercial
5.	Government (Olympic/Paralympic)	E	November 2017	Senior leader and manager; national and international; state
6.	National Governing Body	F	October 2017	Senior leader and manager; national and regional; not-for-profit
7.	Education Charity	G	January 2018	Senior leader and manager; national; not-for-profit
8.	Education Charity/ Consultancy	H	January 2018	Senior leader and manager; regional, national, and international; not-for-profit and commercial
9.	Education Consultant (Olympic/Paralympic)	I	January 2018	Senior leader and manager; regional, national, and international; not-for-profit and commercial
10.	Olympic/Paralympic	J	February 2018	Senior leader and manager; national and international; not-for-profit and commercial
11.	Parliament (Olympic/Paralympic)	K	February 2018	Senior figure and board member; regional, national, and international; state
12.	Parliament (Olympic/Paralympic)	L	April 2018	Senior figure and board member; regional, national, and international; state, not-for-profit, and commercial

¹⁶ In brackets (Olympic/Paralympic) to include direct connections to London 2012 during its life course but not necessarily now part of the current organisation type they work in.

Appendix 8: Methodological procedure: Interview schedule

Semi-structured Interview Schedule

1. **Demographic and Experience Context:** What is your professional background and connection to sport, physical activity, London 2012 or education?
 - Current or previous roles?
 - Direct connection or experience with a particular policy?
 - Involvement or engagement with any policy?

2. **Sector Context:** What are your understandings of the following sectors?
 - Sport and physical activity
 - Education
 - How do they intersect or interact?
 - Have you experienced this in your practice?

3. **Historical Context:** What have been key milestones in changes to your practice or organisation for sport and physical activity since 2002?
 - Role of central government- Department of Culture, Media and Sport, Department of Education
 - Role of other stakeholders- local government, funders, change in staff, change in organisation
 - The change you have witnessed or noticed in policy or governance of your organisation, sport sector as a whole

4. **Engagement with London 2012:** What has (if any) the policy, practice or organisation been influenced by London 2012?

- Policy conception (refer to a specific one where necessary/applicable)
- Policy implementation (refer to a specific one where necessary/applicable)
- Policy enactment (refer to a specific one where necessary/applicable)

5. Inspire a Generation: Interaction between London 2012 and the education sector around the legacy aim ‘inspire a generation’

- Did the legacy aim ‘inspire a generation’ impact on your practice or organisation?
- Could more have been done?
- Is this process on going?
- Have you engaged with the Sport Strategy 2015?
- Does this engagement involve young people, and education?

Appendix 9: Methodological procedure: Analytical tables and diagrams


A.9.1 Timeline of political changes, policy documents and London 2012 legacy milestones

Prime Minister	Dominant Political Party	Years in Power	London 2012 Development	Sport Policies Published	London 2012 Legacy Documents	Additional contextual moments
John Major	Conservative	1990 – 1997	Preliminary work on the bid, informal discussions between the BOA and government	Sport Raising the Game, 1995	BOA and Government scoping studies	1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, Team GB finishes 36 th National Lottery Act, 1993 Royal Charter for Sport England and UK Sport, 1996
Tony Blair	Labour	1997 – 2007	Formal bid preparation and success. Creation of LOCOG and initial Games' preparation	A Sporting Future for All, 2000 Game Plan: A strategy for delivering the Government's sport and physical activity objectives, 2002 Physical Education, School Sport and Club Links Strategy, 2003	London 2012 Candidature File, 2004	2002 inclusion of 'obesity' in sport and health policy 2003 Iraq War 2005 London bombings


				(including Public Service Agreements)		
Gordon Brown	Labour	2007 – 2010	Continued formal Games' preparation	Physical Education and Sport Strategy for Young People, 2008 Playing to win: A New Era for Sport, 2008	Before, during and after: making the most of the London 2012 Games, 2007, 2008 (including Public Service Agreements) The London 2012: a legacy for disabled people. Setting new standards, changing perceptions, 2010	2007/8 Global Financial Crisis, UK economic recession
David Cameron	Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition Conservative	2010 – 2016 <i>2010- 2015 (Coalition)</i> <i>2015 – 2016 (Conservative)</i>	Hosting Games' and post Games' evaluation	Creating a Sporting Habit for Life: A new youth sport strategy, 2012 PM Office announcements (2012, 2013)	Plans for the legacy from the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, 2010 The London 2012: a legacy for disabled people. Setting new	2010/13 Economic austerity programme and reduction of Government deficit and public spending 2016 Brexit referendum

				Sporting Future: A new strategy for an active nation, 2015	standards, changing perceptions, 2011 Beyond 2012: The London 2012 Legacy Story, 2012	
Theresa May	Conservative	2016 –2019	Continued engagement with legacy of the Games'		Evaluation of the legacy from 2012, and continued funding of initiatives	2019 Motion of no confidence in HoC against May


Original, as seen in “Figure 1. Selected factors influencing domestic sport policy” (source: Houlihan 2016, p.56) and above Chapter Three, Figure 3.8




Labour Government 2004-2010 Young people, education, and sport policy



Coalition Government 2010-2015 Young people, education, and sport policy



Labour Government 2004-2010 'inspire a Generation' legacy aim



Coalition Government (and Conservative Government) 2010-2016 ‘inspire a Generation’ legacy aim

